“We contribute to the development of South Korea”: Bilingual womanhood and politics of bilingual policy in South Korea

Multilingua ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bong-Gi Sohn ◽  
Mia Kang

AbstractGlobal flows of migration to South Korea bring a new challenge of how to negotiate the identities of migrants. Unlike other reported cases that reframe the value of migrants’ first language as part of contingent practices of diversity management, the South Korean government has responded to this challenge by explicitly reframing so-called damunhwa mothers (foreign women married to Korean men) as bilingual workers, imagining them as self-governed, autonomous workers whose linguistic capital can be mobilized for the betterment of South Korean society. The government’s adoption of linguistic entrepreneurship and ethnocentric nationalism becomes particularly salient in this process. This paper studies how four damunhwa mothers respond to this new bilingual worker identity as promoted in the bilingual policy texts. We examine the ways in which they negotiate their bilingual worker identities by echoing the government’s new linguistic nationalism and linguistic entrepreneurship on the one hand, and by problematizing the insecure job markets, stratified linguistic needs, lack of systematic training for bilingual instructors, and native Korean’s misunderstanding of their new roles on the other. Finally, we discuss the implications of Korea’s bilingual policy, elaborating on the significance of linguistic entrepreneurship in language policy planning and practice and calling for more reflective accounts of ecological and translingual policy implementation in Korea.

Studia Humana ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 62-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Levi

Abstract This paper aims to explain the adaptation of North Korean elite defectors who fled from North Korea. Data used for the purpose of this article came from surveys of North Korean defectors conducted in the late 2000’s. Findings of the realized research indicate that the majority of senior defectors are experiencing less psychological and material issues when adjusting to society than regular North Korean defectors. The paper will proceed in three steps: explaining the notion of defectors, outlining their background, and focusing on their adaptation in South. Although defectors as a whole has emerged as of the most research group as a minority in South Korea, the so-called senior defectors have hardly been spotlighted. Basically North Korean senior defectors are supposed to strengthen the anti-Kim movement and legitimize the power of the South Korean government and the image of South Korea abroad. What has to be enlightened upon is the fact that North Korean senior defectors partially disagree with the integration policy of South Korean authorities. A major research question emerges: How are the experience of elite defectors localized in South Korea? How do their specific identities impact their opinion within the South Korean society? The aim of the article is also to categorize senior defectors and to provide in a single document a list of senior North Korea defectors based abroad. This kind of information is only available for Korean speaking readers. I wanted to make it accessible to the Englishspeaking community.


2012 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-63
Author(s):  
Won Jee Cho ◽  
Denise Lewis

This study explored multidimensional meanings related to “becoming old” for the young-old in South Korean society. Six persons aged 62 to 68 were interviewed in-depth. They chronologically, physically, and socially experienced the transition to old age at different times determined through “Hwan-Gap” (at age 60) and through current social policies that define entry into elderhood (at age 65). However, most did not psychologically accept their own aging as beginning at age 60 with “Hwan-Gap.” They reported that they were “forced” to become old at that time, even though they did not yet qualify for old age benefits provided by the South Korean government. In addition, they did not consider others’ perceptions of them as “old” as a psychological obstacle to defining themselves as young. Knowledge about young-old persons’ dissonance between their identities and sociopolitical views of entry into elderhood is important for understanding their experiences during the five-year gap between sociocultural entry into old age at age 60 and entry into the nationally defined elderhood at age 65.


2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (5) ◽  
pp. 665-680
Author(s):  
Min-jung Kim ◽  
Min-joo Kim ◽  
Jyung-soo Kim ◽  
Joon-ho Kim

The purpose of this study is to critically examine how North Korean defectors adapt to South Korean society and how the South Korean government institutes policies to support their settlement in the perspective of social integration. In particular, economic and psychological support by the South Korean government will be analyzed among the current resettlement support policies. The aim of this study is also to suggest proper remedial actions for North Korean defectors based on empirical research on the actual conditions of North Korean defectors in South Korea.


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Seungeun Lee (李承恩)

