Moral Judgments of COVID-19 Social Distancing Violations: The Roles of Perceived Harm and Impurity

2021 ◽  
pp. 014616722110254
Author(s):  
Daniel L. Rosenfeld ◽  
A. Janet Tomiyama
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Total N ◽  
Social Distancing ◽  
Competing Hypotheses ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
Perceived Harm

Can perceptions of impurity uniquely explain moral judgment? Or is moral judgment reducible to perceptions of harm? Whereas some perspectives posit that purity violations may drive moral judgment distinctly from harm violations, other perspectives contend that perceived harm is an essential precursor of moral condemnation. We tested these competing hypotheses through five preregistered experiments (total N = 2,944) investigating U.S. adults’ perceptions of social distancing violations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Perceived harm was more strongly related to moral judgment than was perceived impurity. Nevertheless, over and above perceived harm, perceived impurity reliably explained unique variance in moral judgment. Effects of perceived harm and impurity were significant among both liberal and conservative participants but were larger among liberals. Results suggest that appraisals of both harm and impurity provide valuable insights into moral cognition. We discuss implications of these findings for dyadic morality, moral foundations, act versus character judgments, and political ideology.

scholarly journals Disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with purity-based moral judgments

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fieke Maria Antoinet Wagemans ◽  
Mark John Brandt ◽  
Marcel Zeelenberg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Personality Characteristics ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Moral Foundations Theory ◽  
Disgust Sensitivity ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Total N ◽  
Moral Domain ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
Moral Condemnation

Individual differences in disgust sensitivity are associated with a range of judgments and attitudes related to the moral domain. Some perspectives suggest that the association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments will be equally strong across all moral domains (purity, authority, loyalty, care, fairness, and liberty). Other perspectives predict that disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with judgments of specific moral domains (e.g., primarily purity). However, no study has systematically tested if disgust sensitivity is associated with moral judgments of the purity domain specifically, more generally to moral judgments of the binding moral domains, or to moral judgments of all of the moral domains equally. Across five studies (total N = 1104), we find consistent evidence for the notion that disgust sensitivity relates more strongly to moral condemnation of purity-based transgression (meta-analytic r = .40) than to moral condemnation of transgressions of any of the other domains (range meta-analytic r’s: .07 ̶ .27). Our findings are in line with predictions from Moral Foundations Theory, which predicts that personality characteristics like disgust sensitivity make people more sensitive to a certain set of moral issues.

All Things Being Equal: Distinguishing Proportionality and Equity in Moral Reasoning

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 374-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Skurka ◽  
Liana B. Winett ◽  
Hannah Jarman-Miller ◽  
Jeff Niederdeppe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
National Sample ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Moral Foundations Theory ◽  
Potential Bias ◽  
Calibration Sample

Moral foundations theory (MFT) has been a useful framework for understanding moral judgment and its relationship to political leaning. However, some have argued that MFT omits key domains of moral reasoning. We explored the utility of two candidate foundations (Proportionality and Equity) with a national sample of U.S. adults recruited through Nielsen’s Harris Panel, randomly split into calibration ( n = 1,499) and replication samples ( n = 1,499). We find that Proportionality and Equity are conceptually distinct from the original foundations (as measured in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire [MFQ]) but relate to them in predictable ways. Equity consistently predicted political leaning above and beyond covariates and the original foundations, but Proportionality only distinguished conservatives from liberals in the calibration sample, which suggests Proportionality may be highly relevant to moral judgments regardless of political ideology. Our findings also indicate potential bias when using one of the MFQ’s screener items to filter out unengaged participants.

Commentaries and Rejoinder on

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Gong ◽  
Douglas L. Medin ◽  
Tal Eyal ◽  
Nira Liberman ◽  
Yaacov Trope ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Psychological Distance ◽  
Temporal Distance ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Cultural Systems ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
Construal Levels

In the hope to resolve the two sets of opposing results concerning the effects of psychological distance and construal levels on moral judgment, Žeželj and Jokić (2014) conducted a series of four direct replications, which yielded divergent patterns of results. In our commentary, we first revisit the consistent findings that lower-level construals induced by How/Why manipulation lead to harsher moral condemnation than higher-level construals. We then speculate on the puzzling patterns of results regarding the role of temporal distance in shaping moral judgment. And we conclude by discussing the complexity of morality and propose that it may be important to incorporate cultural systems into the study of moral cognition.

