scholarly journals NETWORK DEPENDENCE OF STRONG RECIPROCITY

2004 ◽  
Vol 07 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 357-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. VILELA MENDES
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Intergroup Dynamics ◽  
Network Parameter ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Strong Reciprocity ◽  
Equilibrium Behavior ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Evolution Dynamics ◽  
Human Trait

Experimental evidence suggests that human decisions involve a mixture of self-interest and internalized social norms which cannot be accounted for by the Nash equilibrium behavior of Homo Economicus. This led to the notion of strong reciprocity (or altruistic punishment) to capture the human trait leading an individual to punish norm violators at a cost to himself. For a population with small autonomous groups with collective monitoring, the interplay of intra- and intergroup dynamics shows this to be an adaptive trait, although not fully invasive of a selfish population. However, the absence of collective monitoring in a larger society changes the evolution dynamics. Clustering seems to be the network parameter that controls maintenance and evolution of the reciprocator trait.

Cooperative Homo economicus

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
The Self ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Game Theoretic

This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based models in explaining human cooperation. It first provides an overview of folk theorems and their account of evolutionary dynamics before discussing the folk theorem with either imperfect public information or private information. It then considers evolutionarily irrelevant equilibrium as well as the link between social norms and the notion of correlated equilibrium. While the insight that repeated interactions provide opportunities for cooperative individuals to discipline defectors is correct, the chapter argues that none of the game-theoretic models mentioned above is successful. Except under implausible conditions, the cooperative outcomes identified by these models are neither accessible nor persistent, and are thus labeled evolutionarily irrelevant Nash equilibria.

scholarly journals Debate sobre el Homo Economicus. El caso de los funcionarios de casilla

2017 ◽  
Vol 84 (335) ◽  
pp. 707
Author(s):  
Miroslava Barragán Robles ◽  
Roberto Escalante Semerena ◽  
Lilia Domínguez Villalobos
Keyword(s):  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Self Interest

Antecedentes: A partir de un caso empírico se estudia la decisión de las personas para participar voluntariamente como funcionarios de casilla el día de la jornada electoral en México. Al respecto, interesaba analizar si esa participación era motivada por un comportamiento prosocial, donde el ciudadano contribuía a la existencia de un bien público: la democracia. De ser el caso, se descartaría el comportamiento de Homo Economicus. Métodos: Ante la falta de información para hacer este estudio a nivel individual, se decidió hacerlo a nivel más agregado, a nivel municipal. Por medio de una regresión logística se exploró la probabilidad de que un municipio tuviera una alta tasa de aceptación para participar en la jornada electoral como funcionarios de casilla. Específicamente, se estudió en qué medida la variable dependiente se explica por variables asociadas a un comportamiento prosocial o a un comportamiento de Homo Economicus. Resultados: Los resultados muestran que, efectivamente, una parte de la participación es motivada por la responsabilidad ciudadana y el compromiso social, es decir, un comportamiento divergente del Homo Economicus. En tanto que la otra parte de la participación responde a incentivos no explícitos que estarían asociados al self-interest. Conclusiones: En este artículo se concluye que una parte de quienes aceptan la invitación para participar como funcionarios de casilla, lo hacen respondiendo a un comportamiento prosocial, pero para el resto no es posible descartar un comportamiento de Homo Economicus. Todo ello apunta a la necesidad de seguir trabajando para consolidar la calidad de la democracia mexicana.

Behavioural Economics, Neuroeconomics, and Corporate Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 269-291
Author(s):  
Julia Redenius-Hövermann
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Field ◽  
Behavioural Economics ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Standard Theory ◽  
Systematic Research ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
The Core ◽  
Research Fields ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
A Minor

Behavioural economics is an established field. Still it carries the premises that the actions of corporate players are only to a minor degree led by self-interest, rationality, and self-discipline. Bias portrayed throughout behavioural economics offers an alternative to rational-theoretical standard theory as it allows predictions about the systematic deviation from the prognosis of the homo economicus’ actions. The reception of the findings of systematic research on the basis of human behaviour in modern psychology, neurology, or behavioural economics in corporate and capital market law enables its continuing development. The intention is to assume that non-legal arguments, complying with the standard of their respective scientific field, can be adopted for the development of corporate law. Therefore, the core of the chapter addresses the question of how the development of corporate law will occur under the consideration of findings from adjacent research fields such as behavioural economics.

