Peirce, Aristotle, metaphor – and comments to Factor

Semiotica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (235) ◽  
pp. 51-61
Author(s):  
Bent Sørensen ◽  
Torkild Thellefsen ◽  
Amalia Nurma Dewi

AbstractCharles Peirce provided a few, but interesting we believe, remarks about metaphor. Aristotle on the other hand developed a theory of metaphor that, to this day has been, and still is, influential (even though his theory, especially within recent years, also has been heavily criticized, e.g., by Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Chicago University Press). Factor, Lance R. 1996. Peirce’s definition of metaphor and its consequences. In Vincent Colapietro & Thomas Olshewsky (eds.), Peirce’s doctrine of signs: Theory, applications, and connections, 229–235. Berlin/New York: Mouton De Gruyter, as one of very few scholars, makes a comparison between Peirce and Aristotle. Factor claims that Peirce’s definition of metaphor and its consequences undermine and overturn Aristotle’s theory. We do not believe that Factor is right; and this is due to Factor’s misinterpretation of key elements within Aristotle’s theory. We rather believe that Peirce and Aristotle, in fact, have central ideas in common concerning metaphor; perhaps, in particular, when it comes to the function of metaphor. Hence, both see, for example, metaphor as a cognitive mechanism. The article tries to develop this argument.

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 94 (4) ◽  
pp. A54-A54
Author(s):  
Student

A scientist who is really exploring the unknown has no idea where the research is going. That makes it difficult to predict. . .But, on the other hand scientists who are actually exploring the unknown are very rare. Most prefer to take whatever mission the NIH proposes and write their grants accordingly. Dr. Ponzy Lu, Biochemist. Quoted in: Kolata G. Scientists fluff the answer to a billion-dollar question. The New York Times. November 1, 1992.


2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 363-398

Abstract The Roman father and son of the same name, P. Decius Mus, became paragon heroes by deliberately giving their lives in battle that Rome might win over a fierce enemy. Both engaged in a special ritual called devotio (from which our word “devotion” derives) to offer themselves to the gods of the Underworld, with whom regular people have very little interaction and to whom they rarely sacrifice. While the Mus family is the most famous for this act, it turns out the willingness to sacrifice oneself for Rome frequently occurs within stories of great patriots, including the story of Horatius Cocles, Mettius Curtius, Atilius Regulus, and even the traitors Coriolanus and Tarpeia. Romans regarded self-sacrifice as a very high, noble endeavor, whereas they loathed and persecuted practitioners of human sacrifice. It is therefore quite amazing to read that the Romans thrice engaged in state-sponsored human sacrifice, a fact they rarely mention and generally forget. The most famous enemy practitioners of human sacrifice were the Druids, whom the Romans massacred on Mona Island on Midsummer Night's Eve, but the Carthaginians, the Germans, the Celts, and the Thracians all infamously practiced human sacrifice. To Romans, the act of human sacrifice falls just short of cannibalism in the spectrum of forbidden practices, and was an accusation occasionally thrown against an enemy to claim they are totally barbaric. On the other hand, Romans recognized their own who committed acts of self-sacrifice for the good of the society, as heroes. There can be no better patriot than he who gives his life to save his country. Often the stories of their heroism have been exaggerated or sanitized. These acts of heroism often turn out to be acts of human sacrifice, supposedly a crime. It turns out that Romans have a strong legacy of practicing human sacrifice that lasts into the historic era, despite their alleged opposition to it. Numerous sources relate one story each. Collecting them all makes it impossible to deny the longevity of human sacrifice in Rome, although most Romans under the emperors were probably unaware of it. The paradox of condemning but still practicing human sacrifice demonstrates the nature of Roman religion, where do ut des plays a crucial role in standard sacrifice as well as in unpleasant acts like human sacrifice. Devotio was an inverted form of sacrifice, precisely because it was an offering to the gods of the Underworld, rather than to Jupiter or the Parcae. Romans may have forsaken devotio, but they continued to practice human sacrifice far longer than most of us have suspected, if one widens the current narrow definition of human sacrifice to include events where a life is taken in order to bring about a better future for the commonwealth, appease the gods, or ensure a Roman victory in battle.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-186
Author(s):  
Sebastian Koch

Summary A (di)graph without parallel edges can simply be represented by a binary relation of the vertices and on the other hand, any binary relation can be expressed as such a graph. In this article, this correspondence is formalized in the Mizar system [2], based on the formalization of graphs in [6] and relations in [11], [12]. Notably, a new definition of createGraph will be given, taking only a non empty set V and a binary relation E ⊆ V × V to create a (di)graph without parallel edges, which will provide to be very useful in future articles.


