scholarly journals The obedient mind and the volitional brain: A neural basis for preserved sense of agency and sense of responsibility under coercion

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (10) ◽  
pp. e0258884
Author(s):  
Emilie A. Caspar ◽  
Frederike Beyer ◽  
Axel Cleeremans ◽  
Patrick Haggard

Milgram’s classical studies famously suggested a widespread willingness to obey authority, even to the point of inflicting harm. Important situational factors supporting obedience, such as proximity with the victim, have been established. Relatively little work has focused on how coercion affects individual cognition, or on identifying the cognitive factors that underlie inter-individual differences in the tendency to yield to coercion. Here, we used fMRI to investigate the neural systems associated with changes in volitional processes associated with sense of agency and sense of responsibility under coercion. Participants either freely chose, or were instructed by the experimenter, to give mildly painful electric shocks to another participant, or to refrain from doing so. We have previously shown that coercion reduces temporal binding, which has been proposed as an implicit proxy measure of sense of agency. We tested how reduced agency under coercion related to differences in neural activity between free choice and coercion. In contrast to previous studies and to participants performing the task outside the MRI scanner, on average there was no effect of coercion on agency for participants in the scanner. However, greater activity in the medial frontal gyrus was reliably associated with greater agency under coercion. A similar association was found using explicit responsibility ratings. Our findings suggest that medial frontal processes, perhaps related to volition during action planning and execution, may help to preserve a sense of accountability under coercion. Further, participants who administered more shocks under free choice showed reduced activity during free choice trials in brain areas associated with social cognition. Possibly, this might reflect participants cognitively distancing themselves from the recipient of the shocks under free choice, whereas this was not observed under coercion.

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 417-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiago Branco ◽  
Peter Redgrave

Escape is one of the most studied animal behaviors, and there is a rich normative theory that links threat properties to evasive actions and their timing. The behavioral principles of escape are evolutionarily conserved and rely on elementary computational steps such as classifying sensory stimuli and executing appropriate movements. These are common building blocks of general adaptive behaviors. Here we consider the computational challenges required for escape behaviors to be implemented, discuss possible algorithmic solutions, and review some of the underlying neural circuits and mechanisms. We outline shared neural principles that can be implemented by evolutionarily ancient neural systems to generate escape behavior, to which cortical encephalization has been added to allow for increased sophistication and flexibility in responding to threat.


Author(s):  
Patricia L Lockwood ◽  
Miriam C Klein-Flügge

Abstract Social neuroscience aims to describe the neural systems that underpin social cognition and behaviour. Over the past decade, researchers have begun to combine computational models with neuroimaging to link social computations to the brain. Inspired by approaches from reinforcement learning theory, which describes how decisions are driven by the unexpectedness of outcomes, accounts of the neural basis of prosocial learning, observational learning, mentalizing and impression formation have been developed. Here we provide an introduction for researchers who wish to use these models in their studies. We consider both theoretical and practical issues related to their implementation, with a focus on specific examples from the field.


2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (10) ◽  
pp. 3162-3180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn Parkinson ◽  
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ◽  
Philipp E. Koralus ◽  
Angela Mendelovici ◽  
Victoria McGeer ◽  
...  

Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether “moral judgments” are sufficiently homogenous to be studied scientifically as a unified category. We tested this assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm, dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment of moral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems for each of the different moral areas and that these differences were much more robust than differences in wrongness judgments within a moral area. Dishonest, disgusting, and harmful moral transgression recruited networks of brain regions associated with mentalizing, affective processing, and action understanding, respectively. Dorsal medial pFC was the only region activated by all scenarios judged to be morally wrong in comparison with neutral scenarios. However, this region was also activated by dishonest and harmful scenarios judged not to be morally wrong, suggestive of a domain-general role that is neither peculiar to nor predictive of moral decisions. These results suggest that moral judgment is not a wholly unified faculty in the human brain, but rather, instantiated in dissociable neural systems that are engaged differentially depending on the type of transgression being judged.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 474-491
Author(s):  
Nathaniel Klooster ◽  
Marguerite McQuire ◽  
Murray Grossman ◽  
Corey McMillan ◽  
Anjan Chatterjee ◽  
...  

