Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy Under Mnangagwa

2021 ◽  
pp. 002190962098657
Author(s):  
Henning Melber ◽  
Roger Southall

Under the presidency of Mnangagwa, Zimbabwe’s foreign policy is characterized by the desire to ‘re-engage’ with the West with a view to securing the removal of sanctions and encouraging investment. In this, it has received the backing of the African Union and Southern African Development Community states. Simultaneously, the violence of the Mnangagwa regime has reinforced the reluctance of the West to remove sanctions, and Zimbabwe has even begun to test the patience of its neighbours. The government has placed renewed faith in the ‘Look East Policy’, but China is seeking to match its investments with tighter control.

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 180-204
Author(s):  
Lawrence Ngobeni ◽  
Babatunde Fagbayibo

Abstract In 2016, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) amended Annex 1 of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment (FIP) in order to remove investor access to international arbitration or Investor-State Dispute Resolution (ISDS). The recent formation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (T-FTA) are factors that will likely curtail SADC’s ability to regulate foreign investments. Both AfCFTA and T-FTA are supposed to have their own investment protocols. This means that SADC faces the loss of regulatory authority over foreign investments. The recent formation of the Pan African Investment Code (PAIC) has shown that some African Union (AU) Member States want to provide ISDS for their investors, while others including SADC Members States do not. This article intends to evaluate the lessons SADC can learn from other jurisdictions in terms of the effective regulation of ISDS.


Significance Rifts within the political elite are deepening, evidenced by the departure of former Prime Minister Jean Ravelonarivo -- and his cabinet -- last month. However, the installation of a new administration does not portend stability. Impacts The central bank's decision to cut its benchmark interest rate to 8.3% from 8.7% will facilitate borrowing by firms and households. This is unlikely to boost GDP growth given the countervailing effects of political volatility and low commodity prices. The UN secretary general's appeal (on an official trip earlier this month) for the government to tackle graft is unlikely to be heeded. If Madagascar experiences another coup, the Southern African Development Community bloc will likely expel it -- again.


Significance A press conference after the meeting saw a succession of cabinet ministers praise Angola’s long-serving president. However, despite the show of unity, dos Santos's rumoured ill-health has revealed new fissures within the ruling party. Impacts Lourenco could struggle to impose his authority on dos Santos-affiliated entities such as state-owned oil firm Sonangol. African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC) observers are likely to trumpet a ‘free and fair’ poll. While the EU may criticise the government's handling of the election, the absence of European monitors will make this largely symbolic. Ruling party divisions could spread to other state entities, including a resurgent Angolan military.


Subject Belarus's attempts to court the EU and the United States. Significance The Belarusian government has shifted from an exclusively Russia-oriented foreign policy to a campaign to mend fences with the West. Government statements and a defence policy document speak of equal, non-adversarial relationships, while President Alexander Lukashenka has encouraged greater engagement with the EU and United States. Impacts Western governments will grant more legitimacy to the government. Opposition parties will find it harder to cite international isolation as a failed government policy. The EU's Eastern Partnership may be revitalised by its emerging role as conduit for ties with Belarus.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-500
Author(s):  
Mehmet Şahin

The Turkish foreign policy (TFP) after the Cold War had been based on traditional institutionalized values. In 2009, the governing party consolidated its power and additionally, the international environment provided more space for decision-makers. As a result, the government seeks to change foreign policy preferences in accordance with its agenda. This article examines this change from a neoclassical realist perspective and argues that due to lack of systemic pressure, Turkey can seek new alignments in the Middle East, rather than overlapping its interests with the West.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Linde

