scholarly journals Disembodied perspective

2015 ◽  
pp. 74-88
Author(s):  
Philippe Bédard
Keyword(s):  
First Person ◽  
Extreme Sports ◽  
Moving Image ◽  
Home Videos ◽  
The World ◽  
Wearable Cameras ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
The Aesthetic ◽  
Sports Videos

Used as much in extreme-sports videos and professional productions as in amateur and home videos, GoPro wearable cameras have become ubiquitous in contemporary moving image culture. During its swift and ongoing rise in popularity, GoPro has also enabled the creation of new and unusual points of view, among which are “third-person images”. This article introduces and defines this particular phenomenon through an approach that deals with both the aesthetic and technical characteristics of the images in question. An analysis is presented of the peculiar and unfamiliar appearance of third-person images, in which the head of the user remains fixed in space while the world around it moves independently. Technical descriptions are provided to explain why the perception of the world presented in third-person images differs so radically from our own “first-person” mode of perception. Throughout the article, descriptions and analyses of GoPro videos are supported by parallels to theories of movement and perception in the cinema, specifically Vivian Sobchack’s film phenomenology.

scholarly journals When the World Breaks Down: A 3-Stage Existential Model of Nihilism in Schizophrenia

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Philipp Klar ◽  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Existential Crisis ◽  
Third Stage ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Pathological Development ◽  
Sense Of Reality ◽  
Intentional Structure

The existential crisis of nihilism in schizophrenia has been reported since the early days of psychiatry. Taking first-person accounts concerning nihilistic experiences of both the self and the world as vantage point, we aim to develop a dynamic existential model of the pathological development of existential nihilism. Since the phenomenology of such a crisis is intrinsically subjective, we especially take the immediate and pre-reflective first-person perspective’s (FPP) experience (instead of objectified symptoms and diagnoses) of schizophrenia into consideration. The hereby developed existential model consists of 3 conceptualized stages that are nested into each other, which defines what we mean by existential. At the same time, the model intrinsically converges with the phenomenological concept of the self-world structure notable inside our existential framework. Regarding the 3 individual stages, we suggest that the onset or first stage of nihilistic pathogenesis is reflected by phenomenological solipsism, that is, a general disruption of the FPP experience. Paradigmatically, this initial disruption contains the well-known crisis of common sense in schizophrenia. The following second stage of epistemological solipsism negatively affects all possible perspectives of experience, that is, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of subjectivity. Therefore, within the second stage, solipsism expands from a disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience (first stage) to a disruption of reflective experience and principal knowledge (second stage), as mirrored in abnormal epistemological limitations of principal knowledge. Finally, the experience of the annihilation of healthy self-consciousness into the ultimate collapse of the individual’s existence defines the third stage. The schizophrenic individual consequently loses her/his vital experience since the intentional structure of consciousness including any sense of reality breaks down. Such a descriptive-interpretative existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia may ultimately serve as input for future psychopathological investigations of nihilism in general, including, for instance, its manifestation in depression.

Being There

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Lienhard
Keyword(s):  
Soy Sauce ◽  
Government Official ◽  
First Person ◽  
Human Intervention ◽  
Science And Engineering ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Being There ◽  
Taking Responsibility ◽  
Human Hands

