The Credible Commitment Problem in the Third-Party Mediation of the Mindanao Peace Process, 1975–2014

2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 181-207
Author(s):  
John Lee Candelaria
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Process Tracing ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Negotiated Settlements ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Monitoring And Enforcement ◽  
Commitment Problems

Abstract Negotiated settlements of civil wars are challenging since incompatibilities take a long time to resolve. Many scholars have approached this puzzle by identifying information asymmetry and commitment problems as critical deterrents to resolution. Similarly, this article argues that third-party mediation could improve or worsen the parties’ credible commitment problems, as illustrated in the Mindanao peace process mediation that spanned almost four decades. Following a contingency framework in analyzing third-party mediation, this article analyzes existing reports, statements, and peace process agreements using a process tracing methodology. The article argues that the success of a peace process could be attributed to how mediation resolves the parties’ credible commitment problems, which are evident in three aspects of the peace process: getting the parties to negotiate, the use of mediator leverage, and the promise of third-party monitoring and enforcement.

scholarly journals How and When Amnesty during Conflict Affects Conflict Termination

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (9) ◽  
pp. 1612-1637
Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Negotiated Settlements ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Conflict Reduction ◽  
The Government ◽  
Conflict Termination ◽  
Commitment Problems ◽  
Cross National

In the difficult process of ending civil wars, granting amnesty during conflict is seen as a useful option, with an underpinning assumption that trading justice for peace is effective. However, is the case? This article tries to bring some clarity to when and how amnesty given during conflict has an impact. Amnesty should have different effects on diverse conflict endings: negotiated settlement, rebel victory, government victory, or conflict reduction. The article also disaggregates amnesties to test direct impacts as an incentive or through reducing the commitment problem, and indirect effects that give military advantage to the government. Using a cross-national data set of amnesties in dyadic conflicts from 1975 to 2011, the research finds that amnesty’s strongest effect is, surprisingly, not as an incentive but rather to reduce commitment problems. It can lead to negotiated settlements but also to government military advantage. The results have implications for negotiations and conflict resolution.

Bargaining Models of War and the Stability of Peace in Post-Conflict Societies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margit Bussmann
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Security Guarantees ◽  
Commitment Problems

A major challenge for countries that emerge from civil war is the stabilization of the post-conflict order in a way that fighting does not break out again. Recent empirical and theoretical work on the resolution of civil wars and on the duration of peace strongly rely on the bargaining framework of war emphasizing information asymmetries and commitment problems as main reasons for why in some states civil wars recur repeatedly, whereas in other societies a conflict ends and a transition to a peaceful society is successful. The length of peace spells depends partly on information about the distribution of power that became available during the conflict, captured by the duration and intensity of the fighting as well as the type of conflict ending. Information problems are more relevant at earlier stages and with regard to the initiation of negotiations. In finding bargaining deals and securing their implementation, the conflict parties have to overcome commitment problems. The literature has investigated in more detail third-party security guarantees and power-sharing arrangements as mechanisms to get conflict parties to credibly commit to and adhere to a negotiated agreement. Recently, empirical research moved beyond the conclusion of peace agreements to the study of their implementation. Particular challenges for a peaceful order are the demobilization of ex-combatants, which is aggravated by time-inconsistency problems, the timing of elections, and the redistribution of economic resources. Finally, solutions become more difficult in multiparty conflicts and if the armed groups are fragmented.

scholarly journals Contract for Peace: Peace Agreements and its Security Implication

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-34
Author(s):  
Rajendra Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
New Delhi ◽  
Constituent Assembly ◽  
Negotiated Settlements ◽  
Peace Agreements ◽  
Building Process ◽  
Justice Process ◽  
Democratic Nation

Negotiated settlements have been increasingly accepted as the preferred way of ending civil wars. Studies show that only 50 percent of negotiated settlements last beyond five years, while in others, negotiated settlements have been shown to keep the peace for only three and half years. Contrary to this, the peace agreements/understandings were universally considered as the pivotal blue print for conflict transformation and peace buildings. In our case, the management of arms and armies, reintegration of few former rebels in the national army, promulgation of the constitution from the constituent assembly etc. are the crucial tasks of the peace process. In this context, this paper highlights the major peace agreements (2005-2010) reached between the then Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)-Maoist and the seven parliamentary party alliance’s government and simultaneously tries to analyze these agreements’ influence on security. The 12-point understanding of 2005 concluded in New Delhi is the guiding framework of the Nepalese peace process and has its geostrategic implication as well. Likewise, the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) of 2006 is a milestone in bringing about an end to the decade of old civil war and beginning an inclusive, secular, peaceful and democratic nation-building process. Despite everything, delaying the transitional justice process and staling the social reconciliation can be the potential reason for a reprisal of conflict

Committing to Peace: Soft Guarantees and Alternative Approaches to Power Sharing in Angola and Mozambique

2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Brown ◽  
Marie-Joëlle Zahar
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Common Method ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Material Resources ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Alternative Power ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Peace And Development

This article analyses how alternative power-sharing mechanisms can be used to secure peace in countries where warring parties fail to reach a traditional power-sharing agreement, the most common method of solving the ‘credible commitment’ problem. By examining the cases of Angola and Mozambique, it demonstrates how ‘soft’ guarantees — in these cases, on the integration of armed forces and access to financial and material resources for rebel leaders — can help end civil wars. The non-binding nature of these pledges, however, also facilitated the ruling parties' progressive withdrawal from them, which has set back the democratisation process in both countries. This in turn may put at risk future peace and development.

