scholarly journals Debate sobre el Homo Economicus. El caso de los funcionarios de casilla

2017 ◽  
Vol 84 (335) ◽  
pp. 707
Author(s):  
Miroslava Barragán Robles ◽  
Roberto Escalante Semerena ◽  
Lilia Domínguez Villalobos
Keyword(s):  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Self Interest

Antecedentes: A partir de un caso empírico se estudia la decisión de las personas para participar voluntariamente como funcionarios de casilla el día de la jornada electoral en México. Al respecto, interesaba analizar si esa participación era motivada por un comportamiento prosocial, donde el ciudadano contribuía a la existencia de un bien público: la democracia. De ser el caso, se descartaría el comportamiento de Homo Economicus. Métodos: Ante la falta de información para hacer este estudio a nivel individual, se decidió hacerlo a nivel más agregado, a nivel municipal. Por medio de una regresión logística se exploró la probabilidad de que un municipio tuviera una alta tasa de aceptación para participar en la jornada electoral como funcionarios de casilla. Específicamente, se estudió en qué medida la variable dependiente se explica por variables asociadas a un comportamiento prosocial o a un comportamiento de Homo Economicus. Resultados: Los resultados muestran que, efectivamente, una parte de la participación es motivada por la responsabilidad ciudadana y el compromiso social, es decir, un comportamiento divergente del Homo Economicus. En tanto que la otra parte de la participación responde a incentivos no explícitos que estarían asociados al self-interest. Conclusiones: En este artículo se concluye que una parte de quienes aceptan la invitación para participar como funcionarios de casilla, lo hacen respondiendo a un comportamiento prosocial, pero para el resto no es posible descartar un comportamiento de Homo Economicus. Todo ello apunta a la necesidad de seguir trabajando para consolidar la calidad de la democracia mexicana.

Cooperative Homo economicus

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
The Self ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Game Theoretic

This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based models in explaining human cooperation. It first provides an overview of folk theorems and their account of evolutionary dynamics before discussing the folk theorem with either imperfect public information or private information. It then considers evolutionarily irrelevant equilibrium as well as the link between social norms and the notion of correlated equilibrium. While the insight that repeated interactions provide opportunities for cooperative individuals to discipline defectors is correct, the chapter argues that none of the game-theoretic models mentioned above is successful. Except under implausible conditions, the cooperative outcomes identified by these models are neither accessible nor persistent, and are thus labeled evolutionarily irrelevant Nash equilibria.

scholarly journals NETWORK DEPENDENCE OF STRONG RECIPROCITY

2004 ◽  
Vol 07 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 357-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. VILELA MENDES
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Intergroup Dynamics ◽  
Network Parameter ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Strong Reciprocity ◽  
Equilibrium Behavior ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Evolution Dynamics ◽  
Human Trait

Experimental evidence suggests that human decisions involve a mixture of self-interest and internalized social norms which cannot be accounted for by the Nash equilibrium behavior of Homo Economicus. This led to the notion of strong reciprocity (or altruistic punishment) to capture the human trait leading an individual to punish norm violators at a cost to himself. For a population with small autonomous groups with collective monitoring, the interplay of intra- and intergroup dynamics shows this to be an adaptive trait, although not fully invasive of a selfish population. However, the absence of collective monitoring in a larger society changes the evolution dynamics. Clustering seems to be the network parameter that controls maintenance and evolution of the reciprocator trait.

Behavioural Economics, Neuroeconomics, and Corporate Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 269-291
Author(s):  
Julia Redenius-Hövermann
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Field ◽  
Behavioural Economics ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Standard Theory ◽  
Systematic Research ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
The Core ◽  
Research Fields ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
A Minor

Behavioural economics is an established field. Still it carries the premises that the actions of corporate players are only to a minor degree led by self-interest, rationality, and self-discipline. Bias portrayed throughout behavioural economics offers an alternative to rational-theoretical standard theory as it allows predictions about the systematic deviation from the prognosis of the homo economicus’ actions. The reception of the findings of systematic research on the basis of human behaviour in modern psychology, neurology, or behavioural economics in corporate and capital market law enables its continuing development. The intention is to assume that non-legal arguments, complying with the standard of their respective scientific field, can be adopted for the development of corporate law. Therefore, the core of the chapter addresses the question of how the development of corporate law will occur under the consideration of findings from adjacent research fields such as behavioural economics.

scholarly journals 'The Emperor is Naked!': Exposing (In) efficiency of Self- Assessment and Group – Assessment in Higher Education

Pedagogika ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 134 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-60
Author(s):  
Inga Minelgaitė ◽  
Rasa Nedzinskaitė-Mačiūnienė ◽  
Kari Kristinsson ◽  
Sigurdur Gudjonsson
Keyword(s):  
Learning Strategy ◽  
Future Research ◽  
First Year ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Self Assessment ◽  
First Year Students ◽  
Group Assessment ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Mean ◽  
The University

In this study, we examine how students grade themselves in comparison with their peers and teachers. Results were formed from a sample of 169 first-year students signed up to the course “Introduction to Management”, run by the School of Business at the University of Iceland and based on a cooperative learning strategy. Irrespective of whether students were evaluating their individual or group work, the mean outcomes suggest that their own grading is much higher than that of their peers, and higher again than their teachers. These results suggest that the self-interest of the Homo economicus was clouding objectivity, and it is also likely that the inexperience of the new undergraduates in such grading approaches played a role. Future research should not abandon the idea of self-assessment as a means of developing critical capacities among students, but rather seek to explore whether these results are replicated in other educational settings, such as different disciplines and sub-disciplines, and whether more experienced students, such as third-year undergraduates, demonstrate similar behavioral responses.

