scholarly journals The Educational Autonomy of Perfectionist Religious Groups in a Liberal State

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-44
Author(s):  
Mark D. Rosen
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Religious Groups ◽  
Political Structure ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
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This Article draws upon, but reworks, John Rawls’ framework from Political Liberalism to determine the degree of educational autonomy that illiberal perfectionist religious groups ought to enjoy in a liberal state. I start by arguing that Rawls mistakenly concludes that political liberalism flatly cannot accommodate Perfectionists, and that his misstep is attributable to two errors: (1) Rawls utilizes an overly restrictive “political conception of the person” in determining who participates in the original position, and (2) Rawls overlooks the possibility of a “federalist” basic political structure that can afford significant political autonomy to different groups within a single country. With these insights, I argue that some, though not all, religious Perfectionists are consistent with a stable liberal polity, and explain why foundational Rawlsian premises require that Perfectionists be accommodated to the extent possible. My ultimate conclusions are that liberal polities ought to grant significant autonomy to those illiberal groups that satisfy specified conditions, and that the autonomy of such “eligible” illiberal groups is subject to two further constraints, which I call “well-orderedness” and “opt-out.” The autonomy to which eligible Perfections are entitled includes the authority to educate their children in a way that provides a fair opportunity for the groups to perpetuate themselves. The constraint of well-orderedness, however, permits the State to impose educational requirements that facilitate peace and political stability. Accommodating eligible illiberal groups, subject to these constraints, is an instantiation of liberal commitments, not a compromise of liberal values.

John Rawls: Moral and Political Philosophy

Philosophy ◽  
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Mandle
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Principles Of Justice

John Rawls (b. 1921–d. 2002) was the leading Anglo-American political philosopher of the second half of the 20th century. In his seminal 1971 book, A Theory of Justice (revised edition, Rawls 1999c, cited under Primary Texts), Rawls defends a liberal theory of social and political justice that he called “justice as fairness” as an alternative to utilitarianism, the then-dominant framework. By considering which principles of justice would be chosen from a hypothetical but fair initial choice situation called “the original position,” Rawls presents a variation on the traditional social contract doctrine. He argues that, deprived of specific knowledge of their own situation, the parties in the original position would be forced to reason impartially, and they would agree to principles of justice that required an equal scheme of basic rights and liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and an egalitarian (although not strictly equal) distribution of wealth and positions of authority. These principles are to be used to evaluate the basic structure of society—the system formed by a society’s basic social institutions. Rawls continues to defend these principles of justice and the argument from the original position, but in his second book, Political Liberalism (Rawls 2005, cited under Primary Texts), he presents justice as fairness as an example of a “political conception of justice” (pp. xxix, 11–15). Recognizing the diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines, Rawls argues that a democratic society’s “public reason” should not be tied to any particular comprehensive doctrine, and its stability could be founded only on an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Although Rawls intended his principles of justice to be used in evaluating the basic institutional structure of a society, some theorists argued that the same (or similar) principles should also be used to evaluate the justice of the global order. In The Law of Peoples (Rawls 1999b, cited under Primary Texts), however, Rawls rejects this direct extension. Instead he argues for a far less egalitarian standard of permissible economic inequality among societies and for toleration of certain non-liberal societies that reject the liberal rights he defends domestically (although toleration need not be extended to those who rejected basic human rights). In all three of these areas—defending a liberal conception of justice, modeled on the idea of a social contract, as an alternative to utilitarianism; developing the ideas of democratic justification contained in public reason and a political conception of justice; and introducing a distinction, grounded in a political liberalism itself, between the standards of domestic justice and those of international relations or global justice—Rawls was both controversial and agenda-setting for Anglo-American philosophy. In political philosophy today, his theories continue to represent a baseline against which other theories present themselves.

scholarly journals O Construtivismo Político: Uma Teoria Pública da Razão Prática/Political Constructivism: a public theory of practical reason

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Everton Puhl Maciel
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Original Position ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Intuitionism ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Face ◽  
Political Constructivism ◽  
The Universe