This article explores three Chinese immigrant groups in South Korea. South Korean society characterizes itself with a long-held traditional myth of being a homogenous society. Two waves of migrants from China, however, challenged this myth. The earlier wave took place in the late 19thcentury. The recent, new, wave of Chinese migration took place in the last three decades and coincidently right before and after the normalization of relations between the People’s Republic of China (prc) and South Korea in 1992. Due to the rise of China and the changing dynamics of inter-Asian migration, new migrants from theprcsince the 1990s have changed the demographic composition of foreign citizens in Korea.These new migrants from theprcare mostly ethnic Han (prcChinese), but some are ethnic Korean (Korean Chinese) who holdprccitizenship. Most previous studies have focused on either old (earlier) Chinese immigrants or new (later) Chinese immigrants separately. This paper, in contrast, comparatively investigates these groups utilizing statistics and secondhand source data. This study contends that the mechanisms of institutional exclusion and inclusion in Korean immigration policies, put forward by the policies’ citizenship, legal and economic aspects, produce both new multiculturalism and ethnonationalism. This paper also contends that mechanisms of institutional exclusion and inclusion are a result of the interplay between citizenship and ethnicity.本文對韓國華僑(“舊華僑”)、持中國國籍的中國大陸漢族和朝鮮族(“新華僑”)進行比較。長久以來,在韓國社會裡“單一民族”一直是一個很普遍的傳統現象。但兩波從中國到韓國的華人華僑移民潮卻反駁此現象。早期的移民潮發生在十九世紀末,在此期間移居到韓國的華人一般稱之為韓國華僑(簡稱為“韓華”)。最近這一波新移民潮則是發生在最近30多年,恰好是在發生在中華人民共和國和韓國建交的一九九二年前後。從一九九零年代開始,因中國崛起和亞洲移民的動態變化帶動的中國“新”移民到了韓國,也改變了在韓國社會裡外國剬民的國籍與種族結構。這些來自中國的新移民大部分都是漢族(簡稱為“漢族”),有些則是朝鮮族,這兩個不同的民族都持有中華人民共和國的國籍。已經有許多研究關注移居韓國的華人,但比較不同時代移居至韓國的華人的討論卻非常少見。這個研究便以統計和二手資料為主,特別針對這些在不同時期來到韓國的華人進行比較。本論文分析了在韓國移民政策裡頭制度排斥和包容的機制,筆者分析了這些政策裡的剬民權、法律和經濟等不同層面,發現韓國的一系列移民政策造成了新的多文化主義和民族國家主義。此外,本研究也發現產生制度排斥和包容機制是剬民權和種族性之間的相互作用的結果。 (This article is in English).


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-141
Author(s):  
Eryolanda Putri Nabila

China Fine Dust issue has emerged in 2013 and increase in 2014 so that South Korea suffered from the impact. Meanwhile, China as a contributor of the haze refuses to take responsibility for tackling this issue, so that South Korea must securitize. This study aims to describe the process of securitization of China Fine Dust issue carried out by South Korea to China by using the concept of securitization by Barry Buzan as an analytical framework. The research method used is a qualitative method with a descriptive approach. The data used in this research was collected through literature study. The securitization process carried out by the South Korean Government against China began with South Korea carrying out a scientific agenda to identify a threat with China's initial involvement of 48%. Then political agenda, which are three points; influencing the public to gain support, forming a domestic emergency policy, holding a bilateral meeting to convince China to work together because domestic actions are not enough yet. The continuation of political management shows that the agenda of securitization carried out by South Korea made China accept the issue as a threat and agreed to cooperate in tackling the haze issue by releasing several projects.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Hough ◽  
Markus Bell

This article draws on the public testimonies of North Koreans living in South Korea (t’albungmin) and analyzes the role that these narratives play in South Korean society as mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. North and South Korea technically remain at war, with South Korea claiming sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula. While t’albungmin are eligible for South Korean citizenship, they describe feeling excluded from full social membership. Although some t’albungmin seek anonymity, this paper considers those who gain social status by speaking publicly about their lives and denouncing the North Korean regime. In so doing, they distance themselves from North Korea and align themselves with the “good” discourse of human rights. However, their actions reinforce a logic of exclusion, implying that t’albungmin who prefer anonymity are “sympathizers,” and consequently restricting their access to social benefits and resources. This case of conditional inclusion illuminates tensions that arise when a sovereignty claim entails the incorporation of people from an enemy state. It also highlights the carefully delineated boundaries of publicly acceptable behavior within which “suspect” citizens must remain as a condition for positive recognition.


2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei Lankov

This article deals with the problems of North Korean defectors currently living in South Korea. In the past, most such defectors came from privileged groups in the North Korean population, and their adjustment to the new environment did not pose a significant problem. However, from the mid-1990s, defectors began to come from the far less privileged groups. They experience serious problems related to jobs, education, crime, and social adjustment. Recent years have seen a dramatic but not always openly stated change in the official South Korean attitude toward defectors: from a policy explicitly aimed at encouraging defection, Seoul has moved to the policy of quietly discouraging it. There are fears that encouraging defection will undermine the policy of peaceful engagement with the North. There is also the perception that refugees are outsiders, not quite adjustable to the conditions of South Korean society and thus a social and budgetary burden.


2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elise Prébin

AbstractToday, international adoptees are welcomed to South Korea by the government, adoption agencies and different associations. These institutions organise educational programmes called 'cultural programmes'. Relatively cheap, these programmes generally include a tour of South Korea, visits to welfare facilities, and classes related to Korean culture: music, language, history, cuisine, martial arts. International adoptees are seen as Koreans of the diaspora, and as such need re-education to discover their true identity. When they return to their adoptive countries, they will be able to represent their birth country accurately and therefore contribute to Korea's successful globalisation. However, what is at stake in these programmes is less political and economical than social. I argue that most of the activities can be viewed as rites of passage and that the entire programme is constructed according to that logic. As a problematic category, international adoptees must be redefined by ritualised actions inside South Korean society. Recent studies considered these ceremonies as mock rituals; however, this article aims to show that these rituals have a valid purpose although they lead not to integration but to separation: defining the diaspora continues to rely on defining what is outside the national territory.


Asian Survey ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 584-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusin Lee

This paper analyzes the potential risks of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline, comparing it with the Russia-Ukraine-Europe (RUE) pipeline. I argue that the possibility of disputes is much higher in the RNS case. Furthermore, I propose that the South Korean government opt to import liquefied natural gas by ship directly from Russia if contingency plans in the case of gas supply disruptions in the RNS pipeline are not available.


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