scholarly journals The Difficulty of Easy Projects

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-302
Author(s):  
Wioletta Dziuda ◽  
A. Arda Gitmez ◽  
Mehdi Shadmehr
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Government Grants ◽  
Strategic Effect ◽  
Private Contributions

We consider binary private contributions to public good projects that succeed when the number of contributors exceeds a threshold. We show that for standard distributions of contribution costs, valuable threshold public good projects are more likely to succeed when they require more contributors. Raising the success threshold reduces free-riding incentives, and this strategic effect dominates the direct effect. Common intuition that easier projects are more likely to succeed only holds for cost distributions with right tails fatter than Cauchy. Our results suggest government grants can reduce the likelihood that valuable threshold public good projects succeed. (JEL D71, H41, H81)

scholarly journals El monopolio de las ideas: Contra la Propiedad Intelectual

2021 ◽  
pp. 47-104
Author(s):  
Albert Esplugas
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Key Words ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Original Meaning ◽  
Palabras Clave

This paper presents a critique of intellectual property from an ethical and economical point of view. Once patents and copyrights are characterized as a monopolies of ideas, it is argued that intellectual pro-perty violates private property rights in its original meaning and it is not based in real scarcity but creates artificial scarcity instead. In addition, the paper challenges intellectual property as an incentive to innovation and studies the several costs of this kind of regulation. Eventually, diffe-rent market alternatives to tackle the free-riding problem are explored. Key words: intelectual property, patents, copyrights, private property, scar-city, public good, innovation incentives, market economy. Clasificación JEL: O310, O320, O340, H410. Resumen: En este trabajo se presenta una crítica a la propiedad intelec-tual desde una perspectiva ética y económica. Tras caracterizar las paten-tes y los copyrights como monopolios sobre ideas, se arguye que la pro-piedad intelectual viola el derecho de propiedad privada en su sentido tradicional y crea una escasez artificial en lugar de fundarse sobre la esca-sez. Se cuestiona, asimismo, que la propiedad intelectual suponga un incen-tivo a la creación, estudiando los distintos costes de una regulación de este tipo. Por último se mencionan varias alternativas de mercado para hacer frente a los problemas de free-riding. Palabras clave: propiedad intelectual, patentes, copyrights, propiedad privada, escasez, bien público, incentivos a la innovación, mercado.

The governance of Internet and game theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2.28) ◽  
pp. 176
Author(s):  
Olivier Lefebvre
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Mobile Phones ◽  
Net Neutrality ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Strategic Effect ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Access Charges

The professional milieu of telecommunications is livened up by controversies lasting decades.  The controversy about access charges (or termination rates, the price paid by an operator to another when the subscriber’s call ends on its network) is ending, while the controversy about Net neutrality is starting. The article focuses on a “fragment”: the regulator’s action. Game theory is useful to answer two questions: (1) why does the regulator decide the decrease and cancellation of access charges (justification)? (2) How does he do it (tactical feasibility)? When the access charges decrease and are cancelled the retail prices decrease and the consumers’ surplus increases. And concerning the tactical feasibility, the regulator can let untouched the profits when he decides some decrease of the access charges (direct effect), then the retail prices decrease when there is a new Nash equilibrium (strategic effect). The operators cannot protest, neither during the first stage (the profits are untouched) neither during the second stage (it would be to admit that access charges are useful to have higher profits thanks to high retail prices, which is detrimental to consumers).One brings some explanation of the move towards access charges lowered or cancelled. Examples are: (1) the peering in the governance of Internet and (2) what is called the Eurotariff (for instance, roaming charges for users of mobile phones in Europe have been cancelled).  

Contributing for Myself, but Free riding for My Group?

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshio Iida ◽  
Christiane Schwieren
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Real World ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Or Groups ◽  
Series Of Experiments ◽  
General Difference

Abstract Many real-world decisions are made by individuals as representatives of groups. Most research, however, studies either individuals or groups as decision-makers. This paper explores whether there is a general difference between a decision made as an individual and as a representative of a group in the context of a public good game. We conducted a series of experiments to test this question and to understand mechanisms contributing to potential differences. We found that representatives contributed less than individuals when they could not communicate with their constituency. However, when they could discuss their strategy before playing, they contributed at least as much as individual decision-makers. Furthermore, when they could justify their decision after playing, they contributed even more than individual decision-makers. We discuss potential reasons for this and directions for future research.

scholarly journals Development aid as a global public good – a case study

Competitio ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-97
Author(s):  
Boglárka Horváthné Angyal
Keyword(s):  
Nongovernmental Organizations ◽  
Public Good ◽  
International Aid ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Development Aid ◽  
Global Public Good ◽  
Economic Literature ◽  
The Public ◽  
Jel Classifications

