scholarly journals Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 139
Author(s):  
Marwa El Zein ◽  
Chloe Seikus ◽  
Lee De-Wit ◽  
Bahador Bahrami
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Collective Structure ◽  
The Individual

Background: It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. Methods: In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Results: Participants made lower offers when making a collective rather than an individual decision. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus seem reluctant to punish others, and even more so when facing a group of proposers. Conclusions: Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

scholarly journals Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 139
Author(s):  
Marwa El Zein ◽  
Chloe Seikus ◽  
Lee De-Wit ◽  
Bahador Bahrami
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Collective Structure ◽  
The Individual

Background: It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. Methods: In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Results: Participants made lower offers when making their decision as part of a group as compared to alone. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish or not to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus take more time to punish others, and to make their mind on whether to punish or not when facing a group of proposers. Conclusions: Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

scholarly journals Punishing the individual or the group for norm violation

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marwa El Zein ◽  
Chloe Seikus ◽  
Lee de-Wit ◽  
Bahador Bahrami
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Collective Structure ◽  
Individual Decisions ◽  
The Individual

It has recently been proposed that a key motivation for joining groups is the protection from consequences of negative behaviours, such as norm violations. Here we empirically test this claim by investigating whether cooperative decisions and the punishment of associated fairness-based norm violations are different in individuals vs. collectives in economic games. In the ultimatum game, participants made or received offers that they could reject at a cost to their outcome, a form of social punishment. In the dictator game with third-party punishment, participants made offers to a receiver while being observed by a punisher, or could themselves punish unfair offers. Participants made lower offers when making a collective vs individual decisions. This difference correlated with participants’ overall mean offers: those who were generally less generous were even less so in a group, suggesting that the collective structure was compatible with their intention. Participants were slower when punishing vs not punishing an unfair offer. Importantly here, they were slower when deciding whether to punish groups as compared to individuals, only when the offer concerned them directly in second party punishment. Participants thus seem reluctant to punish others, and even more so when facing a group of proposers. Together, these results show that people behave differently in a group, both in their willingness to share with others and in their punishment of norm violations. This could be explained by the fact that being in a collective structure allows to share responsibility with others, thereby protecting from negative consequences of norm violations.

Domineering Dispositions and Hierarchy Preferences: Differentiating the Impact of Traits and Social Values in Economic Games

2020 ◽  
pp. 014616722096529
Author(s):  
Robin Bergh ◽  
Jim Sidanius
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Social Values ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Value Orientations ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Total N ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
The Impact

In this article, we examined the relation between valuing hierarchies (dominant value orientations) and personally wanting to get ahead, without regard for others’ welfare (domineering dispositions). Survey data from five studies (total N > 1,500) indicated differences between being domineering and endorsing dominant value orientations. This distinction was also evident in different strategies in economic games. Domineering individuals typically gave less to a powerless player (dictator game) but changed behaviors when the other party possessed bargaining power (ultimatum game). Individuals endorsing dominant value orientations did not show such “exploitative opportunism.” In a third-party punishment task, in contrast, individuals with dominant value orientations were more likely to intervene against fair decisions (i.e., upholding inequalities between others). Correcting behaviors of others were not predicted by domineering dispositions. We discuss implications for distinguishing between traits and social values more broadly.

scholarly journals The Intuition of Punishment: A Study of Fairness Preferences and Cognitive Ability

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Seier
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Other Regarding

Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games.

Generosity, fairness, trust and time: the performance of therapeutic community residents in economics experiments

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anup Gampa ◽  
Jessica V. Linley ◽  
Brian Roe ◽  
Keith L. Warren
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Behavior ◽  
Time Preference ◽  
Comparison Group ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Preference Elicitation ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Economic Games

Purpose Therapeutic communities (TCs) assume that residents are capable of working together to overcome substance abuse and criminal behavior. Economic games allow us to study the potential of cooperative behavior in TC residents. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach The authors analyze results from a sample of 85 corrections-based TC residents and a comparison group of 45 individuals drawn from the general population who participated in five well-known economic experiments – the dictator game, the ultimatum game, the trust game, risk attitude elicitation and time preference elicitation. Findings TC residents keep less money in the dictator game and return more in the trust game, and prefer short-term rewards in the time preference elicitation. In the ultimatum game, nearly half of all residents refuse offers that are either too low or too high. Research limitations/implications While the study involves a sample from one TC and a comparison group, the results suggest that residents are at least comparable to the general public in generosity and appear willing on average to repay trust. A substantial minority may have difficulty accepting help. Practical implications Rapid peer feedback is of value. Residents will be willing to offer help to peers. The TC environment may explain residents’ tendency to return money in the trust game. Residents who refuse to accept offers that are either too low or too high in the ultimatum game may also have difficulty in accepting help from peers. Social implications Economic games may help to clarify guidelines for TC clinical practice. Originality/value This is the first use of economic games with TC residents.

scholarly journals Cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicts strategic choices in economic games

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (20) ◽  
pp. 5582-5587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshio Yamagishi ◽  
Haruto Takagishi ◽  
Alan de Souza Rodrigues Fermin ◽  
Ryota Kanai ◽  
Yang Li ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Cortical Thickness ◽  
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Strategic Reasoning ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Dorsolateral Prefrontal