M/C Journal ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather Wolffram

The 'scholarly striptease', particularly as it is manifested in the United States, has attracted an increasing number of participants during the past decade. Unbeknownst to many, some academics have been getting their gear off in public; that is, publicly and provocatively showcasing their identities in order to promote their politics. While you might imagine that confessions about sexual orientation, ethnicity and pet hates could only serve to undermine academic authority, some American feminists -- and a small number of their male colleagues -- have nevertheless attempted to enhance their authority with such racy revelations. Nancy Miller's admission of a strained relationship with her father (Miller 143-147), or Jane Gallop's homage to the three 36-year-old men she had affairs with (Gallop 41), might make interesting reading for the academic voyeur (or the psychoanalyst), but what is their purpose beyond spectacle? The cynic might argue that self-promotion and intellectual celebrity or notoriety are the motivators -- and certainly he or she would have a point -- but within such performances of identity, and the metacriticism that clings to them, other reasons are cited. Apparently it is all to do with identity politics, that is, the use of your personal experience as the basis of your political stance. But while experience and the personal (remember "the personal is the political"?) have been important categories in feminist writing, the identity of the intellectual in academic discourse has traditionally been masked by a requisite objectivity. In a very real sense the foregrounding of academic identity by American feminists and those other brave souls who see fit to expose themselves, is a rejection of objectivity as the basis of intellectual authority. In the past, and also contemporaneously, intellectuals have gained and retained authority by subsuming their identity and their biases, and assuming an "objective" position. This new bid for authority, on the other hand, is based on a revelation of identity and biases. An example is Adrienne Rich's confession: "I have been for ten years a very public and visible lesbian. I have been identified as a lesbian in print both by myself and others" (Rich 199). This admission, which is not without risk, reveals possible biases and blindspots, but also allows Rich to speak with an authority which is grounded in experience of, and knowledge about lesbianism. Beyond the epistemological rejection of objectivity there appear to be other reasons for exposing one's "I", and its particular foibles, in scholarly writing. Some of these reasons may be considered a little more altruistic than others. For example, some intellectuals have used this practice, also known as "the personal mode", in a radical attempt to mark their culturally or critically marginal subjectivities. By straddling their vantage points within the marginalised subjectivity with which they identify, and their position in academia, these people can make visible the inequities they, and others like them, experience. Such performances are instances of both identity politics at work and the intellectual as activist. On the other hand, while this politically motivated use of "the personal mode" clearly has merit, cultural critics such as Elspeth Probyn have reminded us that in some cases the risks entailed by self-exposition are minimal (141), and that the discursive striptease is often little more than a vehicle for self-promotion. Certainly there is something of the tabloid in some of this writing, and even a tentative linking of the concepts of "academic" and "celebrity" -- Camille Paglia being the obvious example. While Paglia is among the few academics who are public celebrities, there are plenty of intellectuals who are famous within the academic community. It is often these people who can expose aspects of their identity without risking tenure, and it is often these same individuals who choose to confess what they had for breakfast, rather than their links with or concerns for something like a minority. For some, the advent of "the personal mode" particularly when it appears to contain a bid for academic or public fame signifies the denigration of academic discourse, its slow decline into journalistic gossip and ruin. For others, it is a truly political act allowing the participant to combine their roles as intellectual and activist. For me, it is a critical practice that fascinates and demands consideration in all its incarnations: as a bid for a new basis for academic authority, as a political act, and as a vehicle for self-promotion and fame. References Gallop, Jane. Thinking through the Body. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Miller, Nancy K. Getting Personal: Feminist Occasions and Other Autobiographical Acts. New York: Routledge, 1991. Probyn, Elspeth. Sexing the Self: Gendered Positions in Cultural Studies. London: Routledge, 1993. Rich, Adrienne. Blood, Bread and Poetry: Selected Prose 1979-1985. New York: W.W Norton, 1986. Citation reference for this article MLA style: Heather Wolffram. "'The Full Monty': Academics, Identity and the 'Personal Mode'." M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 1.3 (1998). [your date of access] <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9810/full.php>. Chicago style: Heather Wolffram, "'The Full Monty': Academics, Identity and the 'Personal Mode'," M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 1, no. 3 (1998), <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9810/full.php> ([your date of access]). APA style: Heather Wolffram. (1998) 'The full monty': academics, identity and the 'personal mode'. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 1(3). <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9810/full.php> ([your date of access])


