Economic governance: Does it make or break a dominant party equilibrium? The case of India

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 451-465
Author(s):  
Chanchal Kumar Sharma ◽  
Wilfried Swenden
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Party System ◽  
National Level ◽  
State Level ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Stable Pattern ◽  
Incumbent Party ◽  
Party Dominance

Why do voters re-elect the same party for prolonged periods of time even when there are reasonable alternatives available? When and why do they stop doing so? Based on a quantitative analysis of elections between 1972 and 2014, we test the significance of ‘economic governance’ for the continuance and fall of one-party dominance. With data from India we show that, under a command economy paradigm, a national incumbent party sustains its dominance by playing politics of patronage, but in a marketized economy, state governments gain considerable scope in managing their economic affairs. This enables different state parties to create a stable pattern of support in states. As state-level effects cease to aggregate at the national level, the party system fragments. However, such an aggregation can re-emerge if a single party consistently delivers in the states which it governs.

The Democratic and Republican Governors Associations and the Nationalization of American Party Politics, 1961–1968

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Anthony Sparacino
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
State Level ◽  
Partisan Politics ◽  
State Governments ◽  
National Party ◽  
Government Programs ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Party Building ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
American Party

Abstract This article examines the origins and early activities of the Democratic and Republican Governors Associations (DGA and RGA, respectively) from the RGA's initial founding in 1961 through the 1968 national nominating conventions. I argue that the formations of these organizations were key moments in the transition from a decentralized to a more integrated and nationally programmatic party system. The DGA and RGA represent gubernatorial concern for and engagement in the development of national party programs and the national party organizations. Governors formed these groups because of the increasing importance of national government programs on the affairs of state governments and the recognition on the part of governors that national partisan politics was having critical effects on electoral outcomes at the state level, through the reputations of the national parties. To varying extents, the governors used these organizations to promote the national parties and contributed to national party-building efforts and the development of national party brands.

Is there Life after Kohl? The CDU Crisis and the Future of Party Democracy in Germany

2000 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ludger Helms
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Party System ◽  
National Level ◽  
State Level ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Christian Democratic Union ◽  
The Future ◽  
Christian Social Union ◽  
The Individual

There are few Chapters of the Federal Republic'S History that could be written without a prominent reference to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Since 1949 Christian Democratic chancellors have led German governments for no less than 37 years. Even when in opposition, the Christian Democrats - composed at the national level of the CDU and the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU)1 - constituted more often than not the strongest parliamentary party group (Fraktion) in the Bundestag, such as after the federal elections of 1969, 1976 and 1980. Also at state level and in the Bundesrat, which represents the individual states (L-nder) in the national decision-making process, the Christian Democrats quite often held a dominant position justifying occasional remarks of a ‘CDU/CSU bias’ within the German party system.

How opposition parties sustain single-party dominance

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 262-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Ziegfeld ◽  
Maya Tudor
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Party Dominance ◽  
Crucial Part ◽  
Opposition Parties

When elections are free and fair, why do some political parties rule for prolonged periods of time? Most explanations for single-party dominance focus on the dominant party’s origins, resources, or strategies. In this article, we show how opposition parties can undermine or sustain single-party dominance. Specifically, opposition parties should be central in explaining single-party dominance in countries with highly disproportional electoral systems and a dominant party whose vote share falls short of a popular majority. Employing a quantitative analysis of Indian legislative elections as well as a paired case study, we show that opposition coordination plays a crucial part in undermining single-party dominance.

US state votes mean Republican advantages

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Minimum Wage ◽  
Drug Policy ◽  
Environmental Regulations ◽  
National Level ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
State Level ◽  
State Governments ◽  
National Politics ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Positive Results

Significance Control of state legislatures is vital to the process of electoral redistricting, triggered by the 2020 census, which will last for the next ten years. Several states also voted on questions of drug policy and the minimum wage; such changes often percolate to the national level. Impacts Democrats will find it difficult to unify their message given divisions between progressives and centrists. State-level politics will influence national politics, such as California de facto setting US emissions policy. Republican state governments will litigate Democratic federal measures, such as reintroducing environmental regulations. Democrats will try to deepen their engagement with state organisations, but positive results will take time.