scholarly journals Priming intuition disfavors instrumental harm but not impartial beneficence

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Jim Albert Charlton Everett ◽  
Brian D. Earp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Dimensional Model ◽  
Total N ◽  
Two Dimensional Model ◽  
Do So

Understanding the cognitive underpinnings of moral judgment is one of most pressing problems in psychological science. Some highly-cited studies suggest that reliance on intuition decreases utilitarian (expected welfare maximizing) judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas in which one has to decide whether to instrumentally harm (IH) one person to save a greater number of people. However, recent work suggests that such dilemmas are limited in that they fail to capture the positive, defining core of utilitarianism: commitment to impartial beneficence (IB). Accordingly, a new two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment has been proposed that distinguishes IH and IB components. The role of intuition on this new model has not been studied. Does relying on intuition disfavor utilitarian choices only along the dimension of instrumental harm or does it also do so along the dimension of impartial beneficence? To answer this question, we conducted three studies (total N = 970, two preregistered) using conceptual priming of intuition versus deliberation on moral judgments. Our evidence converges on an interaction effect, with intuition decreasing utilitarian judgments in IH—as suggested by previous work—but failing to do so in IB. These findings bolster the recently proposed two-dimensional model of utilitarian moral judgment, and point to new avenues for future research.

scholarly journals I think, therefore I forgive: The role of reasoning in forgiving accidental harms

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrajeet Patil ◽  
Bastien Trémolière
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Time Pressure ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Cognitive Resources ◽  
Reasoning Ability ◽  
Total N ◽  
Moral Condemnation

People experience a strong conflict while condemning someone who brought about an accidental harm, her innocent intention exonerating her, but the harmful outcome incriminating her. In the present research (total N = 4879), we explore how reasoning ability and cognitive style relate to how people choose to resolve this conflict and judge the accidental harms. A first set of studies (1a-c) showed that individual differences in cognitive style predicted severity of judgments in fictitious accidental harms scenarios, with more able (or willing) reasoners being less harsh in their judgments. A second set of studies (2a-c) relied on experimental manipulations of cognitive load (Dot matrix, Time pressure, Mortality Salience manipulations), aiming to tax available cognitive resources to participants while evaluating third-party harmful behaviors. These manipulations, however, failed to modulate people’s moral judgments for accidental harms. We discuss the importance of individual differences in reasoning ability in the assessment of accidental harms, and we also propose potential explanations for the failure of our experimental manipulations to affect severity of moral condemnation.

scholarly journals Politicizing the COVID-19 Pandemic: Ideological Differences in Adherence to Social Distancing

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hank Rothgerber ◽  
Thomas Wilson ◽  
Davis Whaley ◽  
Daniel L. Rosenfeld ◽  
Michael Humphrey ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Health Risk ◽  
Health Risks ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Demographic Characteristics ◽  
Psychological Variables ◽  
Total N ◽  
Social Distancing ◽  
Mainstream Media ◽  
Political Conservatism ◽  
Media Reports

Data from two MTurk studies with U.S. respondents (total N =1,153) revealed an ideological divide in adherence to social distancing guidelines during the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, political conservatism inversely predicted compliance with behaviors aimed at preventing the spread of the COVID-19. Differences in reported social distancing were mediated by divergent perceptions of the health risk posed by COVID-19 (Studies 1 and 2), which were explained by differences in self-reported knowledge of COVID-19 (Study 1) and perceived media accuracy in covering the pandemic (Studies 1 and 2). The politicization of COVID-19 may have prompted conservatives to discount mainstream media reports of the severity of the virus, leading them to downplay its health risks and consequently adherence less to social distancing protocols. These effects hold when controlling for key demographic characteristics as well as psychological variables, including belief in science and COVID-19-related anxiety. Thus, political ideology may uniquely explain COVID-19 behavior.

scholarly journals Moral Judgment: An Overlooked Deficient Domain in Multiple Sclerosis?

