scholarly journals Religious Freedom and the European Court of Human Rights’ Two Margins of Appreciation

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 198-209
Author(s):  
Stephanie E. Berry
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
The State ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Religious Clothing

Abstract The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) use of the margin of appreciation (MoA) in cases concerning religious clothing is well-documented. This article paints a more complete picture of the use of the doctrine in cases falling within Article 9 and Article 2, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (echr). The ECtHR’s use of the normative MoA often appears to be superfluous as it does not seem to extend past the Article 9(2) echr, limitations clause. In contrast, the systemic MoA allows almost complete deference to the State, which has the potential to undermine the religious freedom of minorities.

New Trends in Religious Liberty and the European Court of Human Rights

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 266-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Leigh
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Religious Education ◽  
Military Service ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Religious Affiliation ◽  
The State ◽  
Religious Liberty ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

This article analyses recent trends in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerned with the right to freedom of thought, belief and religion (Article 9, European Convention on Human Rights) and the right of parents to respect by the state for their religious and philosophical views in the education of their children (Article 2, Protocol 1).1 These developments include notable decisions concerned with protection from religious persecution in Georgia, with religious education in Norway and Turkey and with the display of crucifixes in state schools in Italy. It is apparent that the European Convention religious liberty jurisprudence increasingly stresses the role of the state as a neutral protector of religious freedom. For individuals religious freedom is now also recognised to include not only the right to manifest their religious belief but also freedom from having to declare their religious affiliation. As the religious liberty jurisprudence comes of age, other significant developments, for example in relation to conscientious objection to military service, can be anticipated.

scholarly journals Dopuszczalność opodatkowania odszkodowania uzyskanego od Skarbu Państwa w świetle standardów ochronnych Europejskiej konwencji praw człowieka

2019 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 19-39
Author(s):  
Aleksander Cieśliński
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
The State ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Legal Obligations ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Commercial Company ◽  
Full Compensation ◽  
Business Entities ◽  
Principle Of Proportionality

ADMISSIBILITY OF TAXATION OF THE COMPENSATION RECEIVED FROM THE STATE TREASURY IN THE LIGHT OF PROTECTIVE STANDARDS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTSThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the legal admissibility of taxing the compensation received by a commercial company from the State Treasury which is responsible for the damage suffered by the company. Such damage may be caused by State officials in the performance of their duties, including the tax authorities. It seems completely obvious that the victim should expect full compensation. Unfortunately, such sums are classified by the Polish tax law as any other income received by the tax payer and no exception is provided, which results in an actual reduction of its value.However, it may raise serious doubts if one takes into account legal obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and the well developed case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Even though the Convention is usually not considered to be a legal act that could protect commercial interests of business entities, one should not forget about its very important Article 1 of Protocol 1, providing protection of property also for legal persons. In this particular case, it is not the amount of tax collected that should be seen as the property that has been taken away, as under this provision domestic authorities are entitled to enforce such laws as they deem necessary to control the use of property to secure the payment of taxes. What makes it so special is this context of compensation and that is why an evaluation of the interpretation of the term “possessions” and the appropriate understanding of the essence of the taxpayer’s right is one the major topics of this paper. The biggest challenge, however, is related to the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting Parties as to the measures that might be undertaken for the sake of the abovementioned purpose, especially seeing as in the area of taxation the Court seems to be particularly tolerant. Therefore, special emphasis is put on the principle of proportionality and its meaning for the analyzed case.

School Bans on the Wearing of Religious Symbols: Examining the Implications of Recent Case Law from the UK

2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erica Howard
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Religious Symbols ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
European Court ◽  
Religious Clothing ◽  
Religious Dress ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Right

AbstractThis article examines school bans on the wearing of religious symbols and starts with a discussion of the arguments for the imposition of a ban and the counter arguments against these. The question whether a ban on the wearing of religious clothing in schools is a violation of the right to manifest one's religion as guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is analyzed using the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and of the English courts in relation to such bans in education. The cases appear to suggest that such bans can be considered an interference with the right to manifest one's religion under Article 9(1), but that these bans can be justified under Article 9(2) in certain circumstances. Two important considerations in the decision of the courts are the way decisions to ban certain forms of religious dress are made and whether alternative ways of manifesting the religion are available.

Pluralism, Secularism and The European Court of Human Rights

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary R. Calo
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Religious Pluralism ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Majority Opinion ◽  
Jehovah's Witness ◽  
The Core ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
European Court ◽  
Core Principle

The Article 9 religious freedom jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights most basically concerns the question of religious pluralism. The “principle of pluralism seems to be the main—the core—principle” guiding the Court's religious freedom jurisprudence, argues one of the Court's judges. Assessing the Court's work in the area of religious freedom therefore requires considering its treatment of pluralism, which is the concept most often employed to interpret Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court's approach to religious pluralism is still heavily indebted to the decision inKokkinakis v. Greece, a 1993 case involving a Jehovah's Witness who had been repeatedly arrested and jailed for violating Greece's prohibition on proselytism. In the majority opinion finding that Mr. Kokkinakis's Article 9 rights had been violated, the Court writes the following:

scholarly journals The Qualified Right to Freedom of Religion: An examination of the limitations contained in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 73-99
Author(s):  
Mark Hill
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Democratic Society ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Freedom Of Religion ◽  
Public Order ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation

The manifestation of religious beliefs under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights is not absolute but may be subject to prescribed limitations. This article discusses the nature and extent of those limitations, as interpreted in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights from its decision in Kokkinakis v. Greece up to the present. It contrasts the prescriptive text of the Article with its loose and inconsistent interpretation by the Court in Strasbourg. Particular attention is given to the criteria of ‘prescribed by law’, ‘necessary in a democratic society’, ‘public safety’, ‘public order, health or morals’ and ‘the rights and freedoms of others’. This article seeks to extract clear principles from the contradictory and confusing jurisprudence, particularly at its intersection with the Court’s illusory doctrine of margin of appreciation.

