scholarly journals The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Promoting Horizontal Positive Obligations of the State

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Florczak-Wątor

Summary Over the last forty years the concept of the horizontal positive obligations of the State Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights has been developing in a number of cases of the European Court of Human Rights. This concept extends the protection of Convention rights and freedoms to horizontal relations, that is, to the relations between two private parties. However, the Convention on Human Rights can be violated only by the State; the violation by private parties is not possible, as private parties are not parties to the Conventions. Therefore, the only way to challenge a violation of Convention rights committed by private parties is to link this action to an act or omission of the State, and to claim that the State is responsible for it. This, in turn, requires demonstrating that the Convention obliges the State to protect one individual’s Convention rights from violations committed by other individuals. The State has a wide margin of appreciation as to how it discharges the obligation to protect Convention rights against violations by private individuals.

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 601-620
Author(s):  
Vladislava Stoyanova

AbstractThe European Court of Human Rights has consistently reiterated that positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights arise when state authorities know or ought to have known about the risk of harm. This article attempts to describe and assess the role of state knowledge in the framework of positive obligations, and to situate the Court’s approach to knowledge about risk within an intelligible framework of analysis. The main argument is that the assessment of state knowledge is imbued with normative considerations. The assessment of whether the state ‘ought to have known’ is intertwined with, first, concerns that positive obligations should not impose unreasonable burden on the state and, second, the establishment of causal links between state omissions and harm.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 198-209
Author(s):  
Stephanie E. Berry

Abstract The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) use of the margin of appreciation (MoA) in cases concerning religious clothing is well-documented. This article paints a more complete picture of the use of the doctrine in cases falling within Article 9 and Article 2, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (echr). The ECtHR’s use of the normative MoA often appears to be superfluous as it does not seem to extend past the Article 9(2) echr, limitations clause. In contrast, the systemic MoA allows almost complete deference to the State, which has the potential to undermine the religious freedom of minorities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 19-39
Author(s):  
Aleksander Cieśliński

ADMISSIBILITY OF TAXATION OF THE COMPENSATION RECEIVED FROM THE STATE TREASURY IN THE LIGHT OF PROTECTIVE STANDARDS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTSThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the legal admissibility of taxing the compensation received by a commercial company from the State Treasury which is responsible for the damage suffered by the company. Such damage may be caused by State officials in the performance of their duties, including the tax authorities. It seems completely obvious that the victim should expect full compensation. Unfortunately, such sums are classified by the Polish tax law as any other income received by the tax payer and no exception is provided, which results in an actual reduction of its value.However, it may raise serious doubts if one takes into account legal obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and the well developed case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Even though the Convention is usually not considered to be a legal act that could protect commercial interests of business entities, one should not forget about its very important Article 1 of Protocol 1, providing protection of property also for legal persons. In this particular case, it is not the amount of tax collected that should be seen as the property that has been taken away, as under this provision domestic authorities are entitled to enforce such laws as they deem necessary to control the use of property to secure the payment of taxes. What makes it so special is this context of compensation and that is why an evaluation of the interpretation of the term “possessions” and the appropriate understanding of the essence of the taxpayer’s right is one the major topics of this paper. The biggest challenge, however, is related to the margin of appreciation left to the Contracting Parties as to the measures that might be undertaken for the sake of the abovementioned purpose, especially seeing as in the area of taxation the Court seems to be particularly tolerant. Therefore, special emphasis is put on the principle of proportionality and its meaning for the analyzed case.


Author(s):  
Lara Redondo Saceda

El artículo 8 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos –que protege los derechos al respeto la vida privada y familiar, el domicilio y la correspondencia– se ha configurado en estos setenta años de Convenio como uno de los escenarios habituales del desarrollo del margen de apreciación nacional y la doctrina de las obligaciones positivas del Estado. Esto parece justificarse en el contenido y estructura de este artículo y en las restricciones y limitaciones al ejercicio de estos derechos establecidas por su párrafo segundo. En este marco, el objetivo de este artículo es analizar cuál ha sido el papel del artículo 8 CEDH en el desarrollo de estos estándares interpretativos y cómo ha influido en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights –which protects the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence– has been configured as a traditional place for the development of the margin of appreciation and the doctrine of State’s positive obligations. The scope and structure of this article and its limitation clause in the second paragraph seem to justify these developments. In this context, the objective of this article is to analyse the role of Article 8 ECHR in the development of these interpretative standards and its influence in the European Court of Human Rights case-law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 9-32
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Jasudowicz