You Have to Know Where to Look in Order to Find It: Competitiveness in Botswana's Dominant Party System

2012 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-126
Author(s):  
Stephanie Burchard
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
National Level ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Macro Level ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Multiparty Systems ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Sub Saharan

Dominant party systems are defined by a lack of party alternation at the national level; however, dominant party systems do not inherently preclude electoral competition at the macro level, the micro level, or both. Nonetheless, little systematic work has documented the competitiveness of elections under a dominant party system. This article describes the nature of competition under one of sub-Saharan Africa's most enduring dominant party systems, Botswana. By examining electoral outcomes at the constituency level, this article demonstrates that elections in Botswana produce significant levels of competition, especially when compared to other sub-Saharan countries. Furthermore, electoral competitiveness appears unrelated to the party system at large: namely, competitiveness is no less or greater under dominant party systems than under multiparty systems.

Party Systems and Government Stability in the Indian States

1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 1384-1405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul R. Brass
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Indian States ◽  
Leadership Skill ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Indian State ◽  
Degree Of Fragmentation

This paper contributes to the substantive and methodological discussion of the issues concerning the causes of cabinet instability through analysis of data from Indian state politics. The focus of the analysis is on explaining the duration of Indian state governments in days with variables measuring the degree of fragmentation and cohesion in the party system, the composition of the cabinet, the characteristics of the opposition, and the role of ideological differences. A substantial amount of the variation in the durability of coalition governments is explained with variables that measure the degree of party system institutionalization and the extent of political opportunism, but ideological factors do not explain much of the differences in durability of governments. It is also found that none of the measures used can explain much of the variation in one-party majority governments for which, it is argued, explanations must be sought that focus on leadership skill and on relationships between leaders and factions in a dominant party.

When State Policy Makes National Politics: The Case of “Obamacare” Marketplace Implementation

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Trachtman
Keyword(s):  
Affordable Care Act ◽  
National Level ◽  
State Level ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
National Politics ◽  
Probability Models ◽  
Direct Benefits ◽  
Political Implications ◽  
Linear Probability

Abstract Context: State governments have been powerful sites of Republican resistance to the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Democratic Party's signature 2010 law. By influencing how citizens experience the ACA, state-level implementation can affect the national-level political implications of the law. Methods: I examine three largely unstudied areas of marketplace implementation: navigator laws, transitional plan termination, and rating area configurations. For each policy area, I use linear probability models to investigate the determinants of state lawmakers bolstering or eroding marketplaces. Findings: In each case, Democrat-controlled states were more likely to bolster marketplaces than Republican-controlled states were, with decisions more polarized in those policy areas—navigator laws and transitional plan termination—and with greater potential for national-level feedback. For navigator laws, where Republican state lawmakers were most cross-pressured by national party interests and local interests, marketplace eroding policy was highly associated with strength of conservative networks. Conclusion: Crafters of federal legislation cannot expect state lawmakers to universally implement federal law to maximize the direct benefits to their constituents. Rather, we should expect state lawmakers to, in many instances, implement federal law in ways that benefit their parties.

scholarly journals Creating COVID-19 Stigma by Referencing the Novel Coronavirus as the “Chinese virus” on Twitter: Quantitative Analysis of Social Media Data (Preprint)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henna Budhwani ◽  
Ruoyan Sun
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
National Level ◽  
State Level ◽  
Fold Increase ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Structural Force ◽  
Novel Coronavirus ◽  
Derivatives Of

BACKGROUND Stigma is the deleterious, structural force that devalues members of groups that hold undesirable characteristics. Since stigma is created and reinforced by society—through in-person and online social interactions—referencing the novel coronavirus as the “Chinese virus” or “China virus” has the potential to create and perpetuate stigma. OBJECTIVE The aim of this study was to assess if there was an increase in the prevalence and frequency of the phrases “Chinese virus” and “China virus” on Twitter after the March 16, 2020, US presidential reference of this term. METHODS Using the Sysomos software (Sysomos, Inc), we extracted tweets from the United States using a list of keywords that were derivatives of “Chinese virus.” We compared tweets at the national and state levels posted between March 9 and March 15 (preperiod) with those posted between March 19 and March 25 (postperiod). We used Stata 16 (StataCorp) for quantitative analysis, and Python (Python Software Foundation) to plot a state-level heat map. RESULTS A total of 16,535 “Chinese virus” or “China virus” tweets were identified in the preperiod, and 177,327 tweets were identified in the postperiod, illustrating a nearly ten-fold increase at the national level. All 50 states witnessed an increase in the number of tweets exclusively mentioning “Chinese virus” or “China virus” instead of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) or coronavirus. On average, 0.38 tweets referencing “Chinese virus” or “China virus” were posted per 10,000 people at the state level in the preperiod, and 4.08 of these stigmatizing tweets were posted in the postperiod, also indicating a ten-fold increase. The 5 states with the highest number of postperiod “Chinese virus” tweets were Pennsylvania (n=5249), New York (n=11,754), Florida (n=13,070), Texas (n=14,861), and California (n=19,442). Adjusting for population size, the 5 states with the highest prevalence of postperiod “Chinese virus” tweets were Arizona (5.85), New York (6.04), Florida (6.09), Nevada (7.72), and Wyoming (8.76). The 5 states with the largest increase in pre- to postperiod “Chinese virus” tweets were Kansas (n=697/58, 1202%), South Dakota (n=185/15, 1233%), Mississippi (n=749/54, 1387%), New Hampshire (n=582/41, 1420%), and Idaho (n=670/46, 1457%). CONCLUSIONS The rise in tweets referencing “Chinese virus” or “China virus,” along with the content of these tweets, indicate that knowledge translation may be occurring online and COVID-19 stigma is likely being perpetuated on Twitter.

