Ties that count: explaining interest group access to policymakers

2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Beyers ◽  
Caelesta Braun
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Network Ties ◽  
Group System ◽  
Network Position ◽  
Dyadic Relation ◽  
Gain Access

AbstractThe degree to which interest groups gain access to policymakers has often been explained by focusing on the exchange of resources in a dyadic relation between interest groups and policymakers. This article argues that the position an interest group occupies within a coalition and the relations it has outside its coalition substantially affect the likelihood of gaining access to policymakers. Our empirical focus is on the Dutch interest group system for which we examine how coalitions among groups and the network position of interest groups within and between such coalitions shape access. The analysis, based on data collected among 107 Dutch interest groups and 28 policymakers, leads to the conclusion that network positions count differently for elected and non-elected officials, and that network ties that bridge different coalitions add significant explanatory leverage to resource-based explanations of access.

14. Interest Groups and the European Union

2019 ◽  
pp. 201-218
Author(s):  
Rainer Eising
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Group System ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Group Structures ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines the role of interest groups in European Union (EU) politics. It also considers the way in which the EU institutions influence interest group structures and activities. The chapter begins with an overview of the relationship between the EU institutions and interest groups and examines the steps taken thus far to regulate that relationship. It then looks at the evolution and the structure of the interest group system, focusing in particular on two salient aspects: the difference between national and EU organizations; and the difference between specific and diffuse interests.

Trade: Determinants of Policies

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc L. Busch ◽  
Edward D. Mansfield
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Turning Point ◽  
The Political ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Policy Space ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
The Face

A survey of the literature on trade has revealed that it is becoming more difficult for elected officials resist protectionist pressures by citing constraints imposed by global pacts and supply free trade. There are two main reasons why. First, the literature on the design and politics of international institutions increasingly emphasizes how they build in slack that can undermine government claims of being constrained. Second, as states accede to an ever-growing list of overlapping international institutions, there is often a choice among, or uncertainty over, which institution’s obligations apply. Where this situation creates more policy space for government officials, it also will make it more difficult for them to credibly tie their hands and supply free trade in the face of interest group pressures for protection. Currently, the literature is somewhat at a turning point. Questions about the design and politics of international institutions, and the growing thickness of the market for them, are very much in vogue. These questions have profound implications for the supply of free trade. The credibility of elected officials’ hands-tying strategies is likely undermined where institutions anticipate the political reactions of their members, or where members can shop for different rules on trade to accommodate domestic preferences. The irony is that the proliferation of international institutions may lead scholars of trade policy to renew their focus on domestic interest groups.

Polarized Pluralism: Organizational Preferences and Biases in the American Pressure System

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 1117-1137 ◽  
Author(s):  
JESSE M. CROSSON ◽  
ALEXANDER C. FURNAS ◽  
GEOFFREY M. LORENZ
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Revealed Preferences ◽  
Significant Heterogeneity ◽  
Pressure System ◽  
Organized Interests ◽  
Group System ◽  
American Interest ◽  
Party Differences

For decades, critics of pluralism have argued that the American interest group system exhibits a significantly biased distribution of policy preferences. We evaluate this argument by measuring groups’ revealed preferences directly, developing a set of ideal point estimates, IGscores, for over 2,600 interest groups and 950 members of Congress on a common scale. We generate the scores by jointly scaling a large dataset of interest groups’ positions on congressional bills with roll-call votes on those same bills. Analyses of the scores uncover significant heterogeneity in the interest group system, with little conservative skew and notable inter-party differences in preference correspondence between legislators and ideologically similar groups. Conservative bias and homogeneity reappear, however, when weighting IGscores by groups’ PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures. These findings suggest that bias among interest groups depends on the extent to which activities like PAC contributions and lobbying influence policymakers’ perceptions about the preferences of organized interests.

scholarly journals Standing in a Crowded Room: Exploring the Relation between Interest Group System Density and Access to Policymakers

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcel Hanegraaff ◽  
Jens van der Ploeg ◽  
Joost Berkhout
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Population Ecology ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Interest Representation ◽  
Policy Domain ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
Policy Fields ◽  
Group Density ◽  
Gain Access

The numerous presence of interest groups may be a recipe for policy deadlock or, more optimistically, indicate the vibrancy of a political community. Population-ecology theory suggests that the number of interest groups active in a policy domain is relevant for strategies and political outcomes, such as policy access, and interest group density is expected to reduce access for individual organizations. Competitive pressures in dense domains necessitate groups to specialize to gain access to the policy access. We empirically assess this argument and indeed find lower levels of access in denser policy fields, moderated by specialization of organizations in lobbying. Furthermore, we identify important differences between mature (the Netherlands and Belgium) and young (Slovenia and Lithuania) interest group systems. These findings address theoretical concerns about the lack of linkages between micro- and macro-studies on interest representation.

