Brauchen wir zur Moralbegründung eine „Metanorm“?

2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (5) ◽  
pp. 669-685
Author(s):  
Norbert Hoerster

Abstract Peter Stemmer advocates a new foundation of morality. He claims that any moral principle is justified only if every person to whom the principle applies consents to it on the basis of his or her own interests. But how can this ‘metanorm’ of unanimous consent be justified? Since Stemmer decisively rejects all objectivist foundations of morality, the only justification for his ‘metanorm’ can again be nothing but a unanimous consent. Through numerous examples I hope to have shown in my article that the alleged connexion of all our moral demands with a general, unanimous consent is not realistic – no matter whether these demands are based on our spontaneous or on our well considered attitudes. And this holds no less for legal norms with their hard sanctions than for moral principles.

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-383
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian

AbstractI argue for the claim that there are instances of a priori justified belief – in particular, justified belief in moral principles – that are not analytic, i.e., that cannot be explained solely by the understanding we have of their propositions. §1–2 provides the background necessary for understanding this claim: in particular, it distinguishes between two ways a proposition can be analytic, Basis and Constitutive, and provides the general form of a moral principle. §§3–5 consider whether Hume's Law, properly interpreted, can be established by Moore's Open Question Argument, and concludes that it cannot: while Moore's argument – appropriately modified – is effective against the idea that moral judgments are either (i) reductively analyzable or (ii) Constitutive-analytic, a different argument is needed to show that they are not (iii) Basis-analytic. Such an argument is supplied in §6. §§7–8 conclude by considering how these considerations bear on recent discussions of “alternative normative concepts”, on the epistemology of intuitions, and on the differences between disagreement in moral domains and in other a priori domains such as logic and mathematics.


1989 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly M. Smith

A moral code consists of principles that assign moral status to individual actions – principles that evaluate acts as right or wrong, prohibited or obligatory, permissible or supererogatory. Many theorists have held that such principles must serve two distinct functions. On the one hand, they serve a theoretical function, insofar as they specify the characteristics in virtue of which acts possess their moral status. On the other hand, they serve a practical function, insofar as they provide an action-guide: a standard by reference to which a person can choose which acts to perform and which not. Although the theoretical and practical functions of moral principles are closely linked, it is not at all obvious that what enables a principle to fill one of these roles automatically equips it to fill the other. In this paper I shall briefly examine some of the reasons why a moral principle might fail to fill its practical role, i.e., be incapable of guiding decisions. I shall then sketch three common responses to this kind of failure, and examine in some detail the adequacy of one of the most popular of these responses.


2005 ◽  
Vol 16 (10) ◽  
pp. 1577-1585
Author(s):  
A. L. EFROS ◽  
P. DÉSESQUELLES

We introduce a new model that mimics the strong and sudden effects induced by conformity in tightly interacting human societies. Such effects range from mere crowd phenomena to dramatic political turmoil. The model is a modified version of the Ising Hamiltonian. We have studied the properties of this Hamiltonian using both a Metropolis simulation and analytical derivations. Our study shows that increasing the value of the conformity parameter, results in a first order phase transition. As a result a majority of people begin to honestly support the idea that may contradict the moral principles of a normal human beings though each individual would support the moral principle without tight interaction with the society. Thus, above some critical level of conformity our society destabilizes with respect to ideas that might be doubtful. Our model includes, in a simplified way, human diversity with respect to loyalty to the moral principles.


2021 ◽  
pp. 125-128
Author(s):  
T. I. Bondaruk

The article attempts to substantiate the approach to law as a socio-cultural phenomenon as decisive for its interpretationтin the historical process. P. Bourdieu’s formula «law is cultural capital» is offered as a starting point. Attention is drawn to law as a socio-cultural phenomenon, legal values as cultural and spiritual values, legal tradition, etc. Attention is drawn to some provisions of Dvorkin’s interpretive theory regarding the conditionality of the content of legal norms by political (strategies pursued by legislators through norms) or moral (principles implemented by judges in resolving conflicts in society) factors. It is concluded that to interpret the law in historical retrospect, when it comes to mastering the legal experience of a society accumulated over the centuries, the most productive, considering and researching law as a socio-cultural phenomenon. Culture, the core of which is values, as a collective programming of consciousness, which distinguishes members of one group or type of people from another (according to G. Hofstede), which includes law, determines the level of implementation and collective life of people in society / state, their social integration and social reproduction in general during a certain historical period. Keywords: law, socio-cultural phenomenon, cultural-historical process, interpretation.


