scholarly journals Cabinets, Prime Ministers, and Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Governments in Post-War Europe

2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-170
Author(s):  
Hanna Bäck ◽  
Jan Teorell ◽  
Staffan I Lindberg

Why are some states more corrupt than others? Drawing on the literature on governance in parliamentary democracies, we suggest that the degree of corruption depends on the ability of key political actors to control ministers who have been delegated power. We argue that the Prime Minister has incentives to limit corruption within the cabinet and has the ability to do so when there are certain “control mechanisms” at hand. One such mechanism is the PM’s ability to fire or demote ministers who are not behaving in accordance with his or her wishes. We hypothesize that governmental corruption will be lower in systems where the constitution grants the PM strong powers. Using a new dataset ( Varieties of Democracy), which provides more specific measures on high-level corruption across a longer time period, we analyze corruption in 26 West and East European democracies over the post-war period and find support for our hypothesis.

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veronica Anghel

Coalition governments are a regularly studied feature of parliamentary democracies. Debates still linger in the field as to what extent the outcomes of these studies are also applicable in determining who has the upper hand over coalition formation in semi-presidential regimes. This article explores the dynamics of government formation under semi-presidential regimes using evidence from Romania (1990–2016) and discusses the formal and informal potential of the president to shape coalitions. It covers a lacuna in qualitative studies by using evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with prime ministers, cabinet members, and key party decision makers and shows that under certain circumstances presidents can play an influential role in government formation, but these are rather the exception than the rule. Using a case that presents the incentives for an increase in the presidentialization of politics, I show that the mechanisms of a multiparty regime mostly limit the president’s exclusive bargaining advantage to nominating the prime minister and then, much as in a parliamentary democracy, render him or her dependent on the coalition potential of his or her own party.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Becher

There is striking variation across parliamentary democracies in the power of prime ministers to employ two prominent procedures to resolve legislative conflict: the vote of confidence and the dissolution of parliament. Whereas previous contributions in comparative politics have investigated each of these two fundamental institutions in isolation, I develop a simple unified model to unbundle how this richer variety of institutional configurations shapes political bargaining over policy. The analysis clarifies that the effects of the confidence vote and dissolution power interact. As a consequence, there can be a non-monotonic effect of increasing prime ministers’ formal power on their ability to shape the policy compromise. Counterintuitively, introducing dissolution power makes the prime minister worse off under some conditions. These results suggest new directions for empirical research on the consequences of parliamentary institutions for legislative politics and policy. They also lay analytical foundations for explaining institutional variation and reforms.


2021 ◽  
pp. 165-205
Author(s):  
Tapio Raunio

Examining coalition governance in Finland, this chapter argues that due to the ideological heterogeneity of Finnish cabinets, prime ministers and governments emphasize the importance of ex ante control mechanisms. Government programmes have become very detailed and there are both established written rules and informal conventions for cabinet decision-making and for solving conflicts within the government. The prime minister is strongly constrained by the types of cabinets formed in Finland. Heading oversized, ideologically heterogeneous governments, prime ministers must strike a balance between active leadership and accommodating the preferences of the coalition partners. The key to managing such broad coalitions is building and maintaining trust among the governing parties. Coalition governance in Finland is also characterized by stability: the existing practices have remained basically unaltered at least since the mid-1990s, and the rise of populism has not changed how cabinets are formed or work. Prime ministers, the coalition partners, and their parliamentary groups know and mainly respect the rules of the game, and this contributes to the survival of the broad Finnish cabinets.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 36-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tina Burrett

The tenure of Japanese prime ministers is famously short. Between 2006 and 2012 Japan changed prime minister once a year. What factors can explain Japan’s revolving-door premiership? To explore this puzzle, this article applies the <em>Leadership Capital Index</em> (LCI) developed by Bennister, ’t Hart and Worthy (2015) to case studies of the nine Japanese prime ministers holding office between 2000 and 2015. Leadership capital is the aggregate of leaders’ political resources: skills, relations and reputation. The LCI thus allows analysis of the interplay between individual capacities and contextual conditions in determining leaders’ ability to gain, maintain and deploy power. The LCI is applied to answer two questions. Firstly, what accounts for the short tenure of many Japanese premiers? In which of the LCI’s three leadership dimensions do Japanese leaders lack capital? Secondly, what forms of capital allow some prime ministers to retain office for longer than average (&gt;2 years)? In particular, the article analyses the leadership of Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) Japan’s longest serving prime minister since the 1970s, and incumbent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has held office for three years since December 2012. As well as utilising the LCI to comparatively analyse the tenure of Japan’s prime ministers, this article tests the applicability of the Index beyond Western parliamentary democracies.


