scholarly journals Standing in a Crowded Room: Exploring the Relation between Interest Group System Density and Access to Policymakers

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcel Hanegraaff ◽  
Jens van der Ploeg ◽  
Joost Berkhout

The numerous presence of interest groups may be a recipe for policy deadlock or, more optimistically, indicate the vibrancy of a political community. Population-ecology theory suggests that the number of interest groups active in a policy domain is relevant for strategies and political outcomes, such as policy access, and interest group density is expected to reduce access for individual organizations. Competitive pressures in dense domains necessitate groups to specialize to gain access to the policy access. We empirically assess this argument and indeed find lower levels of access in denser policy fields, moderated by specialization of organizations in lobbying. Furthermore, we identify important differences between mature (the Netherlands and Belgium) and young (Slovenia and Lithuania) interest group systems. These findings address theoretical concerns about the lack of linkages between micro- and macro-studies on interest representation.

2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 287-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danica Fink-Hafner ◽  
Mitja Hafner-Fink ◽  
Meta Novak

Based on a social constructivist framing, this article seeks to address the gap in the literature on the impact of Europeanisation on the national interest group political culture in general and in the post-communist context in particular. The impacts of Europeanisation on interest group domestic policy behaviour, in terms of national interest groups networking with their European counterparts, their contacts with EU-level decision makers, and their access to EU funds, are tested based on the panel surveys that were conducted in 1996 and 2012 of the most influential interest groups in eleven policy fields in Slovenia. Our key findings are that Europeanisation does support changes in the national interest group political culture in the direction of a more pro-active approach in influencing national policy processes. However, Europeanisation explains only a small portion of the variability among the domestic policy behaviour of interest groups.


2018 ◽  
Vol 86 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frédéric Varone ◽  
Pirmin Bundi ◽  
Roy Gava

Members of Parliament (MPs) request policy evaluations and use the resultant findings to inform law-making and hold the government to account. Since most elected representatives have developed strong ties to interest groups, one might wonder whether these privileged relationships influence MPs’ parliamentary behavior. This study investigates how MPs’ affiliations to groups affect their demand for policy evaluations. Empirical evidence shows that, regardless of respective party or individual characteristics, MPs are more likely to request evaluations in those policy domains where they have a group affiliation. This effect holds even when controlling for a classical measure of MP's policy specialization, such as legislative committee membership. These findings suggest that ties between MPs and specific types of interest group should be considered when explaining parliamentary behavior across different policy domains. Point for practitioners To influence the policymaking process, interest groups participate in consultation procedures and parliamentary hearings, they lobby elected officials and deliver policy expertise to decision-makers. These advocacy strategies are well studied. This article innovates by showing that, in addition, interest groups foster the development of policy evaluations. MPs affiliated to an interest group active on a specific issue are likely to request policy evaluations in that policy domain. Interest groups strengthen the parliamentary demand for evaluation studies and, thus, may potentially contribute to the accountability of government and public administration.


Author(s):  
Darren McCauley

State-centric Anglo-American studies continue to dominate the interest group landscape (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Jordan and Maloney, 2007; Truman, 1951). As a commanding “outside-in” pressure on French scholarship, a long debate on defining France on the pluralism–corporatism spectrum has ensued (Keeler and Hall, 2001; Wilson, 1987; 2008). The exceptional nature of interest representation in France has inspired a plethora of state-centric modeling. This chapter argues that an “inside-out” influence is gaining momentum, whereby French political sociological accounts underline the primacy of group behavior (Courty, 2006; Offerlé, 2009; Mathieu, 2009). Active in Europeanization research (Saurugger, 2009), and social movement theory (Fillieule and Tartakowsky, 2014), French scholars are leading the way in bringing the debate on interest representation beyond Anglo-American state-centric models.


1991 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Lijphart ◽  
Markus M. L. Crepaz

This research Note has two complementary theoretical objectives. First, we shall attempt to place the form of interest representation and the involvement of interest groups in policy formation known as corporatism – or as democratic, societal, liberal or neo-corporatism – in a broader political context: is corporatism systematically linked with other democratic institutions and processes? Secondly, we shall try to fill a gap in the theory of consensus democracy. This theory holds that types of party, electoral, executive and legislative systems occur in distinct clusters, but it fails to link interest group systems to these clusters.


2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. de Figueiredo ◽  
Rui J.P. de Figueiredo

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions—legislative, administrative, and legal—is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage that cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, (1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, (2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and (3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court.


2002 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 1221-1229 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P Baron

In Special Interest Politics Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman examine how special-interest groups influence political outcomes for the benefit of their members. The authors take interest groups seriously by considering a range of theories and supporting evidence on interest group activity. Their book provides perspectives on how to study interest group politics and a set of methods for that study. Although the authors present a number of standard models, the book contains much that is new. The reader takes away a multitude of results, tools, models, and new research ideas. The result is an outstanding book full of insight, useful methods, and perspective.


2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Klüver ◽  
Elisabeth Zeidler

Why does the number of interest groups vary across economic sectors? Interest groups are an important channel through which companies can transmit their policy preferences to decision-makers. However, empirical research shows that the number of interest groups varies considerably across sectors. We argue that the size and the wealth of the potential constituency as well as government activity positively affect interest group density. We test our theoretical expectations based on an unprecedented longitudinal analysis of interest groups that registered at the German Bundestag from 1978 until 2013 and show that the number of firms, the wealth of an economic sector, and government activity positively influence interest group density. However, we also find that the relationship between interest groups and legislative activity is reciprocal as legislative activity positively impacts the number of interest groups in an economic sector, but at the same time interest group density also positively affects legislative activity.


2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Beyers ◽  
Caelesta Braun

AbstractThe degree to which interest groups gain access to policymakers has often been explained by focusing on the exchange of resources in a dyadic relation between interest groups and policymakers. This article argues that the position an interest group occupies within a coalition and the relations it has outside its coalition substantially affect the likelihood of gaining access to policymakers. Our empirical focus is on the Dutch interest group system for which we examine how coalitions among groups and the network position of interest groups within and between such coalitions shape access. The analysis, based on data collected among 107 Dutch interest groups and 28 policymakers, leads to the conclusion that network positions count differently for elected and non-elected officials, and that network ties that bridge different coalitions add significant explanatory leverage to resource-based explanations of access.


2003 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTHONY J. NOWNES

This article analyses the founding rate of nationally active homosexual rights interest groups in the United States for the period 1950–98. Drawing upon the extensive organizational ecology literature, we test the hypothesis that the founding rate of homosexual rights interest groups is related non-monotonically to the number of groups in the population. Our statistical analyses support the hypothesis that as population density rises from very low to high, the founding rate first rises but eventually decreases. This pattern holds when we control for a number of contextual variables. In all, the data provide a great deal of support for the theory of density dependence – a novel approach to the study of interest group formation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renata Lizzi ◽  
Andrea Pritoni

Within interest group research, scholars following the population ecology perspective mainly look at the demographic features of populations and systems under scrutiny: density and diversity represent the main dimensions investigated. Even though, in recent years, an impressive amount of literature on this topic has been produced, there has been neither systematic analysis of, nor empirical research into, the Italian interest system so far. This article aims to address this lacuna. Following a diachronic perspective, we count how many politically active groups have populated the Italian interest system with regard to two different periods: 1984–88 and 2010–14. From 1984 to 2014 the number of interest groups almost doubled and the density of the system greatly increased; diversity, however, has remained relatively more stable.


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