Author(s):  
Anouk Barberousse

How should we think of the dynamics of science? What are the relationships between an earlier theory and the theory that has superseded it? This chapter introduces the heated debates on the nature of scientific change, at the intersection of philosophy of science and history of science, and their bearing on the more general question of the rationality of the scientific enterprise. It focuses on the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of scientific change and the various versions of the incommensurability thesis one may uphold. Historicist views are balanced against nagging questions regarding scientific progress (Is there such a thing? If so, how should it be defined?), the causes of scientific change (Are they to be found within scientific method itself?), and its necessity (Is the history of scientific developments an argument in favor of realism, or could we have had entirely different sciences?).


Author(s):  
Marta Gritti

When your job is a research job, it is easy to spend plenty of hours in the lab, and to work in international environments, far from your hometown, mainly developing friendships with other people involved in a research job, leading to multicultural communities where it is possible to share ideas, hypotheses and, even more simply, the genuine passion and amazement that move every researcher to pursue his studies despite all the frustrations which come as the other side of the medal. This looks like a beautiful scenario, but it leads to some crucial consequences that should be taken into account. For each honest researcher, every step of investigation, independently on the research field, is governed by the rule of the scientific method, and every advance, from a single experiment that works, to the rare and great discoveries that allow the big jumps in our knowledge, is welcomed with curiosity, optimism and enthusiasm, and with the pride to be, even if as a little drop in the ocean, part of the ‘team’. But what is missing? For an ‘insider’, it is crystal clear that science tries to explain natural phenomena, and to apply the current knowledge to ameliorate technologies and life style, and that every theory is just the starting point to push forward the scientific progress. But, despite all this, especially in the high-tech and wealthy western societies, we are facing a symptomatic and anachronistic ‘war’ against the scientific discoveries, and we assist to the rise of movements which, if at the beginning could be considered just as funny or pathetic, are now having an impact on the society itself. Just to make an example, we can consider the anti-vaccination group: there is no scientific reason to follow this theories; still, we are assisting to the representations of former eradicated pathologies, and the consequences of that are there for all to see.


Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 875 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evangelos Athanassopoulos ◽  
Michael Gr. Voskoglou

The present article studies the connection of scientific reasoning with fuzzy logic. Induction and deduction are the two main types of human reasoning. Although deduction is the basis of the scientific method, almost all the scientific progress (with pure mathematics being probably the unique exception) has its roots to inductive reasoning. Fuzzy logic gives to the disdainful by the classical/bivalent logic induction its proper place and importance as a fundamental component of the scientific reasoning. The error of induction is transferred to deductive reasoning through its premises. Consequently, although deduction is always a valid process, it is not an infallible method. Thus, there is a need of quantifying the degree of truth not only of the inductive, but also of the deductive arguments. In the former case, probability and statistics and of course fuzzy logic in cases of imprecision are the tools available for this purpose. In the latter case, the Bayesian probabilities play a dominant role. As many specialists argue nowadays, the whole science could be viewed as a Bayesian process. A timely example, concerning the validity of the viruses’ tests, is presented, illustrating the importance of the Bayesian processes for scientific reasoning.


2021 ◽  
pp. 108926802110465
Author(s):  
Brian D. Haig

In this article, I critically examine a number of widely held beliefs about the nature of replication and its place in science, with particular reference to psychology. In doing so, I present a number of underappreciated understandings of the nature of science more generally. I contend that some contributors to the replication debates overstate the importance of replication in science and mischaracterize the relationship between direct and conceptual replication. I also claim that there has been a failure to appreciate sufficiently the variety of legitimate replication practices that scientists engage in. In this regard, I highlight the tendency to pay insufficient attention to methodological triangulation as an important strategy for justifying empirical claims. I argue, further, that the replication debates tend to overstate the closeness of the relationship between replication and theory construction. Some features of this relationship are spelt out with reference to the hypothetico-deductive and the abductive accounts of scientific method. Additionally, an evaluation of the status of replication in different characterizations of scientific progress is undertaken. I maintain that viewing replication as just one element of the wide array of scientific endeavors leads to the conclusion that it is not as prominent in science as is often claimed.


1983 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 18-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul F. Anderson

It is argued that the long debate concerning the scientific credentials of marketing has been couched in terms of an idealized notion of science as the ultimate source of objectively certified knowledge. A review of contemporary literature in the philosophy, sociology, and history of science reveals that this canonical conception of science cannot be supported. The implications of this literature for the marketing–as–science debate are developed, and practical measures for the enhancement of scientific practice in marketing are discussed.