2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Kerby

Abstract. The Canadian federal cabinet stands out among Westminster parliamentary democracies because of the large number of first-time ministers who are appointed to cabinet without any previous parliamentary or political experience. Several explanations have been put forward to account for this peculiarity but no attempt has been made to examine how Canadian prime ministers overcome the information deficit associated with appointing ministers with no experience. How can prime ministers be confident that they are making the right choice? This paper explores the subject by estimating the survival functions of ministerial turnover for potential, but not yet appointed, cabinet ministers were they to survive to a defined political benchmark; these survival rates are included in a logit model of Canadian ministerial appointment following four general elections (1957, 1979, 1984 and 2006) in which the prime minister was tasked with appointing a cabinet with ministerial neophytes.Résumé. Le Conseil des ministres fédéral du Canada se démarque dans l'ensemble des démocraties parlementaires britanniques en raison du grand nombre de ministres novices qui sont nommés au Conseil alors qu'ils ne possèdent aucune expérience parlementaire ou politique antérieure. Plusieurs explications de cette anomalie ont été proposées, mais aucune démarche d'analyse ne s'est encore penchée sur la manière dont les premiers ministres du Canada arrivent à surmonter le manque d'information associé à la nomination de ministres sans expérience. Comment les premiers ministres peuvent-ils être certains d'avoir fait le bon choix? Cette étude scrute le sujet en évaluant le coefficient de survie, en cas de remaniement ministériel, pour les ministres du Conseil potentiels, mais pas encore mandatés, advenant que ces derniers survivent à certains jalons politiques précis. Ces taux de survie font partie intégrante d'un modèle de répartition des nominations ministérielles qui sont survenues à la suite de quatre élections générales (1957, 1979, 1984 et 2006) où le premier ministre a dû constituer un Conseil des ministres composé de néophytes.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meri Kulmala ◽  
Michael Rasell ◽  
Zhanna Chernova

  Meri Kulmala – Dr., Finnish Centre for Russian and East European Studies/Finnish Centre of Excellence in Russian Studies, Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland. Email: [email protected] Michael Rasell – Dr., School of Health & Social Care, University of Lincoln, UK. Email: [email protected] Zhanna Chernova – Dr. Sciences, Department of Sociology, National Research University 'Higher School of Economics', Saint Petersburg. Email: [email protected]   This article studies the causal factors behind the major overhaul of Russia’s system for children in substitute care that has been taking place since the late 2000’s. A series of reforms have promoted fostering and family-like care in contrast to the large residential homes used in the Soviet period and 1990’s. We highlight the fundamental change in the 'ideal of care' represented by the move to 'deinstitutionalise' the care system by promoting domestic adoptions, increasing the number of foster families, creating early support services for families as well as restructuring remaining residential institutions into smaller, home-like environments. These are all key elements of the global deinstitutionalisation trend that is taking place around the globe. We look at the evolution of the related policies and ask why this policy shift happened during the 2010’s even though the issue of reform had partially been on the Russian policy agenda for some time. Building on an explanatory approach to family policy changes by Magritta Mäztke and Ilona Ostner, which incorporates material and ideational driving forces, we explain that the 'political will from above' behind these major reforms was shaped by a range of other societal and political factors. Multiple factors drove Russian political actors to adopt new ideas about care for children left without parental care. For instance, the increasing conservative turn in policies towards children and families, which are driven by the severe demographic decline in the country, work alongside the influence of international norms around children’s rights and changing socio-economic circumstances. In the 1990’s Russian NGOs had considerable input into the reforms as 'epistemic communities' in policy formation thanks to the high level of expertise that they developed in international networks and the increasing number of cross-sector consultative platforms at governmental bodies in contemporary Russia. We conclude that ideational factors were necessary preconditions for the reforms, but that political forces were ultimately the key driving force. The recentralisation of power and prioritisation of social policy under President Putin allowed new ideas to gain concrete policy realisation.


2004 ◽  
pp. 4-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Gaidar

The question of limits of state burden on the economy is considered in the article. In the countries — leaders of economic growth in XIX century taxation was minimal (approximately 8% of GDP). But during the First World War it sharply increased. The economic crisis of the 1930s expanded scales of intervention of the state in the economy. The fastest growth of taxes was observed during the Second World War and in the post-war period attempts to lower tax burden were not undertaken. State burden on the economy continued to grow up to the end of the 1980's (up to 50% of GDP and more) and modern liberal tendencies could only slow down the growth of taxes. In socialist countries tax burden was traditionally high — close to 50% of GDP, that is the limit for developed countries. In East-European countries it remains at a high level, also due to the necessity to carry out social obligations inherent to EU. In the CIS countries the transformational crisis lasted longer, so tax burden was fixed at lower level. The question of direct influence of state expenditures on rates of economic growth remains unsolved but there are limits of taxation for each level of per capita GDP: when taxes reach them rates of growth slow down.