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (101) ◽  
pp. 122-139
Author(s):  
Thor Grünbaum

Action in Narratology, Literature, and LifeIn this article I argue that the representation of simple, bodily action has the function of endowing the narrative sequence with a visualizing power: It makes the narrated scenes or situations ready for visualization by the reader or listener. By virtue of this visualizing power or disposition, these narrated actions disrupt the theoretical divisions, on the one hand, between the narrated story and the narrating discourse, and on the other hand, between plot-narratology and discourse-narratology. As narrated actions they seem to belong to the domain of plot-narratology, but in so far as they serve an important visualizing function, these narrated actions have a communicative function and as such they can be said to belong to the domain of discourse-narratology. In a first part of the article, I argue that a certain type of plot-narratology, due to its retrospective epistemology and abstract definition of action, is unable to conceive of this visualizing function. In a second part, I argue that discourse-narratology fares no better since the visualizing function is independent of voice and focalization. In a final part, I sketch a possible account of the visualizing function of simple actions in narratives.


2015 ◽  
pp. 153
Author(s):  
Gordana Matic

<div class="WordSection1"><p><strong>Resumen</strong></p><p>La fábula ha tenido desde siempre una función retórica e ilustrativa que se ha manifestado a lo largo de la historia de modo dual: mostraba para enseñar, lo que muchas veces implicaba el componente moralizador, o para criticar. Mientras se empeñaba en conseguir una de las dos intencionalidades, o las dos simultáneamente, ha podido ser revestida de un tono humorístico, burlón, irónico o sarcástico. Partiendo de las observaciones sobre el género de Fedro, Rodríguez Adrados o Mireya Camurati, en este trabajo nos proponemos analizar una selección de fábulas clásicas, medievales, dieciochescas y decimonónicas, para demostrar que el aspecto crítico e incluso subversivo del género se mantiene abiertamente activo aun en las épocas en las que se potencia su intención didáctico-moralizante.</p><p>Palabras clave: fábula, definiciones del género, estudio diacrónico, aspecto crítico, aspecto didáctico-moralizante</p><p> </p><p><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p>The fable has always had a rhetoric and illustrative function that manifested itself during its long history in two different ways: on one hand, it represented an example in order to teach, which usually implied the moral component, or on the other hand, to criticize. While it strived to achieve one of these intentions, or sometimes both simultaneously, it could have been written in a humorous, mocking, ironic or sarcastic tone. In this paper, we analyze a selection of classical and medieval, 18th and 19th century fables written in Spanish, with definitions proposed by Phaedrus, Rodríguez Adrados and Mireya Camurati as starting points, in order to show that the critical aspect of this genre was openly maintained and taken benefit of even in the historical periods when its didactic and moralizing intention was preferred and strongly emphasized.</p></div><p>Key words: fable, definition of genre, diachronic approach, critical aspect, didactic and moral aspect</p><p> </p>


Author(s):  
Daniel Gracia Pérez

Resumen: El presente trabajo parte de la hipótesis de que no es posible diseñar un régimen de protección internacional para las personas desplazadas por disrupciones medioambientales sin antes aclarar qué se entiende por “desplazado medioambiental” y cómo se ha llegado a tal entendimiento. Así, el artículo se estructura en dos partes. La primera de ellas pretende reconstruir el íter que ha configurado la figura del desplazado medioambiental en el pensamiento académico, tanto desde los estudios medioambientales como desde los migratorios. La segunda, por su parte, analiza la primera definición de desplazado ambiental, con vocación jurídica, que aparece en plano internacional y la influencia que en su redacción han tenido las corrientes anteriores. Abstract:  This paper is based on the hypothesis that it is not possible to design an international protection regime for people displaced by environmental disruptions without first clarifying what is meant by "environmental displaced" and how this understanding has been reached. Thus, the article is structured in two parts. The first of them aims to reconstruct how the concept of environmentally displacement has been shaped in academic thinking, both from environmental and migratory studies. The second one, on the other hand, analyzes the first definition of environmental displaced which appears, with a legal vocation, on the international scene and the influence that those previous streams have had on it.