We come at last to the forbidden first person, the I am. No story is right until the teller is part of it. Yet a peculiar mischief is abroad in the land of science and engineering. It is a mischief born out of the noblest of intentions. For decades it has spread like the flu, far beyond the technical journals that gave it birth. The intention is to let us stand like blindfolded Justice—pure, objective, and aloof. To do this, we write about our work without ever speaking in the first person. We try to let fact speak for itself. Instead of saying, “I solved the equation and got y = log x”, we write, “The solution of the equation is y = log x”. We turn our actions into facts that are untouched by human hands. To some extent we must do that. Our facts should be sufficiently solid that we do not need to prop them up with our desires. Third-person detachment has its place, but my own person is not so easy to erase. Suppose I think another engineer, whom I shall call Hoople, is wrong. I am not objective about Hoople, but I must appear to be. So I write, “It is believed that Hoople is incorrect.” That’s a cheap shot. I express my thoughts without taking responsibility for them. I seem to be reporting general disapproval of Hoople. In the unholy name of objectivity, I make it sound as though the whole profession thinks that Hoople is a fool. Now radio and TV journalists are doing it. I cringe every time I hear, “It is expected that Congress will pass the bill. “Who expects that? The announcer? The Democrats? A government official? Maybe the soy sauce lobby is the expectant source. So instead of objectivity we get obfuscation. If our work really occurred in objective isolation, we could write about it that way. But people are present. They think and they act. If we fail to represent human intervention accurately, we are dishonest, and objectivity becomes meaningless. The things we make tell the world what we are.

Consciousness, Being and Life: Phenomenological Approaches to Mindfulness

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Bitbol
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Phenomenological Reduction ◽  
First Person ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
And Behaviors ◽  
Phenomenological View ◽  
Cross Fertilization

Abstract A phenomenological view of contemplative disciplines is presented. However, studying mindfulness by phenomenology is at odds with both neurobiological and anthropological approaches. It involves the first-person standpoint, the openness of being-in-the-world, the umwelt of the meditator, instead of assessing her neural processes and behaviors from a neutral, distanced, third-person standpoint. It then turns out that phenomenology cannot produce a discourse about mindfulness. Phenomenology rather induces a cross-fertilization between the state of mindfulness and its own methods of mental cultivation. A comparison between the epochè, the phenomenological reduction, and the practice of mindfulness, is then undertaken.

scholarly journals Caracteres da experiência

Phainomenon ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-36
Author(s):  
Andre Barata
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
The Other ◽  
Reference Object ◽  
First Person ◽  
The Third ◽  
Intentional Consciousness ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Intentional Experience ◽  
The Third Person

Abstract The discrimination between two points of view, or perspectives, in respect to consciousness, one on the first-person other on the third-person, deals with two concepts of consciousness- respectively, phenomenal consciousness and intentional consciousness (sections 1 and 2). I will accept, generally, this idea. However, I will argue that are not two, but three kinds of consciousness and typ of experience, making my point introducing the concept of different characters of experience (section 3). These characters are ‘experience’, ‘signification’ and ‘reference/object’, and when all of them occur I say that we have an intentional experience. If it lacks the last one, we have a meaningful experience, but without reference. Finally, if the only occurrence is ‘experience’, then the type of experience we live is a meaningless or mute experience. This ‘taxonomy’ allows classifying a perceptum as an intentional experience, a quale as a meaningful experience and a sense datum as a mute experience. On the other hand, it represents, as I claim, an approach much more clear, than those usually appears, to the question ‘what qualia really are? ‘ (sections 4 e 5). Moreover: it makes possible talk about objectivity of qualia, an objectivity without object (section 6).

scholarly journals The first-person perspective description error in naturalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-415
Author(s):  
Diana E. Gasparyan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Work Strategies ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Radical Naturalism ◽  
Third Person Perspective

In this article, it is shown that in some theories defending the non-reductive nature of the firstperson perspective it is possible to find a very inconsistent attitude. Such theories are associated by the author to a so-called moderate naturalism. The article demonstrates the difference between moderate and radical naturalism. Radical naturalism completely abandons the idea of subjectivity as unobservable from a third-person perspective. On the contrary, moderate naturalism defends the irreducibility of subjectivity, but believes subjectivity to be a part of the nature. As a case of moderate naturalism, the article considers the approaches of Lynne Baker and Thomas Metzinger. Exemplifying these approaches to the first-person perspective, it is shown that in the case of certain work strategies focused on the first-person perspective, it is possible that a so-called description error may appear, by which a description error of subjectivity — when it is placed in the world as a part of nature, existing according to its laws — is understood. The logic of this error points to one of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s statements about the incorrect placement of the eye in the perspective of the eye view itself. If the first-person perspective is introduced as a point of view (or a point of observation), then its subsequent shift to the observation result area leads to description error. If there is no observation, as well as no viewpoint, we lose the very idea of first-person perspective and actually take the position of radical naturalism.