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (11) ◽  
pp. 105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samar Ayache ◽  
Moussa Chalah
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Sclerosis ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Clinical Population ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Information Processing Speed ◽  
Cognitive Measures ◽  
The Central Nervous System

Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a chronic inflammatory and neurodegenerative disease of the central nervous system through which patients can suffer from sensory, motor, cerebellar, emotional, and cognitive symptoms. Although cognitive and behavioral dysfunctions are frequently encountered in MS patients, they have previously received little attention. Among the most frequently impaired cognitive domains are attention, information processing speed, and working memory, which have been extensively addressed in this population. However, less emphasis has been placed on other domains like moral judgment. The latter is a complex cognitive sphere that implies the individuals’ ability to judge others’ actions and relies on numerous affective and cognitive processes. Moral cognition is crucial for healthy and adequate interpersonal relationships, and its alteration might have drastic impacts on patients’ quality of life. This work aims to analyze the studies that have addressed moral cognition in MS. Only three works have previously addressed moral judgement in this clinical population compared to healthy controls, and none included neuroimaging or physiological measures. Although scarce, the available data suggest a complex pattern of moral judgments that deviate from normal response. This finding was accompanied by socio-emotional and cognitive deficits. Only preliminary data are available on moral cognition in MS, and its neurobiological foundations are still needing to be explored. Future studies would benefit from combining moral cognitive measures with comprehensive neuropsychological batteries and neuroimaging/neurophysiological modalities (e.g., functional magnetic resonance imaging, tractography, evoked potentials, electroencephalography) aiming to decipher the neural underpinning of moral judgement deficits and subsequently conceive potential interventions in MS patients.

On Disease and Deontology: Multiple Tests of the Influence of Disease Threat on Moral Vigilance

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damian R. Murray ◽  
Nicholas Kerry ◽  
Will M. Gervais
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Disease Transmission ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Multiple Tests ◽  
Moral Domains

Threat has been linked to certain facets of moral cognition, but the specific implications of disease threat for moral judgment remain poorly understood. Across three studies, we investigated the role of perceived disease threat in shaping moral judgment and hypothesized that perceived disease threat would cause people to be more sensitive to moral violations (or more “morally vigilant”). All three studies found a positive relationship between dispositional worry about disease transmission and moral vigilance. Additional analyses suggested that this worry was more strongly related to vigilance toward binding moral foundations. Study 3 demonstrated that moral vigilance was higher in individuals for whom the threat of disease was experimentally made salient, relative to individuals in both a neutral and a nondisease threat condition. Taken together, these results suggest that perceived disease threat may influence people’s moral vigilance across moral domains.

scholarly journals Social Threat Indirectly Increases Moral Condemnation via Thwarting Fundamental Social Needs

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert K. Henderson ◽  
Simone Schnall
Keyword(s):  
Social Anxiety ◽  
Indirect Effect ◽  
Social Needs ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Social Threat ◽  
Social Standing ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
Social Esteem

Individuals who experience threats to their social needs may attempt to avert further harm by condemning wrongdoers more severely. Three pre-registered studies tested whether threatened social esteem is associated with increased moral condemnation. In Study 1 (N = 381) participants played a game in which they were socially included or excluded and then evaluated the actions of moral wrongdoers. We observed an indirect effect: Exclusion increased social needs-threat, which in turn increased moral condemnation. Study 2 (N = 428) was a direct replication, and also showed this indirect effect. Both studies demonstrated the effect across five moral foundations, which was most pronounced for harm violations. Study 3 (N= 102) examined dispositional concerns about social needs threat, namely social anxiety, and showed a positive correlation between this trait and moral judgments. Overall, results suggest threatened social standing is linked to moral condemnation, presumably because moral wrongdoers pose a further threat when one’s ability to cope is already compromised.

scholarly journals Which Appraisals Are Foundational to Moral Judgment? Harm, Injustice, and Beyond

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 903-913 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jared Piazza ◽  
Paulo Sousa ◽  
Joshua Rottman ◽  
Stylianos Syropoulos
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Past Research ◽  
The United States ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Diverse Range

Harm-centric accounts of judgments of moral wrongdoing argue that moral judgments are fundamentally based on appraisals of harm. However, past research has failed to operationally discriminate harm appraisals from appraisals related to injustice. Four studies carefully discriminated harm qua pain/suffering from injustice, alongside appraisals related to impurity, authority, and disloyalty. Appraisals of injustice outperformed appraisals of harm as independent predictors of the judged wrongness of recalled offenses (Study 1). Studies 2a, 2b, and 3 extended these findings using a diverse range of wrongful acts and two different cultural samples—the United States and Greece. In addition to the strong relevance of injustice appraisals, these latter studies uncovered substantial contributions of impurity and authority appraisals. The results inform debates on moral pluralism and the foundations of moral cognition.

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