Despite the ubiquity of metaphor in cognition and communication, it is absent from standard clinical assessments of language, and the neural systems that support metaphor processing are debated. Previous research shows that patients with focal brain lesions can display selective impairments in processing metaphor, suggesting that figurative language abilities may be disproportionately vulnerable to brain injury. We hypothesized that metaphor processing is especially vulnerable to neurodegenerative disease, and that the left hemisphere is critical for normal metaphor processing. To evaluate these hypotheses, we tested metaphor comprehension in patients with left-hemisphere neurodegeneration, and in demographically matched healthy comparison participants. Stimuli consisted of moderately familiar metaphors and closely matched literal sentences sharing the same source term (e.g., The interview was a painful crawl / The infant’s motion was a crawl). Written sentences were presented, followed by four modifier-noun answer choices (one target and three foils). Healthy controls, though reliably better at literal than metaphor trials, comprehended both sentence conditions well. By contrast, participants with left-hemisphere neurodegeneration performed disproportionately poorly on metaphor comprehension. Anatomical analyses show relationships between metaphor accuracy and patient atrophy in the left middle and superior temporal gyri, and the left inferior frontal gyrus, areas that have been implicated in supporting metaphor comprehension in previous imaging research. The behavioral results also suggest deficits of metaphor comprehension may be a sensitive measure of cognitive dysfunction in some forms of neurodegenerative disease.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (7) ◽  
pp. 882-893 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khatereh Borhani ◽  
Brianna Beck ◽  
Patrick Haggard

Sense of agency—a feeling of control over one’s actions and their outcomes—might include at least two components: free choice over which outcome to pursue and motoric control over the action causing the outcome. We orthogonally manipulated locus of outcome choice (free or instructed choice) and motoric control (active or passive movement), while measuring the perceived temporal attraction between actions and outcomes ( temporal binding) as an implicit marker of agency. Participants also rated stimulus intensity so that we could measure sensory attenuation, another possible implicit marker of agency. Actions caused higher or lower levels of either painful heat or mild electrotactile stimulation. We found that both motoric control and outcome choice contributed to outcome binding. Moreover, free choice, relative to instructed choice, attenuated the perceived magnitude of high-intensity outcomes, but only when participants made an active movement. Thus, choosing, not just doing, influences temporal binding and sensory attenuation, though in different ways. Our results show that these implicit measures of agency are sensitive to both voluntary motor commands and instrumental control over action outcomes.


2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (8) ◽  
pp. 1372-1382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy R. Koscik ◽  
Daniel Tranel

People tend to assume that outcomes are caused by dispositional factors, for example, a person's constitution or personality, even when the actual cause is due to situational factors, for example, luck or coincidence. This is known as the “correspondence bias.” This tendency can lead normal, intelligent persons to make suboptimal decisions. Here, we used a neuropsychological approach to investigate the neural basis of the correspondence bias, by studying economic decision-making in patients with damage to the ventromedial pFC (vmPFC). Given the role of the vmPFC in social cognition, we predicted that vmPFC is necessary for the normal correspondence bias. In our experiment, consistent with expectations, healthy (n = 46) and brain-damaged (n = 30) comparison participants displayed the correspondence bias during economic decision-making and invested no differently when given dispositional or situational information. By contrast, vmPFC patients (n = 17) displayed a lack of correspondence bias and invested more when given dispositional than situational information. The results support the conclusion that vmPFC is critical for normal social inference and the correspondence bias. The findings help clarify the important (and sometimes disadvantageous) role of social inference in economic decision-making.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice PAILHES ◽  
gustav kuhn ◽  
Ronald Rensink

