Potential Risks of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline

Asian Survey ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 584-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusin Lee

This paper analyzes the potential risks of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline, comparing it with the Russia-Ukraine-Europe (RUE) pipeline. I argue that the possibility of disputes is much higher in the RNS case. Furthermore, I propose that the South Korean government opt to import liquefied natural gas by ship directly from Russia if contingency plans in the case of gas supply disruptions in the RNS pipeline are not available.

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bayu Eko Yulianto

This paper describes the ineffectiveness of South Korea�s confidence-building measures towards North Korea during the reign of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun through the sunshine policy. The previous studies on the sunshine policy only discussed the efforts made by the South Korean government through the sunshine policy and America's influence on the implementation in general. The studies are divided into three major categories namely: domestic politics, political economy, and regional studies, but none has discussed the causes of the ineffectiveness of the sunshine policy. By using confidence-building measures as an analytical framework, this paper will explain the variables in confidence-building measures that cause sunshine policies to be ineffective. The main argument of this paper is that there are 2 factors that cause the sunshine policy to be ineffective, namely the influence of America and the absence of political will from North Korea to achieve the goal of confidence-building measures through sunshine policy.


Studia Humana ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 62-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Levi

Abstract This paper aims to explain the adaptation of North Korean elite defectors who fled from North Korea. Data used for the purpose of this article came from surveys of North Korean defectors conducted in the late 2000’s. Findings of the realized research indicate that the majority of senior defectors are experiencing less psychological and material issues when adjusting to society than regular North Korean defectors. The paper will proceed in three steps: explaining the notion of defectors, outlining their background, and focusing on their adaptation in South. Although defectors as a whole has emerged as of the most research group as a minority in South Korea, the so-called senior defectors have hardly been spotlighted. Basically North Korean senior defectors are supposed to strengthen the anti-Kim movement and legitimize the power of the South Korean government and the image of South Korea abroad. What has to be enlightened upon is the fact that North Korean senior defectors partially disagree with the integration policy of South Korean authorities. A major research question emerges: How are the experience of elite defectors localized in South Korea? How do their specific identities impact their opinion within the South Korean society? The aim of the article is also to categorize senior defectors and to provide in a single document a list of senior North Korea defectors based abroad. This kind of information is only available for Korean speaking readers. I wanted to make it accessible to the Englishspeaking community.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-141
Author(s):  
Eryolanda Putri Nabila

China Fine Dust issue has emerged in 2013 and increase in 2014 so that South Korea suffered from the impact. Meanwhile, China as a contributor of the haze refuses to take responsibility for tackling this issue, so that South Korea must securitize. This study aims to describe the process of securitization of China Fine Dust issue carried out by South Korea to China by using the concept of securitization by Barry Buzan as an analytical framework. The research method used is a qualitative method with a descriptive approach. The data used in this research was collected through literature study. The securitization process carried out by the South Korean Government against China began with South Korea carrying out a scientific agenda to identify a threat with China's initial involvement of 48%. Then political agenda, which are three points; influencing the public to gain support, forming a domestic emergency policy, holding a bilateral meeting to convince China to work together because domestic actions are not enough yet. The continuation of political management shows that the agenda of securitization carried out by South Korea made China accept the issue as a threat and agreed to cooperate in tackling the haze issue by releasing several projects.


Author(s):  
Jude Woodward

This chapter looks at South Korea’s response to the US ‘pivot’. It takes stock of the post-war division of the peninsula and its consequences for the international alignment of both North and South. It considers how the ‘economic miracle’ in South Korea led to growing competition with Japan and greater synergies with China. It looks at the degree to which North Korea threatens stability in the region, and to what extent its demonisation justifies a major US presence in close proximity to China. The chapter discusses whether resurgent China is seen as a threat to South Korean interests or chiefly viewed through the prism of mutual economic benefit; and contrasts alleged concerns about China with those provoked by Japan. It concludes that while South Korea has continued to step up its military collaboration with the US, it has not become a cheerleader for pushing back against China and has not signed up to a US strategy to contain China.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 515 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyo-Jin Kim ◽  
Sung-Min Kim ◽  
Seung-Hoon Yoo

