Sextus and Wittgenstein on the End of Justification

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaul Tor
Keyword(s):  
Belief System ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement

Following the lead of Duncan Pritchard’s “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism,” this paper takes a further, comparative and contrastive look at the problem of justification in Sextus Empiricus and in Wittgenstein’sOn Certainty. I argue both that Pritchard’s stimulating account is problematic in certain important respects and that his insights contain much interpretive potential still to be pursued. Diverging from Pritchard, I argue that it is a significant and self-conscious aspect of Sextus’ sceptical strategies to call into question large segments of our belief systemen masseby exposing as apparently unjustifiable fundamental propositions which are closely related in their linchpin role to Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions. In the first instance, the result is a more complex account of both a deeper affinity between Wittgenstein’s approach to hinge propositions and Sextus’ approach to what I termarchaipropositions and a divergence between the two. In the second instance, I suggest how the comparison withOn Certaintycan be illuminating for the interpreter of Sextus. In particular, it can help us to see how the Pyrrhonist’s everyday conduct—common assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding—involves rational procedures of justification, in line with a naturalism reminiscent of Wittgenstein. Furthermore, it can help us to reflect on the Pyrrhonist’s attitude to what Wittgenstein would have called her ‘worldview’. Throughout, I suggest that the comparison with Wittgenstein is interesting, although it must be cashed out differently, not only on the interpretation—or, perhaps, strand—of ancient Pyrrhonism which has the sceptic exempt ordinary beliefs from her suspension of judgement, but also on the interpretation (or strand) which has her disavow all beliefs categorically.

Common Knowledge

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 309-325
Author(s):  
John Greco
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Transmission Of Knowledge ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
Distinctive Role

A promising idea in the recent literature is that the concept of knowledge serves to govern the flow of actionable information within a community of information sharers. In this connection, several authors have argued that knowledge is the “norm of assertion,” while others have explored the distinctive role of testimony in the transmission of knowledge. This paper investigates the role of “common knowledge” in such a community, and compares it to Wittgenstein’s notion of “hinge propositions” in On Certainty. Wittgenstein’s thinking is evaluated in this context, and an account of common knowledge along Wittgensteinian lines is considered. I do not here endorse the account of common knowledge that results. Rather, I consider some of the advantages and disadvantages of what looks to be a promising approach.

scholarly journals Dobradiças, Vertigem Epistémica e Moralidade

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (53) ◽  
pp. 125-140
Author(s):  
Nuno Venturinha ◽  
Keyword(s):  
On Certainty ◽  
The Third ◽  
Inexact Knowledge ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
Rational Evaluation

This paper explores central themes of Duncan Pritchard’s epistemology intimately related to the Wittgensteinian idea of a “hinge epistemology”. The first section calls attention to the eminently empirical character of our “hinges”. The second section focuses on Pritchard’s notion of “arational hinge commitments”, more specifically his distinction between the pair “über hinge commitments”/“über hinge propositions” and the pair “personal hinge commitments”/“personal hinge propositions”. The third section brings to the discussion Timothy Williamson’s view of “inexact knowledge” and examines another pair of notions introduced by Pritchard, namely “antiskeptical hinge commitments”/“antiskeptical hinge propositions”. I conclude with a reevaluation of the diagnosis made by Pritchard that, confronted with a sceptical scenario, our “epistemic angst” can be surpassed if we follow Wittgenstein’s teaching in On Certainty about the “structure of rational evaluation”, but that an “epistemic vertigo” can never be ultimately dispelled. My argument is that in a moral scenario there is no room for vertigo.

scholarly journals Wittgenstein on Scepticism. An Interpretation of Wittgenstein's On Certainty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Agata Orłowicz
Keyword(s):  
On Certainty ◽  
The World ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
New Interpretation

<p>The thesis puts forward a new interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and contrasts it with the standard reading of the book, also known in literature as the Framework Reading. The Framework Reading sees hinge propositions, that is our most basic and indubitable beliefs, as framing our practice of talking about the world, and, therefore, external to this practice. As such, they are seen as not truth-apt, purely regulative in character and our relation to them as non-epistemic. According to the interpretation put forward in this thesis, we should instead see hinges as uncontroversially correct moves in our practice of talking about the world, and, therefore, we should see them as obviously true and playing both a regulative and a descriptive role.</p>