2017 ◽  
Vol 284 (1866) ◽  
pp. 20170948 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Mason ◽  
Haozhe Shan

Well over 90% of studies in biomedical sciences are performed on single animals. While knowledge of the genetics, development and physiology of single individuals accrues, an understanding of the biological mechanisms by which individuals interact has barely budged. Yet many of society's greatest problems derive from an inability of humans to get along with each other. Studies in social neuroscience are primarily observational and rarely employ subjects who physically interact. Thus, social interaction represents a largely unexplored frontier of biology. The neuroscience that underlies social behaviour and interactions can and should be studied using the scientific method. However, a workable and objective definitional framework of sociality is needed for scientific progress in this field. Here we propose a definition that uses a test of independence from the presence of others. The null hypothesis is that a behaviour is independent from the influence of others. Rejection of this null hypothesis means that the actions of an individual depend on the actions of one or more other individuals. This definition has the advantages of not being contaminated by moral judgements or biases in favour of pro-social behaviour, and of being applicable to a wide range of physiological processes. The definition of a social behaviour proposed here says nothing regarding the valence of the behaviour with respect to others. Thus, a behaviour that is influenced by the presence of others may benefit, harm, or have no effect on others. It is hoped that this definitional framework for sociality will facilitate our understanding of the origins and mechanisms of social behaviour among animals including humans as well as offer efficacious approaches to social disorders such as autism.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Haig

In this article, I critically examine a number of widely held beliefs about the nature of replication and its place in science, with particular reference to psychology. In doing so, I present a number of underappreciated understandings of the nature of science more generally. I contend that some contributors to the replication debates overstate the importance of replication in science and mischaracterize the relationship between direct and conceptual replication. I also claim that there has been a failure to appreciate sufficiently the variety of legitimate replication practices that scientists engage in. In this regard, I highlight the tendency to pay insufficient attention to methodological triangulation as an important strategy for justifying empirical claims. I argue, further, that the replication debates tend to overstate the closeness of the relationship between replication and theory construction. Some features of this relationship are spelt out with reference to both the hypothetico-deductive and the abductive accounts of scientific method. Additionally, an evaluation of the status of replication in different characterizations of scientific progress is undertaken. I maintain that viewing replication as just one element of the wide array of scientific endeavors leads to the conclusion that it is not as prominent in science as is often claimed.


1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (74) ◽  
pp. 3-21
Author(s):  
Sergio Martínez

In this paper I address the problem of characterizing a notion of scientific or cognitive progress. I show that there is a close connection between the different characterizations of scientific method and notions of progress. Until the early sixties, a very common (often implicit) assumption was that progress could be understood as a by-product of the use of the scientific method. The work of Thomas Kuhn made clear that such a simple minded characterization of progress could not be right. I examine a series of attempts aiming to spell out a notion of scientific progress, and argue that an underlying assumption of these proposals is an assumption about the underlying methodological unity of science. I claim that it is important for the correct formulations of a series of problems in the philosophy of science, and for the problem of characterizing progress in particular, to draw a distinction among different sorts of traditions in science. Each tradition articulates different explanatory aims, methods and notions of progress. In this paper I spell out a notion of cognitive progress that is implicit in experimental traditions. In future work I will discuss the notions of progress associated with other traditions. In experimental traditions progress is understood in terms of the stabilization of phenomena and their entrenchment. A phenomenon gets entrenched when it is used for the construction of other phenomena. In order to understand the epistemological significance of the entrenchment of phenomena it is necessary to show that the traditional understanding of laws of nature in theoretical traditions, and in most philosophical accounts, is not suitable to understand the sense in which experimentalists talk of the “manipulation of laws of nature”. I provide a series of examples in order to clarify to concepts of phenomenon and entrenchment of phenomena which are important in experimental traditions. I suggest that the process of entrenchment of phenomena can be understood as a generalized evolutionary process. In that way, the analogy between progress and evolution, a topic of heated discussions for over a century, can help to elucidate the dynamics of experimental traditions in science.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Białek

AbstractIf we want psychological science to have a meaningful real-world impact, it has to be trusted by the public. Scientific progress is noisy; accordingly, replications sometimes fail even for true findings. We need to communicate the acceptability of uncertainty to the public and our peers, to prevent psychology from being perceived as having nothing to say about reality.


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