scholarly journals The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Promoting Horizontal Positive Obligations of the State

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Florczak-Wątor
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
The State ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Wide Margin ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation

Summary Over the last forty years the concept of the horizontal positive obligations of the State Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights has been developing in a number of cases of the European Court of Human Rights. This concept extends the protection of Convention rights and freedoms to horizontal relations, that is, to the relations between two private parties. However, the Convention on Human Rights can be violated only by the State; the violation by private parties is not possible, as private parties are not parties to the Conventions. Therefore, the only way to challenge a violation of Convention rights committed by private parties is to link this action to an act or omission of the State, and to claim that the State is responsible for it. This, in turn, requires demonstrating that the Convention obliges the State to protect one individual’s Convention rights from violations committed by other individuals. The State has a wide margin of appreciation as to how it discharges the obligation to protect Convention rights against violations by private individuals.

Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 321-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn Evans
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
Positive Role ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
European Court ◽  
Short Period

The Evolution of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human RightsArticle 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects religious freedom, looked for many decades as though it was going to be effectively a dead letter. The European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) did not find a violation of Article 9 until the case of Kokkinakis v. Greece which was decided only seventeen years ago, in 1993. Even after that seminal decision, religious freedom cases were still relatively rare for several years; in 2001, there had been fewer than thirty Court cases on Article 9. However, in the last decade the case law has expanded significantly; and from 2001 to 2010 there have been more than sixty additional cases. Thus, in a relatively short period, the Court has been pushed to develop a jurisprudence of religious freedom to deal with increasingly complex and controversial cases. As the case law has multiplied and the issues have diversified, however, it has become clear that the Court has not yet developed a sufficiently coherent and principled approach to this area. So far, its approach has proved of very limited utility to individuals making claims of religious freedom.This is not to suggest that the Court has played no role in the protection of religious freedom in Europe. Indeed, in recent years, it has arguably played an increasingly positive role, particularly in cases involving group religious rights. However, this jurisprudence has not translated into greater protection for religious individuals in many instances.

Lachiri v Belgium and Bans on Wearing Islamic Dress in the Courtroom: An Emerging Trend

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-53
Author(s):  
Kaushik Paul
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Religious Freedom ◽  
Public Spaces ◽  
Religious Liberty ◽  
Recent Case ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
Islamic Dress

In recent years, the wearing of Islamic dress in public spaces and elsewhere has generated widespread controversy all over Europe. The wearing of the hijab and other Islamic veils has been the subject of adjudication before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on many occasions. The most recent case before the ECtHR as to the prohibition on wearing the hijab is Lachiri v Belgium. In this case, the ECtHR held that a prohibition on wearing the hijab in the courtroom constitutes an infringement of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to freedom of religion or belief. From the perspective of religious freedom, the ruling of the Strasbourg Court in Lachiri is very significant for many reasons. The purpose of this comment is critically to analyse the ECtHR's decision in Lachiri from the standpoint of religious liberty.

Abortion for Foetal Abnormalities in Ireland; The Limited Scope of the Irish Government’s Response to the A, B and C Judgment

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Donoghue ◽  
Claire-Michelle Smyth
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Legal Abortion ◽  
Member States ◽  
Non Invasive ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Controversial Topic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Limited Scope

Abstract Abortion has been a controversial topic in Irish law and one which the Government has been forced to address following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in A, B and C v. Ireland. The Working Group established to make recommendations have specifically been instructed to deal only with the issues raised in the A, B and C judgment and legislate on the basic of the ‘X case’. This restricted approach calls for legalisation of abortion only where the life of the mother is at risk, a position unique only to Ireland and Andorra within Europe. The vast majority of member states to the European Convention on Human Rights allow for legal abortion on the basis of foetal abnormality and with this emerging consensus the margin of appreciation hitherto afforded by the European Court to member states is diminishing. The advancement and availability of non-invasive genetic tests that can determine foetal abnormalities together with the ruling in R. R. v. Poland leaves Ireland in a precarious position for omitting any reference to foetal abnormalities in any proposed legislation.

Muslim Reformists, Female Citizenship, and the Public Accommodation of Islam in Liberal Democracy

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Fadel
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Gender Equality ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
The Public ◽  
European Court ◽  
Margin Of Appreciation ◽  
Gender Hierarchy ◽  
Normative Justification

AbstractThe European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in a trilogy of cases involving Muslim claimants, has granted state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights a wide margin of appreciation with respect to the regulation of public manifestations of Islam. The ECHR has justified its decisions in these cases on the grounds that Islamic symbols, such as the ḥijāb, or Muslim commitments to the shari‘a — Islamic law — are inconsistent with the democratic order of Europe. This article raises the question of what kinds of commitments to gender equality and democratic decision-making are sufficient for a democratic order, and whether modernist Islamic teachings manifest a satisfactory normative commitment in this regard. It uses the arguments of two modern Muslim reformist scholars — Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī and ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Abū Shuqqa — as evidence to argue that if the relevant degree of commitment to gender equality is understood from the perspective of political rather than comprehensive liberalism, doctrines such as those elaborated by these two religious scholars evidence sufficient commitment to the value of political equality between men and women. This makes less plausible the ECHR's arguments justifying a different treatment of Muslims on account of alleged Islamic commitments to gender hierarchy. It also argues that in light of Muslim modernist conceptions of the shari‘a, there is no normative justification to conclude that faithfulness to the shari‘a entails a categorical rejection of democracy as the ECHR suggested.

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