RESUMO: Esse trabalho tem por objetivo analisar o construtivismo político da Terceira Conferência da obra Liberalismo Político, de John Rawls. Especificamente, vamos tentar compreender como, limitando o universo de construção aos parâmetros estabelecidos pelo discurso político, podemos estender o alcance dos princípios acordados na posição original para uma comunidade muito mais ampla frente às doutrinas morais abrangentes. Demonstraremos o construtivismo político coerentista não em oposição ao intuicionismo moral utilitarista nem ao construtivismo moral kantiano, mas como capaz de absorver modelos com esse grau de razoabilidade. Isso será disposto através de uma justificação pública tanto do conteúdo quanto da forma do modelo adotado. Assim, o consenso sobreposto apresentado por Rawls é responsável direto pelo resultado democrático que esperamos de uma sociedade onde a publicidade ocupa espaço enquanto fato e possui um valor aceito como legítimo. Nosso método de trabalho envolve uma leitura analítica do texto e de comentadores pertinentes ao assunto proposto.ABSTRACT: This study aims to objective analyze the political constructivism of the Third Conference of the work Political Liberalism, by John Rawls. Specifically, we understand how limiting the universe of construction to the parameters by the political discourse, we can extend the reach of the principles agreed in the original position to a much larger universe in the face of comprehensive moral doctrines. We demonstrate what political constructivism no consistent as opposed to utilitarian moral intuitionism or the Kantian moral constructivism, but as capable of absorbing models with this degree of reasonableness. This will be provided through a public justification of both the content and form of the model adopted. Thus, the overlapping consensus presented by Rawls is directly responsible for the democratic results we expect from a society where democracy takes up space as a fact and has a value accepted as legitimate. KEYWORDS: Constructivism; justification; liberalism.

scholarly journals Luck Egalitarianism, Responsibility, and Political Liberalism

Dialogue ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
RYAN LONG
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Novel Reading ◽  
Luck Egalitarians

Luck egalitarians argue that distributive justice should be understood in terms of our capacity to be responsible for our choices. Both proponents and critics assume that the theory must rely on a comprehensive conception of responsibility. I respond to luck egalitarianism’s critics by developing a political conception of responsibility that remains agnostic on the metaphysics of free choice. I construct this political conception by developing a novel reading of John Rawls’ distinction between the political and the comprehensive. A surprising consequence is that many responsibility-based objections to luck egalitarianism turn out to be objections to Rawls’ political liberalism as well.

scholarly journals IN WHAT SENSE MUST POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BE POLITICAL?

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 155-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Miller
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Narrow View ◽  
The Status ◽  
Political Evaluation ◽  
The Right

Abstract:Political philosophy appears to have recovered from its alleged death in the middle of the last century, but now faces the realist charge that in the work of John Rawls and those influenced by him it fails to be political in the right way; it is merely “applied moral philosophy.” I dismiss the hyper-realist position of authors such as Raymond Geuss for taking an implausibly narrow view of politics. There is more merit in Bernard Williams’s claim that legitimacy, not justice, is the central problem of political philosophy. Yet we cannot understand the significance of legitimation without referring to the moral values that are realized when it succeeds. Thus, Williams fails to show that political normativity can be detached entirely from ethics. Moreover the legitimacy requirements of a liberal state, according to Williams, are substantively close to the requirements of justice according to Rawls. In light of the latter’s turn to “political liberalism,” they appear also to hold convergent views about the status of the theories they are advancing. I conclude by suggesting that the “applied moral philosophy” charge would apply only to philosophers who believe that general moral principles, like utility or rights, can do all the work of political evaluation. Politics does indeed have special features that impose distinctive justificatory requirements on its procedures and the outcomes they produce.

POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND TRUTH

Legal Theory ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jody S. Kraus
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Every theory of justice requires a first-order theory specifying principles of justice, and a second-order view explaining why those principles constitute the correct principles of justice. According to John Rawls, political liberalism is committed to the two principles of justice specified in its first-order theory, “justice as fairness.” Justice as fairness, according to Rawls, in turn presupposes the second-order view that justice is a political conception. A political conception of justice treats the principles derived from the fundamental ideas in the public political culture as the correct principles of justice. Political liberalism, however, nowhere offers a defense of the view that justice is a political conception. Indeed, it even strives to avoid the admission that it presupposes that justice is a political conception by stating only that it uses a political conception of justice, while allowing that justice might not actually be a political conception. As to the truth of its second-order presupposition, political liberalism chooses to remain agnostic. Rawls claims that political liberalism has no choice at all. To do otherwise, he argues, would lead to an internal contradiction.

scholarly journals DOES THE IDEA OF GOD BELONG IN POLITICS? A RESPONSE TO THE “POLITICAL LIBERALISM” OF JOHN RAWLS

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-284
Author(s):  
L. Scott Smith
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Cultural Analysis ◽  
Original Position ◽  
The Political ◽  
Christian Religion ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Idea Of God

This is a polemical essay providing an historical and cultural analysis of John Rawls’s political liberalism, and arguing that the “original position” in his philosophy is not only hypothetical, but also unrealistic by virtue of ignoring comprehensive religious and philosophical points of view. Rawls attempts to derive the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity from a mere thought experiment withoutconsidering the foundational role of the Christian religion, which was instrumental in the birth and refinement of these ideas.

Habermas on Rawls and the normative foundations of democracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 136843102098541
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Kędziora
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Normative Foundation ◽  
Internal Relations ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Politics And Law ◽  
Normative Foundations

The debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls concerns the question of how to do political philosophy under conditions of cultural pluralism, if the aim of political philosophy is to uncover the normative foundation of a modern liberal democracy. Rawls’s political liberalism tries to bypass the problem of pluralism, using the intellectual device of the veil of ignorance, and yet paradoxically at the same time it treats it as something given and as an arbiter of justification within the political conception of justice. Habermas argues that Rawls not only incorrectly operationalizes the moral point of view from which we discern what is just but also fails to capture the specificity of democracy which is given by internal relations between politics and law. This deprives Rawls’s political philosophy of the conceptual tools needed to articulate the normative foundation of democracy.

scholarly journals Comprehensive or Political Liberalism? The Impartial Spectator and the Justification of Political Principles

Utilitas ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Nir Ben-Moshe
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Alternative Framework ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Political Form ◽  
Political Principles

Abstract John Rawls raises three challenges – to which one can add a fourth challenge – to an impartial spectator account: (a) the impartial spectator is a utility-maximizing device that does not take seriously the distinction between persons; (b) the account does not guarantee that the principles of justice will be derived from it; (c) the notion of impartiality in the account is the wrong one, since it does not define impartiality from the standpoint of the litigants themselves; (d) the account would offer a comprehensive, rather than a political, form of liberalism. The narrow aim of the article is to demonstrate that Adam Smith's impartial spectator account can rise to Rawls's challenges. The broader aim is to demonstrate that the impartial spectator account offers the basis for a novel and alternative framework for developing principles of justice, and does so in the context of a political form of liberalism.

Shared intentions, public reason, and political autonomy

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 776-804 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blain Neufeld
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
State Power ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Corporate Body ◽  
Gerald Gaus

AbstractJohn Rawls claims that public reasoning is the reasoning of ‘equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power’. Drawing upon an amended version of Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intentions, I flesh out this claim by developing the ‘civic people’ account of public reason. Citizens realize ‘full’ political autonomy as members of a civic people. Full political autonomy, though, cannot be realised by citizens in societies governed by a ‘constrained proceduralist’ account of democratic self-government, or the ‘convergence’ account of public justification formulated recently by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier.

La Idea de “Razón Publica” (y su Revisión) en el Último Rawls

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 5-31
Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Public Good ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Political Philosopher

In 1993 John Rawls published his main and longest work since 1971, where he had published his reknowned A Theory of Justice, book that made him famous as the greatest political philosopher of the century. We are referring to Political Liberalism, a summary of his writings of the 80’s and the first half of the 90’s, where he attempts to answer the critics of his intellectual partners, communitarian philosophers. One of the key topics in this book is the issue of “public reason”, whose object is nothing else than public good, and on which the principles and proceedings of justice are to be applied. The book was so important for the political philosophy of the time that in 1997 Rawls had to go through the 1993 edition, becoming this new one the last relevant writing published before the death of the Harvard philosopher in November 2002.

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