Who Governs in the Council? Determinants of Ministerial Participation in Council Meetings

2020 ◽  
pp. 088832541990052
Author(s):  
Jan Kovář ◽  
Kamil Kovář

The Council of the EU is the primary institution through which ministers of member states can express their positions on Commission proposals and vote upon legislation. This article first examines the extent to which ministers actually attend Council meetings before moving toward investigating the determinants of ministerial participation in over a period covering almost thirteen years between May 2004 and December 2016. It aims to identify determinants of why ministers from the Visegrad countries participate at some meetings and are absent from others. Using an original data set containing information about 940 Council meetings as well as several country-specific characteristics, we show that, on average, at about four out of every six meetings, ministers are absent. The results of our regressions indicate a pattern in which holding the office of the EU’s rotating presidency, the number of b-points on the agenda, and the size of the government increase the likelihood of ministerial participation in meetings. In contrast, high levels of popular support for Eurosceptic parties and holding of national legislative elections decrease the probability of ministerial attendance. Moreover, meetings of Council formations related to policy areas with a low level of EU competence are significantly less likely to be attended by ministers.

Author(s):  
Francesca Ghiretti

AbstractThe formal conclusion of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investments (CAI) has drawn much criticism. Criticisms for member states did not always recognise the same critical points. The case of Italy presents an instance in which the issue rather than laying in the content of the agreement was identified in the process. Not only had Italy been marginalised in the process of negotiation that led to the conclusion of the CAI, but also exponents from the government claim that leading negotiators, amongst which France and Germany, ignored Italy’s doubts about the deal when these were raised. Beyond politics, the paper shows that the Italian business community displays a response to the agreement in line with that of the rest of the EU in its positive assessment of the outcome.


Author(s):  
Johannes Bubeck ◽  
Kai Jäger ◽  
Nikolay Marinov ◽  
Federico Nanni

Abstract Why do states intervene in elections abroad? This article argues that outsiders intervene when the main domestic contenders for office adopt policy positions that differ from the point of view of the outside power. It refers to the split between the government's and opposition's positions as policy polarization. Polarization between domestic political forces, rather than the degree of unfriendliness of the government in office, attracts two types of interventions: process (for or against democracy) and candidate (for or against the government) interventions. The study uses a novel, original data set to track local contenders’ policy positions. It shows that the new policy polarization measurement outperforms a number of available alternatives when it comes to explaining process and candidate interventions. The authors use this measurement to explain the behavior of the United States as an intervener in elections from 1945 to 2012. The United States is more likely to support the opposition, and the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US opposition is facing an anti-US government. It is more likely to support the government, and undermine the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US government is facing an anti-US opposition. The article also presents the results for all interveners, confirming the results from the US case.


2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (11) ◽  
pp. 1474-1499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laron K. Williams

If no-confidence motions are primarily motivated by bringing down governments, why do only approximately 5% of no-confidence motions in advanced parliamentary democracies from 1960 result in the termination of government? In this project the author addresses this puzzle by developing a formal model of the electoral benefits of no-confidence motions and tests these hypotheses with the use of an original data set. No-confidence motions represent highly visible opportunities for opposition parties to highlight their strength or ability compared to the government in the hopes of improving their vote shares. The author finds support for the signal-based theory on a sample of 20 advanced parliamentary democracies from 1960 to 2008. Although no-confidence motions result in decreases for the government parties, the opposition parties that propose the motion experience boosts in vote share. This relationship is even stronger when the proposing party is an alternative governing possibility—illustrated by the conditioning impacts of the number of parliamentary parties and the opposition party’s ideological extremism. This provides an explanation as to why opposition parties would continue to challenge the government even though the motions are likely to fail.


Subject The Hungarian government's anti-immigration stance. Significance Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his government have been campaigning against the wave of migrants seeking refuge in Europe, and the EU's handling of the resulting crisis. The government hoped a referendum on October 2 would reject EU settlement of non-Hungarians in Hungary without parliament's consent. With a turnout of less than 50%, the referendum is null and void. Orban's Fidesz party nevertheless claimed victory, as 98.6% of those who cast a valid vote opposed relocation. Impacts The opposition to Fidesz will be able to frame the referendum as its first victory since 2010 and try to build unity on that basis. Fidesz will be unable to extend its popular support on the basis of these results. The EU is unlikely to react forcefully to constitutional amendments in Hungary, given Brexit and elections in France and Germany.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 1250-1253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Campa ◽  
Stefania Toselli

Purpose: To establish a specific player profile on body-composition parameters and to provide a data set of bioelectric impedances values for male volleyball players. Methods: The study included 201 athletes (age 26.1 [5.4] y, height 191.9 [9.7] cm, weight 86.8 [10.8] kg) registered in the Italian volleyball divisions. The athletes were divided into 3 groups: The elite group comprised 75 players participating in the 1st (Super Lega) division, the subelite group included 65 athletes performing in the 2nd (Serie A2) division, and the low-level group included 61 players participating in the 3rd (Serie B) division. Bioelectric impedance, body weight, and height of the athletes were measured in the second half of the competitive season. In addition, bioelectrical impedance vector analysis was performed. Results: The elite group showed a greater amount of fat-free mass (FFM) and total body water (TBW) and a lower fat mass (FM) than the subelite group (P < .05). In addition, the elite players were taller and heavier and had a higher FFM, FM, TBW, and body cellular mass than the low-level athletes (P < .05). Finally, the mean impedance vectors of the elite group significantly differed from those measured in the normal population and in the other 2 groups (P < .05). Conclusions: This study provides an original data set of body-composition and bioelectric impedance reference values of elite male volleyball players. The results might be useful for interpretation of individual bioimpedance vectors and for defining target regions for volleyball players.


