Stackelberg Game of Buyback Policy in Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer and a Risk-Averse Supplier Based on CVaR

Literature concerning about the supply chain management problem is usually based on perfect rationality. However, risk preferences have been proved to be an important role which influences managers’ decisions significantly. This paper investigates a risk combination problem under supplier encroachment with different risk preferences players. Assuming that the supply chain players may be risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-taking, we build a Stackelberg game model to explore the optimal decisions and the impact of different risk combinations, respectively. We focus on two scenarios: the consumers perceive uniform quality between the two channels and perceive differentiated quality between the two channels. We find that the retailer always prefers a risk-averse supplier, while the supplier always prefers a risk-taking retailer. But the combination of a risk-averse supplier and a risk-taking retailer is not always beneficial to the whole supply chain. Further, we conduct numerical experiments to explore the risk combinations and the impacts of players’ selfish, aggressive and altruistic behaviors on optimal decisions.

Download Full-text

Joint financing and ordering decisions in a capital-constrained supply chain with risk preference

RAIRO - Operations Research ◽

10.1051/ro/2020094 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Zhiyuan Zhen ◽

Jing Ru Wang

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Trade Credit ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Wholesale Price ◽

Risk Preference ◽

Bank Credit ◽

Risk Averse ◽

Initial Capital ◽

Preference Behavior ◽

Credit Financing

We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one dominant supplier and one capital-constrained retailer. The retailer needs to solve the shortage of working capital either from a bank or from its core supplier, which offers trade credit when it is also beneficial to itself. We assume the retailer is risk-averse behavior and the supplier has different risk preference behaviors that jointly model risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-taking. With a wholesale price contract, we incorporate each member’s risk preference behavior into its objective function. Then we derive the optimal decisions in a Stackelberg game under bank credit financing and trade credit financing, respectively. We find that there exists a supplier’s risk preference threshold that distinguishes financing scheme. When the supplier is a relatively higher risk preference, trade credit financing makes both the retailer and the supplier better off and is a unique financing equilibrium. Otherwise, the members prefer bank credit financing . Besides, the supplier with relatively higher risk preference behavior prefers the retailer with a low initial capital as a partner; the supplier with relatively lower risk preference behavior prefers the retailer with a higher initial capital level. The above theoretical results are verified by numerical analysis.

Download Full-text

The Complex Dynamics of Bertrand-Stackelberg Pricing Models in a Risk-Averse Supply Chain

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society ◽

10.1155/2014/749769 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 2014 ◽

pp. 1-14 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

Junhai Ma ◽

Qiuxiang Li

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Complex Dynamics ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Price Adjustment ◽

Stable Region ◽

Uncertain Demand ◽

Risk Averse ◽

Pricing Models ◽

Increase With Increase ◽

Adjustment Speed

We construct dynamic Bertrand-Stackelberg pricing models including two manufacturers and a common retailer in a risk-averse supply chain with the uncertain demand. The risk-averse supply chain follows these strategies: Bertrand game between the two manufacturers and Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer. We study the effect of the price adjustment speed, the risk preference, and the uncertain demand on the stability of the risk-averse supply chain using bifurcation, power spectrum, attractor, and so forth. It is observed that there exists slip bifurcation when the price adjustment speed across some critical value, the stable region, and total profit of the risk-averse supply chain will increase with increase ofRM1and decrease with increase ofσ. The profit of the supply chain and the two manufacturers will decrease and the weaker (retailer) is a beneficiary when the supply chain is in chaos. The fluctuation in the supply chain can be gradually controlled by the control of the price adjustment speed.

Download Full-text

Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su13116425 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (11) ◽

pp. 6425

Author(s):

Quanxi Li ◽

Haowei Zhang ◽

Kailing Liu

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Closed Loop ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Recycling Rate ◽

Transfer Payment ◽

Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽

Asymmetry Of Information ◽

Optimal Decisions ◽

The Government ◽

The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

Download Full-text

Decisions and Coordination in E-Commerce Supply Chain under Logistics Outsourcing and Altruistic Preferences

Mathematics ◽

10.3390/math9030253 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 9 (3) ◽

pp. 253

Author(s):

Yuyan Wang ◽

Zhaoqing Yu ◽

Liang Shen ◽

Runjie Fan ◽

Rongyun Tang

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Supply Chains ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Consumer Preferences ◽

Third Party ◽

Altruistic Behavior ◽

Fixed Cost ◽

Equilibrium Solutions ◽

Factors Affecting ◽

Dual Channel

Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.