2008 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-114
Author(s):  
Pieter-Jan Van Bosstraeten

Op 11 oktober 1978 splitste de Belgische Socialistische Partij zich als laatste van de drie unitaire partijen op in twee autonome partijen. Langs Franstalige zijde werd éénzijdig de Parti Socialiste opgericht, twee jaar later volgde de Socialistische Partij. De splitsing vormde het eindpunt van een lange en bewogen geschiedenis van de socialistische eenheidspartij.Ondanks het feit dat heel wat auteurs reeds een licht hebben geworpen op de belangrijkste gebeurtenis uit de na-oorlogse geschiedenis van de BSP, is het antwoord op de vraag naar de oorzaken van de splitsing vrij eenduidig. Overwegend wordt aangenomen dat de splitsing van de BSP het gevolg is van een moeilijke samenwerking in het kader van het communautaire dossier. Andere oorzaken worden amper aangehaald, of onvoldoende verduidelijkt. Tevens wordt slechts het politiek-tactische aspect van het communautaire dossier uitvoerig besproken. In de bestaande literatuur wordt zo goed als nergens dieper ingegaan op de inhoudelijke elementen die binnen de partij problemen teweegbrachten.Onderzoek van twee cruciale documenten heeft de mogelijkheid geboden het verhaal van de splitsing beter te reconstrueren. Daarbij is gebleken dat de splitsing van de partij in een ruimer kader dient te worden geïnterpreteerd dan het communautaire dossier. Aan de splitsing van de partij ging een lang proces van autonomisering en vleugelvorming vooraf. Bovendien werd aangetoond dat de problematiek inzake het Egmont-Stuyvenbergpact niet de enige directe oorzaak vormde voor de splitsing van de partij, in de periode 1977-1978. Enkele andere oorzaken hebben daartoe eveneens bijgedragen.________The division of the Belgian Socialist Party. Two explanatory documentsOn 11 October 1978 the Belgian Socialist Party divided into two autonomous parties, the last of the three unitary parties to do so. First the French speaking section unilaterally founded the ‘Parti Socialiste’, two years later the ‘Socialistische Partij’ followed. The division constituted the termination of the long and eventful history of the socialist unitary party.In spite of the fact that many authors have already shed light on the most important event from the post-war history of the BSP, the answer to the question about the causes for the division are fairly unequivocal. The majority of opinions favour the view that the division of the BSP was the consequence of the difficulty of collaborating within the framework of the community dossier. Other causes are hardly cited, or insufficiently elucidated. Moreover only the politico-tactical aspect of the community dossier is discussed in detail. The existing literature hardly ever carries out a more thorough examination of the intrinsic elements that caused problems within the party.The investigation of the two crucial documents has offered the opportunity to provide a better reconstruction of the division. This showed that the division of the party should be interpreted within a larger framework than the community dossier alone. A long process of autonomisation and the formation of political wings preceded the division of the party. It also demonstrated that the issues concerning the Egmont-Stuyvenberg pact were not the only direct cause for the division of the party, during the period 1977-1978. There were several other causes that also contributed to this division.


Author(s):  
Patrick Weller

Prime ministers are the key campaigners for their governments, not just in electoral campaigns, but every day and in every place. Media management has become a continuing and significant part of the prime ministers’ activities; it is a daily, indeed an hourly, pressure. Speeches have to be planned. The pressure has changed the tone and priorities of governing. It has dangers as well as benefits. Media demands have become more immediate, more continuous, and more intrusive. Prime ministers must respond. The same technical changes allow prime ministers to interact with their voters in a way that bypasses journalists and other intermediaries. They are writ large in campaigns. They are never out of mind or out of sight. Re-election is always a consideration for tactics and strategy. The public leader, the ‘rhetorical prime minister’, is shaped by the demands of the media and organized by the technological capacity.


Author(s):  
Talbot C. Imlay

This chapter examines the post-war efforts of European socialists to reconstitute the Socialist International. Initial efforts to cooperate culminated in an international socialist conference in Berne in February 1919 at which socialists from the two wartime camps met for the first time. In the end, however, it would take four years to reconstitute the International with the creation of the Labour and Socialist International (LSI) in 1923. That it took so long to do so is a testimony to the impact of the Great War and to the Bolshevik revolution. Together, these two seismic events compelled socialists to reconsider the meaning and purpose of socialism. The search for answers sparked prolonged debates between and within the major parties, profoundly reconfiguring the pre-war world of European socialism. One prominent stake in this lengthy process, moreover, was the nature of socialist internationalism—both its content and its functioning.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document