Omnis definitio periculosa est: on the Definition of the Term “Embryo” in the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act 1990

2003 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thérèse Callus
Keyword(s):  
Rapid Evolution ◽  
Embryo Research ◽  
Therapeutic Cloning ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Parliamentary Debates ◽  
Human Fertilisation ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Democratic Debate

In adopting a purposive interpretation of the definition of the term “embryo” in the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act 1990, the Court of Appeal judgement in R (on the application of B. Quintavalle on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) v. Secretary of State for Health effectively stifled democratic debate on the development of therapeutic cloning techniques. Instead of being evidence of the flexibility of the statute to adapt to the rapid evolution of scientific techniques, the judgment bears witness to a certain dependence of the law on scientific criteria and moreover, raises the question of legitimate judicial function. Indeed, judges should not be seen to be deciding questions of social choice that should ultimately be decided through the democratic process. Although the purposive approach may be objectively justified, it is suggested that the appeal judges erred in their appreciation of the very purpose of the 1990 Act. It is argued that the Parliamentary debates in 1990 illustrate that the purpose of the 1990 Act does not go beyond the area of procreation and embryo research in this context. Consequently, it is claimed that no economy should have been made on a full democratic debate. By preventing such a debate, the Court of Appeal appears to admit that the law has become servile to the scientific, political and a fortiori economic, interests at stake.

12. Theft

2020 ◽  
pp. 356-406
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This chapter examines the law governing theft. It considers the extent to which the criminal law of theft conflicts with civil law concepts of property; whether it is possible to steal property that belongs to oneself; the types of property that may be stolen; and the extent to which it is possible to provide a definition of ‘dishonesty’. The test for dishonesty has been fundamentally altered by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, developments which are analysed in this chapter.

THE EFFECT OF ROME II ON NATIONAL PROCEDURAL LAW

2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Folkard
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Of Laws ◽  
Applicable Law ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
Foreign Law ◽  
Procedural Autonomy ◽  
The Law ◽  
Council Regulation ◽  
Contractual Obligations ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Court Of Appeal

AT common law, in cases where the substantive claim is governed by foreign law, questions of procedure are nonetheless governed by the lex fori. In the context of damages, although the existence of damage is a question for the lex causae, its quantification and assessment is determined according to the law of the forum (Boys v Chaplin [1971] A.C. 356). The distinction between substance and procedure is preserved by Article 1(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 (“Rome II”) which provides, with certain exceptions, that Rome II “shall not apply to evidence and procedure”. That rule is, however, qualified by Article 15, which requires the law applicable under the Regulation (i.e. “the law applicable to non-contractual obligations”) to govern, inter alia, “the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy claimed” (Article 15(c)). The decision of the Court of Appeal in Wall v Mutuelle De Poitiers Assurances [2014] EWCA Civ 138; [2014] 3 All E.R. 340 concerns the definition of “procedure” in Article 1(3) and the meaning of “applicable law” in Article 15(c). It raises the important question of how far Rome II has encroached on the traditional view of national procedural autonomy in the conflict of laws.

Hearsay evidence in Uganda: Understanding its meaning, admissibility and probative value

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 418-439
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Direct Evidence ◽  
Case Law ◽  
High Court ◽  
Probative Value ◽  
The Law ◽  
Hearsay Rule ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Hearsay Evidence ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In Uganda legislation requires witnesses to adduce direct evidence in court. However, this may not be possible in all cases and the law provides for circumstances in which hearsay may be admissible. The Evidence Act is the main piece of legislation which governs the issue evidence. In this article, the author relied on 539 cases in which the Ugandan High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have dealt with hearsay evidence to establish the principles which these courts have developed on this issue. This case law shows, inter alia, that there are three major issues that Ugandan courts are still grappling with when it comes to hearsay evidence: the definition of hearsay; the admissibility of hearsay (exceptions to the hearsay rule) and the probative value of hearsay evidence. The author suggests ways in which courts can handle these issues.