Keats, Sextus Empiricus, and Medicine

Romanticism ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-176
Author(s):  
Li Ou
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Values ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Indirect Influence ◽  
Medical Background ◽  
The Common ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement ◽  
Pyrrhonian Scepticism

This essay discusses Keats's affinity with Pyrrhonian scepticism as recorded by Sextus Empiricus in Outlines of Scepticism in the following aspects: the investigative, non-dogmatic attitude towards the truth, the ability to set out oppositions and to realise the equipollence in opposed accounts of the truth, suspension of judgement, and the goal of tranquility. It also speculates on the implication of the common medical background Sextus and Keats shared by linking the ethical values of ancient scepticism to the humanitarian concerns of medicine that might have shaped Keats's scepticism. Although the connection between Keats, Sextus, and medicine is speculative, Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy – carefully studied by Keats – mentions Sextus, from which we can assume Keats's exposure to Sextan scepticism. The Renaissance revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism provides us with stronger evidence about its indirect influence on Keats through Montaigne and Shakespeare as its important inheritors.

Are There Mathematical Hinges?

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 346-366
Author(s):  
Annalisa Coliva
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Normative Function ◽  
Hinge Propositions

Abstract In this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have claimed, Wittgenstein did not maintain that simple mathematical propositions like “2 × 2 = 4” or “12 × 12 = 144,” much like G. E. Moore’s truisms, could be examples of hinge propositions. In particular, given his overall conception of mathematics, it was impossible for him to single out these simpler mathematical propositions from the rest of mathematical statements, to reserve only to them a normative function. I then maintain that these mathematical examples were introduced merely as objects of comparison to bring out some peculiar features of the only hinges he countenanced in On Certainty, which were all outside the realm of mathematics. I then close by gesturing at how the distinction between mathematical hinges and non-hinges could be exemplified and by exploring its consequences with respect to (Wittgenstein’s) philosophy of mathematics.

scholarly journals Is the Pyrrhonist happy, again? On ἀταραξία and πάθος in Sextus Empiricus.

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 618-636
Author(s):  
Denis Maslov
Keyword(s):  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
The Third ◽  
Pyrrhonian Skepticism ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement

The article tackles the question whether the Pyrrhonian skeptic can be happy having “pathe” in his life. Thus, the consistency of Pyrrhonian skepticism is discussed. In the first section, I consider the notions of ataraxia and tarache. The source of unhappiness is considered by Sextus to be beliefs about the good and the evil, which give rise to intense longing that creates anxiety. Sceptical suspension of judgement extirpates beliefs and therefore this anxiety. In the second section, the notion of pathe is analyzed in comparison with the Stoics. Pathe, such as hunger, thirst, pain, etc., are inevitably and involuntarily present in the life and they create a certain kind of distress. Because of their unreasonable and necessary nature, pathe cannot be disposed of but are nevertheless moderate and hence bearable. The question is, therefore, whether pathe can cause distress directly or through compelling people to form beliefs, which is examined in the third section. Sextus clearly distinguishes between these things as being dependent (beliefs) and independent (pathe) from us. A presupposition that beliefs are exclusively in our power was widely held at the time. On that ground, I argue that pathe do not originate anxiety for they cannot compel us to form beliefs. In addition, such conditions do not cause great agitation and therefore they cannot be a source of unhappiness. Those who hold something for good or true are burdened with a double distress – mental suffering from beliefs and from pathos. Thus, the skeptical life is better off than the dogmatic one. In the last section, I try to show on example of mental pathe, which are not bodily (the search for truth, love for people, the ethos of the community), that even they do not compel the sceptic to form beliefs.

