The Depiction of ‘Orthodoxy’ in Post-Soviet Space: How Vladimir Putin Uses the Church in His Anti-Western Campaign

2021 ◽  
pp. 097359842110351
Author(s):  
Punsara Amarasinghe
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Orthodox Church ◽  
Eastern Christianity ◽  
Western Influence ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Status ◽  
Global Affairs ◽  
Historical Trajectory ◽  
Vladimir Putin ◽  
Spiritual Legacy

This article seeks to examine Russia’s recent interest in uplifting the status of Orthodox church as a pivotal factor in the state. Most importantly, the position of Orthodox Church has grown rapidly during Putin’s administration as a solacing factor to fill the gap emerging from the fall of the Soviet Union. The sixteenth-century doctrine propounded by Filofei called ‘Third Rome’, which profoundly portrayed Moscow as the last sanctuary for Eastern Christianity and the nineteenth-century nationalist mantra of ‘Orthodoxy, Nationality, and Autocracy’, is rejuvenated under Putin as the new ideological path to move away from the Western influence. Specifically, it is an evident factor that ideological movement that rigidly denies Russia’s hobnobbing with the Liberal West is rather intensified after the Crimean crisis in 2014. Under this situation, Putin’s usage of Orthodoxy and Russia’s spiritual legacy stands as a direct political tool, expressing Russia’s uniqueness of the global affairs. This article will critically examine the historical trajectory of the Orthodox Church in Russia as an indicator of its distinctiveness.

scholarly journals The depiction of “Orthodoxy” in Post-Soviet Space: How Vladimir Putin uses the Church in his anti-Western campaign?

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-82
Author(s):  
Punsara Amarasinghe
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Orthodox Church ◽  
Eastern Christianity ◽  
Western Influence ◽  
The Status ◽  
Global Affairs ◽  
Historical Trajectory ◽  
Vladimir Putin ◽  
Spiritual Legacy ◽  
Crimean Crisis

Abstract This Article seeks to examine the Russia’s recent interest in uplifting the status of Orthodox church as a pivotal factor in the state and beyond that. Most importantly the position of the Orthodox church has grown rapidly during Putin’s administration as a solacing factor to fill the gap that emerged from the fall of Soviet Union. The 16th century doctrine propounded by Filofei called “Third Rome”, which profoundly portrayed Moscow as the last sanctuary for Eastern Christianity and the 19th century nationalist mantra of “Orthodoxy, Nationality and Autocracy” have been rejuvenated under Putin as new ideological path to move away from Western influence. It has been especially evident that the ideological movement that rigidly denies Russia’s hobnobbing with the Liberal West has been rather intensified after the Crimean crisis in 2014. Under this situation Putin’s usage of Orthodoxy and Russia’s spiritual legacy stand as a direct political tool expressing Russia’s uniqueness in global affairs. This article will critically examine the historical trajectory of Orthodox church in Russia as an indicator of its distinctiveness.

Russia under Putin: Titanic looking for its iceberg?

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 209-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lilia Shevtsova
Keyword(s):  
Social Support ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Power System ◽  
Urban Population ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Old Russian ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Status ◽  
Vladimir Putin

December 2011 protests in Russia, the largest after the collapse of the Soviet Union, shattered the status quo that had taken shape over the last decade and signaled that Russia is entering turbulent waters. Russia found itself caught in a trap: the 2011–2012 elections perpetuate a personalized power system that became the source of decay. The top-down rule and its “personificator” – Vladimir Putin – are already rejected by the most dynamic and educated urban population. However, no clear political alternative with a broad social support has yet emerged to replace the old Russian matrix. In terms of strategic significance, Putin’s regime will most certainly unravel in the fore-seeable perspective. But it is hard to predict what consequences this will have: the system’s disintegration and even collapse of the state, growing rot and atrophy, or the last grasp in the life of personalized power and transformation that will set Russia on a new foundation. One thing is apparent: transformation will not happen in the form of reform from above and within, and if it does occur, it will be the result of the deepening crisis and society’s pressure.

scholarly journals Paavo Kontkanen and his Role in Normalization of Relations between the Russian and Finnish Orthodox Churches

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 1107-1123
Author(s):  
Siluan Nikitin, episcopus ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Church History ◽  
The State ◽  
Active Member ◽  
Orthodox Church ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Short Period ◽  
The Status ◽  
State Archives ◽  
The Church