Download Full-text

Single-Manufacturer Multi-Retailer Supply Chain Models with Discrete Stochastic Demand

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su13158271 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 13 (15) ◽

pp. 8271

Author(s):

Yaqing Xu ◽

Jiang Zhang ◽

Zihao Chen ◽

Yihua Wei

Keyword(s):

Dynamic Programming ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Computational Complexity ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Programming Model ◽

Dynamic Programming Method ◽

Game Model ◽

Chain Model ◽

Stochastic Demands ◽

Demand Models

Although there are highly discrete stochastic demands in practical supply chain problems, they are seldom considered in the research on supply chain systems, especially the single-manufacturer multi-retailer supply chain systems. There are no significant differences between continuous and discrete demand supply chain models, but the solutions for discrete random demand models are more challenging and difficult. This paper studies a supply chain system of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers with discrete stochastic demands. Each retailer faces a random discrete demand, and the manufacturer utilizes different wholesale prices to influence each retailer’s ordering decision. Both Make-To-Order and Make-To-Stock scenarios are considered. For each scenario, the corresponding Stackelberg game model is constructed respectively. By proving a series of theorems, we transfer the solution of the game model into non-linear integer programming model, which can be easily solved by a dynamic programming method. However, with the increase in the number of retailers and the production capacity of manufacturers, the computational complexity of dynamic programming drastically increases due to the Dimension Barrier. Therefore, the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) approach is introduced, which significantly reduces the computational complexity of solving the supply chain model.

Download Full-text

Pricing Policies in a Retailer Stackelberg O2O Green Supply Chain

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su12083236 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 12 (8) ◽

pp. 3236

Author(s):

Gan Wan ◽

Gang Kou ◽

Tie Li ◽

Feng Xiao ◽

Yang Chen

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Good Combination ◽

Green Supply Chain ◽

Game Model ◽

Mathematical Function ◽

Pricing Strategies ◽

Direct Channel ◽

Retail Channel ◽

Offline Channels

Due to the popularization of the concept of “new retailing”, we study a new commercial model named O2O (online-to-offline), which is a good combination model of a direct channel and a traditional retail channel. We analyze an O2O supply chain in which manufacturers are responsible for making green products and selling them through both online and offline channels. The retailer is responsible for all online and offline channels’ orders, and the manufacturer gives the retailer a fixed fee. We construct a mathematical function model and analyze the greenness and pricing strategies of centralized and decentralized settings through the retailer Stackelberg game model. Due to the effects of the double marginalization of supply chain members, we adopt a simple contract to coordinate the green supply chain. The paper’s contributions are that we obtain pricing and greening strategies by taking the cooperation of offline channels and online channels into consideration under the O2O green supply chain environment.

Download Full-text

Strategic Analysis of the Pricing Mechanisms in an Online Book Supply Chain in the Presence of Reference Price Effects

Journal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce research ◽

10.3390/jtaer16050084 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 16 (5) ◽

pp. 1492-1516

Author(s):

Wenhua Hou ◽

Yuwen Zeng

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Discount Rate ◽

Reference Price ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Lower Boundary ◽

Retail Price ◽

Reference Points ◽

Price Effects ◽

Retail Prices ◽

Online Book

(1) Background: A binding recommended retail price has been used in several markets in a variety of forms, and the book market is a typical example. Publishers sell books to online retailers at a unit wholesale discount computed on the cover price. Retailers are then allowed to set the retail price. Therefore, if consumers regard the cover prices as reference points, then they may be more likely to purchase books if retail prices are lower than the cover prices. (2) Methods: We develop a Stackelberg game model for a book supply chain to investigates how reference price effects affect retailers and publisher’s pricing strategies. (3) Results: The results show that retailers will sell printed books at a discount only when the publisher’s wholesale discount rate is not high. Further, as the intensity of the reference price effects increases, (a) the lower boundary of the wholesale discount rate rises, (b) publishers’ profits increase and (c) retailers’ profits increase relative to the level of consumers’ e-books acceptance. (4) Conclusions: This result is related to the fact that the online retailer, such as Amazon and JD.com, like to invoke reference price effects in consumers’ minds by highlighting the printed book’s discount rate.

Download Full-text

Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health ◽

10.3390/ijerph17072274 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 17 (7) ◽

pp. 2274 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Dooho Lee

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Supply Chains ◽

Closed Loop ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Innovation Strategy ◽

Market Demand ◽

Green Innovation ◽

Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽

Innovation Strategies ◽

Market Leadership

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

Download Full-text

A Dynamic Stackelberg Game of Supply Chain for a Corporate Social Responsibility

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society ◽

10.1155/2017/8656174 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 2017 ◽

pp. 1-8 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Massimiliano Ferrara ◽

Mehrnoosh Khademi ◽

Mehdi Salimi ◽

Somayeh Sharifi

Keyword(s):

Corporate Social Responsibility ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Social Responsibility ◽

Supply Chains ◽

Equilibrium Point ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Dynamic Game ◽

Supply Chain Performance ◽

Information Structures ◽

Corporate Social

In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of a supply chain in a decentralized state which includes a supplier and a manufacturer. For analyzing supply chain performance in decentralized state and the relationships between the members of the supply chain, we formulate a model that crosses through multiperiods with the help of a dynamic discrete Stackelberg game which is made under two different information structures. We obtain an equilibrium point at which both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken up by supply chains are maximized.

Download Full-text