scholarly journals Dynamic Incentive Mechanism of Multitask Cooperation in Logistics Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Song Wang ◽  
Yang Zhao ◽  
Lanfeng Liu ◽  
Fuhua Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Risk Tolerance ◽  
Incentive Effect ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Incentive Model ◽  
Model Research ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Dynamic Cooperation

This paper studies the incentive mechanism of multitask cooperation in logistics service supply chain (LSSC) by building a dynamic incentive model. Research shows the following: (1) the implicit reputation in dynamic cooperation can effectively improve system incentive effectiveness; (2) the difference in the contribution of different logistics cooperation to the performance of the LSSC has a significant impact on the incentive effect; (3) when two kinds of cooperation tasks have complementary relationships, both the LSP’s choice of logistics tasks and the incentives will simultaneously act on the two types of cooperation tasks; and (4) the antirisk degree of LSI and the environment uncertainty will also have a certain impact on the incentive effect of the LSSC. Therefore, the LSI should comprehensively consider the requirements of logistics cooperation and the risk tolerance of LSI to be chosen.

Study on Incentive Mechanism of MRCTM Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on the Uncertainty Quality

2010 ◽  
Vol 108-111 ◽  
pp. 341-346
Author(s):  
Huang Ling
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Conversion Factor ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Incentive Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Analysis ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Product Recycling

In this paper, the MRCTM model of closed-loop supply chain was investigated. An effective incentive mechanism that considered the uncertainty quality of product recycling was designed by the introduction of brand conversion factor. The author made an optimal analysis of the incentive mechanism. Moreover, the influence of different parameters, such as quality and brand to the fixed reward and the unit incentive payment was analyzed and some useful results were obtained.

scholarly journals Analysis of Revenue Incentive Dynamic Mechanism of Financial Supply Chain from the Perspective of the Internet of Things

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yue Yin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Life Cycle ◽  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Influencing Factor ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Supply Chain Finance ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Relationship Factors ◽  
The Internet Of Things

With the rapid development of society, all walks of life need the support of the Internet of Things, and the financial industry is no exception. This article integrates blockchain technology with supply chain finance and builds a supply chain financial alliance architecture based on blockchain technology and an underlying model of the Ethereum blockchain system suitable for supply chain finance. We innovated new supply chain finance models and operating mechanisms and proposed business scenarios for supply chain finance from the perspective of blockchain. Taking into account the actual operation of the blockchain supply chain financial platform, the principal-agent model and the incentive theory are applied, and the supply chain financial accounts receivable model is taken as an example in the case of complete information and incomplete information. The incentive mechanism between the service provider of the chain supply chain financial platform and the core enterprise promotes the better implementation of blockchain technology and supply chain finance. Based on the existing theoretical research, this paper identifies the key influencing factors of the supply chain’s cross-enterprise incentive mechanism. These influencing factors system includes two dimensions: transaction factors and relationship factors. Transaction factors include resource dependence, uncertainty, and cooperation experience; relationship factors include corporate reputation, trust level, and relationship commitment. Based on the nature of the incentive mechanism, information sharing and revenue sharing are extracted as the measurement dimensions of the supply chain’s cross-enterprise incentive mechanism. On this basis, this article draws on the existing enterprise life cycle division method and constructs a hypothetical model of the influencing factors of the incentive mechanism in the incubation period, the growth period, and the maturity period. Relevant data was collected through questionnaires, and SPSS and AMOS software were used to perform statistical analysis, reliability analysis, exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and structural equation hypothesis testing on the data. The performance of each influencing factor in different stages of the enterprise’s life cycle and the importance of each influencing factor in the same life cycle stage are obtained.

scholarly journals A Game Model for Incentive Mechanism of Distributed Nodes in Supply Chains

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jingjing Jiang ◽  
Aobo Lyu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Operation Mode ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Digital Currency ◽  
Distributed Ledger ◽  
Distributed Ledger Technology ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Reward Mechanism

This study aims to solve the credit problems in the supply chain commodity and currency circulation links from the perspective of the ledger, while the game model method has been adopted. The research firstly reviews the relationship between distributed ledger technology and the essential functions of currency. Then, by constructing two-agent single-period and multi-period game models in the entire supply chain, the researchers analysed the incentive mechanism and equilibrium solution of distributed nodes of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). The results of this study include the incentive mechanism and optimization of distributed nodes based on licensed distributed ledger technology, which is an important issue that CBDC faces when performing currency functions. The implications of this study mainly cover the limitations of the underlying technology of the public chain and its reward mechanism in the supply chain management and provide support for the rationality of the CBDC issuance mechanism based on state-owned commercial banks, which provides a reference for the CBDC practice. The main value of the research not only serves the decision-making department of the CBDC issuance but also provides ideas on the operation mode of digital currency for the field of digital currency research.