Abstract The essay examines Vladimir Putin’s civilisational discourse, which arose in earnest with the publication of his presidential campaign articles in 2012. It argues that what makes Putin’s rendering of Russia’s civilisational identity distinctive is its strongly emphasized Statism, understood as a belief in the primacy of the state. This suggests that while his endorsement of a distinct civilisational identity represents an important conceptual turn as regards how national identity is articulated, there are also significant lines of continuity with previous presidential periods, given that state primacy has been at the heart of Putin’s political agenda since the very beginning of his presidential career. This detail also reveals a great deal about the political rationale behind Putin’s commitment to a Russian civilisational identity. It provides the government with a theoretical justification of an illiberal political course. There are important implications for foreign policy-making as well. In relation to the West, there is an attempt to limit its normative reach by depicting liberal values as less than universal. In regional affairs, Russia is attempting to legitimate its involvement in the near abroad on civilisational grounds. The loose definition of ‘co-patriots’ as foreign nationals experiencing some affinity with Russia gives it plenty of leeway in this regard. Lastly, Russia has petitioned for Ukraine’s neutrality based on the argument that the country is straddling a civilisational fault line.


1972 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 793-819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlene J. Mayo

Post-Restoration Japan faced a number of serious problems in its relations with East Asia and the West, all of which came to a head in seikan ronsō, the clash in the Council of State, October 1873, over sending a punitive expedition to Korea. Essentially this was a struggle to define the nature of the Meiji Restoration—how radical would it be—and to decide who would control the politics of Japan's renovation, but intermixed with these domestic issues were several questions of foreign policy. To Japan's leaders, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and Sakhalin were as important as Korea; security of the frontier in East Asia as significant as equal treaties with China and the West. And for historians with the advantage of a century of hindsight, the debate is important evidence in assessing the strength and sophistication of expansionist sentiment in early Meiji Japan. Does modern Japanese imperialism date from this period as consistent and persistent government policy or simply as a set of commonly held aspirations and desires, stronger in some than others or more evident outside of government than within it? To assist in answering these questions there is a wealth of Western and Japanese language diplomatic correspondence and numerous memoirs, letters, and diaries. The clash pitted die returning members of the Iwakura embassy and their allies at home against prominent officials in the caretaker government. The envoys, who had gained from their journey to die West a better understanding of international politics and the instability of the world order as well as a clearer perception of the gigantic transformation Japan must undergo, won with the argument of restraint abroad and rapid reform at home. But were the differences primarily in methods and timing and not ultimate intentions? Were Japan's leaders only biding their time until domestic strength made foreign adventurism possible, as is often charged? There is little evidence that Iwakura's group had such ulterior motives. In the grosser sense of the existence of an elaborate plan of conquest, there was no imperialist conspiracy. In the more complex sense of consistency of dreams, aims, or ambitions, there was more continentalism among public critics than officials. The victors in the debate wished to create a strong and enlightened state capable of taking whatever measures seemed necessary, whether at home or abroad. Expansion into frontier regions therefore was always a possibility but even then for security and prestige rather than overseas dominion. Such thinking guided the government for the next twenty years. However more research is needed on the basic character of Meiji Japan's political and economic institutions, the expansionist sentiments of the government's critics, changing concepts of security, and Japan's response to Western imperialism.


1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-62
Author(s):  
Olajide Aluko

Over the nine years since the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s regime in February 1966, Ghana has come under three different governments: that of the National Liberation Council (February 1966 to October 1969), the Progress government (late 1969 to January 1972), and the government of the National Redemption Council (1972– ). Various views have been expressed in journals and magazines where writers have tried to depict the country’s foreign policy under the different regimes. For instance, Ruth First said that the government of the National Liberation Council (NLC) pursued a pro-West policy, and the Times (London) said a day after the coup d’etat of 24 February 1966 that Ghana had “swung back to reliance on the West.” William Gutteridge, however, maintained that the NLC government had restored a degree of neutralism to the country’s foreign policy rather than abandon the policy of nonalignment and neutralism in entirety. He added that the NLC had opted for more modest pan-African policies following Nkrumah’s pan-African excesses. Other people accused the NLC government of supporting the colonialists in Africa by refusing to allow freedom fighters the opportunity to meet and organize from within Ghana.


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