scholarly journals Complex Dynamics and Chaos Control on a Kind of Bertrand Duopoly Game Model considering R&D Activities

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongliang Tu ◽  
Xueli Zhan ◽  
Xiaobing Mao
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Complex Dynamic ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
Straight Line ◽  
Stable Conditions ◽  
The Stability

We study a dynamic research and development two-stage input competition game model in the Bertrand duopoly oligopoly market with spillover effects on cost reduction. We investigate the stability of the Nash equilibrium point and local stable conditions and stability region of the Nash equilibrium point by the bifurcation theory. The complex dynamic behaviors of the system are shown by numerical simulations. It is demonstrated that chaos occurs for a range of managerial policies, and the associated unpredictability is solely due to the dynamics of the interaction. We show that the straight line stabilization method is the appropriate management measure to control the chaos.

COMPLEXITY OF A REAL ESTATE GAME MODEL WITH A NONLINEAR DEMAND FUNCTION

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (11) ◽  
pp. 3171-3179 ◽  
Author(s):  
LINGLING MU ◽  
PING LIU ◽  
YANYAN LI ◽  
JINZHU ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Real Estate ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Demand Function ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Chaotic Behavior ◽  
Period Doubling ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Nonlinear Feedback ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point

In this paper, a real estate game model with nonlinear demand function is proposed. And an analysis of the game's local stability is carried out. It is shown that the stability of Nash equilibrium point is lost through period-doubling bifurcation as some parameters are varied. With numerical simulations method, the results of bifurcation diagrams, maximal Lyapunov exponents and strange attractors are presented. It is found that the chaotic behavior of the model has been stabilized on the Nash equilibrium point by using of nonlinear feedback control method.

HADAMARD AND TYKHONOV WELL-POSEDNESS IN TWO PLAYER GAMES

2003 ◽  
Vol 05 (04) ◽  
pp. 375-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
GRAZIANO PIERI ◽  
ANNA TORRE
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Well Posedness ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
Suitable Definition ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Zero Sum

We give a suitable definition of Hadamard well-posedness for Nash equilibria of a game, that is, the stability of Nash equilibrium point with respect to perturbations of payoff functions. Our definition generalizes the analogous notion for minimum problems. For a game with continuous payoff functions, we restrict ourselves to Hadamard well-posedness with respect to uniform convergence and compare this notion with Tykhonov well-posedness of the same game. The main results are: Hadamard implies Tykhonov well-posedness and the converse is true if the payoff functions are bounded. For a zero-sum game the two notions are equivalent.

scholarly journals Complex Dynamics in a Mixed Duopoly Game Based on Relative Profit Maximization

2021 ◽  
pp. 47-57
Author(s):  
Yuqi Dou ◽  
Xingyu Liu
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Systems ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Rational Expectation ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Complex Dynamic ◽  
Discrete Dynamic Systems ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Relative Profit

In this paper, the complex dynamic behavior of a mixed duopoly game model is studied. Based on the principle of relative profit maximization and bounded rational expectation, the corresponding discrete dynamic systems are constructed in the case of nonlinear cost function. In theory, the conditions for the local stability of Nash equilibrium are given. In terms of numerical experiments, bifurcation diagrams are used to depict the effects of product differences, adjustment speed, and other parameters on the stability of Nash equilibrium.

scholarly journals Complexity Analysis of a 3-Player Game with Bounded Rationality Participating in Nitrogen Emission Reduction

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jixiang Zhang ◽  
Xuan Xi
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Nitrogen Emissions ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
The Stability

In this paper, a decision-making competition game model concerning governments, agricultural enterprises, and the public, all of which participate in the reduction of nitrogen emissions in the watersheds, is established based on bounded rationality. First, the stability conditions of the equilibrium points in the system are discussed, and the stable region of the Nash equilibrium is determined. Then, the bifurcation diagram, maximal Lyapunov exponent, strange attractor, and sensitive dependence on the initial conditions are shown through numerical simulations. The research shows that the adjustment speed of three players’ decisions may alter the stability of the Nash equilibrium point and lead to chaos in the system. Among these decisions, a government’s decision has the largest effect on the system. In addition, we find that some parameters will affect the stability of the system; when the parameters become beneficial for enterprises to reduce nitrogen emissions, the increase in the parameters can help control the chaotic market. Finally, the delay feedback control method is used to successfully control the chaos in the system and stabilize it at the Nash equilibrium point. The research of this paper is of great significance to the environmental governance decisions and nitrogen reduction management.

scholarly journals Dynamic Analysis and Chaos Control of Bertrand Triopoly Based on Differentiated Products and Heterogeneous Expectations

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Liuwei Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Dynamical System ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Dynamic Behavior ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Complex Dynamic ◽  
Heterogeneous Expectations ◽  
Price Game ◽  
The Stability

Price competition has become a universal commercial phenomenon nowadays. This paper considers a dynamic Bertrand price game model, in which enterprises have heterogeneous expectations. By the stability theory of the dynamic behavior of the Bertrand price game model, the instability of the boundary equilibrium point and the stability condition of the internal equilibrium point are obtained. Furthermore, bifurcation diagram, basin of attraction, and critical curve are introduced to investigate the dynamic behavior of this game. Numerical analysis shows that the change of model parameters in a dynamic system has a significant impact on the stability of the system and can even lead to complex dynamic behaviors in the evolution of the entire economic system. This kind of complex dynamic behavior will cause certain damage to the stability of the whole economic system, causing the market to fall into a chaotic state, which is manifested as a kind of market disorder competition, which is very unfavorable to the stability of the economic system. Therefore, the chaotic behavior of the dynamical system is controlled by time-delay feedback control and the numerical analysis shows that the effective control of the dynamical system can be unstable behavior and the rapid recovery of the market can be stable and orderly.