Phenomenon of the narrative from a limited third person in fiction

2021 ◽  
pp. 136-145
Author(s):  
I. V. Ushchapovska ◽  
Ye. V. Nehaienko
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Distinctive Feature ◽  
English Literature ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
First Person ◽  
Inner Experiences ◽  
Outer World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Points Of View

During the last centuries, modern English literature’s methodology developed many techniques. Due to the work of numerous translators, we can evaluate the effectiveness of this toolkit. However, despite the prevalence and availability of research materials, some aspects remain unexplored. There is a completely underestimated branch, which is narratology. Despite several similar features, studies prove that narrators can be different. The main characteristic to distinguish them is the point of view. It is worth noting that every narrative contains a combination of three points of view: narrator’s, character’s, and author’s. Considering the role of the parameter in fiction, it possible to compare it with the conductor because it determines the rules according to which the work will be organized. The purpose of the proposed research is to consider the phenomenon of narrative from a limited third person in English literature, in particular, to analyze the sources of its origin, a description of its characteristics, delineation of conceptual boundaries, and the analysis of its application. A narrative from a third person is recognizable in the text. Its distinctive feature is represented with third-person pronouns. An advantage of this point of view is the ability to give more information to the reader about the outer world. It lies far beyond the perspective of the first person. In the twentieth century, the narrative from a limited third person gained popularity. Its application implies that the narrator tells the story from the perspective of one character, unlike a narrative from an omniscient third person. This approach causes the effect of closeness, while not limited to the inner experiences

Meta-Encyclopaedic Reflections on the Beginning of Philosophy

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Umur Başdaş
Keyword(s):  
First Person ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Third Person ◽  
Better Than

Abstract Since in Hegel's view the end of philosophy coincides with its beginning, it is reasonable to expect that the end of the Encyclopaedia sheds some light on the Science of Logic. The Encyclopaedia concludes with three syllogisms in which logic, nature and spirit are related to each other in three different ways. This article analyses these three final syllogisms with an eye to how they can contribute to our understanding of the logical movement that starts from pure being. Trendelenburg and Schelling, like many others after them, think that Hegel's project in the Science of Logic is doomed from the start, because there can be no such thing as a non-temporal, purely logical movement. I argue that the three final syllogisms contain Hegel's response to this challenge. I call them ‘meta-encyclopaedic reflections’ in the sense that they take the whole encyclopaedic presentation of the Hegelian system as an object of critical inquiry and identify its limitations. The core of my approach is to examine how each one of these syllogisms situate us, namely the philosophizing subjects, vis-à-vis the world as disclosed by them. They demand that we shift from a third-person to a first-person perspective towards the world. The logical categories initially appear to move of their own accord only due to the limitations of the third-person perspective of the encyclopaedic presentation, which is to be sublated in a higher, first-person perspective. Hence, Hegel would happily admit that a purely logical movement is a mere appearance, but he would also claim that his philosophy can immanently explain the necessity of this appearance in the beginning of philosophy, and explain it better than his critics.

Gender Differences in Dream Perspectives

1994 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 311-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barlow Soper ◽  
Gary T. Rosenthal ◽  
Gary E. Milford
Keyword(s):  
College Students ◽  
Gender Differences ◽  
First Person ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Points Of View

A study exploring gender differences in self-reported dream perspectives was performed with 282 college students. Significantly more of the 164 women reported dreaming exclusively in first person and more of the 114 men exclusively in third person Also, gender differences were found for those who dreamed in mixed perspective, a combination of first- and third-person points of view. Possible reasons for these differences were suggested and further research posited.