Teosofia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
Umi Daris Salamah

<em><span>Postmodern society has related to the terms of relativism, it is kind of the rejection of certain universal forms (grand narrative). In this case, the uncertainty of ethic is being one of the problems of humanity that exist in postmodern society. It implies that there is no true moral principle. The accuracy of all moral principles are relatively accommodated to the concerned or selected individual environment. The difficulty is how to marry such values to respect for diversity. Some agreements on the principles of social justice are desirable. Human has to position themselves between ‘absolutism’ and ‘anything goes’. Ki Ageng Suryomentaram, one of the Javanese Philosophers, formulated a set of philosophical views called to deal with human life. It is not an absolute concept to follow. Neither is it a form of totalitarianism reconstruction. Yet, it can be included as one of what so called by Lyotard as a small narrative. So in postmodernism view, the concept of Ki Ageng Suryomentaram, be it about harmony or manungsa tanpa tenger (human without signs), mawas diri (self-cautiousness), and mulur mungkret (state of being developed and shrunk) can be regarded as knowledge that qualifies to be publicized. It fits to some degree into a postmodern society for creating a harmonious life. </span></em>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bramka Arga Jafino ◽  
Jan Kwakkel

&lt;p&gt;The importance of considering equity in climate change adaptation planning is increasingly being acknowledged. A preferred adaptation strategy is one that not only yields robust outcomes under multiple futures, but also has a fair distribution of benefits and harms across affected actors. In this study we propose two complementary approaches for assessing the equity of impacts of adaptation strategies. First, in the explorative approach, we explore what different multi-actor inequality patterns might emerge under different policy and uncertainty scenarios. Put differently, we identify who benefits and who loses under which kind of circumstances. Second, in the normative approach, we attempt to rank alternative strategies based on their performance across uncertain futures. Identifying which strategy is more preferable requires us to define what kind of distribution is considered to be &amp;#8216;good&amp;#8217;. We thus employ six alternative distributive moral principles that each has its own maxim in justifying the moral righteousness of a distribution: utilitarianism, prioritarianism, sufficientarianism, envy measures, weighted utilitarianism, and the Rawlsian difference principle.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We apply both approaches to a case study on agricultural adaptation planning in An Giang and Dong Thap, two provinces in the upper Vietnam Mekong Delta. We develop an integrated assessment metamodel to assess the equity implications of six alternative adaptation strategies, including dikes (de)construction policies, fertilizer subsidy, and seeds upgrading. We evaluate the distributional impacts of the alternative strategies to 23 districts in the two provinces under a large number of strategic scenarios, i.e., combinations of policy scenarios and uncertain futures. From the explorative approach, we discover six distinctive inequality patterns and identify the strategic scenarios that give rise to each inequality pattern. We find a trade-off between districts located along the Mekong river and those located further away. In some strategic scenarios the former group of districts are substantially better-off than the latter, and vice versa.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;From the normative approach, we find a mixed result of preferred strategies depending on what moral principle is being adopted. The dikes deconstruction policy in Dong Thap, which performs best from a utilitarian point of view, ranks fifth from a prioritarian perspective. Upgrading seed is the most preferred strategy from the prioritarian view, but it performs the worst when looked at from a sufficientarian point of view. We further find that the results from each principle are strongly affected by uncertainties. For example, the fertilizer subsidy policy ranks last in approximately 70% of the uncertain futures according to the sufficientarian principle, but it becomes the most preferable in the other 20% of the uncertain futures. Our findings further emphasize the simultaneous consideration of both uncertainties and alternative distributive principles in adaptation planning. By using multiple moral principles, we expand the information base upon which adaptation decisions are made, and thus minimizing potential surprises and unintended consequences from our choice.&lt;/p&gt;


1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. B. Thomas

John Rawls’ use of a contractarian strategy for justifying basic principles of justice has raised the hope that a similar strategy might work for a theory of right and moral principles generally. I want to show that this hope cannot be fulfilled.In what follows I interpret contractarianism in a Rawlsian way on the grounds that his is the most plausible version of the doctrine we are likely to get. I am not however concerned with the details of Rawls’ argument for justice but instead with an idea that appears to underlie the contractarian strategy. In order to avoid the complications of Rawlsian exegesis, I choose to discuss the doctrine as it might be used to justify a moral principle of mutual assistance and not as Rawls in fact uses it to justify principles of justice.


