Mind–Body Dissonance: A Catalyst to Creativity

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 754-768 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Huang

Mind–body dissonance (MBD) is the psychological experience of one’s bodily expressions contradicting one’s mental states. Across four experiments (total N = 887), the current research proposes and demonstrates that MBD can enhance creativity by facilitating an atypicality mind-set. First, two different instantiations of MBD (i.e., assuming a high-power/low-power role while adopting a constricted/expansive posture, or recalling a happy/sad memory while frowning/smiling) increased performance on creative association, insight, and generation tasks (Experiments 1 and 2). A third study showed that an atypicality mind-set was an underlying mechanism for the creativity effect (Experiment 3). Finally, the frequency of past MBD experiences was found to reduce MBD’s creativity effect (Experiment 4). The present research offers evidence for the positive functions of bodily expressions that contradict mental states and highlights the significance of understanding the interactive effects of psychological states and their physical analogues in studying creativity.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Prinzing ◽  
Julian De Freitas ◽  
Barbara Fredrickson

The desire for a meaningful life is ubiquitous, yet the ordinary concept of a meaningfullife is poorly understood. Across six experiments (total N = 2,539), we investigated whether third-person attributions of meaning depend on the psychological states an agent experiences (feelings of interest, engagement, and fulfillment), or on the objective conditions of their life (e.g., their effects on others). Studies 1a–b found that laypeople think subjective and objective factors contribute independently to the meaningfulness of a person’s life. Studies 2a–b found that positive mental states are thought to make a life more meaningful, even if derived from senseless activities (e.g., hand-copying the dictionary). Studies 3a–b found that agents engaged in morally bad activities are not thought to have meaningful lives, even if they feel fulfilled. In short, both an agents’ subjective mental states and objective impact on the world affect how meaningful their lives appear.


Author(s):  
David Rosenthal

Dennett’s account of consciousness starts from third-person considerations. I argue this is wise, since beginning with first-person access precludes accommodating the third-person access we have to others’ mental states. But Dennett’s first-person operationalism, which seeks to save the first person in third-person, operationalist terms, denies the occurrence of folk-psychological states that one doesn’t believe oneself to be in, and so the occurrence of folk-psychological states that aren’t conscious. This conflicts with Dennett’s intentional-stance approach to the mental, on which we discern others’ mental states independently of those states’ being conscious. We can avoid this conflict with a higher-order theory of consciousness, which saves the spirit of Dennett’s approach, but enables us to distinguish conscious folk-psychological states from nonconscious ones. The intentional stance by itself can’t do this, since it can’t discern a higher-order awareness of a psychological state. But we can supplement the intentional stance with the higher-order theoretical apparatus.


2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-273
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic

This paper aims to discuss psychological aspect of rational choice theory. The standard version of rational choice rests on a kind of psychology, since it operates with mental states. In standard davidsonian version it is claimed that we explain rational actions by stating proper desires and beliefs that caused the action. We will explore two challenges to the standard version that might be called cultural and naturalistic versions of rational choice. Satz and Ferejohn (1994) challenged standard version by stating that we can provide rational-choice explanations without relying too much on psychological assumptions. They argued in favor of moderate externalism, which should replace thin desire-belief model with thick structuralist conception. According to their model moderate externalism is compatible with realism about psychological states, while at the same time those states need not figure in the best rational choice explanations of actions. The focus of rational choice explanations therefore shifts to non-individual and non-psychological entities, such as firms in explaining economic behavior, parties in explaining functioning of democracy, etc. Although there is a place for psychological states within a moderate externalism, those states are not causally relevant. On Pettit?s account desires and beliefs figure in rational choice explanations merely as ?standby causes?. They explain resilience of certain behavior, not its actual cause. Quite contrary to standard rational choice theory, the programming model (Pettit, 2002) defines the neurophysiological level as more basic in explaining behavior. This means that higher-level psychological states are causally relevant for certain behavior only if certain lower-level neurophysiological producer obtains. In this paper standard rational choice theory will be defended against culturalist and naturalist criticism.


Author(s):  
Mark Rowlands ◽  
Susana Monsó

The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other psychological abilities. This chapter attacks the idea that reflexive thought is required in this pervasive way and holds that supposing that it is derives from a tendency among philosophers and scientists toward overcomplication. Against this tendency, it recommends an aponoian framework, from apó, “away from” and noûs, “intelligence” or “thought,” arguing that seemingly complex psychological abilities are often not as complex as they seem, and do not require the ability to engage in reflexive thought.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 (1) ◽  
pp. 10714
Author(s):  
Priyanka D. Joshi ◽  
Nathanael J. Fast

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro de la Vega ◽  
Tal Yarkoni ◽  
Tor D. Wager ◽  
Marie T. Banich

AbstractExtensive fMRI study of human lateral frontal cortex (LFC) has yet to yield a consensus mapping between discrete anatomy and psychological states, partly due to the difficulty of inferring mental states in individual studies. Here, we used a data-driven approach to generate a comprehensive functional-anatomical mapping of LFC from 11,406 neuroimaging studies. We identified putatively separable LFC regions on the basis of whole-brain co-activation, revealing 14 clusters organized into three whole-brain networks. Next, we used multivariate classification to identify the psychological states that best predicted activity in each sub-region, resulting in preferential psychological profiles. We observed large functional differences between networks, suggesting brain networks support distinct modes of processing. Within each network, however, we observed low functional specificity, suggesting discrete psychological states are not modularly organized. Our results are consistent with the view that individual LFC regions work as part of highly parallel, distributed networks to give rise to flexible, adaptive behavior.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-90
Author(s):  
Attila Szabo ◽  
Attila Szűcs ◽  
Zoltán Gáspár ◽  
Krisztina Süle