Author(s):  
Alicja Michalska

In Poland and other European Union member states, young people are disfavoured by employers in the labour market. This applies to the forms of employment (flexible and fixed- term contracts) and its financial conditions. In 2013, the unemployment rate among economically active population under the age of 25 in the EU was 23.1%, while in Poland it amounted to 27 %. The problems of the young people in the labour market include the mismatch of skills sought by employers and the ones mastered by potential employees, the limited number of new jobs, as well as the discriminatory practices of employers towards young people. Young people classified as NEET (not in employment, education, training) generate considerable social costs. In 2010, 16.5 % of individuals in the 18–24 group and 19.7 % in the 25 29 group in the EU were classified as  NEETs. The EU supported the member states’ governments actions regarding young people via the Lisbon Strategy and the Europe 2020 Strategy. The EU also proposed a new model for flexible management of the labour market (the so-called flexicurity) to improve the efficiency of labour markets and to ensure more jobs while fostering social security of workers. In Poland, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy implemented the government policy as well as the recommendations of the European Commission through the “Youth in the labour market” programme.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (54) ◽  
pp. 223-246
Author(s):  
Hana N. Hlaváčková ◽  

The European security environment has changed and the EU has become more independent in its security policy. New threats faced by the EU in 2014 (the migration crises) and other remaining threats (such as terrorism, organised crime, piracy) need solving by its greater involvement in the region. One problem that the EU tries to solve is the inconsistency of member states in security issues. In this article, we focus on the V4 group and their opinions towards EU security. This article examines strategies adopted by small/new EU member states to protect European borders and European territories and regions outside the EU that affect their security. For a long time, the V4 countries only participated sporadically in EU missions. The article shows what changes took place and what were the reasons for the decision to participate or not in the EU activities. The article raises the question of whether the show-the-flag strategy adopted by the V4 countries and their participation in EU missions is relevant for ensuring European security nowadays.


2020 ◽  
pp. 23-34
Author(s):  
Petro Zhuk

The issues of delineating the mountain areas as an object of support of socio-economic development are examined. The 2021-2027 State Regional Development Strategy adopted by the Government of Ukraine stipulates the transition to a territory-oriented development policy. The Strategy provides the types of territories that require special attention on part of the state and the application of specific mechanisms and tools to stimulate their development. Mountain areas are indicated among such territories, which requires substantiation and institutionalization of the concept of mountain areas. The paper compares the domestic practice and relevant European approaches to delineation and granting the status of mountain areas to some territories. The features of the methodology of territorial typology in the delineation of mountain areas used in the EU Member States are outlined. In particular, the categories of mountain areas, the methods and criteria for their identification based on digital analysis of topographic data on the relief are indicated. The mechanisms of external support of sustainable development and improvement of the economic competitiveness of mountain areas in the EU Member States are determined. The features of domestic practice in supporting mountain areas focused on mountain settlements are outlined, and the interpretation of mountain areas in strategic documents and legislation of Ukraine is analyzed. The conclusions regarding the need to improve the mechanisms of state support of mountain areas in Ukraine and approaches and criteria to their identification are made. The difficulties of application in Ukraine of the methodology used in the EU due to the lack of necessary mapping-digital framework are emphasized. The option of not abandoning the domestic practice of considering the settlements as mountain ones is suggested. Yet, the category of mountain areas should include the territories of administrative-territorial units of the basic level where half and over half settlements have the mountain status.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 757-761 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Alcover

This dispute arose after African Swine Fever (ASF), a highly contagious disease of pigs, was detected in four member States of the European Union (EU) and Russia stopped accepting imports of pigs and pig products from the EU. The EU presented claims with respect to two measures: (i) the ‘EU-wide ban’, consisting of Russia's ban on the importation of the products at issue from the entire EU; and (ii) the ‘country-specific import bans’ imposed by Russia on imports from the four EU member States – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. There were two categories of products at issue: ‘treated products’ (finished products subject to a treatment that ensures destruction of ASF) and ‘non-treated products’ (products including live pigs, and raw meat preparations). Treated products were not subject to the EU-wide ban. The EU brought multiple claims under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).


Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (23) ◽  
pp. 6401
Author(s):  
Barbara Fura ◽  
Małgorzata Stec ◽  
Teresa Miś

In this paper, we have analysed the level of advancement in circular economy (CE) in the EU-28 countries. First, we used a synthetic measure to examine CE advancement in EU countries in each of the Eurostat CE distinguished areas, i.e., production and consumption, waste management, secondary raw materials, and competitiveness and innovation. For the empirical analysis, we applied 17 Eurostat indicators to the CE areas. To find the synthetic measure in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016, we used multidimensional comparative analysis, i.e., a zero unitarisation method. Second, based on the synthetic measures of the CE areas, we created a general synthetic measure of the CE advancement of the EU-28 countries as well as the countries’ rankings. Third, we classified the countries into groups according to their level of advancement in CE, i.e., high level, medium–high level, medium–low level and low level groups. Finally, we applied a similarity measure to evaluate the correlation between obtained rankings in two most extreme moments in the period of analysis (2010, 2016). Our analysis covers all EU member states, as well as “old” and “new” EU countries separately. Our results confirm that highly developed Benelux countries, i.e., Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium, have the highest CE advancement level. Malta, Cyprus, Estonia and Greece are the least advanced in CE practice. Apart from that, on average, there is some progress in CE implementation, significant disproportions between the EU countries were observed, especially among the “new” member states.


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