Restoring Confidence in Post-Conflict Security Sectors: Survey Evidence from Liberia on Female Ratio Balancing Reforms

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 799-821 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina Karim
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Support ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Peace Building ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Female Ratio ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
The Right

Civilian confidence in domestic institutions, particularly in the security sector, is important for stability and state consolidation in post-conflict countries, where third-party peacekeepers have helped maintain peace and security after a conflict. While other scholars have suggested that a strong security sector is necessary for mitigating the credible commitment problem, this article provides two alternative criteria for assessing security sector reforms’ effect on confidence in the security sector: restraint and inclusiveness. Female ratio balancing in the security sector meets these two criteria, suggesting that it has the potential to help enhance confidence in the security sector and thereby create the right conditions for the peacekeeping transition. The argument is tested using original surveys conducted in post-conflict, ex-combatant communities in Liberia. The expectations received empirical support. The findings indicate that restraining and inclusive reforms could improve trust in the state’s security sector. They also demonstrate the importance of considering gender in theories related to post-conflict peace building and international relations more broadly.

scholarly journals Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janina Beiser-McGrath ◽  
Nils W. Metternich
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Regime Type ◽  
Political Survival ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Conditional Logit ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Population Sizes ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Commitment Problems

Why do authoritarian governments exclude ethnic groups if this jeopardizes their regime survival? We generalize existing arguments that attribute exclusion dynamics to ethnic coalition formation. We argue that a mutual commitment problem, between the ethnic ruling group and potential coalition members, leads to power-balanced ethnic coalitions. However, authoritarian regimes with institutions that mitigate credible commitment problems facilitate the formation of coalitions that are less balanced in power. We test our arguments with a k-adic conditional logit approach, using data on ethnic groups and their power status. We demonstrate that in autocracies, the ruling ethnic group is more likely to form and maintain coalitions that balance population sizes among all coalition members. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the extent to which balancing occurs is conditional on authoritarian regime type.

Changing horses in midstream: Leadership changes and the civil war peace process

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirssa Cline Ryckman ◽  
Jessica Maves Braithwaite
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Interstate Relations ◽  
Negotiated Settlements ◽  
Leadership Turnover ◽  
Leadership Changes ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Commitment Problems

We examine the impact of governmental leadership changes on the civil war peace process. In line with the literature on leadership changes and interstate war, we argue that transitions can help overcome lags in the rational updating process, leading to negotiations and termination through negotiated settlements. However, while studies of interstate relations emphasize the role of “outsider” changes that produce new winning coalitions, we argue that owing to the critical nature of credible commitment problems within the civil war peace process, only “insider” changes can generate the benefits of leadership change while mitigating uncertainty generated by leadership turnover. Using existing and original data on changes in governmental leadership, we find support for our expectations. Leadership changes can produce conditions favorable to negotiations and settlements, but only changes from inside the existing regime should be encouraged to avoid prolonging the conflict.

The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information

2004 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT POWELL
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Stochastic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Common Mechanism ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Rapid Changes ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Commitment Problems

Recent work across a wide range of issues in political economy as well as in American, comparative, and international politics tries to explain the inefficient use of power—revolutions, civil wars, high levels of public debt, international conflict, and costly policy insulation—in terms of commitment problems. This paper shows that a common mechanism is at work in a number of these diverse studies. This common mechanism provides a more general formulation of a type of commitment problem that can arise in many different substantive settings. The present analysis then formalizes this mechanism as an “inefficiency condition” that ensures that all of the equilibria of a stochastic game are inefficient. This condition has a natural substantive interpretation: Large, rapid changes in the actors' relative power (measured in terms of their minmax payoffs) may cause inefficiency.

scholarly journals The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement

1997 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara F. Walter
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Peace Treaty ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Negotiated Settlements ◽  
Treaty Negotiations ◽  
Internal Wars ◽  
Similar Solutions ◽  
Bargaining Table

Unlike interstate wars, civil wars rarely end in negotiated settlements. Between 1940 and 1990 55 percent of interstate wars were resolved at the bargaining table, whereas only 20 percent of civil wars reached similar solutions. Instead, most internal wars ended with the extermination, expulsion, or capitulation of the losing side. In fact, groups fighting civil wars almost always chose to fight to the finish unless an outside power stepped in to guarantee a peace agreement. If a third party agreed to enforce the terms of a peace treaty, negotiations always succeeded regardless of the initial goals, ideology, or ethnicity of the participants. If a third party did not intervene, these talks usually failed.

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