scholarly journals Arguments for considering Uncertainty in QSAR Predictions in Hazard and Risk Assessments

2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ullrika Sahlin ◽  
Laura Golsteijn ◽  
M. Sarfraz Iqbal ◽  
Willie Peijnenburg
2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 1441-1464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell A. Green ◽  
Julian J. Bommer

Probabilistic assessments of the potential impact of earthquakes on infrastructure entails the consideration of smaller magnitude events than those generally considered in deterministic hazard and risk assessments. In this context, it is useful to establish if there is a magnitude threshold below which the possibility of triggering liquefaction can be discounted because such a lower bound is required for probabilistic liquefaction hazard analyses. Based on field observations and a simple parametric study, we conclude that earthquakes as small as moment magnitude 4.5 can trigger liquefaction in extremely susceptible soil deposits. However, for soil profiles that are suitable for building structures, the minimum earthquake magnitude for the triggering of liquefaction is about 5. We therefore propose that in liquefaction hazard assessments of building sites, magnitude 5.0 be adopted as the minimum earthquake size considered, while magnitudes as low as 4.5 may be appropriate for some other types of infrastructure.


Author(s):  
Moness Rizkalla ◽  
R. S. (Rod) Read

Undertaking a systematic pipeline geohazard assessment may be driven by the design and regulatory permitting needs for proposed new pipelines or as an input to the integrity management of operating pipeline assets. Yet the leading international pipeline codes do not provide explicit direction on undertaking such assessments, rather providing considerable latitude in the guidance to do so which in turn provides several options. The methods for identifying and assessing the potential likelihood and severity of geohazards vary significantly, from purely expert judgment-based approaches relying largely on visual observations of geomorphology to analytically-intensive methods incorporating phenomenological and/or mechanistic models and route, pipeline properties and, where applicable, operational monitoring data. Each of these methods can be used to assess hazard and risk associated with specific geohazards in terms of qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative approaches provided that associated underlying assumptions are clearly understood. Some of these methods are better suited to provide a continuous contiguous geohazard risk assessment for a pipeline system while others are better suited for localized site-specific risk assessments. Following a brief review of pipeline codes, this paper provides an overview of the range of pipeline geohazard assessment approaches and explores the “fitness for purpose” strategy that allows for continuing improvement during design stages and into operations.


Eos ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 84 (23) ◽  
pp. 213 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Zimbelman ◽  
Robert J. Watters ◽  
Steve Bowman ◽  
Ian Firth

Geology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane M. Rooyakkers ◽  
John Stix ◽  
Kim Berlo ◽  
Maurizio Petrelli ◽  
Freysteinn Sigmundsson

Unintentional encounters with silicic magma at ~2–2.5 km depth have recently occurred during drilling at three volcanoes: Kilauea (Hawaii), Menengai (Kenya), and Krafla (Iceland). Geophysical surveys had failed to warn about shallow magma before each encounter, and subsequent surveys at Krafla have been unable to resolve the size or architecture of its silicic magma body. This presents a conundrum for volcano monitoring: Do such shallow “covert” magma bodies pose an eruption risk? Here, we show that Krafla’s most recent explosive eruption, a mixed hydrothermal-magmatic event in 1724 C.E. that formed the Víti maar, involved rhyolite essentially indistinguishable in composition from magma encountered during drilling in 2009. Streaks of quenched basalt in some Víti pumices provide direct evidence for interaction between co-erupted rhyolitic and basaltic magmas, but crystals in these pumices show no evidence for late-stage heating or re-equilibration with more mafic melt, implying mixing time scales of at most several hours. Covert silicic magma thus presents an eruption risk at Krafla and may be mobilized with little warning. Difficulties in resolving magma bodies smaller than ~1 km3 with geophysical surveys mean that covert silicic magma may exist at many other volcanoes and should be considered in hazard and risk assessments.


Geografie ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 205-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Blahůt ◽  
Jan Klimeš ◽  
Zuzana Vařilová

Quantitative rockfall hazard and specific risk assessment of the selected municipalities within the České Švýcarsko National Park was performed using two rockfall hazard analysis modelling codes. CONEFALL and RockFall Analyst codes were used to delimit rockfall hazard regions. Specific risk to buildings was consequently assessed using results from the hazard analysis and literature-derived vulnerability values. Results of hazard and risk assessments for two nearby municipalities were compared and evaluated. Both models provide similar rockfall hazard values in areas characterized with relatively steep (36°–50°), convex and short slopes (up to 200 m). Whereas in regions with less steep (20°–35°), concave and longer slopes (about 350 m) the predicted rockfall hazard differs considerably. We argue that the results of the RockFall Analyst are more reliable due to complex input data and modelling approach which closely resembles the natural process of falling rocks on forested slopes. Differences in hazard assessment are further reflected in assigning risk values to exposed buildings, where CONEFALL is more conservative.


1994 ◽  
Vol 96 (11) ◽  
pp. 26-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brinton Phillips ◽  
Neil Rutherford ◽  
Tom Gorsuch ◽  
Mark Mabey ◽  
Nick Looker ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 74-92
Author(s):  
Jan Stejskal

The article deals with the issue of identifying required material reserves, also referred to as strategic or emergency reserves. These reserves are managed by state authority as part of national crisis preparedness. The article explores how scenarios can be used as a method for planning, i.e. determining adequate, realistic, and affordable material reserves. A scenario-based analysis, well proven in the defence planning domain, is identified as a method offering a high degree of analytical rigor and traceability of resulting requirements. Selected planning scenarios clearly must reflect national threat/hazard and risk assessments. They also have to reflect other important national policies, such as those governing economy, industry, health care, or environment. The illustrative conduct of the initial steps of the proposed method is demonstrated using Latvia’s security policy circumstances.


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