This study introduces a new concept to the analysis of development aid. Aid is regarded as a global public good where donors benefit from the advantages of aid without rivalry and exludability. The public-goodnature of aid is a logical explanation for the deficiencies of the international aid regime, especially the suboptimal supply of aid and the free-riding of donors. The concept of aid as a public good raises the question whether there are any actors who could produce this global public good. The study analyses whether nongovernmental organizations are able to fill this gap in the international aid regime. The model is introduced through a case study: aid in Afghanistan in general, and the activities of the NGO Hungarian Baptist Aid in the country. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classifications: F590, H410

Domanda di inflazione come «bene pubblico» e regimi di indicizzazione dei redditi*

1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 159-171
Author(s):  
Mario Ferrero
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Real World ◽  
Decision Process ◽  
Traditional Approach ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Political Decision ◽  
The Real ◽  
Inflation Tax ◽  
Natural Way

Abstract The traditional approach to inflation as a tax does not take any account of the state of indexation of the economy, as if universal «implicit» indexation of individual incomes to inflation by adjustment of inflationary expectations prevailed. This article shows that if - as is the case in much of the real world today - explicit indexation through wage escalator clauses and the like is sufficiently widespread but does not cover all individuals in the economy, then it may become feasible and attractive for a coalition of voters to pass inflationary budgets. Since budget choices and the determination of the associated inflation tax are outcomes of a collective (political) decision process while indexation is privately negotiated in the market, indexed voters may try to make non-indexed voters pay the bill of budget benefits to themselves through the inflation tax. Inflation thus becomes a peculiar, negative public good with a private exit: the inflation tax can now be individually avoided through indexation, and a demand for inflation in the literal meaning can manifest itself through the electoral process. Various properties of this perverse budget-inflation game are discussed, showing that the only natural way out of it appears to be universal indexation, which would eliminate the incentive to free-riding behavior by the indexed voters, though at some transitional cost to society.

Nonprofit Commercial Revenue

2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (6) ◽  
pp. 686-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janelle A. Kerlin ◽  
Tom H. Pollak
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Resource Dependency ◽  
Panel Analysis ◽  
Dependency Theory ◽  
Commercial Activity ◽  
Government Grants ◽  
Private Contributions ◽  
Government Grant

This article examines whether there has been an increase in nonprofit commercial revenue and if so whether declines in government grants and private contributions were behind the rise. A number of nonprofit scholars have held that nonprofit commercial activity increased significantly during the 1980s and 1990s. Following on resource dependency theory, they suggest that nonprofits use commercial income as a replacement for lost government grant and private revenue. However, authors for and against this thesis have provided little empirical evidence to test these claims. This study uses the Internal Revenue Services’ Statistics of Income database to track sources of revenue for charitable nonprofit organizations from 1982 to 2002. Trend and panel analysis show that although there was a large increase in commercial revenue, there is little evidence the increase was associated with declines in government grants and private contributions. Findings point to institutional theory and have important implications for policymakers and nonprofit practitioners.

scholarly journals Dynamic Free Riding with Irreversible Investments

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (9) ◽  
pp. 2858-2871 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Battaglini ◽  
Salvatore Nunnari ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Private Consumption ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Steady States ◽  
Discount Factor ◽  
Unique Point ◽  
Efficient Level ◽  
Markov Equilibria ◽  
Irreversible Investments

We study the Markov equilibria of a model of free riding in which n infinitely lived agents choose between private consumption and irreversible contributions to a durable public good. We show that the set of equilibrium steady states converges to a unique point as depreciation converges to zero. For any level of depreciation, moreover, the highest steady state converges to the efficient level as agents become increasingly patient. These results are in contrast to the case with reversible investments, where a continuum of inefficient equilibrium steady states exists for any level of depreciation, discount factor, and size of population. (JEL D11, H41)

THE EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY ON THE VOLUNTARY PRIVATE PROVISION OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS

2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (01) ◽  
pp. 61-73
Author(s):  
ILTAE KIM
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Voluntary Provision ◽  
Impure Public Goods ◽  
Impure Public Good ◽  
Increase In Risk

This paper examines the effects of uncertainty on an individual's own contribution to the provision of the collective good using an impure public good model. Two types of uncertainty analyzing free-riding behavior are evaluated: (i) uncertainty surrounding the contributions of others to the public characteristic and (ii) uncertainty surrounding the response of others to an individual's own contribution. We extend previous studies by examining both the compensated and uncompensated effects of increases in such risks on the provision of the collective good. We also establish the conditions that are sufficient to determine both compensated and the total, uncompensated effects of an increase in risk on the voluntary provision of the collective good.

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