Transformations of Victory Day: “in step with the time”

Статья представляет собой рецензию на коллективную монографию «Памятник и праздник: этнография Дня Победы», обобщающую результаты полевого исследования практик празднования Дня Победы в 23 городах 11 стран. Книга интересна как в сюжетном, так и в теоретическом плане, поскольку затрагивает проблемы дальнейшего развития и современных трудностей memory studies: насколько у этого направления исследований получается идти «в ногу со временем». В центре внимания – не столько политизация памяти, сколько постоянное переплетение и взаимодействие практик коммеморации разного уровня – локальных и транснациональных, поколенческих и семейных, этических и эстетических культурных форм, выходящих за рамки распространенных в современных «мемориальных войнах» бинарных оппозиций. The article is a review of the book "Monument and Holiday: Ethnography of Victory Day", edited by M. Gabovich, which summarizes the results of a study of Victory Day celebrating practices in 23 cities of 11 countries. The book is interesting both in terms of plot and in theoretical terms, since it touches upon the problems of further development and contemporary difficulties of memory studies: to what extent this sphere of research succeeds in “keeping up with the time”. Its focus is not so much on the politicization of memory (especially after the Crimean crisis), as on the constant intertwining and interaction of commemoration practices of different levels - local and transnational, generational and family, ethical and aesthetic cultural forms that go beyond common in contemporary "memory wars" binary oppositions.

“Nostalgia Not for the Past but Nostalgia for the Present”: Post-Soviet Youth on USSR’s Collapse

. The article focuses on the perceptions of the generation of post-Soviet youth about the collapse of the USSR. An attempt to analyse the reasons for the favourable and “nostalgic” attitude to the USSR on the part of those who, due to their age, have no experience of Soviet life is made. It is shown that, according to mass surveys, attitudes towards the collapse of the USSR depend on the age of respondents: older generations predominantly perceive the collapse of the Soviet Union negatively, while among young people (especially in the youngest cohort of 18-24-year olds) the number of those who are not upset about the collapse of the USSR exceeds the number who regret it. The dynamics of public opinion on this event have been erratic in recent years, strongly influenced by the “Crimean effect”: during the Crimean crisis – 2014, the number of those regretting the collapse of the USSR rose sharply, but, years later, it has returned to its previous level. The data of the author’s study devoted to the problem of perception of post-Soviet transformations and the 90s in general by young Russians are given. The study conducted has shown that young people’s attitudes towards the post-Soviet period in Russian society are mainly based on clichés about the “wild” nineties that have been replicated in the Russian media. In their assessments, young people often rely on the views of parents (or other older relatives) and teachers. The mythology of young people’s perception of the events of December 1991 and their internal distance from the last decade of the XX century, as well as their poor knowledge of Soviet and post-Soviet realities of life are noted. The conclusion is drawn that some young people’s interest in the Soviet past stems from dreams of a prosperous and just society of equal opportunities, from which today’s Russia is so far removed.

From ‘Greater Europe’ to Confrontation: Is a ‘Common European Home’ Still Possible?

Over the past thirty years, relations between Russia and the EU have gone from the idea of a ‘Common European home’ and ‘the unification of everything except institutions’ to periods of fading partnership, culminating in the post-Crimean crisis and the current systemic confrontation over geopolitics and values. Today, the EU and Russia seem to be irreconcilable in terms of values, domestic politics, and geopolitical approaches. For the time being, the most likely scenario for EU-Russia relations will be tense coexistence with cooperation restricted by a climate of general mistrust. The best prospects for constructive cooperation will come from a common commitment to pragmatic ‘neighborliness’. Nevertheless, given the turbulence and unpredictability of international politics a return to “Greater European” integration cannot be entirely ruled out. The fundamental conditions for such a rapprochement still exist, though critical internal processes and external issues need to be resolved before this process can begin.

The depiction of “Orthodoxy” in Post-Soviet Space: How Vladimir Putin uses the Church in his anti-Western campaign?

