Domanda di inflazione come «bene pubblico» e regimi di indicizzazione dei redditi*

The traditional approach to inflation as a tax does not take any account of the state of indexation of the economy, as if universal «implicit» indexation of individual incomes to inflation by adjustment of inflationary expectations prevailed. This article shows that if - as is the case in much of the real world today - explicit indexation through wage escalator clauses and the like is sufficiently widespread but does not cover all individuals in the economy, then it may become feasible and attractive for a coalition of voters to pass inflationary budgets. Since budget choices and the determination of the associated inflation tax are outcomes of a collective (political) decision process while indexation is privately negotiated in the market, indexed voters may try to make non-indexed voters pay the bill of budget benefits to themselves through the inflation tax. Inflation thus becomes a peculiar, negative public good with a private exit: the inflation tax can now be individually avoided through indexation, and a demand for inflation in the literal meaning can manifest itself through the electoral process. Various properties of this perverse budget-inflation game are discussed, showing that the only natural way out of it appears to be universal indexation, which would eliminate the incentive to free-riding behavior by the indexed voters, though at some transitional cost to society.