SATS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Nykänen

AbstractThe aim of the paper is to show that moral reasoning is not really reasoning in the sense usually assumed in moral philosophy. Instead, moral reasoning is one aspect of repressing conscience. The formal dimensions of moral reasoning function as a repressive depersonalisation of our sense of being an I who stands in a relationship to a you. For instance, “moral principle” invokes a formal and hence impersonal understanding of a moral problem. The thinking person loses her sense of being a particular person related to another particular person and focuses instead on the moral principles with their inherent, systematic implications. However, and as I will show in connection to so-called moral dilemmas, the thinking person does not actually act in the rational manner that is presupposed by reasoning. Instead, moral reasoning will reveal itself as a discourse for repressing conscience. Part of the aim of the paper is to show that, contrary to what is generally assumed, repression is a morally related phenomenon that arises as a result of a person’s difficulties with acknowledging the character of a moral difficulty; an acknowledgement that is an essential aspect of moral understanding.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prince Saprai

The rule against penalty clauses in contract law sits uneasily with the promise theory of contract. According to the rule, if contracting parties agree a monetary remedy for breach which is substantially in excess of what would be required to compensate the claimant then that remedy is not enforceable. If contracts enforce promises however one would expect to see these clauses enforced. The rule appears therefore to be an example of a contract doctrine that diverges from promise. Promise theorists tend to respond to divergent doctrines in one of three ways, they either: seek to accommodate these doctrines within the promise principle, or they repudiate them, or finally they justify these doctrines on the basis of the specific legal context within which they operate.I argue that in the case of the penalties rule all of these standard responses would fall short. These responses are inadequate because they are premised on the claim that the promise principle is the only general moral principle relevant to evaluating contract law, or that it has overriding justificatory priority when it conflicts with other moral concerns. I argue that a richer conception of the moral principles that bear on contract and how they interact offers a way forward for justifying the rule.


Author(s):  
Wing-yi LEE

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.現代人對於自殺的討論,普遍地從科學的觀點剖析,視之為與疾病有關。從科學的觀點而言,當事人是在受制於心理或生理的疾病影響下作出自殺的行為。他們的自殺,是處於“不由自主”、“無力選擇”下的自殺,當事人其實是“受害者”,需要的是心理輔導、醫治以預防自殺,而非對其背後所包含的價值觀予以討論。然而,有一些自殺卻不能歸納為與疾病有關。當事人的自殺,是處於自主的狀態之中,是經過深思熟慮,有其充分道德理據下的自主行為。當事人自殺的理據,是與同時代,同一社群的人所認同的道德價值觀,有著密切的關係。對當事人的自殺子以道德價值上的探討,則屬於倫理學上的討論。本文以明代的婦女自殺為例,試從倫理學研究的進路,探究古代中國人的自殺。Modern people usually discuss suicide from scientific views and treat it as a kind of disease. Suicidal behavior occurs under the influence of psychological or physiological illness; it is an involuntary behavior. People who commit suicide are deemed the "victims" of their illnesses. All what we should do is to prevent, to intervene and to postvent their suicidal behavior.However, some cases of suicide are not due to illness. They are the result of voluntary and deliberate moral choice. The reasons of committing suicide are associated with the ethical values of people in the same period of time and in the same community. For example, the moral principle of "zhen" played an important role in woman suicide of Ming Dynasty. In Ming Dynasty, " zhen" was manifested in three ways: (1) "Congi er yongzhong", women should commit suicide after the death of their husbands in order to express loyalty. (2) "Daili er zhengshi", women should commit suicide if they have inappropriate sexual relations with other people, such as pre-marital sex, in order to express their regret and to cover up their sinful behavior. (3) "Sijie", women should commit suicide in order to avoid being raped.Although the government and some intellectuals in Ming Dynasty encouraged women to commit suicide for "men", the suicide and suicide attempt cases in San Yan show that women should consider other moral principles and other values of life and death before they commit suicide. We found that the moral principle of "xiao" overrode the moral principle of "men" in some cases of woman suicide and suicide attempt in San Yan. In Chinese society, "xiao" was manifested in three ways: (l) "Fengyang shuangqin", women should keep their lives for supporting and serving their parents. (2) "Fengyang sizi", women should keep their lives for bringing up their children. (3) "Wei Jiaren Baochou", women should keep their lives for avenging their dead family members. Under the moral principle of "xiao", women should give up suicide. The purpose of this paper is to uncover the underlying values of woman suicide in Ming Dynasty and give an ethical analysis on it.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 68 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


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