Positively Resilient? How Framing Local Action Affects Public Opinion

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-103
Author(s):  
Sara Meerow ◽  
Fabian G. Neuner

Cities face numerous environmental challenges. Local governments need the public’s support to tackle these problems, and scholars and practitioners have suggested that framing initiatives around resilience, as opposed to sustainability, reducing vulnerability, or adaptation, may increase public support for local action. Resilience, they argue, has a better social connotation, is more positive, and less polarizing than related concepts. Empirical evidence supporting these claims is lacking. In three online survey experiments, we test whether the public is more likely to support policies when they are framed in terms of “resilience.” We also examine public conceptualizations of these different terms and whether resilience has a more positive connotation. We find significant differences in policy support, perceived importance, and interpretations of the concepts. The study confirms that framing affects policy support, but complicates claims that resilience is inherently more appealing. These findings have implications for urban research and policymaking.

Sexual Abuse ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly M. Socia ◽  
Christopher P. Dum ◽  
Jason Rydberg

In this study, we examine the influences of citizen decision making in the context of four policy scenarios that would affect the living conditions of sex offenders (SOs) residing at an “emergency shelter” budget motel. We surveyed 773 citizens in an online survey about their support for four policy scenarios that would improve the living conditions of SOs: (a) at no cost to the respondent, (b) in exchange for a US$100 tax increase, and (c) by relocating SOs within the respondent’s neighborhood (i.e., “in my backyard”/IMBY scenario). The fourth scenario involved moving nearby SOs into substandard housing located far away from the respondent (i.e., “not in my backyard”/NIMBY). While prior research finds that the public overwhelmingly supports punitive SO policies, we find that indifference is a mainstay of public opinion about improving SO housing conditions. That is, we find only modest levels of average support for any of the policy scenarios, and policy support decreased when increased taxes would be involved, compared with a “no cost” scenario. While no respondent characteristics significantly predicted policy support consistently across all four scenarios, some scenarios showed stark differences in support when considering specific respondent characteristics. Overall, these results suggest that what does affect support depends on the details of the policy being proposed, as well as who is considering the policy. We end by discussing the policy implications of our study for both policymakers and the public.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Peterson ◽  
Gabor Simonovits

AbstractCan politicians use targeted messages to offset position taking that would otherwise reduce their public support? We examine the effect of a politician’s justification for their tax policy stance on public opinion and identify limits on the ability of justifications to generate leeway for incongruent position taking on this issue. We draw on political communication research to establish expectations about the heterogeneous effects of justifications that employ either evidence or values based on whether or not constituents agree with the position a politician takes. In two survey experiments, we find small changes in support in response to these types of messages among targeted groups, but rule out large benefits for politicians to selectively target policy justifications toward subsets of the public. We also highlight a potential cost to selective messaging by showing that when these targeted messages reach unintended audiences they can backfire and reduce a candidate’s support.


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Baum ◽  
Tim Groeling

AbstractPrevailing theories hold that U.S. public support for a war depends primarily on its degree of success, U.S. casualties, or conflict goals. Yet, research into the framing of foreign policy shows that public perceptions concerning each of these factors are often endogenous and malleable by elites. In this article, we argue that both elite rhetoric and the situation on the ground in the conflict affect public opinion, but the qualities that make such information persuasive vary over time and with circumstances. Early in a conflict, elites (especially the president) have an informational advantage that renders public perceptions of “reality” very elastic. As events unfold and as the public gathers more information, this elasticity recedes, allowing alternative frames to challenge the administration's preferred frame. We predict that over time the marginal impact of elite rhetoric and reality will decrease, although a sustained change in events may eventually restore their influence. We test our argument through a content analysis of news coverage of the Iraq war from 2003 through 2007, an original survey of public attitudes regarding Iraq, and partially disaggregated data from more than 200 surveys of public opinion on the war.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002242782095320
Author(s):  
Alexander L. Burton ◽  
Justin T. Pickett ◽  
Cheryl Lero Jonson ◽  
Francis T. Cullen ◽  
Velmer S. Burton

Objectives: The recurring mass murder of students in schools has sparked an intense debate about how best to increase school safety. Because public opinion weighs heavily in this debate, we examine public views on how best to prevent school shootings. We theorize that three moral-altruistic factors are likely to be broadly relevant to public opinion on school safety policies: moral intuitions about harm, anger about school crime, and altruistic fear. Methods: We commissioned YouGov to survey 1,100 Americans to explore support for a range of gun control and school programming policies and willingness to pay for school target hardening. We test the ability of a moral-altruistic model to explain public opinion, while controlling for the major predictors of gun control attitudes found in the social sciences. Results: The public strongly supports policies that restrict who can access guns, expand school anti-bullying and counseling programs, and target-harden schools. While many factors influence attitudes toward gun-related policies specifically, moral-altruistic factors significantly increase support for all three types of school safety policies. Conclusions: The public favors a comprehensive policy response and is willing to pay for it. Support for prevention efforts reflects moral intuitions about harm, anger about school crime, and altruistic fear.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nate Breznau ◽  
Carola Hommerich

Does public opinion react to inequality, and if so, how? The social harms caused by increasing inequality should cause public opinion to ramp up demand for social welfare protections. However, the public may react to inequality differently depending on institutional context. Using ISSP and WID data (1980-2006) we tested these claims. In liberal institutional contexts (mostly English-speaking), increasing income inequality predicted higher support for state provision of social welfare. In coordinated and universalist contexts (mostly of Europe), increasing inequality predicted less support. Historically higher income concentration predicted less public support, providing an account of the large variation in inequality within the respective liberal and coordinated contexts. The results suggest opinions in liberal societies – especially with higher historical inequality – reached the limits of inequality, reacting negatively; whereas in coordinated/universalist societies – especially with lower historical inequality – opinions moved positively, as if desiring more inequality.