The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in tax matters has developed in three dimensions. Firstly, it involved Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention with reference to “the payment of taxes”, viewed, notwithstanding the State’s wide margin of appreciation, in the light of the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions. Secondly, from the perspective of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Convention, tax disputes can be covered by the guarantees of a fair trial where the proceedings and sanctions, for example, concerning tax surcharges, are qualified in their autonomous Convention meaning as a “criminal charge” against the taxpayer. Moreover, despite its traditional case-law, in the last years the Court has seemed to allow the possibility of qualifying tax disputes as concerning “civilrights and obligations” Thirdly, on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, the Court has found violations of the prohibition “to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings” in the context of dual, i.e. tax (administrative) and penal, proceedings. The author critically assesses the Court judgment in the case of A. and B. v. Norway, in which the Court did not find a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. In the Norwegian case, the distinct administrative and penal proceedings were in fact merged, since the state introduced a system of integrated legal answers to taxpayers’ behavior. According to Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, expressing a dissenting opinion, the Court in this judgment wrongly changed its stance from pro persona to pro auctoritate, possibly forgetting that it is a court of humanrights, and not a pleader of raison d’Etat. Although the Court declared that it considers the Convention “as a whole”, and seeks to ensure the consistency of the Convention system and harmony of its provisions, it might have lost sight of ties existing between them. Taxpayers are also individual humansand have a title to human rights, thus tax disputes are those of a human rights nature. Understandably, the ECHR must persist as a Court of Human Rights.


2012 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wannes Van Hoof ◽  
Guido Pennings

Abstract Certain states impose restrictions on assisted reproduction because they believe such acts to be morally wrong. However, people who live in a state with restrictive legislation always have the option of going abroad to evade that law. Turkey and several states in Australia have enacted extraterritorial laws to stop forms of reproductive travelling for law evasion. Within the EU, the European Convention of Human Rights would normally remove the need for extraterritorial laws. However, because of the wide margin of appreciation allowed by the European Court of Human Rights, legal diversity on these matters persists. In the case of S.H. and Others v. Austria, moral justification, consistency and proportionality were introduced by the First Section to rule on Member States’ legislation on medically assisted reproduction. The First Section mostly ruled on the effectiveness of the law, while the focus should be on the validity of the normative aim. The Grand Chamber reversed this judgement based on the margin of appreciation doctrine, using it as a pragmatic substitute for a substantial decision. In general, the EU’s interests of harmonization and unification are at odds with the right to national identity of individual states in areas of contested morality.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie E. Berry

Calls for the adoption of an Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (echr) on National Minorities have persisted within the Council of Europe despite the adoption of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (fcnm). This article explores the potential implications of the adoption of an Additional Protocol on National Minorities to the echr for the fcnm. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) already has several tools that would allow it to extend protection to persons belonging to national minorities. However, as the ECtHR tends to allow States a wide margin of appreciation in cases concerning persons belonging to minorities, it is argued that the adoption of an Additional Protocol on National Minorities may not be desirable, as it has the potential to undermine the progress made by the Framework Convention Advisory Committee.


Legal Studies ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 625-650 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Williams ◽  
Bernadette Rainey

In the Belgian Linguistic case the European Court of Human Rights held that legislation regarding language in education which was based on the principle of territoriality did not offend against the rights guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol 1 or Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, whether taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14 on non-discrimination. That ruling was given some 35 years ago, and this paper considers whether developments since then might lead the European Court of Human Rights to decide similar issues differently if they arose today. However, having considered the situation, including instruments which have been adopted specifically to deal with language rights and minority rights, the conclusion is reached that the European Court of Human Rights would be likely to continue to allow a fairly wide margin of appreciation to states in the highly sensitive and controversial area of language rights and how they should be protected.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Donoghue ◽  
Claire-Michelle Smyth

Abstract Abortion has been a controversial topic in Irish law and one which the Government has been forced to address following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in A, B and C v. Ireland. The Working Group established to make recommendations have specifically been instructed to deal only with the issues raised in the A, B and C judgment and legislate on the basic of the ‘X case’. This restricted approach calls for legalisation of abortion only where the life of the mother is at risk, a position unique only to Ireland and Andorra within Europe. The vast majority of member states to the European Convention on Human Rights allow for legal abortion on the basis of foetal abnormality and with this emerging consensus the margin of appreciation hitherto afforded by the European Court to member states is diminishing. The advancement and availability of non-invasive genetic tests that can determine foetal abnormalities together with the ruling in R. R. v. Poland leaves Ireland in a precarious position for omitting any reference to foetal abnormalities in any proposed legislation.


2012 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Fadel

AbstractThe European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in a trilogy of cases involving Muslim claimants, has granted state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights a wide margin of appreciation with respect to the regulation of public manifestations of Islam. The ECHR has justified its decisions in these cases on the grounds that Islamic symbols, such as the ḥijāb, or Muslim commitments to the shari‘a — Islamic law — are inconsistent with the democratic order of Europe. This article raises the question of what kinds of commitments to gender equality and democratic decision-making are sufficient for a democratic order, and whether modernist Islamic teachings manifest a satisfactory normative commitment in this regard. It uses the arguments of two modern Muslim reformist scholars — Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī and ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Abū Shuqqa — as evidence to argue that if the relevant degree of commitment to gender equality is understood from the perspective of political rather than comprehensive liberalism, doctrines such as those elaborated by these two religious scholars evidence sufficient commitment to the value of political equality between men and women. This makes less plausible the ECHR's arguments justifying a different treatment of Muslims on account of alleged Islamic commitments to gender hierarchy. It also argues that in light of Muslim modernist conceptions of the shari‘a, there is no normative justification to conclude that faithfulness to the shari‘a entails a categorical rejection of democracy as the ECHR suggested.


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