Quality Over Quantity: Amici Influence and Judicial Decision Making

2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 446-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
JANET M. BOX-STEFFENSMEIER ◽  
DINO P. CHRISTENSON ◽  
MATTHEW P. HITT
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Judicial Decision Making ◽  
Network Position ◽  
Nuanced Understanding ◽  
Two Sides

Interest groups often make their preferences known on cases before the U.S. Supreme Court via amicus curiae briefs. In evaluating the case and related arguments, we posit that judges take into account more than just the number of supporters for the liberal and conservative positions. Specifically, judges’ decisions may also reflect the relative power of the groups. We use network position to measure interest group power in U.S. Supreme Court cases from 1946 to 2001. We find that the effect of interest group power is minimal in times of heavily advantaged cases. However, when the two sides of a case are approximately equal in the number of briefs, such power is a valuable signal to judges. We also show that justice ideology moderates the effect of liberal interest group power. The results corroborate previous findings on the influence of amicus curiae briefs and add a nuanced understanding of the conditions under which the quality and reputation of interest groups matter, not just the quantity.

Interest Groups

2020 ◽  
pp. 432-449
Author(s):  
Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
News Media ◽  
Early Mobilization ◽  
Public Affairs ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Group System ◽  
Political Role

Interest groups are key actors in the Danish political system. This chapter discusses the origin and development of the interest group system and the political role of groups. The focus is on interest groups both as membership-based associations and as political actors. The chapter discusses how the early mobilization of farmers, workers, and businesses interacted with emerging corporatist structures in shaping the contours of the interest group system. Later developments led to a shift towards more groups representing citizen interests rather than economic groups. The political role of groups traditionally centred on access to public decision-making through, for example, representation in boards and committees. Today, interest groups operate across multiple arenas, and Parliament and the news media have become central. New actors such as think tanks and public affairs agencies have gained importance, but traditional interest groups remain the most prominent policy advocates in Denmark.

scholarly journals The organisational development of interest groups in Montenegro and Slovenia: Do they contribute to more inclusive democracy?

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 647-665
Author(s):  
Meta Novak ◽  
Olivera Komar
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Government Control ◽  
Quality Of Democracy ◽  
Associational Life ◽  
Group System ◽  
Form Of Government ◽  
International Donor ◽  
History Of

AbstractDespite the joint history of Montenegro and Slovenia as republics of the former Yugoslavia, the development of the interest groups system has been different in these countries. While in Slovenia, these groups started to develop from the 19th century, in Montenegro the interest groups system was almost non-existent in the pre-socialist period with only a few participative elements, such as the use of tribal assemblies. Socialism did not support associational life, since most of the organizations that were founded at the time were under some form of government control. As a consequence, the interest groups system in Slovenia shrank during socialist rule, while in Montenegro it remained at the same level. During the 1980s and after the collapse of the socialist regime the interest group system in Montenegro finally starts to develop, being heavily influenced by international donor and assistance programmes, while in Slovenia the system had a new opportunity to flourish. In this article we are in particularly interested in how the interest group system contributes to the quality of democracy. Although Montenegrin interest groups have been a tool of influence and democratisation primarily on behalf of the international community, their internal democracy is less sophisticated than is the case in Slovenia. The results show that the origin of the interest groups system and the distinct histories of the specific political cultures seem to be embedded in the functioning of contemporary interest groups. This in turn, determines the strength or weakness of these groups in facing the challenges of de-democratisation.

Negotiating Political Power at ‘Critical Junctures’: Women and Constitution Drafting in South Africa and India

2021 ◽  
pp. 002190962110258
Author(s):  
Nila Mohanan
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Political Participation ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Substantive Representation ◽  
Representation Of Women ◽  
Critical Junctures ◽  
Women's Participation ◽  
Gain Access

From a feminist institutionalist perspective, this article engages in a comparative analysis of South Africa, one of the only post-transition democracies where women organized as a distinct interest group representing gender interests were able to negotiate and gain access to political power, and India, where women’s participation was predominantly as ‘nationalist women’. It argues that constitution drafting is a decisive critical juncture when descriptive representation can be translated very effectively into the substantive representation of women as equal citizens, provided women qua women and as gender-conscious agents are able to intervene to promote the cause of their effective political participation.

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