Author(s):  
Douglas L. Kriner ◽  
Eric Schickler

This chapter proposes and empirically tests a general mechanism through which congressional investigative activity could affect presidential behavior and policy making more broadly: by influencing the president’s well of support among the American people. It proceeds in four parts. First, it describes two mechanisms through which committee investigations of executive misconduct are well positioned to shape levels of public support for the president. The empirical analysis then begins by asking a basic, but essential pre-cursor question: does the public generally support Congress employing its investigative powers to uncover and pursue allegations of abuse of power by the executive branch? Having answered this question in the affirmative, the analysis continues by merging the database of congressional investigative activity described in Chapter 2 with more than sixty years of public opinion data measuring support for the president. The chapter then presents the results of several original survey experiments that isolate the influence of congressional investigations on public opinion independent of potential confounding factors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (6) ◽  
pp. 753-766 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Haesebrouck

Does public opinion act as a constraint on military action, are ordinary citizens the easily manipulated targets of the public relations efforts of their governments, or does the general public react as assertively to threats as decisionmakers? This article examines the causal connection between military action, public opinion and threats. Empirically, it focuses on the pattern of EU member state participation in two recent military operations: the 2011 intervention in Libya and the operation against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS). Three competing causal models on the relationship between threats, public opinion and military action were derived from the scholarly literature and tested with coincidence analysis. The results of the analysis show that public opinion acted as a constraint on executives during the Libya operation. However, there was no direct causal link between public opinion and military participation in the operation against IS, in which both military action and public support were an effect of threat. More generally, the results suggest that the context of the intervention is decisive for the relation between threat, military action and public support. More specifically, whether public opinion constitutes a constraint on military action or is an effect of threats to national interests depends on whether these threats are clear and tangible.


2020 ◽  
Vol 135 (575) ◽  
pp. 860-891
Author(s):  
Ian Cawood

Abstract While the problem of political corruption in mid-nineteenth century Britain has been much studied, the experience of corrupt behaviour in public bodies, both new and long established, is comparatively neglected. This article takes the example of one of the first inspectorates set up after the Great Reform Act, the Factory Office, to examine the extent of corrupt practices in the British civic state and the means whereby it was addressed. It examines the changing processes of appointment, discipline and promotion, the issues of remuneration and venality, and the relationships between inspectors, workers, factory owners, the government and the wider civil service, and the press and public opinion. The article argues that the changing attitudes of the inspectors, especially those of Leonard Horner, were indicative of a developing ‘public service ethos’ in both bureaucratic and cultural settings and that the work of such unsung administrators was one of the agencies through which corrupt behaviour in the civic structures of Victorian Britain was, with public support, challenged. The article concludes that the endogenous reform of bureaucratic practice achieved by the factory inspectorate may even be of equal significance as that which resulted from the celebrated Northcote–Trevelyan Report of 1854.


2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (13-14) ◽  
pp. 2207-2234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elin Naurin ◽  
Stuart Soroka ◽  
Niels Markwat

Governments often fulfill election pledges to remain in power; yet, it is unclear how pledge fulfillment and breakage actually affect public support for government. This article explores the tendency for governments to be penalized for unfulfilled pledges more than they are rewarded for fulfilled pledges. In two large-scale highly realistic online survey experiments ( N = 13,000, 10,000), performed at the beginning and middle of a government’s term in office, respondents are presented with a range of (real) election pledges. We find that broken pledges often are more important to government evaluations than fulfilled pledges, and that pledge fulfillment can produce decreases in support from nonsupporters that more than offset the marginal gains among supporters. Findings provide valuable evidence on asymmetries in political behavior, and a unique account of the “cost of ruling,” the seemingly inevitable tendency for governments to lose support during their time in office.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-653
Author(s):  
Timothy Hildebrandt ◽  
Leticia Bode ◽  
Jessica S. C. Ng

Abstract Introduction Under austerity, governments shift responsibilities for social welfare to individuals. Such responsibilization can be intertwined with pre-existing social stigmas, with sexually stigmatized individuals blamed more for health problems due to “irresponsible” sexual behavior. To understand how sexual stigma affects attitudes on government healthcare expenditures, we examine public support for government-provisioned PrEP in England at a time when media narratives cast the drug as an expensive benefit for a small, irresponsible social group and the National Health Service’s long-term sustainability was in doubt. Methods This paper uses data from an original survey (N = 738) conducted in September 2016, when public opinion should be most sensitive to sexual stigma. A survey experiment tests how the way beneficiaries of PrEP were described affected support for NHS provision of it. Contrary to expectations, we found that support was high (mean = 3.86 on a scale of 1 to 5) irrespective of language used or beneficiary group mentioned. Differences between conditions were negligible. Discussion Sexual stigma does not diminish support for government-funded PrEP, which may be due to reverence for the NHS; resistance to responsibilization generally; or just to HIV, with the public influenced by sympathy and counter-messaging. Social policy implications Having misjudged public attitudes, it may be difficult for the government to continue to justify not funding PrEP; the political rationale for contracting out its provision is unnecessary and flawed. With public opinion resilient to responsibilization narratives and sexual stigma even under austerity, welfare retrenchment may be more difficult than social policymakers presume.


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