scholarly journals Alcohol unleashes homo economicus by inhibiting cooperation

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. e0253296
Author(s):  
Paul J. Zak ◽  
Kylene Hayes ◽  
Elizabeth Paulson ◽  
Edward Stringham
Keyword(s):  
Alcohol Consumption ◽  
Blood Alcohol Concentration ◽  
Alcohol Concentration ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
The Public ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Standard Task ◽  
Socially Motivated ◽  
The Brain

Human behavior lies somewhere between purely self-interested homo economicus and socially-motivated homo reciprocans. The factors that cause people to choose self-interest over costly cooperation can provide insights into human nature and are essential when designing institutions and policies that are meant to influence behavior. Alcohol consumption can shed light on the inflection point between selfish and selfless because it is commonly consumed and has global effects on the brain. The present study administered alcohol or placebo (N = 128), titrated to sex and weight, to examine its effect on cooperation in a standard task in experimental economics, the public goods game (PGG). Alcohol, compared to placebo, doubled the number of free-riders who contributed nothing to the public good and reduced average PGG contributions by 32% (p = .005). This generated 64% higher average profits in the PGG for those who consumed alcohol. The degree of intoxication, measured by blood alcohol concentration, linearly reduced PGG contributions (r = -0.18, p = .05). The reduction in cooperation was traced to a deterioration in mood and an increase in physiologic stress as measured by adrenocorticotropic hormone. Our findings indicate that moderate alcohol consumption inhibits the motivation to cooperate and that homo economicus is stressed and unhappy.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Models of Preference Formation

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 329-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingela Alger ◽  
Jörgen W. Weibull
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Evolutionary Models ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Preference Formation ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Local Dispersion ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Evolutionary Success ◽  
Evolution Of Preferences

The literature on the evolution of preferences of individuals in strategic interactions is vast and diverse. We organize the discussion around the following question: Supposing that material outcomes drive evolutionary success, under what circumstances does evolution promote Homo economicus, defined as material self-interest, and when does it instead lead to other preferences? The literature suggests that Homo economicus is favored by evolution only when individuals’ preferences are their private information and the population is large and well-mixed, so that individuals with rare mutant preferences almost never get to interact with each other. If rare mutants instead interact more often (say, due to local dispersion), then evolution instead favors a certain generalization of Homo economicus including a Kantian concern. If individuals interact under complete information about preferences, then evolution destabilizes Homo economicus in virtually all games.

Moving Beyond Dehumanisation and Greed in the Light of African Economic Ethics – A Statement

2008 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 74-96
Author(s):  
Munyaradzi Murove
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Well Being ◽  
African Society ◽  
Economic Ethics ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Early Christian ◽  
Political Discourses ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Modern Economic

AbstractThis article argues that the popular term self-interest which is used in economic and political discourses can be used interchangeably with greed. Tracing the origins of the term greed from antiquity through the early Christian era, it is also argued that classical modern economic and political theorists justified and absolved greed when they replaced it with the word self-interest. It was argued by modern economists and political philosophers that the pursuit of self-interest was integral to human nature, and also indispensable to the attainment and increase of wealth. Contemporary economists have also absolved greed when they constructed an ideal homo economicus as solely a utility maximiser who is only concerned with his or her well-being without taking into account the well-being of others. In an African society where greed is primarily seen as dehumanising, I argue that egalitarian economic programmes that have been implemented by many postcolonial African governments should be seen as an expression of moral protest against greed.

scholarly journals Social Norms and Economic Theory

1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 99-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Elster
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Emile Durkheim ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
The Social ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
Genetic Fitness

One of the most persistent cleavages in the social sciences is the opposition between two lines of thought conveniently associated with Adam Smith and Emile Durkheim, between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. Of these, the former is supposed to be guided by instrumental rationality, while the behavior of the latter is dictated by social norms. In this paper I characterize this contrast more fully, and discuss attempts by economists to reduce normoriented action to some type of optimizing behavior. Social norms, as I understand them here, are emotional and behavioral propensities of individuals. Are norms rationalizations of self-interest? Are norms followed out of self-interest? Do norms exist to promote self-interest? Do norms exist to promote common interests? Do norms exist to promote genetic fitness?

scholarly journals Self-interest and greed: Is the homo economicus unethical?

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 343-362
Author(s):  
Predrag Krstic
Keyword(s):  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Self Interest

scholarly journals Homo Economicus

MELINTAS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-129
Author(s):  
B. Herry Priyono
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Classical Sense ◽  
The Core ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
History Of ◽  
Trading Activities

Human being is driven by many factors, but in trading activities, an individual is driven primarily by self-interest rather than other encouragement. This is the point which then develops into the core of the image of an economic being. However, the whole of human self is never driven only by self-interest. Through the history of the idea of homo economicus, what was originally a particular point of view about humans turned into a claim about the whole of human nature. The actions and behaviours of homo economicus were still driven by self-interest, but what was meant by self-interest was no longer in its classical sense. Its meaning has been much more extensive. This article shows the ambiguity of the idea of homo economicus: what was originally a certain point of view about human being, was applied to human nature and then became an agenda of how human beings and society should be. Humans must be homo economicus, but the latter is definitely not the whole picture of human nature. The image of an economic being is not the real description of the nature of human self, for it has its own territory. It is not the economic beings that gave birth to economics, but the economics that created economic beings.

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