scholarly journals How to Implement Return Policies in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain?

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Hu ◽  
Jianbin Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Modeling Framework ◽  
Optimal Response ◽  
Return Policies ◽  
Return Policy ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Valuation Uncertainty

We integrate a retailer's return policy and a supplier's buyback policy within a modeling framework. In this setting, consumers decide whether to buy and then whether to return the product, the retailer sets the retail price, quantity, and refund price, and the supplier chooses the wholesale price and buyback price. Both the demand uncertainty and consumers' valuation uncertainty are considered; consumers realize their valuations only after purchase. We discuss four scenarios for each party in the supply chain that may offer or not offer return policy. We characterize each party's optimal decisions for all scenarios and we show that the supplier's best choice is to provide buyback policy and the retailer's optimal response is to set refund price to be the same as supplier's buyback price.

Price Decisions of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with and without Competition

2011 ◽  
Vol 204-210 ◽  
pp. 1710-1715
Author(s):  
Qiao Lun Gu ◽  
Tie Gang Gao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Example ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
The Difference

In this paper, we focus on the price decisions of the wholesale price, the retail price and the collecting price for the closed-loop supply chain with and without competition. We obtain the optimal decisions based on two models: Model I without competition and Model II with competition. By the analysis of a numerical example, we find that the competition between the manufacturers in model II will affect their prices decisions and their profits; in model II, the two manufacturers would like to halve the market while the retailer hope to increase the difference of their market shares, and the two manufacturers would not like to increase the substitute ratio of their products while the retailer can benefit from that. So, from the manufacturers’ point of view, they should avoid the competition risk by choosing the independent retailers.

scholarly journals Impact of Risk Aversion on Price and Quality Decisions under Demand Uncertainty via the CARA Utility Function

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinqin Li ◽  
Zhiying Liu ◽  
Yi He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Absolute Risk ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Cara Utility ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates optimal price and quality decisions of a manufacturer-retailer supply chain under demand uncertainty, in which players are both risk-averse decision makers. The manufacturer determines the wholesale price and quality of the product, and the retailer determines the retail price. By means of game theory, we employ the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) function to analyze two different supply chain structures, that is, manufacturer Stackelberg model (MS) and retailer Stackelberg model (RS). We then analyze the results to explore the effects of risk aversion of the manufacturer and the retailer upon the equilibrium decisions. Our results imply that both the risk aversion of the manufacturer and the retailer play an important role in the price and quality decisions. We find that, in general, in MS and RS models, the optimal wholesale price and quality decrease with the risk aversion of the manufacturer but increase with the risk aversion of the retailer, while the retail price decreases with the risk aversion of the manufacturer as well as the retailer. We also examine the impact of quality cost coefficient on the optimal decisions. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the different degree of effects of players’ risk aversion on equilibrium results and to compare results in different models considered.

The Impact of Dual-Fairness Concerns Under Different Power

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Tianjian Yang ◽  
Guangdong Liu ◽  
Yao Wei ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Xinglin Dong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Equilibrium Structure ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
The Impact

By analyzing the impact of different fairness concerns on a green supply chain, this study determines the optimal decisions under different power structures and conducts a comparative analysis of them. The findings of this study are summarized as follows: 1) under the manufacturer-dominated structure, retail price, wholesale price, product greenness, the manufacturer's profit, the total profit of the supply chain, the manufacturer's utility, and the retailer's utility are all negatively correlated with fairness concerns, but positively correlated with the retailer's profit; 2) under the retailer-dominated structure, fairness concerns have no impact on retail price, product greenness, or the total profit of the supply chain, are positively correlated with wholesale price and the manufacturer's profit and utility, and are negatively correlated with the retailer's profit and utility; 3) under the Nash equilibrium structure, fairness concerns have no impact on the green supply chain.

scholarly journals Emergency Coordination Model of Fresh Agricultural Products’ Three-Level Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Yang ◽  
Haorui Liu ◽  
Xuedou Yu ◽  
Fenghua Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Nonlinear Function ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Emergency Events

In consideration of influence of loss, freshness, and secret retailer cost of products, how to handle emergency events during three-level supply chain is researched when market need is presumed to be a nonlinear function with retail price in fresh agricultural product market. Centralized and decentralized supply chain coordination models are studied based on asymmetric information. Optimal strategy of supply chain in dealing with retail price perturbation is caused by emergency events. The research reveals robustness for optimal production planning, wholesale price for distributors, wholesale price for retailers, and retail price of three-level supply chain about fresh agricultural products. The above four factors can keep constant within a certain perturbation of expectation costs for retailers because of emergency events; the conclusions are verified by numerical simulation. This paper also can be used for reference to the other related studies in how to coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric and punctual researches information response to disruptions.

scholarly journals Research on the Dynamics Game Model in a Green Supply Chain: Government Subsidy Strategies under the Retailer’s Selling Effort Level

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xigang Yuan ◽  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Dalin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selling Effort

Based on dynamic game theory and the principal-agent theory, this paper examined different government subsidy strategies in green supply chain management. Assuming that the retailer’s level of selling effort involved asymmetric information, this study analyzed the impact of different government subsidy strategies on the wholesale price, the product greenness level, retail price, the level of selling effort, the manufacturer’s profit, and the retailer’s profit. The results showed that (1) the government’s subsidy strategy can effectively not only improve the product greenness level but also increase the profits of an enterprise in a green supply chain, which helps the retailer to enhance their selling effort; (2) regardless of whether the retailer’s level of selling effort was high or low, as the government’s subsidy coefficient increased, the wholesale price continued to decrease, and the product greenness level and retailer’s selling effort level also increased.