Nash Equilibrium Points for Generalized Matrix Game Model with Interval Payoffs

2021 ◽  
pp. 2150021
Author(s):  
Ajay Kumar Bhurjee ◽  
Vinay Yadav
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Linear Optimization ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Matrix Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
Generalized Matrix

Game theory-based models are widely used to solve multiple competitive problems such as oligopolistic competitions, marketing of new products, promotion of existing products competitions, and election presage. The payoffs of these competitive models have been conventionally considered as deterministic. However, these payoffs have ambiguity due to the uncertainty in the data sets. Interval analysis-based approaches are found to be efficient to tackle such uncertainty in data sets. In these approaches, the payoffs of the game model lie in some closed interval, which are estimated by previous information. The present paper considers a multiple player game model in which payoffs are uncertain and varies in a closed intervals. The necessary and sufficient conditions are explained to discuss the existence of Nash equilibrium point of such game models. Moreover, Nash equilibrium point of the model is obtained by solving a crisp bi-linear optimization problem. The developed methodology is further applied for obtaining the possible optimal strategy to win the parliament election presage problem.

scholarly journals A Type of Time-Symmetric Stochastic System and Related Games

Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 118
Author(s):  
Qingfeng Zhu ◽  
Yufeng Shi ◽  
Jiaqiang Wen ◽  
Hui Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Time Delay ◽  
Differential Equations ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Stochastic Differential Equations ◽  
Stochastic System ◽  
Stochastic Systems ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
Doubly Stochastic

This paper is concerned with a type of time-symmetric stochastic system, namely the so-called forward–backward doubly stochastic differential equations (FBDSDEs), in which the forward equations are delayed doubly stochastic differential equations (SDEs) and the backward equations are anticipated backward doubly SDEs. Under some monotonicity assumptions, the existence and uniqueness of measurable solutions to FBDSDEs are obtained. The future development of many processes depends on both their current state and historical state, and these processes can usually be represented by stochastic differential systems with time delay. Therefore, a class of nonzero sum differential game for doubly stochastic systems with time delay is studied in this paper. A necessary condition for the open-loop Nash equilibrium point of the Pontriagin-type maximum principle are established, and a sufficient condition for the Nash equilibrium point is obtained. Furthermore, the above results are applied to the study of nonzero sum differential games for linear quadratic backward doubly stochastic systems with delay. Based on the solution of FBDSDEs, an explicit expression of Nash equilibrium points for such game problems is established.

scholarly journals Mathematical Modelling of Deforestation Due to Population Density and Industrialization

Jurnal Varian ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-16
Author(s):  
Didiharyono D. ◽  
Irwan Kasse
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Population Density ◽  
Mathematical Modelling ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Stability Criteria ◽  
Hurwitz Stability ◽  
Stable Conditions ◽  
Linear Differential ◽  
The Stability

The focus of the study in this paper is to model deforestation due to population density and industrialization. To begin with, it is formulated into a mathematical modelling which is a system of non-linear differential equations. Then, analyze the stability of the system based on the Routh-Hurwitz stability criteria. Furthermore, a numerical simulation is performed to determine the shift of a system. The results of the analysis to shown that there are seven non-negative equilibrium points, which in general consist equilibrium point of disturbance-free and equilibrium points of disturbances. Equilibrium point TE7(x, y, z) analyzed to shown asymptotically stable conditions based on the Routh-Hurwitz stability criteria. The numerical simulation results show that if the stability conditions of a system have been met, the system movement always occurs around the equilibrium point.

scholarly journals Complexity of a Duopoly Game in the Electricity Market with Delayed Bounded Rationality

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Hongliang Tu
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Fractal Dimensions ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Phase Portraits ◽  
Largest Lyapunov Exponent ◽  
Game Model

According to a triopoly game model in the electricity market with bounded rational players, a new Cournot duopoly game model with delayed bounded rationality is established. The model is closer to the reality of the electricity market and worth spreading in oligopoly. By using the theory of bifurcations of dynamical systems, local stable region of Nash equilibrium point is obtained. Its complex dynamics is demonstrated by means of the largest Lyapunov exponent, bifurcation diagrams, phase portraits, and fractal dimensions. Since the output adjustment speed parameters are varied, the stability of Nash equilibrium gives rise to complex dynamics such as cycles of higher order and chaos. Furthermore, by using the straight-line stabilization method, the chaos can be eliminated. This paper has an important theoretical and practical significance to the electricity market under the background of developing new energy.

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