The 'Law' of Uneven and Combined Development: Some Underdeveloped Thoughts

2007 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcel van der Linden

AbstractThis paper presents a critical reconstruction of the main Marxist debates about the idea of 'leaps forward' in historical development. There have been two important approaches: the so-called 'law of uneven and combined development', as developed by Leon Trotsky, George Novack and Ernest Mandel, and Jan Romein's 'handicap of a head start'. Although Romein's approach is Stalinist in origin, elements of it are compatible with Trotsky's interpretation. But, even an expanded version of the 'law' of uneven and combined development lacks predictive value, although one can say with certainty in hindsight whether a combined development has taken place. It is argued that the 'law' is, in fact, an underspecified social mechanism and that its explanatory power can be increased by identifying a number of recurrent patterns.

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Davidson

Since the 1990s there has been an upsurge of academic interest in Trotsky’s concept of uneven and combined development, but relatively little attention has been paid to its intellectual antecedents. This first of two articles will reconstruct the sources and components of uneven and combined development, in particular the strategy of permanent revolution, the conditions for which it was intended as an explanation, and the theory of uneven development, which Trotsky had to extend in order to provide that explanation. The article moves between the concepts of permanent revolution and uneven development, tracing their historical development from emergence in the eighteenth century until the era of the first Russian Revolution. By this point a relationship between the two had begun to be established by Marxists on the centre and left of the Second International, and in turn made possible the formulation of the “law” of uneven and combined development, which will be discussed in the second article.


Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák

This chapter traces the development of the law of belligerent occupation in order to identify trends relevant to the regulation of internationalized armed conflicts. It observes that despite the general grounding of this body of law in a state-centric paradigm, several isolated developments have contemplated the possibility of non-state actors becoming belligerent occupants of a portion of state territory. Moreover, the chapter highlights that the law of belligerent occupation has undergone a fundamental transformation as part of a general trend of individualization and humanization of international law. Therefore, it is no longer simply a brake on inter-state relations and a protector of states’ interests and institutions. Instead, the law has gradually brought individuals’ interests to the fore, putting persons before institutions and individuals before states. Overall, the chapter uncovers the historical reasons that support an extensive view of the applicability of the law of occupation to modern internationalized armed conflicts.


1892 ◽  
Vol 38 (162) ◽  
pp. 378-382
Author(s):  
A. Wood Renton

In view of the interest which the subject is at present arousing, a critical analysis of the historical development of the law of insanity in its relation to divorce may be neither inopportune nor uninstructive.


Author(s):  
Marcel Buß

Abstract Immanuel Kant states that indirect arguments are not suitable for the purposes of transcendental philosophy. If he is correct, this affects contemporary versions of transcendental arguments which are often used as an indirect refutation of scepticism. I discuss two reasons for Kant’s rejection of indirect arguments. Firstly, Kant argues that we are prone to misapply the law of excluded middle in philosophical contexts. Secondly, Kant points out that indirect arguments lack some explanatory power. They can show that something is true but they do not provide insight into why something is true. Using mathematical proofs as examples, I show that this is because indirect arguments are non-constructive. From a Kantian point of view, transcendental arguments need to be constructive in some way. In the last part of the paper, I briefly examine a comment made by P. F. Strawson. In my view, this comment also points toward a connection between transcendental and constructive reasoning.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Henrique Garbellini Carnio

<p><strong>Resumo:</strong> O presente artigo tem como base a conferência dada por Rudolf von Jhering em 12 de março de 1884 para a Sociedade Jurídica de Viena, intitulada "Sobre o nascimento do sentimento jurídico". O objetivo é demonstrar algumas reflexões surpreendentes e pouco conhecidas deste importante jurista, enfatizando, em especial, a importância que ele atribui ao devir histórico na formação do sentimento jurídico, apostando que o sentido do direito é modelado pela história e não proveniente das leis naturais eternas. Jhering, propondo uma tarefa genealógica, defende de forma contundente um historicismo ético e jurídico que o distancia de um relativismo absoluto como o das clássicas posições jusnaturalistas, completamente ahistóricas, que se revela extremamente interessante para as reflexões atuais sobre a filosofia do direito.</p><p><strong>Palavras-chave:</strong> Rudolf von Jhering; sentimento jurídico; historicismo ético-político.</p><p><strong>Abstract:</strong> This article is based on a lecture given by Rudolf von Jhering on March 12, 1884 for the Law Society of Vienna, entitled "About the birth of the legal feeling." The objective is to demonstrate some surprising and little-known reflections of this important jurist, emphasizing, in particular, the importance he attaches to the historical development in the formation of the legal feeling, betting that the sense of law is shaped by history and not from the eternal natural laws. Jhering proposing a genealogical task, forcefully defends an ethical and legal historicism that distances him of the absolute relativism as the way of classic natural law positions, completely ahistorical, that reveals itself highly interesting for the current reflections on the philosophy of law.</p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Rudolf von Jhering; legal feeling; ethical and political historicism.</p>


Author(s):  
Marion Katz

This article examines the historical development and social and intellectual functioning of Islamic law in the twelfth through fifteenth centuries. In particular, it considers the progressive stabilization and institutionalization of the four classical Sunni madhhabs (schools of law) and the corresponding developments in Imami Shi‘ism; developments in legal theory (usul al-fiqh); and the practical administration of the law. It also discusses the various forms of ijtihad and taqlid that could generate new legal rulings, along with the textual forms and real-world interactions within which legal judgments were sought and expressed. Finally, it looks at the fatwa, which consists of a legal opinion issued in response to an inquiry (istifta’).


Author(s):  
Denise Meyerson

What is the nature of a court? In this article I argue that we need to know what a court is supposed to do in order to understand what it is. I argue against two conceptions of a court which I call ‘minimalist’ and ‘essentialist’. The former holds that a court is simply a body empowered to make binding resolutions of disputes by applying existing laws. I argue that this conception is incomplete. The latter identifies further essential features of courts, such as the use of fair processes. I argue that the essentialist conception lacks explanatory power. Drawing on the central case methodology in legal philosophy, I introduce a conception that I call the ‘paradigm case conception’. I argue that paradigm courts are not merely empowered to apply the law but equipped to do so, by virtue of possessing features that assist them to resolve legal disputes accurately and effectively (ie, with the public’s acceptance). Courts that do not possess all of these features or possess them to a limited degree are not ‘non-courts’ but defective courts. I explain why the paradigm case conception is theoretically and practically superior to the other conceptions.


Author(s):  
Mark Lunney ◽  
Donal Nolan ◽  
Ken Oliphant

This chapter first discusses the historical development of tort law, covering the origins of tort law; the forms of action; the development of fault-based liability; eighteenth-century developments; the classification of obligations; and the modern pre-eminence of negligence. It then turns to theories of tort, covering the aims of the law of tort and doctrinal classifications. Finally, the chapter considers modern influences on tort law, covering the influence of insurance; the influence of human rights; and concerns about ‘compensation culture’.


Author(s):  
Paul Torremans

This chapter discusses law on confidentiality and trade secrets. It covers the historical development of the law of breach of confidence; the three essential elements necessary in a claim for breach of confidence; remedies for breach of confidence; and the impact of the internationalization of the law of intellectual property.


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