scholarly journals Creating COVID-19 Stigma by Referencing the Novel Coronavirus as the “Chinese virus” on Twitter: Quantitative Analysis of Social Media Data

10.2196/19301 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. e19301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henna Budhwani ◽  
Ruoyan Sun
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
National Level ◽  
State Level ◽  
Fold Increase ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Structural Force ◽  
Novel Coronavirus ◽  
Derivatives Of

Background Stigma is the deleterious, structural force that devalues members of groups that hold undesirable characteristics. Since stigma is created and reinforced by society—through in-person and online social interactions—referencing the novel coronavirus as the “Chinese virus” or “China virus” has the potential to create and perpetuate stigma. Objective The aim of this study was to assess if there was an increase in the prevalence and frequency of the phrases “Chinese virus” and “China virus” on Twitter after the March 16, 2020, US presidential reference of this term. Methods Using the Sysomos software (Sysomos, Inc), we extracted tweets from the United States using a list of keywords that were derivatives of “Chinese virus.” We compared tweets at the national and state levels posted between March 9 and March 15 (preperiod) with those posted between March 19 and March 25 (postperiod). We used Stata 16 (StataCorp) for quantitative analysis, and Python (Python Software Foundation) to plot a state-level heat map. Results A total of 16,535 “Chinese virus” or “China virus” tweets were identified in the preperiod, and 177,327 tweets were identified in the postperiod, illustrating a nearly ten-fold increase at the national level. All 50 states witnessed an increase in the number of tweets exclusively mentioning “Chinese virus” or “China virus” instead of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) or coronavirus. On average, 0.38 tweets referencing “Chinese virus” or “China virus” were posted per 10,000 people at the state level in the preperiod, and 4.08 of these stigmatizing tweets were posted in the postperiod, also indicating a ten-fold increase. The 5 states with the highest number of postperiod “Chinese virus” tweets were Pennsylvania (n=5249), New York (n=11,754), Florida (n=13,070), Texas (n=14,861), and California (n=19,442). Adjusting for population size, the 5 states with the highest prevalence of postperiod “Chinese virus” tweets were Arizona (5.85), New York (6.04), Florida (6.09), Nevada (7.72), and Wyoming (8.76). The 5 states with the largest increase in pre- to postperiod “Chinese virus” tweets were Kansas (n=697/58, 1202%), South Dakota (n=185/15, 1233%), Mississippi (n=749/54, 1387%), New Hampshire (n=582/41, 1420%), and Idaho (n=670/46, 1457%). Conclusions The rise in tweets referencing “Chinese virus” or “China virus,” along with the content of these tweets, indicate that knowledge translation may be occurring online and COVID-19 stigma is likely being perpetuated on Twitter.

Conceptualizing and Measuring Dominant-Party Enclaves

2020 ◽  
pp. 50-83
Author(s):  
Jonathan T. Hiskey ◽  
Mason W. Moseley
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
The State ◽  
Central Concept ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
San Luis ◽  
Measurement Strategy ◽  
Party Dominance

Chapter 3 begins with a brief review of previous efforts to measure regimes at the national level and then introduces the study’s central concept, dominant-party enclaves, and the measurement strategy the authors employ to capture that concept. The latter focuses on the first transfer of power from incumbent to opposition as the marker for a system’s move from single-party dominance toward a multiparty electoral environment. This approach is then applied to the provinces and states of Argentina and Mexico, in which 16 cases of dominant-party enclaves are identified. These cases, home to more than 30 percent of citizens of the two countries, serve as the focus for the remainder of the study. The chapter then concludes with further exploration of the two cases that serve as prototypes for this study of dominant-party enclaves: the province of San Luis in Argentina and the state of Mexico (Edomex) in Mexico.

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