This Article seeks to examine the Russia’s recent interest in uplifting the status of Orthodox church as a pivotal factor in the state and beyond that. Most importantly the position of the Orthodox church has grown rapidly during Putin’s administration as a solacing factor to fill the gap that emerged from the fall of Soviet Union. The 16th century doctrine propounded by Filofei called “Third Rome”, which profoundly portrayed Moscow as the last sanctuary for Eastern Christianity and the 19th century nationalist mantra of “Orthodoxy, Nationality and Autocracy” have been rejuvenated under Putin as new ideological path to move away from Western influence. It has been especially evident that the ideological movement that rigidly denies Russia’s hobnobbing with the Liberal West has been rather intensified after the Crimean crisis in 2014. Under this situation Putin’s usage of Orthodoxy and Russia’s spiritual legacy stand as a direct political tool expressing Russia’s uniqueness in global affairs. This article will critically examine the historical trajectory of Orthodox church in Russia as an indicator of its distinctiveness.

Risking Border Instability: the Russian-Estonian Case

In international relations, the last three decades have been marked by national and institutional fragmentation. The fate of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and the regrettable way that events played out (especially in the former case), could befall other federative entities as well. Canada and Belgium come to mind, as do countries like Spain, all of which effectively function as federations. However, while federations usually have dispute settlement and mechanisms for secession embedded in their constitutions, sub-constitutive territories are often excluded from such considerations. What territories such as Kosovo, Sandjak, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, etc. have in common is that they share a desire for independence from their parent country. However, achiveing independence would present risks to the territorial integrity of other countries (what can be termed the domino principle), as well as risks to the endurance of flexible international law. The cases we have alluded to above culminated in the Crimean crisis. The problems between Estonia and the Russian Federation stem from the choice of precedent and founding text on which to base the former’s renewed independence. While Estonia was founded on the basis of the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty that put an end to the country’s War of Independence, its experience as a Soviet Republic added another legislative filter in the form of the 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union. However, the principle of uti possidetis had evolved to apply to more than cases of colonialism. Thus, when Estonia seceded from the USSR with the borders it had been since 1945, it was doing so under the principle of uti possidetis. The current dispute stems from the fact that the Estonian political elite seek to have the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty recognized as the foundational document for the country’s renewed independence. Under the Treaty, Estonian sovereignty applied over a much larger territory. By insisting that any new border arrangement with Russia be based on that Treaty, Estonia is invalidating the principle of uti possidetis and the validity of the Constitution of the Soviet Union as a vehicle for independence. It implies a latent Article 5 situation between NATO and Russia, and threatens the legitimacy of other post-Soviet secessions.

Die Wiederkehr der Landes- und Bündnisverteidigung

From homeland defence to crisis intervention—this statement describes the conceptual transformation of the German army and NATO since 1990. The Crimean crisis in 2014 changed this situation, with homeland defence becoming a major concern again. However, the security policy environment, potential threats and the structure of the army and NATO have little in common with the traditional scenario of the Cold War. Entirely new challenges need to be dealt with—from new forms of conflict (asymmetrical and hybrid conflicts, cyber- and information warfare) to NATO’s geography with its vulnerable periphery in the Baltic region. These challenges raise new legal questions, which are discussed in this conference volume. With contributions by Rainer Meyer zum Felde; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg; Stephan Hobe, Rada Popova; Tassilo Singer; Björnstjern Baade; Jan Arno Hessbruegge; Stefan Oeter; Michael Teichmann

Russia's hybrid aggression as an instrument of geopolitical influence on African countries: conclusions for Ukraine

Experts in the field of international conflicts focus on a threatening trend - increasing levels of aggression in Europe. Russia has been involved in all the high-intensity conflicts that have taken place in the region since the 2000s – the wars in Ukraine and Georgia, the limited wars in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya, and the content of the conflict in Moldova. The Crimean crisis and aggression in Donbas have become a painful reaction to Russia's inability to lead the world leadership and structure a new world order. Modern foreign policy of the Russian Federation is based on the Soviet understanding of the geopolitical structure of the world in general and the European region in particular. Russia is making every effort to consolidate itself as a center of power on a continental scale and dreams of regaining the geopolitical weight of the Soviet era. The article analyzes the causes and consequences of the use of hybrid aggression, identifies the complexity of using military-political, economic, informational and international tools to influence the formation of the world order. The example of Russian aggression in the African region is considered and the ways of counteracting Russian aggression are offered to Ukraine.