The interrelations of the Russian and Finnish Orthodox Churches in the 20th century are dramatic and poorly studied by Russian historians. This article, on the basis of materials from the State Archives of the Russian Federation and studies into church history translated from Finnish, attempts to evaluate the role of Dr. Paavo Kontkanen, an active member of the Finnish Archdiocese, in the relations between these two Churches. He exemplified a change in the attitude of the National Orthodox Church of Finland towards the Russian Church, historically kyriarchal, in the second half of the previous century. Dr. Paavo Kontkanen, being for a long time a member of the collegiate administrative body of the Finnish Archdiocese, the Church Administrative Council, with permission from Archbishop Herman (Aav) started negotiations with the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church on a private level. Having archieved understanding with the chairman of the Department of External Church Relations, Metropolitan Nicholas (Yarushevich), Kontkanen considered the possibility of reunification of the Finnish Church and the Russian Church only for a short period, before receiving the status of Autocephalous Local Church from Moscow. Kontkanen’s actions enable to regard him as a conductor of Finland’s ecclesiastical interests aimed at rapprochement with the Soviet Union. It can be proved by Kontkanen’s close contacts with the President of Finland, Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, and his ability to defend interests of the “pro-Russian” part of the clergy and the Finnish Orthodox Church in the face of the state and the Church Council.

scholarly journals The Problem of Ethno-Religious Nationalism in Georgia

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tinatin Kavtaradze
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Middle Ages ◽  
Religious Identity ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Modern State ◽  
Orthodox Church ◽  
Eastern Christianity ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Ethnoreligious Identity ◽  
The Russian Empire

This research aims to demonstrate the range of Georgian Orthodox Church constructing the Georgian ethnoreligious nationalism. How ethnoreligious identity affects the functioning of a modern state? The pre-modern tradition of identity was based on religion and dynasty. Religious identity, under the church (mostly in eastern Christianity), could be associated with some ethnos. For example, Kartvelian”, in the middle ages, is determiner not for ethnos but faith. From this derived the term – Kartvelian (Georgian) by faith. Ethnoreligious nationalism and liberal nationalism are different. According to the tradition of state nationalism, religion is not a determinative factor for nationalism. Even non-Christian can be Georgian. The ethnoreligious nationalism is a non-modern project created during the modernity. In the period of nationalism religious identity, in some cases, was transformed into an ethnoreligious identity that contradicts a liberal understanding of the modern nation by which the idea of nation is not limited by religion or ethnos. Georgian Orthodox Church is an important factor forming Georgian ethnoreligious nationalism. Based on this, we can claim that the church’s anti-western trends, often, hinder the functioning of the modern state. This trend was formed in the period of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. This point of view is dramatically different from the 1918-1921 years’ church’s aspiration for which western and liberal values were natural and vital setting.

Cold War consumption and the marketing of childhood in the Soviet Union and the United States, 1950-1960

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Peacock
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Usa ◽  
History Of ◽  
Global Discourse ◽  
The Cold War

Purpose – This paper aims to explore the relationship between childhood, consumption and the Cold War in 1950s America and the Soviet Union. The author argues that Soviet and American leaders, businessmen, and politicians worked hard to convince parents that buying things for their children offered the easiest way to raise good American and Soviet kids and to do their part in waging the economic battles of the Cold War. The author explores how consumption became a Cold War battleground in the late 1950s and suggests that the history of childhood and Cold War consumption alters the way we understand the conflict itself. Design/Methodology/Approach – Archival research in the USA and the Russian Federation along with close readings of Soviet and American advertisements offer sources for understanding the global discourse of consumption in the 1950s and 1960s. Findings – Leaders, advertisers, and propagandists in the Soviet Union and the USA used the same images in the same ways to sell the ethos of consumption to their populations. They did this to sell the Cold War, to bolster the status quo, and to make profits. Originality/Value – This paper offers a previously unexplored, transnational perspective on the role that consumption and the image of the child played in shaping the Cold War both domestically and abroad.

scholarly journals Między Kijowem a Konstantynopolem Relacje Kościoła ukraińskiego z Patriarchatem Ekumenicznym (X–XXI w.)

2019 ◽  
pp. 67-95
Author(s):  
Konrad Kuczara
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Second World War ◽  
Russian Orthodox ◽  
Orthodox Church ◽  
World War ◽  
Russian Orthodox Church ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The 19Th Century ◽  
Second World

Relations between the Ukrainian Church and Constantinople were difficult. This goes back as far as 988, when the Christianisation of the Rus created a strong alliance between Kiev and the Byzantine Empire. There were times when Constantinople had no influence over the Kiev Metropolis. During the Mongolian invasion in 1240, the Ukranian region was broken up and Kiev lost its power. The headquarters of the Kiev Metropolis were first moved to Wlodzimierz nad Klazma in 1299 and then to Moscow in1325. In 1458 the Metropolis of Kiev was divided into two; Kiev and Moscow, but Kiev still remained under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Since that time, the orthodox hierarchs of Moscow no longer adhered to the title Bishop of Kiev and the whole of Rus and in 1588 the Patriarchate of Moscow was founded. In 1596 when  the Union of Brest was formed,  the orthodox church of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth was not liquidated. Instead it was formally revived in 1620 and in 1632 it was officially recognized by king Wladyslaw Waza. In 1686 the Metropolis of Kiev which until that time was under the Patriarchate of Constantinople was handed over to the jurisdiction of Moscow. It was tsarist diplomats that bribed the Ottoman Sultan of the time to force the Patriarchate to issue a decree giving Moscow jurisdiction over the Metropolis of Kiev. In the beginning of the 19th century, Kiev lost its Metropolitan status and became a regular diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church. Only in the beginning of the 20thcentury, during the time of the Ukrainian revolution were efforts made to create an independent Church of Ukraine. In 1919 the autocephaly was announced, but the Patriarchate of Constantinople did not recognize it. . The structure of this Church was soon to be liquidated and it was restored again after the second world war at the time when Hitler occupied the Ukraine. In 1992, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when Ukraine gained its independence, the Metropolitan of Kiev requested that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine becomes autocephalous but his request was rejected by the Patriarchate of Moscow. Until 2018 the Patriarchate of Kiev and the autocephalous Church remained unrecognized and thus considered schismatic. In 2018 the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople looked  into the matter and on 5thJanuary 2019, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine received it’s tomos of autocephaly from Constantinople. The Patriarchate of Moscow opposed the decision of Constantinople and as a result refused to perform a common Eucharist with the new Church of Ukraine and with the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

Introduction: Reflections on Baltic Exceptionalism

1989 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 156-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrejs Penikis
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Panel Discussion ◽  
Columbia University ◽  
Soviet Leadership ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Key Points ◽  
The Status ◽  
New Thinking ◽  
The Baltic ◽  
Independence Movements

On October 20, 1989 the Harriman Institute's Nationalities and Siberian Studies Program of Columbia University sponsored a panel discussion entitled, “The Baltic Republics Fifty Years After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.” The panel, consisting of Dr. Allen Lynch, Dr. Stephan Kux, Mr. Jenik Radon and Mr. William Hough, analyzed the current situation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as in the other republics from a variety of perspectives, and debated the motivations and appropriateness of the response of the Western powers to the growing strength of the various independence movements in the Baltic republics. The following edited transcript of those proceedings points up the complex and contentious nature of the status of the Baltic republics in the era of Gorbachev, in both the domestic (Soviet) and international contexts. Nationalist leaders within the Soviet Union debate the appropriate tactics and pace to pursue their goals. The Soviet leadership dabates the extent to which autonomy may be granted to the nationalities. Western leaders consider their options in responding to the changes in the Soviet Union, changes which necessitate an overhaul of policies nearly a half-century old as well as some “new thinking” on their parts. The discussion centered on two issues: (1) What in general has been the response of the West to nationalist movements in the USSR and how appropriate has that response been? (2) Is there any validity to claims of Baltic “exceptionalism”? The following introduction comments briefly on these issues and places them into perspective by drawing on the discussion and exploring several key points.

In the Name of State Sovereignty? The Justification of War in Russian History and the Present

2021 ◽  
pp. 395-416
Author(s):  
Paul Robinson ◽  
Mikhail Antonov
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Military Interventions ◽  
Legal Traditions ◽  
Imperial Russia ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Humanitarian Interventions ◽  
The Status ◽  
Necessary Evil

This chapter shows that the Russian philosophical and legal traditions regarding war have advanced along a number of different tracks. In Imperial Russia, some thinkers adopted pacifist positions; others regarded war as a necessary evil. A similar bifurcation of thought can be seen in the Soviet era. The Soviets expounded a belief in the principles of non-interference and peaceful coexistence. At the same time, they also sometimes portrayed war in a positive light. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian scholars and political leaders have generally supported state sovereignty and rejected attempts to justify humanitarian interventions, regime change, and preventive war (on these Western strategies, see Geis/Wagner, Stohl, and Jahn in this volume). Nevertheless, they have on occasion resorted to very similar language themselves. Russian narratives thus oscillate between favouring pacifism and sovereignty as means of preserving the status quo and, as an exception, supporting military interventions when these are required by the transient goals of Russian foreign policy.

14. US foreign policy in Russia

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Rutland ◽  
Gregory Dubinsky
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Bill Clinton ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Vladimir Putin

This chapter examines U.S. foreign policy in Russia. The end of the Cold War lifted the threat of nuclear annihilation and transformed the international security landscape. The United States interpreted the collapse of the Soviet Union as evidence that it had ‘won’ the Cold War, and that its values and interests would prevail in the future world order. The chapter first provides an overview of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 before discussing U.S.–Russian relations under Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, respectively. It then turns to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its enlargement, the Kosovo crisis, and the ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. It also analyses the rise of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia and the deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations and concludes with an assessment of the cautious partnership between the two countries.

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