Abstract Justification and aim of the study: Successful athletes tend to approach contest situations with different psychological mind-set than their less successful counterparts. The aim of this repeated-measures design study was to assess whether a successful (national league third rank) and a less successful (11th rank) first division women’s basketball team differ in anxiety, positive affect, and negative affect before six consecutive games in the annual championship. Methods: Two psychometrically validated questionnaires, the Sport Competition Anxiety Test (SCAT; Martens et al., 1990) and the Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) were used to measure pre-competitive anxiety and positive-and negative affect. The scales were completed by first division female basketball players, who were members of either the successful or the less successful team, before six matches; three played at home and three played away from home. Results: Successful players reported lower anxiety before games (effect size (Cohen’s d = 1.2) than less successful players. Both teams displayed more positive affect before the games played at home than before the games played away from home (d = .44). However, ratings of the subjective states varied substantially across the games. Conclusion: The results, interpreted in light of an interactional model (Cerin et al., 2000), show that subjective appraisal of each competition situation yields very specific or unique expectations, which in turn determine the psychological states of the players before the upcoming contest.


Author(s):  
Brooke Sinclair

Depression is associated with pervasive impairments in social and interpersonal functioning. Research demonstrates that individuals with depression have difficulty interacting with peers and show lower levels of social activity than do nondepressed individuals (Levendosky, Okun, & Parker, 1995). In addition, depressed individuals report that their social interactions are less supportive and less rewarding than those of non‐depressed individuals (Nezlek, Hamptom, & Shean, 2000). This reduced social competence may cause depressed individuals to disengage from social interaction, which may in turn exacerbate their state of depression (Rippere, 1980). It is thus important to understand and identify the mechanisms beneath these deficits.  Researchers commonly use the theory of mind framework to understand impaired social functioning in clinical conditions. Theory of mind refers to the ability to make judgments about others’ mental states to understand and predict their social behaviour. Research has found a relationship between theory of mind and dysphoria (i.e., elevated scores on a measure of depression symptoms, but not necessarily a diagnosis of clinical depression). Specifically, dysphoric individuals demonstrate enhanced mental state judgments (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005).  My research investigates social motivation as an underlying mechanism for dysphoric individuals’ enhanced decoding ability. A sample of undergraduates will participate in a theory of mind decoding task following social, monetary or no motivation. I hypothesize that dysphoric individuals will make significantly more accurate judgments than non‐dysphoric individuals. Further, I predict that social motivation will enhance non‐dysphoric individuals’ sensitivity to others’ mental states.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jin Yao ◽  
Xinmei Liu ◽  
Wenxin He

Purpose Based on the social dominance theory, this study aims to theorize the moderating effect of power disparity in the impact of team knowledge variety on team creativity and further to verify team open communication as the mediating mechanism of the aforementioned interactive effect. Design/methodology/approach The multisource (team members and their team leaders) and longitudinal (separated by four months) survey data were collected from 67 research and development teams in China to test the research model. The authors used multiple regression analyses to validate all the proposed hypotheses. Findings Results reveal that team knowledge variety has a more positive impact on team creativity when teams have lower power disparity. Besides, team open communication is significantly and positively related to team creativity and mediates the interactive effect of team knowledge variety and team power disparity on team creativity. Originality/value This study reconciles the mixed findings in the previous study and provides new insights regarding the functionality of team knowledge variety. By identifying team power disparity as a moderator in shaping the effects of team knowledge variety, the authors extend the research that explores the moderators of the team knowledge variety–team creativity relationship, and make comprehensive consideration of the coexistence of multiple diversities within teams (i.e. knowledge variety and power disparity) and their joint effects on team creativity. Besides, this research identifies team open communication as an important underlying mechanism in transmitting the interactive effects of two different types of diversities on team creativity, thus offering new insights on how teams can perform creatively.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chujun Lin ◽  
Mark Allen Thornton

People understand other individuals by considering both their momentary and enduring characteristics: their mental states and their traits. Mental states and traits are both independently useful for making sense of others’ behavior. However, people might gain even more insight by linking these two forms of social information together. Here we investigated this potential link between how perceivers attribute mental states and traits to other people. Prior research indicates that mental state and trait attributions are correlated. Here, we tested whether this correlation generalized to more naturalistic contexts, including forming impressions about unfamiliar target people based on videos (Study 1) and making judgments about personally familiar people such as family and friends (Study 2). In both studies, we found that trait attributions were correlated with the frequency distribution of mental state attributions. Having corroborated this association, we next sought to understand the causal relationship between mental state and trait attributions. We achieved this through a pair of carefully controlled experiments in which we manipulated trait attributions (Study 3) and mental state frequencies (Study 4) of target people, and observed corresponding judgments of mental states and traits, respectively. The results of these experiments indicate that mental state and trait attributions bidirectionally affect each other. Together these four preregistered studies (total N = 762) show that perceivers’ attributions of mental states and traits are linked in naturalistic contexts and help to causally shape one another.


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