scholarly journals Bundesstaatsreform und Zukunft der Finanzverfassung

2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Kitterer

AbstractThe reform of fiscal federalism in Germany enacted in 2006 has focussed on separating the joint legislation process between the federal government and the States (Laender). The German commission on the reform of federalism is now disputing about further reforms in order to establish a more competitive fiscal system. In this paper we discuss some institutional arrangements minimizing tax sharing between different layers of government and strengthening tax autonomy of the sub-central governments. Furthermore, a reform of the inter-state tax equalization system is proposed which provides more transparency and more incentives to the States to raise their own economic performance and tax base. Finally, as the constitutional borrowing constraints provide no credible enforcement mechanism and as decentralized fiscal policy cannot be effective the States should be bound to balanced budgets and rainy day funds. Only central government should be responsible for stabilization policy.

2009 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedrich Gröteke ◽  
Karsten Mause

AbstractIn 2009, a new “debt brake” has been introduced into the German constitution. According to this fiscal rule, the federal government has to limit its annual net borrowing from the year 2016 on to a maximum of 0.35 percent of GDP; the German Laender must not take out new loans from the year 2020. Based on findings of the economic theory of fiscal federalism, this paper argues that the new debt brake - within the existing institutional framework - seems not to be an effective instrument to ban the risk of a bailout. For example, the Laender which de jure face the toughest budget constraint have no sufficient tax autonomy in order to react to a looming budget deficit through tax increases.


Equilibrium ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 689
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Magdalena Hybka

Tax sharing arrangements provide considerable financial resources to sub-central government levels. This statement is true both for unitary and federal states although tax revenue sharing mechanisms differ significantly across countries. The basic aim of this article is to compare the mechanisms adopted in Germany and in Poland. It assesses the degree of tax autonomy granted to sub-central government levels in the countries analysed, overviews the principles of apportionment of joint (shared) taxes and presents statistics on tax revenue composition of sub-central government levels.


2016 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Edward Hutagalung

The fi nancial relationship between central and local government can be defi ned as a system that regulates how some funds were divided among various levels of government as well as how to fi ndsources of local empowerment to support the activities of the public sector.Fiscal decentralization is the delegation of authority granted by the central government to theregions to make policy in the area of   fi nancial management.One of the main pillars of regional autonomy is a regional authority to independently manage thefi nancial area. State of Indonesia as a unitary state of Indonesia adheres to a combination of elementsof recognition for local authorities to independently manage fi nances combined with the element oftransferring fi scal authority and supervision of the fi scal policy area.General Allocation Fund an area allocated on the basis of the fi scal gap and basic allocation whilethe fi scal gap is reduced by the fi scal needs of local fi scal capacity. Fiscal capacity of local sources offunding that comes from the area of   regional revenue and Tax Sharing Funds outside the ReforestationFund.The results showed that the strengthening of local fi scal capacity is in line with regional autonomy.


China Report ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-56
Author(s):  
Jun Yang ◽  
Shuyang Sheng

Although involved in the age of globalisation,1 China has become more centralised. After the decentralisation from 1978 to 1993, the trend of centralisation2 has been once again strengthened since 1994, which was called re-centralisation by some scholars. Many scholars only focus on the period since the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, but they fail to find out the root cause for re-centralisation. They ignore the fact that the 1994 Tax-sharing System Reform is an important sign of China’s re-centralisation, the answer may lie in it. In this article, we analyse the 1994 Tax-Sharing System from the perspective of Weber’s theory of domination and find out that the anxiety of the new Chinese central government in the early 1990s was the motivation for both tax reform and re-centralisation. At that time, the new central government could rely on none of Weber’s types of legitimate authority to maintain efficient operations because the charismatic authority3 of central leaders had weakened since the era of Deng Xiaoping, and the new type of authority had not been established. In these circumstances, the central government was eager to reshape the authority to stabilise the centralised order, which was also the basic motivation for Tax-Sharing System Reform.


Urban Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 806-826
Author(s):  
Fan Fan ