The Common Ownership of Property in Essene Communities

Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 140-149
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner

Empirical findings that common ownership is associated with anticompetitive outcomes including higher prices raise questions about possible policy responses. This comment evaluates the major proposals, including antitrust enforcement against common owners, regulation of corporate governance, regulation of compensation of management of portfolio firms, regulation of capital market structure, and greater antitrust enforcement against portfolio firms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sunday Adeniyi Fasoro

AbstractThe trend toward the concept of humanity in political theory has arisen largely as a reaction against the mistreatment of vulnerable people such as immigrants. The issue of immigrants’ vulnerability has led political thinkers to ponder on how to apply the principle of humanity to the question of the treatment of immigrants. I would like to address this matter by examining two questions: what is humanity, is it a value property, or a virtue? Does it really matter if the means by which an immigrant immigrates is demeaning to his own humanity as a person? The most common or intuitive reply to these questions would probably be: ‘humanity’ is simply a value-bestowing property, so regardless of immigrants’ actions they are owed respectful treatment. The aim of this paper is to emphasise instead that ‘humanity’ should be conceived as a virtue of actual commitment to act on moral principles. I explore three different meanings of humanity. First, I discuss ‘humanity’ as the common ownership of the earth. Second, I discuss ‘humanity’ as a value property. Third, I discuss humanity as a virtue of acting, on the one hand, with humanity, and on the other hand, on moral principles.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-308
Author(s):  
Matthew Backus ◽  
Christopher Conlon ◽  
Michael Sinkinson

We empirically assess the implications of the common ownership hypothesis from a historical perspective using the set of S&P 500 firms from 1980 to 2017. We show that the dramatic rise in common ownership in the time series is driven primarily by the rise of indexing and diversification and, in the cross section, by investor concentration, which the theory presumes to drive a wedge between cash flow rights and control. We also show that the theory predicts incentives for expropriation of undiversified shareholders via tunneling, even in the Berle and Means (1932) world of the widely held firm. (JEL D22, G32, G34, L21, L25)


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
MOHAMMED JAFAR

The system of ownership of floors and apartments represents a developed form of the forms of class ownership. In addition to the old image that prevailed in the old laws of the ownership of classes, represented by the system of ownership of the top and bottom, it appeared in Europe as a result of the acute housing crisis in which the system of ownership of floors and apartments occurred. The law was adopted The Egyptian civil system adopted this system, and from it the majority of laws in Arab countries were taken. This advanced system of tiered ownership is based on dividing the vertical building into tiers or apartments owned by multiple persons, separate ownership and common ownership in the building structure, its land and all the common parts intended for the common use of the owners. Although the Iraqi civil law did not adopt the system of ownership of floors and apartments in its texts, the Iraqi legislator tried to fill this legislative deficiency in the Real Estate Registration Law No. (43) of 1971, and despite that, the system of ownership of floors and apartments remained unorganized and constituted completely in Iraqi legislation, The Iraqi legislator has made many attempts to fill this shortcoming, the most recent of which was his issuance of the Law Regulating Ownership of Floors and Apartments in Buildings No. (61) of 2000. However, the change that Iraq witnessed after 2003 made it necessary to reconsider the legislative regulation of the system of ownership of floors and apartments, from During the development of a new regulation in line with the investment laws and instructions in Iraq and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. We have divided our research into three demands. In the first requirement, we discussed the legislative history of the ownership system of floors and apartments in Iraqi law. In the second requirement, we discussed the legal systems applied in the ownership of classes. As for the third requirement, we devoted it to discussing ways to manage the common parts in the system of ownership of floors and apartments. . We concluded our research, with a conclusion in which we mentioned the most important conclusions, the most important of which is the distinction of the system of ownership of floors and apartments from the system of ownership of the top and bottom, and the multiplicity of Iraqi laws that dealt with this system by organizing without the existence of a comprehensive law for all its provisions applicable to all parts of Iraq, and we suggested finding a new legal organization in the Iraqi legislation , by regulating the substantive provisions of the system of ownership of floors and apartments in the Iraqi civil law, and the necessity of developing a special law dealing with the detailed provisions of this system.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 33-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arash Abizadeh

In On Global Justice, Mathias Risse claims that the earth’s original resources are collectively owned by all human beings in common, such that each individual has a moral right to use the original resources necessary for satisfying her basic needs. He also rejects the rival views that original resources are by nature owned by no one, owned by each human in equal shares, or owned and co-managed jointly by all humans. I argue that Risse’s arguments fail to establish a form of ownership at all and, moreover, that his arguments against the three rival views he considers all fall short. His argument establishes, rather, a moral constraint on any conventional system of property ownership.


Author(s):  
Alec J Burnside ◽  
Adam Kidane

Abstract Recent antitrust scholarship has claimed that parallel investments by institutional investors in competing firms may harm competition. Proponents of this theory, dubbed ‘common ownership’, posit that harm may arise even with small shareholdings, particularly in oligopolistic markets.  Although the debate has been focused on the U.S., the European Commission recently invoked common ownership as an ‘element of context’ in two merger decisions. This article examines common ownership through a European lens. A threshold issue will be whether levels of common ownership in Europe are comparable to those in the U.S.; the available evidence suggests they are not.  We note a number of misconceptions about the asset management industry, putting in doubt core elements of the common ownership hypothesis. We review the academic debate in which the theory has been vigorously contested on both methodological and theoretical grounds. We review the battle between empirical studies claiming to demonstrate and to disprove common ownership effects. The article considers whether the theory is sufficiently robust to provide a basis for enforcement, and (if so) whether current European Union competition law tools could be used to that end. The European Commission’s invocation of common ownership is subjected to critical evaluation. We conclude that it is premature to draw any conclusions as to the reality of alleged common ownership concerns or to base enforcement efforts on them. Until a better understanding of the underlying facts and a broad academic consensus emerge, reform prescriptions that have been advanced are a solution in search of a problem—to say nothing of the conflicts that would arise with other rules governing asset management.


2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-99
Author(s):  
Albert Banal-Estañol ◽  
Melissa Newham ◽  
Jo Seldeslachts

We investigate patterns in common ownership networks between firms that are active in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry for the period 2004–2014. Our main findings are that “brand firms”—that is, firms that have research and development capabilities and launch new drugs—exhibit relatively dense common ownership networks with each other that further increase significantly in density over time, whereas the network of “generic firms”—that is, firms that primarily specialize in developing and launching generic drugs—is much sparser and stays that way over the span of our sample. Finally, when considering the common ownership links between brands firms, on the one hand, and generic firms, on the other, we find that brand firms have become more connected to generic firms over time. We discuss the potential antitrust implications of these findings.


2013 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna di Robilant

In recent years, common ownership has enjoyed unprecedented favour among policy-makers and citizens in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Conservation land trusts, affordable-housing co-operatives, community gardens, and neighbourhood-managed parks are spreading throughout major cities. Normatively, these common-ownership regimes are seen as yielding a variety of benefits, such as a communitarian ethos in the efficient use of scarce resources, or greater freedom to interact and create in new ways. The design of common-ownership regimes, however, requires difficult trade-offs. Most importantly, successful achievement of the goals of common-ownership regimes requires the limitation of individual co-owners’ ability to freely use the common resource, as well as to exit the common-ownership arrangement. This article makes two contributions. First, at the normative level, it argues that common ownership has the potential to help foster greater “equality of autonomy”. By “equality of autonomy”, I mean more equitable access to the material and relational means that allow individuals to be autonomous. Second, at the level of design, this article argues that the difficult trade-offs of common-ownership regimes should be dealt with by grounding the commitment to equality of autonomy in the context of specific resources. In some cases, this resource-specific design helps to minimize or avoid difficult trade-offs. In hard cases, where trade-offs cannot be avoided, this article offers arguments for privileging greater equality of autonomy over full negative freedom.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christiaan Boonen ◽  
Nicolas Brando

Many theories of global distributive justice are based on the assumption that all humans hold common ownership of the earth. As the earth is finite and our actions interconnect, we need a system of justice that regulates the potential appropriation of the common earth to ensure fairness. According to these theories, imposing limits and distributive obligations on private and public property arrangements may be the best mechanism for governing common ownership. We present a critique of the assumption that this issue can be solved within the private–public property regime, arguing that the boundaries of this regime should not be taken for granted and that the growing literature on the democratic commons movement suggests how this can be accomplished. We consider that, if the earth is defined as a common, the private– public property paradigm must be open to questioning, and democratic commoners’ activities should be considered. 


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document