Ground of mechanism of pay in a budget for the pipelinetransporting of hydrocarbon commodities

2019 ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Adam Bodіuk
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
State Budget ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
State Recognition ◽  
Main Pipelines ◽  
Business Entities ◽  
Combination Of Methods ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Hydrocarbon Transport

The subject of the study is the mechanism for determining the fiscal fee forthe main transportation of hydrocarbon goods as a resource concept. The purposeof this article is to justify the nature and prospects of using, instead of currentrent, hydrocarbon fiscal-main income as a fiscal payment, which is brought intothe state budget by operators of the main hydrocarbon-transport system as business entities for their transportation of hydrocarbons and products of their processing through main pipelines appropriate to the economic requirements. Theresearch methodology is determined by a combination of methods: a) cognition:legal analysis (study of the regulatory framework for the use of rent); b) justification: abstract logical analysis (definition of the concepts of hydrocarbon fiscalmain income); c) generalization (substantiation of conclusions and proposals).Results of work. In the process of analyzing the regulatory legal acts that regulate the use of current annuity as payment to the budget for the main transportation of hydrocarbons, it was established that it is not a tax in the interpretationof PKU, since the essence does not meet the official definition of tax, does notmeet the accepted definition of the concept of rent. The accepted nature andmechanism of paying rent for the transportation of hydrogen resources and associated revenues of the state and users of the main hydrogen transport systemand the unpromising nature of its use as a fiscal payment are analyzed. Conclusions.It is proposed that the state pay for the territorial pumping of hydrocarbon resources according to our triple principle as hydrocarbon fiscal-main income, whichcorresponds to its essence, and accordingly change the mechanism for calculatingand depositing funds to treasury accounts. Since the funds come to the revenueside of the state budget, that is, inherently belong to state revenue. The creationof such a mechanism needs certain studies, justifications and government decisions. The same applies to land use, since the quality indicators of soils, wherethe laid pipelines are territorially different. In addition, there is a process ofchanging land for its intended purpose, for the property. The fee for movinghydrocarbon resources should be calculated depending on the type of transport,including pipelines, for a set of indicators: quantity and quality of goods, time,main tariffs and distance of its movement. The amount may be adjusted usingfactors officially established by the CMU. Since the pipelines are located in territorial lands, part of this fee should be transferred to the territorial local budgets.Theoretically, the economic use of trunk pipelines should be considered as a typeof economic environmental management. Therefore, this type of government revenue should be determined by a set of indicators, as well as taking into account the economic interests of business entities authorized by the CMU. Thus, theimplementation of our proposed fiscal payment is relevant, has scientific noveltyand promising practical significance, therefore, for state recognition it is proposedto include it in the Tax Code of Ukraine.

scholarly journals What is a firm? A reply to Jean-Philippe Robé

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Simon Deakin ◽  
David Gindis ◽  
Geoffrey M. Hodgson
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Everyday Language ◽  
Modern Capitalism ◽  
Legal Foundations ◽  
Common Parlance ◽  
The Law ◽  
Business Entities ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Way

Abstract In his recent book on Property, Power and Politics, Jean-Philippe Robé makes a strong case for the need to understand the legal foundations of modern capitalism. He also insists that it is important to distinguish between firms and corporations. We agree. But Robé criticizes our definition of firms in terms of legally recognized capacities on the grounds that it does not take the distinction seriously enough. He argues that firms are not legally recognized as such, as the law only knows corporations. This argument, which is capable of different interpretations, leads to the bizarre result that corporations are not firms. Using etymological and other evidence, we show that firms are treated as legally constituted business entities in both common parlance and legal discourse. The way the law defines firms and corporations, while the product of a discourse which is in many ways distinct from everyday language, has such profound implications for the way firms operate in practice that no institutional theory of the firm worthy of the name can afford to ignore it.

Consent after the House of Lords: Taking and leading astray the Law of Theft

Legal Studies ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-322
Author(s):  
Mitchell C. Davies
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Specific Definition

The objectives of the Criminal Law Revision Committee when drafting the radical reforms proposed by the 1966 Theft Bill were described by a contemporary commentator2 as being: ‘. . . to do away with the more embarrassing and restrictive technicalities of the existing law . . .’In the same place it was observed that the Committee faced a choice between creating a specific definition of the various theft offences and their elements, or one whose generality would allow it to evolve to meet the challenges presented by ever more complex and sophisticated dishonest dealing.

scholarly journals Culpability, Kingston and the Law Commission

2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cath Crosby
Keyword(s):  
Justice System ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Character Theory ◽  
Criminal Offence ◽  
Pragmatic Approach ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Law Commission ◽  
Do So