Focaal ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 2004 (44) ◽  
pp. 72-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paola Filippucci

In France, the classic produit du terroir, the local product that with its mix of skill and raw materials embodies the distinctive tie between people and their terroir (soil), is cheese. Thus, when inhabitants of the Argonne say that it “does not even have a cheese”, they imply that it lacks a patrimoine (cultural heritage). On the other hand, they do make passionate claims about 'being Argonnais', conveying a marked recognition of, and attachment to, a named place in relation to which they identify themselves and others. Focusing on this paradox, this article will highlight certain assumptions regarding the definition of cultural heritage found in public policy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 104-116
Author(s):  
Ivan O. Volkov ◽  

For the first time, in the article, Vladimir Titov’s letter (dated 12/24 February 1869) is published and commented. In the 1820s, in Russia, Titov was well-known as a writer and literature theorist, the author of a romantic novella The Remote House on Vasilyevsky Island (1829) close to Society of Lyubomudriye. The letter extracted from the archives of the National Library of Russia is addressed to Duke Vladimir Odoevsky whose relationship with Titov was friendly from the very beginning of their acquaintance. The letter focuses on Ivan Turgenev’s speech published in the first issue of Sovremennik and titled “Hamlet and Don Quixote”. Reacting to Turgenev’s article, Titov shortly and critically accesses the comparison concentrating mainly on the image of Hamlet and thoroughly expresses his opinion on the essence of his tragic state. Titov’s opinion is just the opposite of Turgenev’s complex and multidimensional interpretation. Having experienced the great impact of the philosophy of German idealism at the beginning of his career, Titov to a great extent idealizes Shakespeare’s character whom he long knows and whom he is clearly eager to vindicate. Meanwhile, Titov does not pursue the aim to absolutely advocate the romantic halo of Hamlet as a Titanic personality (grandiose intellect and scale of feeling) and to enact the tragic pathos of the inner fight only. Developing Goethe’s definition of the essence of the character’s inner conflict, Titov, on the one hand, approaches its real understanding underlying the prince’s necessity to stay in a derogatory position of a “pitiful semiclown, indecisive grouch and shred”. On the other hand, the assessment can not be absolutely objective because Titov wants to see Hamlet as a victim of the fatal fortune which turns him into a character of an almost classical tragedy of fate. Titov’s bright and developed reaction (in the document of private nature) to Turgenev’s article is attractive and important first of all for its vividly demonstrated novelty and creativity of the writer’s view, wideness and multimodality of the author’s perception of Hamlet’s image. For the first time, Turgenev gave a developed interpretation of Shakespeare’s image in the tale “Hamlet of Shchigrovsky Province” (1848). Continuing his searches in the area of “Russian” (or “steppe”) Hamlet, Turgenev creates moral and philosophical problems of the English tragedy in the crisis socio-historical and cultural atmosphere of Russia of the 1840s. However, the principles of the artistic generalization and the peculiarities of the new reading, not mentioned and not fully comprehended by his contemporaries, were surprising and rejected when the speech “Hamlet and Don Quixote” appeared, in which Shakespeare’s character is presented ultimately vividly and lively in the then current interpretation.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz

Spinoza's ethics is grounded by a conviction which is as simple as it is programmatic: Subjective experience can be explained, and its successful explanation is of ethical relevance. For it makes us smarter, freer and happier. This is the programmatic conviction behind Spinoza's ethics and motivates many of the theses it puts forward. Ursula Renz shows which kind of a theory of the human mind informs this program. The systematic differentiation of theory parts in the architecture of ethics proves to be a decisive move: A theory part that deals with questions of the ontology of the mental is followed by a definition of the human mind as a kind of subject theory, which in turn is separated from a theory part dealing with the constitution of content. This structure makes it possible to deal separately with different problems that arise in the course of the explanation of experience. In the end, Spinoza succeeds in avoiding both reductionisms and skepticisms right from the start. In this way, two intuitions are brought together that are often considered incompatible: on the one hand, the view that experience is something irreducibly subjective, and on the other hand, the assumption that there are better and worse explanations of experience.


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