Human prosociality has been traditionally explained in the social sciences in terms of internalized social norms. Recent neuroscientific studies extended this traditional view of human prosociality by providing evidence that prosocial choices in economic games require cognitive control of the impulsive pursuit of self-interest. However, this view is challenged by an intuitive prosociality view emphasizing the spontaneous and heuristic basis of prosocial choices in economic games. We assessed the brain structure of 411 players of an ultimatum game (UG) and a dictator game (DG) and measured the strategic reasoning ability of 386. According to the reflective norm-enforcement view of prosociality, only those capable of strategically controlling their selfish impulses give a fair share in the UG, but cognitive control capability should not affect behavior in the DG. Conversely, we support the intuitive prosociality view by showing for the first time, to our knowledge, that strategic reasoning and cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were not related to giving in the UG but were negatively related to giving in the DG. This implies that the uncontrolled choice in the DG is prosocial rather than selfish, and those who have a thicker dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and are capable of strategic reasoning (goal-directed use of the theory of mind) control this intuitive drive for prosociality as a means to maximize reward when there are no future implications of choices.

Economic Games

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 178-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Baumert ◽  
Thomas Schlösser ◽  
Manfred Schmitt
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Personality Tests ◽  
Interindividual Differences ◽  
Economic Games ◽  
Need For Power ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Self Reports ◽  
Person Game

The psychometric properties of behaviors in economic games as indicators of stable latent dispositions of altruism and fairness were tested in two studies. Using latent state-trait analyses, we explored the factor structure of offers in the dictator game, rejection decisions in the ultimatum game, and altruistic punishment and altruistic compensation in a three-person game. Results showed that four distinct but intercorrelated latent dispositions best described the interindividual differences in these behaviors. The reliabilities and stabilities of these behaviors across 6 weeks were generally moderate to high. Correlations with self-report measures of personality suggested that offers in the dictator game and altruistic compensation reflect a concern for fairness coupled with a reluctance to harm others. Rejection decisions in the ultimatum game were correlated with competitiveness and the need for power. In sum, our results suggest that economic games have good psychometric qualities as instruments that can be used to assess stable latent dispositions and can be employed as objective personality tests sensu Cattell to gain a more complete picture of personality beyond self-reports.

Nationalism and Social Sanctioning Across Ethnic Lines: Experimental Evidence from the Kenya–Tanzania Border

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangick Jeon ◽  
Tim Johnson ◽  
Amanda Lea Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Ethnic Composition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Group Members

AbstractPast research shows that ethnic diversity reduces the ability to sanction norm violators, ultimately undermining cooperation. We test this directly by experimentally varying the ethnic composition of groups playing a dictator game with third-party punishment among two ethnic groups along the Kenya–Tanzania border. We also implement a structurally identical game where the endowment division is randomly determined in order to isolate a punishment motivation from the motivation to rectify income inequality. While costly income adjustment in both games is driven primarily by norm violations and inequality aversion, the ethnic composition of groups also influences sharing and sanctioning behavior in Kenya but not Tanzania, consistent with documented differences in the strength of nationalism across the two countries. However, the way in which shared ethnicity affects sanctioning in Kenya—namely, increased punishment of out-group violations against in-group members—is at odds with theories that anticipate that costly sanctioning will primarily target coethnics.

scholarly journals The ‘spiteful’ origins of human cooperation

2010 ◽  
Vol 278 (1715) ◽  
pp. 2159-2164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank W. Marlowe ◽  
J. Colette Berbesque ◽  
Clark Barrett ◽  
Alexander Bolyanatz ◽  
Michael Gurven ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Economics ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Complex Societies ◽  
Basic Emotion ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Third Person

We analyse generosity, second-party (‘spiteful’) punishment (2PP), and third-party (‘altruistic’) punishment (3PP) in a cross-cultural experimental economics project. We show that smaller societies are less generous in the Dictator Game but no less prone to 2PP in the Ultimatum Game. We might assume people everywhere would be more willing to punish someone who hurt them directly (2PP) than someone who hurt an anonymous third person (3PP). While this is true of small societies, people in large societies are actually more likely to engage in 3PP than 2PP. Strong reciprocity, including generous offers and 3PP, exists mostly in large, complex societies that face numerous challenging collective action problems. We argue that ‘spiteful’ 2PP, motivated by the basic emotion of anger, is more universal than 3PP and sufficient to explain the origins of human cooperation.

scholarly journals The contribution of the individual to the group’s social capital: the structure of altruistic investment

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
L.V. Mararitsa ◽  
T.V. Kazantseva ◽  
L.G. Pochebut ◽  
A.L. Sventsitskiy
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Common Good ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Social Situation ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretical Ground ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Individual

The article sets theoretical ground for the content and structure of the “altruistic investment” networking strategy as one of the strategies of individual social behavior. Altruistic investment is based, firstly, on the value of a benevolent attitude toward all people; secondly, the desire of the individual to improve the “social situation” for all its participants and thirdly, it involves conscious action for the sake of the common good, namely, investing resources in maintaining positive group norms and protecting justice. The study used the modified social dilemmas, “Public good dilemma” and “Dictator game under third-party punishment”. Using structural modeling in a sample of 362 people, it was found that the empirical data correspond to the a priori model of altruistic investment in the group’s social capital. The structure of the networking strategy of the individual contains the value, motivational and be havioral components. The role of altruistic investment in the formation of the social capital of the group is shown.

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