Risks of Seven UK Electricity Generation Options Part 1: Routine Operation

1995 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 283-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. J. Ball ◽  
L. E. J. Roberts

This paper examines, on a full fuel cycle basis, routine operational risks associated with the generation of electricity by seven options available to the United Kingdom. These options are tidal power, on-shore and off-shore wind, nuclear power, and coal, oil and gas-fired power. To facilitate comparison, risk estimates are normalised per GWa of electricity produced. Risks to the workforce and the public are considered as distinct items. So far as occupational risks are concerned, it is concluded that when such risks are combined for each cycle, they range from about 0.1 to 0.2 to a maximum of about 1 to 2 fatalities per GWa, with tidal power and gas lying at the lower end of this range, and coal and off-shore wind at the higher end. With the exception of the renewable cycles, for which significant public health risks of the type included within the remit of this project were not identified, the estimation of risks to the public presents many challenges. For example, while individual radiation doses to the public from the nuclear (and fossil) cycles are found to be insignificant compared to those from natural background radiation, collective doses may appear otherwise when integrated over thousands of years and continental or global populations. However, the meaning of such estimates in terms of health cannot be assessed, and in any event the estimates pale into insignificance when compared with those resulting from exposure to natural radiation were this to be calculated on the same basis. The problem of comparing public risks associated with the nuclear and fossil cycles is further compounded on considering the copious quantities of solid, liquid and gaseous waste products which are generated, particularly by the fossil cycles. These waste streams contain heavy metals, carcinogens and known respiratory irritants, but neither the short-term nor long-term public health implications can be quantified at present with confidence. Despite the uncertainties, our broad conclusion is that the routine operational risks of all these cycles are comparatively modest for modern, well-run systems and that the more important factors in energy choice are likely to entail considerations of security of supply, employment, optimum utilisation of the nation's resources and wider environmental considerations.

2019 ◽  
Vol 184 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 347-350
Author(s):  
Masato Sugino

Abstract A car-borne survey of air dose rate measurements was performed yearly from 2011 to 2013 to determine the levels of environmental radiation in Gunma prefecture after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident in 2011. The results revealed that the average ambient doses in each year were 85.3 ± 34.1 nGy/h in 2011, 60.3 ± 19.9 nGy/h in 2012, and 43.5 ± 15.1 nGy/h in 2013. The ambient dose rate in 2011, which was about three times higher than the average of 27.0 ± 7.1 nGy/h in 1998, was still in safety level considering the public health, and the ambient dose rate subsequently decreased in 2013 to approximately half the 2011 level. A contour map of the ambient dose rate showed relatively higher levels in the northern and western parts of the prefecture, with relatively lower levels toward the eastern and southern parts.


Subject Outlook for public health policy in South Africa. Significance Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi released the National Health Insurance (NHI) White Paper on December 11 -- the latest possible date to fulfill his pledge to deliver a plan for universal insurance by end-2015. It represents little progress on the discussion document presented in 2011, leaving core issues unanswered. Impacts The lack of a clear funding plan for the government's ambitious nuclear power expansion will add to fiscal concerns. The public health system will struggle to handle growing incidence of chronic diseases, increasing pressure to find more funding. Social stigmas attached to HIV/AIDS could discourage individuals in traditional rural communities from seeking treatment.


Author(s):  
V.K. Ivanov ◽  
◽  
A.V. Lopatkin ◽  
A.N. Menyajlo ◽  
E.V. Spirin ◽  
...  

The Russian Government approved the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation (Government Decree No.1523-r of June 9, 2020). The Strategy envisages the use of both thermal (TR) and fast (FR) reactors. The Strategy points out that the problems of nuclear power are associated with po-tential high expenses for irradiated fuel and radioactive wastes management. The previously de-signed model of the Russian nuclear energy development suggested that fast reactors only would operate at NPPs after 2010. Radiological equivalence, expressed as the equivalence of lifetime radiation risks to the public from radioactive wastes and from primary uranium ore, was shown to be achieved after 100-year storage. The burnup of 241Am, 237Np и 242Сm in closed nu-clear fuel cycle with fast reactors is a key part in the achievability of radiation risks equivalence. Scenarios of the Russian nuclear energy development through to 2100 with account of uncertain-ty factors in the measurement of contribution of fast and thermal reactors to the electric energy production are considered in the paper. The following three scenarios were developed: uncer-tainty is replaced by FRs; uncertainty is replaced by TRs; 50 per cent of FRs and 50 per cent of TRs replace uncertainty. If the energy is produced by fast reactors only (scenario 1) radiological equivalence was found to be achieved in 412 years. In two other scenarios radiological equiva-lence will be achieved after more than 1000 years. Contribution of main dose-forming radionu-clides and relevant ratios of potential biological hazards is included in models regardless of whether uncertainty in nuclear energy development is taking or not taking into account. Results of the study of conditions for radiological equivalence achievement should be used for amending Strategic plan of Russian nuclear power development through to 2100 that meets requirements of radiation ecology and radiation protection of the public.


