Minor Events and Grand Dreams

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 739-771
Author(s):  
David Tobin
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Difference ◽  
World Order ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Rightful Place ◽  
Global Power ◽  
Targeted Violence ◽  
International Power ◽  
Sixtieth Anniversary ◽  
China Dream ◽  
Great Revival

The official China Dream of the Great revival tells a story of China reversing “humiliation” by Western powers and returning to its premodern, rightful place at the center of world affairs. However, since ethnically targeted violence in Ürümqi in 2009, leading thinkers and policy makers ask how they can avoid a “nightmare” of frontier insecurity derailing dreams of international power. This article uses a postcolonial approach to critically analyze tensions between ethnic inclusion and exclusion in visual and textual narratives from a Xinjiang regional exhibition that celebrated the PRC’s sixtieth anniversary. It asks who is included and excluded in these visions of China’s rise? How does China domestically refract insecurity from experiences of a colonial world order that constructs it as inferior? The event tells a story of the history and future of a powerful rising state but expresses deep insecurities that domestic cultural difference is an obstacle to China’s global power.

After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline

2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall L. Schweller ◽  
Xiaoyu Pu
Keyword(s):  
Early Stage ◽  
World Order ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
International Order ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
New World Order ◽  
Global Power ◽  
Rising Power ◽  
Emerging Powers

The emerging transition from unipolarity to a more multipolar distribution of global power presents a unique and unappreciated problem that largely explains why, contrary to the expectations of balance of power theory, a counterbalancing reaction to U.S. primacy has not yet taken place. The problem is that, under unipolarity and only unipolarity, balancing is a revisionist, not a status quo, behavior: its purpose is to replace the existing unbalanced unipolar structure with a balance of power system. Thus, any state that seeks to restore a global balance of power will be labeled a revisionist aggressor. To overcome this ideational hurdle to balancing behavior, a rising power must delegitimize the unipole's global authority and order through discursive and cost-imposing practices of resistance that pave the way for the next phase of full-fledged balancing and global contestation. The type of international order that emerges on the other side of the transition out of unipolarity depends on whether the emerging powers assume the role of supporters, spoilers, or shirkers. As the most viable peer competitor to U.S. power, China will play an especially important role in determining the future shape of international politics. At this relatively early stage in its development, however, China does not yet have a fixed blueprint for a new world order. Instead, competing Chinese visions of order map on to various delegitimation strategies and scenarios about how the transition from unipolarity to a restored global balance of power will develop.

Historiographies of International Law from a Chinese Perspective

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Adele Carrai
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
World Order ◽  
Global History ◽  
Global Power ◽  
Chinese Perspective ◽  
The Future ◽  
History Of ◽  
Chinese Scholars ◽  
History Of International Law ◽  
Selection Of

One objective of the emerging global history of international law is to broaden its scope in an attempt to overcome Eurocentrism. In this context, China, not only as an emerging global power that can influence the creation of the normative principles grounding the future world order, but also with its history of international law, offers a counter-teleology to the classic progress narrative of international law understood as a science. This article presents a critical summary and analysis of the approaches of a selection of Chinese scholars to the history of international law. The current debates seem to be closely linked to a new conception of modernity that does not correspond with the Western conception. The Chinese perspective, in this sense, can help broaden the history of international law, especially when that history claims to be global.

China’s Relations with Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East

2020 ◽  
pp. 291-312
Author(s):  
Joshua Eisenman ◽  
Eric Heginbotham
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Developing World ◽  
World Order ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Policy Tools ◽  
Policy Makers

Over the last two decades, developing countries have become central to China’s increasingly ambitious foreign policy makers. This chapter begins by explaining China’s conceptualization of the developing world and its position in Beijing’s geostrategy. After describing the three characteristics of China’s approach—asymmetry, comprehensiveness, and its interlocking structure—the chapter then explains the various economic, political, and security policy tools that comprise it. China works to bring the separate strands of its foreign policy together in a comprehensive whole and to build synergies between component parts. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that Beijing’s primary objectives—regime survival and advancing China’s position in an increasingly multipolar world—are probably insufficient to engender widespread political support among developing countries for a China-led world order.

A global New Deal

2021 ◽  
pp. 109-131
Author(s):  
Jens Steffek
Keyword(s):  
New Deal ◽  
Interwar Period ◽  
World Order ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Post War ◽  
United Nations System ◽  
Second World ◽  
The New Deal ◽  
Nations System

This chapter shows how technocratic internationalism survived the crisis of world order utopias in the 1940s and gained influence on the negotiation of the post-war order. The first section discusses the critique of modern rationalism in the war and post-war years. In the field of international thought, that critique came in the guise of a ‘realist’ backlash against the ‘idealism’ of the interwar period. The second section documents the enduring prominence of technocratic ideas during the Second World War. David Mitrany re-proposed his functional approach in his Working Peace System, a pamphlet that addressed policy-makers rather than academics. Regardless, this wartime version of Mitrany’s functionalism became the point of reference for subsequent generations of scholars. Technocratic thought gained political influence when American policy-makers projected the New Deal and its institutions onto the international plane in the founding of the United Nations system. The final section studies the co-existence of realist and technocratic figures of thought. Realist Hans J. Morgenthau came to advocate international cooperation in the field of low politics, but also multilateral control over nuclear technology. In doing so, he drew directly on Mitrany’s functionalism. E. H. Carr, the eminent British critic of utopianism, in the 1940s suggested a technocratic European planning authority and a bank of Europe to unite the continent.