scholarly journals Service and Price Decisions of a Supply Chain with Optional After-Sale Service

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Xiaochen Sun ◽  
Qingshuai Zhang ◽  
Yancong Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Quality Assurance ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Optional Service ◽  
Durable Products ◽  
Purchase Behaviors

For durable products, the high quality after-sales service has been playing an increasingly important role in consumers’ purchase behaviors. We mainly study a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. In a process of products sales, the manufacturer will provide a basic free quality assurance service. On this basis, the retailer provides paid optional quality assurance service to consumers to promote sales. Users are divided into two categories in this paper: users with no optional service and users with optional services. We derive the equilibrium decisions between the manufacturer and the retailer under the following two cases: (i) the optional after-sales service level and the wholesale price determined by the manufacturer and the retail price determined by the retailer; (ii) the wholesale price determined by the manufacturer and the optional after-sales service level and the retail price determined by the retailer.

Decision Models of Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information with Demand Disruption

2010 ◽  
Vol 143-144 ◽  
pp. 773-781
Author(s):  
Xin Rong Jiang ◽  
Yong Chao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Production Quantity

This paper studied the influence of asymmetric information and demand disruption on the decision of the supply chain. We analyzed the supply chain decision models based on a Stackelberg game under normal circumstances and demand disruption situation. The conclusion indicates when the market demand is disrupted, the optimal wholesale price, the retail price, the supplier’s expected profit and the supply chain system’s expected profit change in the same direction as the demand disruption, while the optimal production quantity and the retailer’s profit both have certain robustness under disruption. Finally we gave a numerical example to illustrate our analysis.

Information Disclosure Model Under Supply Chain Competition with Asymmetric Demand Disruption

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (06) ◽  
pp. 1650043 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kebing Chen ◽  
Renxing Xu ◽  
Hanwei Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Information Rent

This paper develops the game models of two symmetric supply chains, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, while both retailers compete in the market with a linear function. The disclosure mechanism is designed when the information of the disrupted demand is asymmetric between supply side and retail side. We first study the model with the full information as a benchmark to explore the effect of asymmetric information on the system. In the case, each manufacturer maximizes her profit while the downstream retailer only obtains the reservation profit. For the case of asymmetric information, each manufacturer can obtain the real information of the disrupted demand by using a menu of contract bundles. For each information structure, there are always robust regions for each manufacturer’s original trading quantity scheme. That is, when the disrupted amount of the demand is sufficiently small, the trading quantity will be unchanged. However, some special measures, e.g., the higher unit wholesale price, should be taken to prevent the retailer from deviating the trading quantity scheme. The high-disruption retailer gets the higher profit due to the information rent. Compared with a single supply chain, Cournot competition results in the less retail price and the lower performance for the whole system.

scholarly journals ReCellular Inc: Managing Demand Uncertainty in Closed-Loop Remanufacturing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akshay Mutha ◽  
Saurabh Bansal ◽  
V. Daniel R. Guide
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Learning Experience ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Low Grade ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Specific Factors

The modeling-based case study is useful for two purposes: introduce closed-loop supply chains and highlight and model some of its unique aspects that the traditional newsvendor formulation does not capture. The case focuses on a third-party remanufacturer (3PR) who buys used cellphones in different quality grades in anticipation of demand. Phones in high grade have been used gently—they have a high acquisition cost but low remanufacturing cost. Low-grade phones have been used extensively—they are cheaper to acquire but have a higher remanufacturing cost. Medium-grade phones have intermediate acquisition and remanufacturing costs. The 3PR needs to trade off these two costs and determine which grade(s) of used phones to buy. The 3PR restores all phones to the same like-new standard during remanufacturing. Extensive use of the case in supply chain management courses shows that in the absence of a mathematical model, students systematically deviate from the optimal decisions because of contextual features. Overall, students believed the case was challenging and that it provides a valuable learning experience, both as an exposure to the closed-loop supply chain domain as well as developing models with industry-specific factors.

scholarly journals Equilibrium decisions on pricing and innovation that impact reference price dynamics

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Shaokun Tao ◽  
Xianjin Du ◽  
Suresh P. Sethi ◽  
Xiuli He ◽  
Yu Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Steady State ◽  
Reference Price ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Interactive Effect ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Price Ratio ◽  
Reference Prices ◽  
Consumer Memory

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Previous studies have confirmed that reference prices play an essential role in consumer purchasing decisions, and some researchers have suggested that reference prices are positively influenced by innovation. Therefore, we construct an interactive effect of innovation and reference price to study their combined impact on supply chain decisions. We model a supply chain, where a manufacturer determines the innovation level and the wholesale price while the retailer controls the retail price, as a dynamic Stackelberg game. We show that the interactive effect causes the steady-state wholesale and retail prices to increase, thus motivating the manufacturer to increase innovation investment. We see that the retail price and the level of innovation increase in reference price effect whereas they decrease in consumer memory. The centralized firm has a higher steady-state innovation level and innovation/price ratio and lower steady-state retail price compared to the decentralized supply chain. Consumers also benefit from the interactive effect as well as from centralization. Finally, we use numerical analysis to demonstrate our results and offer some managerial implications.</p>

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