Incentive Mechanism to Promote Supplier's R&D of Green Technology in Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 804 ◽  
pp. 370-377
Author(s):  
Ding Yue Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Design Process ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Incentive Payment ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism

For a two-echelon supply chain consisted of one manufacturer and one supplier, the incentive mechanism is designed for the supplier to reduce the production cost of green intermediate products by the manufacturer. It is proposed under the situation of asymmetric information on the endeavor level of supplier to promote the initiative of suppliers technology R&D. The design process of the incentive mechanism in the face of moral hazard problems is discussed by the manufacturer. It indicates that the manufacturer can adopt linear incentive payment according to different periods of producing and marketing. The results manifest that the proposed incentive mechanism will promote the supplier's efforts on R&D as far as possible and make the profits of the members Pareto improvement distinctly. The paper affords great guidance on operating decisions for the green supply chain at initial stages of the green market.

scholarly journals Incentive mechanism design for citizen reporting application using Stackelberg game

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 2147
Author(s):  
I Made Ariya Sanjaya ◽  
Suhono Harso Supangkat ◽  
Jaka Sembiring ◽  
Widya Liana Aji
Keyword(s):  
Optimization Problem ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Multi Objective Optimization ◽  
Mobile Crowdsensing ◽  
Limited Budget ◽  
Incentive Model ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Incentive Mechanism Design

<p>The growing utilization of smartphones equipped with various sensors to collect and analyze information around us highlights a paradigm called mobile crowdsensing. To motivate citizens’ participation in crowdsensing and compensate them for their resources, it is necessary to incentivize the participants for their sensing service. There are several studies that used the Stackelberg game to model the incentive mechanism, however, those studies did not include a budget constraint for limited budget case. Another challenge is to optimize crowdsourcer (government) profit in conducting crowdsensing under the limited budget then allocates the budget to several regional working units that are responsible for the specific city problems. We propose an incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing based on several identified incentive parameters using the Stackelberg game model and applied the MOOP (multi-objective optimization problem) to the incentive model in which the participant reputation is taken into account. The evaluation of the proposed incentive model is performed through simulations. The simulation indicated that the result appropriately corresponds to the theoretical properties of the model.</p>

A Optimization Model of Incentive Mechanism between Manufacturer and Dealer in Supply Chain

2012 ◽  
Vol 430-432 ◽  
pp. 1306-1310
Author(s):  
Jian Hua Yang ◽  
Kun Niu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Optimization Model ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Chain Flexibility ◽  
Supply Chain Flexibility ◽  
Quantity Flexibility ◽  
Quantity Flexibility Contract ◽  
Buyback Contract ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism

According to the idea of existing quantity flexibility contract , aiming at the particularity of buyers' market's timeliness product, through introducing buyback contract method, a optimization model of supply chain flexibility contract is put forward which can incent dealer and make up the deficiency of single flexibility contract. An example is given to calculate the contented factors of wholesale price and rebate proportion to take the incentive mechanism effect, and to illustrate that manufacturer and dealer share the risk in the supply chain.

scholarly journals Research on the Incentive Mechanism of the Pension Service Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Xiaohua Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Incentive Model ◽  
Service Capability ◽  
Important Means ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism

The information asymmetry between the pension service integrator and the pension service providers will affect the efficiency of the whole supply chain, and information sharing can solve this problem to a certain extent. To achieve information sharing, mutual trust is the first condition and mutual trust is also one of the important means of endogenous incentives. In this paper, the trust incentive coefficient is embedded in the principal-agent model. Considering the service capability coefficient, the communication degree coefficient, and the information sharing degree coefficient of the pension service providers, the trust incentive model of the supply chain of the pension service is constructed, the model is solved, and the conclusion is drawn. Finally, the correctness of the conclusion is verified by the numerical simulation using SAS software. The final results show that, under the condition of information asymmetry, the trust incentive coefficient of the pension service integrator to the pension service providers is positively correlated with the effort coefficient, the service capability coefficient, the communication coefficient, and the information sharing degree coefficient of the pension service providers, while it is positively correlated with the effort cost coefficient, the output sharing coefficient, and the risk aversion coefficient of the pension service providers. The variance of number and external environmental variables is negatively correlated. This research has shown that the trust is a means of incentive for pension service providers to share information. This research has a certain practical significance for improving the service efficiency of the pension services supply chain and optimizing the level of pension services.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document