Magicians have developed a wide range of techniques to influence and control spectators’ choices of such things as card, word, or number. These techniques are what is called forcing. The present paper develops a psychologically-based taxonomy of forcing techniques with two goals in mind. Firstly, it should help uncover the different psychological mechanisms that underlie forcing techniques. Secondly, it should facilitate knowledge transfer between magicians and psychologists. The main division present two basic categories that can be used as a way of focussing separately on (1) decision-making processes and external influences on choices, and (2) links between sense of agency over action and outcome as well as the illusion of control over this outcome. This taxonomy allows us to clearly differentiate between forces in which there is or is not a free choice, and whether this choice has an impact on the following events.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (27) ◽  
pp. eaay8301 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Zapparoli ◽  
S. Seghezzi ◽  
E. Zirone ◽  
G. Guidali ◽  
M. Tettamanti ◽  
...  

Every day, we do things that cause effects in the outside world with little doubt about who caused what. To some, this sense of agency derives from a post hoc reconstruction of a likely causal relationship between an event and our preceding movements; others propose that the sense of agency originates from prospective comparisons of motor programs and their effects. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found that the sense of agency is associated with a brain network including the pre–supplementary motor area (SMA) and dorsal parietal cortex. Transcranial magnetic stimulation affected the sense of agency only when delivered over the pre-SMA and specifically when time-locked to action planning, rather than when the physical consequences of the actions appeared. These findings make a prospective theory of the sense of agency more likely.


2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yutaka Sakai ◽  
Tomoki Fukai

The ability to make a correct choice of behavior from various options is crucial for animals' survival. The neural basis for the choice of behavior has been attracting growing attention in research on biological and artificial neural systems. Alternative choice tasks with variable ratio (VR) and variable interval (VI) schedules of reinforcement have often been employed in studying decision making by animals and humans. In the VR schedule task, alternative choices are reinforced with different probabilities, and subjects learn to select the behavioral response rewarded more frequently. In the VI schedule task, alternative choices are reinforced at different average intervals independent of the choice frequencies, and the choice behavior follows the so-called matching law. The two policies appear robustly in subjects' choice of behavior, but the underlying neural mechanisms remain unknown. Here, we show that these seemingly different policies can appear from a common computational algorithm known as actor-critic learning. We present experimentally testable variations of the VI schedule in which the matching behavior gives only a suboptimal solution to decision making and show that the actor-critic system exhibits the matching behavior in the steady state of the learning even when the matching behavior is suboptimal. However, it is found that the matching behavior can earn approximately the same reward as the optimal one in many practical situations.


1966 ◽  
Vol 86 ◽  
pp. 78-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albin Lesky

In the paper that I read to the Third International Congress of Classical Studies in London in 1959 I tried to delimit the sphere of human reflexion and freedom of decision, as opposed to the sphere of divine intervention, in Homeric poetry. The conclusion I reached was that there was a mutual and often indissoluble fusion of these two spheres. In trying here to say something about the significance of personal decision in the dramas of Aeschylus, I am in fact continuing my inquiry in a different literary genre. But the problems are basically the same: in both cases the question is what significance the poet ascribes to the personal decisions of the human agent within the frame-work of a basically God-governed ‘Welt-bild’, how the limitations upon his freedom are defined, and what degree of responsibility is thus entailed.I began the previous paper with my thanks to Bruno Snell, who was the first to clarify these problems of free human action with which we are faced in epic poetry, and I must now begin by thanking him again. Professor Snell, in his book Aischjlos und das Handeln im Drama, which appeared in 1928, emphatically placed the personal decision of the human agent in the centre of his interpretation of Aeschylus; he even went so far as to regard a decision based on free choice as the most important element in the development of a genuinely tragic conflict. I cannot enter upon the history of these problems; however, I should like to emphasise the importance of the question and the interest it has recently aroused in scholarly discussion.


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