Committing to Peace: Soft Guarantees and Alternative Approaches to Power Sharing in Angola and Mozambique

2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Brown ◽  
Marie-Joëlle Zahar

This article analyses how alternative power-sharing mechanisms can be used to secure peace in countries where warring parties fail to reach a traditional power-sharing agreement, the most common method of solving the ‘credible commitment’ problem. By examining the cases of Angola and Mozambique, it demonstrates how ‘soft’ guarantees — in these cases, on the integration of armed forces and access to financial and material resources for rebel leaders — can help end civil wars. The non-binding nature of these pledges, however, also facilitated the ruling parties' progressive withdrawal from them, which has set back the democratisation process in both countries. This in turn may put at risk future peace and development.

2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 181-207
Author(s):  
John Lee Candelaria

Abstract Negotiated settlements of civil wars are challenging since incompatibilities take a long time to resolve. Many scholars have approached this puzzle by identifying information asymmetry and commitment problems as critical deterrents to resolution. Similarly, this article argues that third-party mediation could improve or worsen the parties’ credible commitment problems, as illustrated in the Mindanao peace process mediation that spanned almost four decades. Following a contingency framework in analyzing third-party mediation, this article analyzes existing reports, statements, and peace process agreements using a process tracing methodology. The article argues that the success of a peace process could be attributed to how mediation resolves the parties’ credible commitment problems, which are evident in three aspects of the peace process: getting the parties to negotiate, the use of mediator leverage, and the promise of third-party monitoring and enforcement.


Author(s):  
V. Makhankov ◽  
A. Maltsev ◽  
A. Kupriniuk ◽  
V. Obertas

The current stage of reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AF) confirms that the crisis in the country's economy has significantly affected the system of logistics of troops, which ensures its main task – to maintain the combat readiness of military units and ensure their livelihood in peacetime. The war in the east of the country and the existing state of providing troops showed the need to improve the organization and management of the process of logistical (technical, rear and medical) provision of training and combat use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is currently in the phase of perspective changes and necessitates the development of a new concept of military information management and logistical flows, which will be implemented by a new, more efficient structure, called the "military logistics system". The purpose of the article is to determine the directions for the creation and accumulation of an optimal nomenclature of stocks of material resources in peacetime and their rational separation at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of management. The article describes the contents of the concepts of "logistics", "echelon", "stocking", "operational accounting". Important tasks of modern conditions of process of creation and management of stocks in the course of reforming of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are systematized; variants of the offered models of inventory management are outlined. The goal is achieved through theoretical and experimental research on volume optimization and material separation at all levels of management, which is one of the key problems of military logistics.


2017 ◽  
pp. 182-195
Author(s):  
I. Sribnyak

The article analyzes the moral condition and conditions of staying of interned Ukrainian soldiers in the camp of Stshalkovo (Poland) in the second half of 1921 – early 1922. Based on the use of a wide range of archival sources, the author concludes that the camp everyday life of the wartime period was marked by significant difficulties due to its extraordinary crowding and presence in the camp of interned and captured soldiers of other formations (Balahovtsy and Red Army soldiers). The lack of any material resources, the lack of adequate and high-quality food, the lack of fuel for heating booths, anti-Ukrainian agitation, led to the fact that a part of Ukrainian soldiers lost national moral values. In order to prevent the demoralization of Ukrainian warfare, the command of the group tried to intensify cultural and educational work in the camp, but due to lack of premises and lack of resources, it slowly collapsed. Some of the interned ones did not withstand the burden of hopeless and burdensome camping munitions, and left the camp in search of better living conditions. Obviously, this was a dangerous trend, and the command of the interned troops in various ways tried to prevent it from further spreading. The leader of the group A. Pиzitsky was particularly opposed to the destructive processes in the camp. His measures were fully understood and supported by the higher military leadership of the Armed Forces and the Government of the UPR.


Author(s):  
Astrid Jamar ◽  
Gerard Birantamije

Military politics have been entangled with the trajectory of Burundian public institutions, experiences of violence, and the army formation. From 1994 to 2009, the peace process brought together different political parties, security forces, and rebel groups to negotiate ceasefires and major institutional reforms. Adopted in 2000, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement contained some of the most ambitious and sophisticated security reforms. While most literature emphasizes mostly on the Arusha Peace Agreement, 22 agreements were signed by different sets of parties, including political parties and rebel groups during these 15 years of peace meditation. The Arusha Peace Agreement provides for complex security arrangements: (a) a strictly defined role, structure, and mandate of the army and other security forces; (b) sophisticated power-sharing arrangements for both leadership and composition of the army and other security forces; (c) demobilization, disarmament, integration, and training of armed forces; (d) transformation of armed groups into political parties; and (e) ceasefires. The peace talks integrated various armed political groups into Burundian institutions. Responding to four decades of violence and military dictatorship, these reforms of the military and other security forces aimed to disentangle the military from politics. Initially contested, the agreements shaped the reading of the historical contexts that justified these institutional military reforms. Indeed, provisions of these agreements also framed a narrative about violence and imposed fixed interpretations of political mobilization of violence. These imposed interpretations neglected key elements that enabled and, continue to enable, the political use of violence as well as the emergence of new forms of military politics. The main institutional approaches adopted to tackle issue of inclusion and correct imbalances in armed forces was the introduction of power-sharing arrangements based on ethnic dimensions. The formulation and further implementation of ethnic quotas reinforced the binary elements of ethnic identities, rather than promote a more fluid understanding that would appreciate intersecting elements, such as gender, political affiliation, and class and regional dimensions in the undertaking of power, alliance, and relations between executive and military institutions. Security reforms continue to affect the functioning of public institutions, with limited effects for disentangling politics and military.


Author(s):  
Marco Bünte

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.


Author(s):  
Octavio Amorim Neto ◽  
Igor P. Acácio

Contra the conventional wisdom that term limits are meaningless in dictatorships, Brazil’s military regime developed term-limits for its chief executives and managed a durable political order. This chapter argue that term limits moderated intra-elite conflicts, thus contributing to regime stability. Term limits were key to reconcile two warring factions within the armed forces. The authors see term limits as a credible-commitment mechanism. Three elements are jointly sufficient to explain the adoption of term limits: (1) the armed forces’ decision in 1964 to part ways with the decades-old pattern of episodic, short political interventions and stay in office for the long haul; (2) a legalist tradition that led the new regime to keep a façade of constitutionalism through a myriad of political institutions; and (3) the ideological and political cleavages within the armed forces. We corroborate our arguments using a new dataset of tension events between the military and the government in 1946–85.


Author(s):  
Margit Bussmann

Demobilization of ex-combatants is a major obstacle in the transition to a stable postconflict society. The combatants must be convinced to abandon the armed confrontation and hand over their weapons in light of security concerns and a lack of alternative means of income. The challenges to overcoming the commitment problem differ in terms of numbers of combatants who must be demobilized for conflicts that end in a decisive victory and conflicts that reach a military stalemate. Peace agreements can offer several solutions for overcoming the parties’ commitment problems, but often the implementation of the provisions is incomplete. Third parties can offer to monitor an agreement and provide security guarantees. International actors increasingly assist with demobilization and reintegration programs for former combatants and help to overcome security-related concerns and economic challenges. Another solution offered is military power-sharing arrangements and the integration of rebel fighters into the national military. These measures are intended to reduce the pool for potential recruitment for existing or new rebel groups. If ex-combatants are left without means of income to support themselves and their families, the risk is higher that they will remobilize and conflict will recur. Reintegration in the civilian labor market, however, is often difficult in the weak economies of war-affected countries.


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