An interruption to residential natural gas (NG) may cause considerable economic damage of the entire country. Thus, the South Korean government requires information about the economic value of improving residential NG supply reliability for planning NG supply. This article aims to measure the value using a specific case of South Korean residential consumers. The choice experiment (CE) approach was adopted for this purpose. The selected four attributes are the duration of interruption, the season of interruption, the time of day, and the day of the week. The value trade-off works among the four attributes and price attribute were sought and completed in a nationwide CE survey of 1000 households. The respondents revealed statistically significant willingness to pay for a decrease in the duration of interruption, avoiding interruption during winter rather than non-winter, and preventing interruption during off-daytime (18:00 to 09:00) rather than daytime (09:00 to 18:00). For example, they accepted a 0.10% increase in the residential NG bill for a one-minute reduction in interruption during NG supply interruption, a 5.16% increase in residential NG bill for avoiding interruption during winter rather than non-winter, and a 2.94% increase in residential NG bill for preventing interruption during off-daytime rather than daytime. However, they placed no importance on the day of the week. These results can be useful for policy-making and decision-making to improve residential NG supply reliability. It is necessary to conduct a study at regular intervals on the value of NG supply reliability because regarding NG supply reliability, it is difficult to maintain a specific value.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 433-457
Author(s):  
Jinhee Park

Abstract This article examines autobiographic documentaries about families that expose “dissensus” in the mapping of transborder migration and diasporic desire that were the results of the Cold War in North Korea, South Korea, and Japan. Jae-hee Hong (dir. My Father’s Emails) and Yong-hi Yang (dir. Dear Pyongyang and Goodbye Pyongyang) document the ongoing Cold War in their fathers’ histories through their position as a “familial other,” who embodies both dissensus and intimacy. Hong reveals that anticommunism in South Korean postwar nation building reverberated in the private realm. Yang documents her Zainichi father, who sent his sons to North Korea during the Repatriation Campaign in Japan. The anticommunist father in South Korea (Hong’s) and the communist father in Japan (Yang’s) engendered family migration with contrasting motivations, departure from and return to North Korea, respectively. Juxtaposing these two opposite ideologies in family histories, as well as juxtaposing the filmmakers’ dissonance with the given ideologies in domestic space, provide the aesthetic form for “dissensus.” The politics of aesthetics in domestic ethnography manifests in that the self and the Other are inextricably interlocked because of the reciprocity of the filmmaker and the communist or anticommunist subject.


Author(s):  
G. D. Toloraya

The importance of Korean Peninsula in Russian foreign strategy is based on the need to preserve peace and stability in the Russia's Far East "soft underbelly" and to be a part of international efforts to solve the Korean problem, as well as to promote regional economic cooperation. In 1990-s Russia's position on the peninsula weakened, mainly because of the rupture of ties with North Korea, while relations with South Korea were reactive in nature. Rebalancing relations with the two Koreas in 2000-s increased Russia's involvement into Korean settlement, including the 6- party format. Russia/s relations with North Korea are now based on good neighborhood principle, however, they are far from idyllic as Russia disapproves of Pyongyang's behavior, especially its nuclear and missile activities. However to influence the situation more Russia should deepen its ties with the current Pyongyang leadership regardless of how irritating its behavior might be. Relations with the ROK are aimed at becoming strategic, but in reality are limited due to ROK's alliance with the USA. However South Korea has become the third most important economic partner in Asia. Russia is especially interested in three- party projects, such as Trans-Korean railroad (linked to Transsiberan transit way), gas pipeline and electricity grid. However implementation of these project is negatively influenced by the tensions in Korean peninsula. It can be solved only by multilateral efforts for comprehensive solution combining security guarantees for North Korea and its abandonment of nuclear option.


Significance This followed Pyongyang’s breach of its 17-month moratorium on missile testing with two volleys on May 4 and May 9, each personally supervised by Kim and both including short-range ballistic missile launches. Impacts Kim has given Washington until the end of the year to rethink its stance; that is possible but unlikely. Pyongyang’s new missile may be able to penetrate South Korean missile defences. South Korea will persevere with cooperation efforts for now, despite Pyongyang’s rebuffs.


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