Altruism and the Indispensability of Motives

2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark S. Peacock ◽  
Michael Schefczyk ◽  
Peter Schaber
Keyword(s):  
Social Preferences ◽  
Strong Reciprocity ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Definition Of

AbstractIn this paper we examine Fehr’s notions of “altruism”, “strong reciprocity” and “altruistic punishment” and query his ascription of altruism. We suggest that, pace Fehr, altruism cannot be defined behaviourally because the definition of altruism must refer to the motives of actors. We also advert to certain inconsistencies in Fehr’s usage of his terms and we question his explanation of altruism in terms of ‘social preferences’.

scholarly journals Decoupling cooperation and punishment in humans shows that punishment is not an altruistic trait

2021 ◽  
Vol 288 (1962) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew ◽  
Claire Guérin
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Models ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Economic Experiments ◽  
Strong Reciprocity ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Helping Behaviours ◽  
Economics Experiments ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Local Levels

Economic experiments have suggested that cooperative humans will altruistically match local levels of cooperation (conditional cooperation) and pay to punish non-cooperators (altruistic punishment). Evolutionary models have suggested that if altruists punish non-altruists this could favour the evolution of costly helping behaviours (cooperation) among strangers. An often-key requirement is that helping behaviours and punishing behaviours form one single conjoined trait (strong reciprocity). Previous economics experiments have provided support for the hypothesis that punishment and cooperation form one conjoined, altruistically motivated, trait. However, such a conjoined trait may be evolutionarily unstable, and previous experiments have confounded a fear of being punished with being surrounded by cooperators, two factors that could favour cooperation. Here, we experimentally decouple the fear of punishment from a cooperative environment and allow cooperation and punishment behaviour to freely separate (420 participants). We show, that if a minority of individuals is made immune to punishment, they (i) learn to stop cooperating on average despite being surrounded by high levels of cooperation, contradicting the idea of conditional cooperation and (ii) often continue to punish, ‘hypocritically’, showing that cooperation and punishment do not form one, altruistically motivated, linked trait.

scholarly journals 'The Emperor is Naked!': Exposing (In) efficiency of Self- Assessment and Group – Assessment in Higher Education

Pedagogika ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 134 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-60
Author(s):  
Inga Minelgaitė ◽  
Rasa Nedzinskaitė-Mačiūnienė ◽  
Kari Kristinsson ◽  
Sigurdur Gudjonsson
Keyword(s):  
Learning Strategy ◽  
Future Research ◽  
First Year ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Self Assessment ◽  
First Year Students ◽  
Group Assessment ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Mean ◽  
The University

In this study, we examine how students grade themselves in comparison with their peers and teachers. Results were formed from a sample of 169 first-year students signed up to the course “Introduction to Management”, run by the School of Business at the University of Iceland and based on a cooperative learning strategy. Irrespective of whether students were evaluating their individual or group work, the mean outcomes suggest that their own grading is much higher than that of their peers, and higher again than their teachers. These results suggest that the self-interest of the Homo economicus was clouding objectivity, and it is also likely that the inexperience of the new undergraduates in such grading approaches played a role. Future research should not abandon the idea of self-assessment as a means of developing critical capacities among students, but rather seek to explore whether these results are replicated in other educational settings, such as different disciplines and sub-disciplines, and whether more experienced students, such as third-year undergraduates, demonstrate similar behavioral responses.

scholarly journals Alcohol unleashes homo economicus by inhibiting cooperation

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. e0253296
Author(s):  
Paul J. Zak ◽  
Kylene Hayes ◽  
Elizabeth Paulson ◽  
Edward Stringham
Keyword(s):  
Alcohol Consumption ◽  
Blood Alcohol Concentration ◽  
Alcohol Concentration ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
The Public ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Standard Task ◽  
Socially Motivated ◽  
The Brain

Human behavior lies somewhere between purely self-interested homo economicus and socially-motivated homo reciprocans. The factors that cause people to choose self-interest over costly cooperation can provide insights into human nature and are essential when designing institutions and policies that are meant to influence behavior. Alcohol consumption can shed light on the inflection point between selfish and selfless because it is commonly consumed and has global effects on the brain. The present study administered alcohol or placebo (N = 128), titrated to sex and weight, to examine its effect on cooperation in a standard task in experimental economics, the public goods game (PGG). Alcohol, compared to placebo, doubled the number of free-riders who contributed nothing to the public good and reduced average PGG contributions by 32% (p = .005). This generated 64% higher average profits in the PGG for those who consumed alcohol. The degree of intoxication, measured by blood alcohol concentration, linearly reduced PGG contributions (r = -0.18, p = .05). The reduction in cooperation was traced to a deterioration in mood and an increase in physiologic stress as measured by adrenocorticotropic hormone. Our findings indicate that moderate alcohol consumption inhibits the motivation to cooperate and that homo economicus is stressed and unhappy.

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