Author(s):  
Gangyang Zheng ◽  
Paul Nelson ◽  
Vera Moiseytseva ◽  
Ernie Kee ◽  
Fatma Yilmaz

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is mandated to ensure “adequate protection” to the public health and safety, regardless of cost. It also has steadfastly declined to specify precisely what constitutes “adequate protection,” except that it does not mean “zero risk.” Rather it judges on a case-by-case basis whether the “adequate protection” standard has been met. NRC also seems to reserve the right to require an even higher level of protection, when that can be achieved in a manner that it judges to meet similarly imprecisely specified criteria such as “practicality” and “reasonableness.” In Regulatory Guide 1.174 NRC comes close to a concrete specification of “adequate protection,” albeit one that depends upon the historical licensing basis for a specific plant. And the technical portion of this paper begins with a description of how the approach of Regulatory Guide 1.174 can be viewed from the perspective of Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization. Meanwhile, in this research, in order to better understand the role of regulation, a microeconomic model of a price-taking nuclear power plant is constructed, particularly of the cost (C) of achieving any specified level of core damage frequency (CDF). Solution of this model reveals an economic optimum, at a point that balances plant value against risk of losing the plant via an accident involving core damage. For CDFs slightly smaller than this economic optimum there is scope for a regulatory mandate of even smaller CDF, should that be deemed either necessary to attain “adequate protection,” or reasonably attainable in order to achieve greater than adequate protection of the public health and safety. It is argued that regulatory bodies must have scope for discretionary decisions, because the information necessary to formulate a reasonable approximation to the cost curve C (fortunately) does not exist.


1985 ◽  
Vol 1 (S1) ◽  
pp. 398-401
Author(s):  
Gordon K. MacLeod

On March 28,1979, a near nuclear catastrophe occurred at Three Mile Island (TMI) near Harrisburgh, Pennsylvania, USA. I was at that time Pennsylvania's Secretary of Health. It was an accident that just “could not happen.” After all, nuclear power plants were built so safely that they could not possibly affect public health.As a physician, lam compelled to say that I am unalterably opposed to nuclear warfare. I am sure that most physicians would agree that there can be no adequate preparedness for the devastating medical consequences of nuclear war. Prevention of nuclear war is the only reasonable medical response to the hazards posed by nuclear weapons.By contrast, many of you may not share my position on nuclear power. Nuclear power can be made relatively safe if we do not ignore the public health lessons of the past. I belive that physicians need to increase and update their understandings of the medical consequences of radiation accidents and be trained to triage and to treat blast, radiation, and burn injuries.


2019 ◽  
pp. 563-574
Author(s):  
Nikolay Dolchinkov ◽  
Bonka Encheva Karaivanova –Dolchinkova

A major Russian political and economic objective is to increase exports, particularly for front-end fuel cycle services through Tenex, as well as nuclear power plants. Russia uses about 3800 tonnes of natural uranium per year. After enrichment, this becomes 190 tU enriched to 4.3% for 9 VVER-1000 reactors (at 2004, now 13), 60 tU enriched to 3.6% for 6 VVER-440s, 350 tU enriched to 2.0% for 11 RBMK units, and 6 tU enriched to 20% (with 9 tU depleted) for the BN-600. Some 90 tU recycled supplements the RBMK supply at about 2% enrichment. This RepU arises from reprocessing the used fuel from BN, VVER-440 and marine and research reactors. There is high-level concern about the development of new uranium deposits, and a Federal Council meeting in April 2015 agreed to continue the federal financing of exploration and estimation works in Vitimsky Uranium Region in Buryatia. It also agreed to financing construction of the engineering infrastructure of Mine No. 6 of Priargunsky Industrial Mining and Chemical Union (PIMCU). The following month the Council approved key support measures including the introduction of a zero rate for mining tax and property tax; simplification of the system of granting subsoil use rights; inclusion of the Economic Development of the Far East and Trans-Baikal up to 2018 policy in the Federal Target Program; and the development of infrastructure in Krasnokamensk. In June 2015 Rosgeologia signed a number of agreements to expedite mineral exploration in Russia, including one with Rosatom. It was established in July 2011 by presidential decree and consists of 38 enterprises located in 30 regions across Russia, but uranium is a minor part of its interests. Russia is engaged in international nuclear energy markets, far from the traditional sites of Eastern Europe. In June 2011, Rosatom announced that it was creating a "Rusatom" overseas company, a new structure responsible for building projects that could not benefit from them. It can be executed as a primary contractor as well as as owner of foreign capacities under a self-exploitation agreement (BOO). She actively strives for shopping in developing countries and has set up eight offices abroad. The Soviet Union also used 116 nuclear explosions (81 in Russia) for geological research, creating underground gas storage, boosting oil and gas production and excavating reservoirs and canals. Most were in the 3-10 kiloton range and all occurred 1965-88.


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