The Elusive Third Way: The Pyrrhonian Illumination in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty

Elenchos ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-362
Author(s):  
Roger E. Eichorn
Keyword(s):  
Third Way ◽  
Epistemic Practices ◽  
Philosophical Position ◽  
Traditional Philosophy ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
The Everyday ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractI argue in this paper that, like the Pyrrhonism of Sextus Empiricus, Wittgenstein’s response to negative–dogmatic skepticism in On Certainty turns on the attempt to free us from the demands of traditional philosophy and is therefore not a philosophical position, strictly speaking. Rather, it is a therapeutic metaphilosophy designed to bring into view (i.e., to illumine) the relationship between our everyday epistemic practices and those of philosophy such that we simultaneously come to recognize (a) what I call the pragmatic–transcendental self–standingness of the everyday and (b) its philosophical–rational groundlessness. The Pyrrhonian illumination of the everyday is therapeutic in that it aims to purify our metadoxastic attitudes of dogmatism.

Ancient Skepticism

Classics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Bett
Keyword(s):  
First Century ◽  
Exact Nature ◽  
Direct Influence ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Greco Roman ◽  
Major Figure ◽  
Roman Antiquity ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement ◽  
Theoretical Reflection

While ideas that can loosely be called skeptical may be found from very early in Greek philosophy, skepticism as an organized method of thinking in Greco-Roman antiquity appears in the post-Aristotelian period. There are two distinct traditions or movements of skeptical thought: Pyrrhonian and Academic. The hallmark of ancient Greco-Roman skepticism, in both traditions, is suspension of judgement, brought about by the juxtaposition of equally persuasive opposing views on any given question. In the Pyrrhonist version, but not the Academic, this is claimed to have a practical benefit: ataraxia or tranquility. In both traditions, however, skepticism is understood not merely as a topic of theoretical reflection, but as something to be lived. The Pyrrhonian tradition claimed inspiration from Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 bce), who is usually considered the first Greek skeptic. However, the exact nature of Pyrrho’s thinking is very hard to reconstruct, given the scarcity of the evidence. Pyrrho’s direct influence seems to have been short-lived. But shortly after Pyrrho another skeptical movement arose in the Academy, the school founded by Plato. The first head of the Academy to take the school in a skeptical direction was Arcesilaus of Pitane (316/5–241/0 bce). Whether Pyrrho was an influence on him is a disputed question. But some aspects of Socrates’ activity, as Plato portrays him, might seem to encourage skepticism, and Arcesilaus is said to have acknowledged this influence. The skeptical Academy lasted for roughly two centuries, its other major figure being Carneades of Cyrene (214–129/8 bce). By the early 1st century bce the skepticism of the Academy seems to have moderated considerably, and it was at this point that the Academy itself, as an institution, came to an end. But in reaction to this softening of the skeptical attitude came a new skeptical movement led by Aenesidemus of Cnossos (dates uncertain, but active in the early first century bce), repudiating the Academy and instead identifying itself with Pyrrho. This later Pyrrhonian movement continued for roughly three centuries. We know the names of a few Pyrrhonists. But the only complete Pyrrhonist works we have are the extensive surviving writings of Sextus Empiricus (probably late 2nd or early 3rd century ce). Because Oxford Bibliographies for Pyrrho of Elis and The Academy already exist, this bibliography is somewhat weighted toward the later Pyrrhonist tradition stemming from Aenesidemus.

Pyrrhonism and the Value of Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-587
Author(s):  
Stéphane Marchand
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Sextus Empiricus ◽  
Political Position ◽  
Real Nature ◽  
Political Effect ◽  
The Law ◽  
Lack Of Commitment ◽  
Suspension Of Judgement ◽  
Pyrrhonian Scepticism

Abstract The aim of this paper is to determine how a Pyrrhonian (as she/he is described by Sextus Empiricus) considers the Law and can respond to Aristocles’ objection that a Pyrrhonian is unable to obey laws. First (1), we analyze the function of the Law in the 10th Mode of Aenesidemus, in order to show laws as a dogmatic source of value. But (2) Sextus shows also that the Sceptic can live in a human society by following laws and customs, according to so-called ‘sceptical conformism’. In the light of Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes (Pyr.) 1.23–24 and Against the Mathematicians (Math.) 11.162–164, I discuss the validity of the label ‘conformism’ in order to understand the nature of the political effect of the suspension of judgement. (3) The real nature of the political position of Pyrrhonian Scepticism – that lack of commitment does not mean indifference to politics but rather a criticism of fanaticism and praise for political cautiousness – appears by comparison with the Scepticism of the New Academy.

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