scholarly journals Dissecting Fourth Person Point of View in Game Design

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (01) ◽  
pp. 37-47
Author(s):  
Dini Faisal ◽  
San Ahdi ◽  
Hendra Afriwan
Keyword(s):  
Game Design ◽  
Case Study Research ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
First Person ◽  
Promotional Material ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Third Person

AbstrakPoint of view dalam desain game erat kaitannya dengan karakter, visualisasi, dan kamera. Seperti first person point of view dimana pemain menjadi karakter dalam game dengan penggunaan kamera yang memperlihatkan perspektif dari karakter game yang dimainkan. Third person point of view yaitu pemain mengontrol karakter sehingga penggunaan kamera memperlihatkan karakter yang dikontrol dan interaksinya dengan environment game. Dua point of view itu adalah point of view yang dikenal dalam desain game. Jika pemain bisa menjadi dan mengontrol karakter, bagaimana jika pemain tidak bisa menjadi maupun mengontrol karakter?. Karakteristik ini disebut sebagai fourth person point of view, istilah yang pertama kali digunakan oleh game Pavilion dalam materi promosinya. Adapun tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk membahas karakteristik permainan fourth person point of view, dan perbandingannya dengan point of view lainnya. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian studi kasus yang membahas mengenai game Pavilion dengan teknik pengumpulan data berupa play-testing game, wawancara dan studi pustaka. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa point of view dalam game memiliki kaitan dengan genre dan style game. Pada studi kasus game Pavilion karakteristik fourth person point of view dapat digunakan karena game tidak berfokus pada eksplorasi cerita dan karakter. Kata kunci: fourth person point of view, game design, game Pavilion  AbstractPoint of view in game design is closely related to character, visualization, and use of in-game cameras. First person point of view means that the player becomes the character in the game, and the camera only shows the perspective from the character’s eyes. The meaning of the third person point of view is the player controls the character, the camera shows the character entirely so the player can see how the character interacts within the environment. These two points of view are basically known in game design. If a player can become and control a character, what if the player cannot become or control the character? This characteristic is called as the fourth person point of view, the term that was first used by game Pavilion in its promotional material. The purpose of this research is to discuss the characteristics of the fourth person point of view, and the comparison with another point of view. This is a case study research that discusses the Pavilion game with data collection techniques through play-testing the game, interviews, and literature studies. The result of the study shows that the point of view in the game has to do with genre and game style. Moreover, the case study of game Pavilion shows that its characteristic of fourth person point of view is appropriate because the game does not focus on the exploration of story and character. Keywords: fourth person point of view, game design, game Pavilion

Rigaut de Berbezilh, the Physiologus Theobaldi, and the opening of animal inspiration

Reinardus ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 81-99
Author(s):  
Sarah Kay
Keyword(s):  
Latin Poetry ◽  
First Person ◽  
Human Language ◽  
Human History ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Third ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Animal Images ◽  
The Third Person

In two of his songs (421.1 and 421.2) the troubadour Rigaut de Berbezilh aspires to sing in response to a voice that is bestial yet somehow metaphysical. Scholars have attributed these animal images to the influence of the Physiologus, but Rigaut’s likeliest source in that tradition has not yet been identified. This article proposes to fill that lacuna by contending that the bestiary redaction closest to Rigaut’s imagery is the Physiologus Theobaldi, a verse text that unlike other bestiaries was used to teach Latin poetry and even song. In both the Physiologus Theobaldi and (though in a different way) Rigaut’s songs, animals’ breath and voice are identified with life and spirit, an identification that places these works within the wider medieval context of natural philosophical interest in pneuma. Whereas Theobaldus allegorizes his beasts in the third person, Rigaut’s first-person lyrics assume their voice, breath, life or spirit as potentially his own. He thereby opens his songs to a being that is not human. No longer anthropocentric, they enact a hybridity that we find elsewhere associated with revelation and apocalypse. The horizon of human history that opens (in Heidegger’s sense) the world of human language is thereby in turn opened up to that which it closes off, and the demarcations by which humanity defines itself are suspended.

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