scholarly journals China's New Multilateral Institutions: A Framework and Research Agenda

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew D Stephen
Keyword(s):  
Global Governance ◽  
Research Agenda ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Multilateral Institutions ◽  
Power Shift ◽  
Global Power ◽  
The Status ◽  
International Power ◽  
New Institutions ◽  
Gouvernance Mondiale

Abstract As China has risen to the status of a global power, it has taken the lead in fostering several new multilateral institutional initiatives. Some of these are formal intergovernmental organizations; others are informal clubs, forums, or platforms. Collectively, these acts of institutional creation suggest that China is no longer content to “join” the existing global order but is constructing its own multilateral infrastructure. What do such institutions mean for global governance? This article provides a framework for studying such multilateral institutions and sketches an emerging research agenda. First, it provides a systematic empirical overview of China's participation in the creation of multilateral institutions between 1990 and 2017. Second, it develops analytical categories for describing types of new institutions based on their relationships with incumbent institutions. Central to this typology is (1) whether new multilateral institutions’ governance functions are additive or rivalrous to those of existing ones, and (2) whether they promote congruent or distinct social purposes. Based on these characteristics, new multilateral institutions may be complementary, divergent, substitutive, or competing. Third, it considers the implications of China's multilateral institution-building for global governance in the context of an international power shift. A medida que China ha ido adquiriendo la condición de potencia mundial, ha asumido el mando de promover varias iniciativas nuevas relacionadas con las instituciones multilaterales. Algunas de estas son organizaciones intergubernamentales formales, mientras que otras son clubes, foros o plataformas informales. En conjunto, estos actos de creación institucional sugieren que China ya no está interesada en «unirse» al orden mundial actual, sino que está construyendo su propia infraestructura multilateral. ¿Qué implican dichas instituciones para la gobernabilidad mundial? Este artículo ofrece un marco para el estudio de dichas instituciones multilaterales y describe brevemente un programa de investigación emergente. En primer lugar, ofrece una visión general empírica y sistemática de la participación de China en la creación de instituciones multilaterales entre 1990 y 2017. En segundo lugar, desarrolla categorías analíticas para describir los tipos de nuevas instituciones en función de sus relaciones con las instituciones vigentes. Un aspecto clave de esta tipología es (1) si las funciones de gobernabilidad de las nuevas instituciones multilaterales se adhieren o se oponen a las de las existentes y (2) si promueven propósitos sociales congruentes o distintos. En función de estas características, las nuevas instituciones multilaterales pueden ser complementarias, divergentes, sustitutivas o competidoras. En tercer lugar, se analizan las consecuencias de la creación de instituciones multilaterales por parte de China para la gobernabilidad mundial en el contexto de un cambio de poder internacional. En s’élevant au rang de puissance mondiale, la Chine a pris la main dans l'encouragement de plusieurs nouvelles initiatives institutionnelles multilatérales. Certaines d'entre elles concernent des organisations intergouvernementales, et d'autres concernent plutôt des plateformes, forums ou clubs informels. Collectivement, ces actes de création institutionnelle suggèrent que la Chine ne contente plus de « rejoindre » l'ordre mondial existant, mais qu'elle construit sa propre infrastructure multilatérale. Que signifient de telles institutions pour la gouvernance mondiale ? Cet article propose un cadre pour l’étude de telles institutions multilatérales et esquisse un programme de recherche émergent. Il commence par fournir une présentation empirique systématique de la participation de la Chine dans la création d'institutions multilatérales entre 1990 et 2017. Il développe ensuite des catégories analytiques permettant de décrire les types de nouvelles institutions en se basant sur leurs relations avec les institutions en place. Pour cette typologie , deux questions centrales consistent à se demander (1) si les fonctions de gouvernance des nouvelles institutions multilatérales s'ajoutent ou rivalisent avec celles des institutions existantes, et (2) si elles promeuvent des objectifs sociaux congruents ou distincts. Sur la base de ces caractéristiques, les nouvelles institutions multilatérales peuvent être complémentaires, divergentes, substitutives ou concurrentes. Enfin, cet article prend en considération les implications de la construction d'institutions multilatérales de la Chine pour la gouvernance mondiale dans le contexte du changement des puissances mondiales.

scholarly journals Editorial: changing views on Empire and Imperialism

2004 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. L. WESSELING
Keyword(s):  
World Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Bible ◽  
Global Power ◽  
The New Testament ◽  
New Form ◽  
Political Philosopher ◽  
Basic Hypothesis ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Antonio Negri

Words can be confusing and titles can be misleading, particularly if titles consist of one simple word. Two titles suffice to illustrate this phenomenon. In 2000, a book appeared with the title Empire and in 2002 another book appeared with exactly the same title. In the first Empire, Michael Hardt, an American literary theorist, and Antonio Negri, an Italian political philosopher, argued that although classical imperialism is over, Empire is alive and well, albeit in a new form. For them ‘Empire’ means the following: ‘Our basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire.’ This is a rather special definition of Empire because what one usually has in mind when using that word is something very different. It is the Empire that the other book, written by the British historian Niall Ferguson, is about. This book describes, as the subtitle indicates, The Rise and Demise of the British World Order. But it is also about something more, as is apparent from the rest of the subtitle: and the Lessons for Global Power. These lessons are intended for the rulers of the Empire of today, the Americans. While the first Empire is the Bible for anti-globalists, Ferguson's book can be considered as the New Testament of the advocates of America's imperial ambitions.

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