This article considers the basis upon which a person should be held to be criminally liable, and to do so, it is necessary to examine the leading theories of character and choice that underpin the State holding a person to be culpable of a criminal offence, i.e. the link between culpability and fault. The case of R v Kingston1 is used to examine the application of these leading theories and it is observed that choice theorists would not excuse such a defendant from criminal liability even though his capacity to make a choice to refrain from law breaking was made extremely difficult by external factors beyond his control. Only character theory could possibly offer exculpation in such circumstances on the basis that the defendant acted ‘out of character’ and his deed did not deserve the full censure and punishment of the criminal law. The Court of Appeal in R v Kingston would have been prepared to excuse, but the House of Lords, and most recently the Law Commission have adopted a pragmatic approach to the involuntarily intoxicated offender. This case serves as a reminder that while justice is the aim of the criminal justice system, it is not an absolute standard.

Correction to a definition of negation

1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic B. Fitch
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Point ◽  
Personal Communication ◽  
The Other ◽  
Transfinite Induction ◽  
Original Form ◽  
Basic Logic ◽  
Double Negation ◽  
Original Letter ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of

In [3] a definition of negation was presented for the system K′ of extended basic logic [1], but it has since been shown by Peter Päppinghaus (personal communication) that this definition fails to give rise to the law of double negation as I claimed it did. The purpose of this note is to revise this defective definition in such a way that it clearly does give rise to the law of double negation, as well as to the other negation rules of K′.Although Päppinghaus's original letter to me was dated September 19, 1972, the matter has remained unresolved all this time. Only recently have I seen that there is a simple way to correct the definition. I am of course very grateful to Päppinghaus for pointing out my error in claiming to be able to derive the rule of double negation from the original form of the definition.The corrected definition will, as before, use fixed-point operators to give the effect of the required kind of transfinite induction, but this time a double transfinite induction will be used, somewhat like the double transfinite induction used in [5] to define simultaneously the theorems and antitheorems of system CΓ.

Transforming the Law on Psychiatric Lesions

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Emile Zitzke
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Expert Witnesses ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Psychological Harm ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Law Of Delict ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Made In

In this article, I trace the development in the law of delict of recognising general damages claims on account of psychiatric lesions with the aim of making suggestions on how to transform it. Using the tragic case of Michael Komape as a springboard for the discussion, I argue that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently brought clarity on the law on psychiatric lesions, more transformative work still needs to be done. More specifically, this article contends that the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity might require us to rethink the high evidentiary threshold that courts have set for proving the element of harm in cases related to psychiatric lesions. I argue that this can be done in at least three ways: First, by very cautiously bringing about a development that would involve protecting victims of psychological harm whose expert witnesses are shown to be inadequate despite all other facts indicating the existence of a psychiatric lesion. Secondly, by lowering the requirement of “recognised psychiatric lesion” to “grievous mental injury”, in line with similar arguments made in England. Thirdly, and most controversially, by acknowledging that perhaps the time has come for our law to recognise claims for so-called “grief in the air”.

Zur Frage der doktrinellen Auslegung des Artikels 61 Pkt. 3 der Verfassung der Republik Kasachstan

2021 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-144
Author(s):  
Ermek B. Abdrasulov
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
Social Relations ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
National Business

This article examines the issues of differentiation of legislative and subordinate regulation of public relations. It is noted that in the process of law-making activities, including the legislative process, practical questions often arise about the competence of various state bodies to establish various legal norms and rules. These issues are related to the need to establish a clear legal meaning of the constitutional norms devoted to the definition of the subject of regulation of laws. In particular, there is a need to clarify the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 61 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan in terms of the concepts "the most important public relations", "all other relations", "subsidiary legislation", as well as to establish the relationship between these concepts. Interpretation is also required by the provisions of p. 4 of Article 61 of the Constitution in terms of clarifying the question of whether the conclusion follows from mentioned provisions that all possible social relations in the Republic of Kazakhstan are subject to legal regulation, including those that are subject to other social and technical regulators (morality, national, business and professional traditions and customs, religion, standards, technical regulations, etc.). Answering the questions raised, the author emphasizes that the law and bylaws, as a rule, constitute a single system of legislation, performing the functions of primary and secondary acts. However, the secondary nature of subsidiary legislation does not mean that they regulate "unimportant" public relations. The law is essentially aimed at regulating all important social relations.

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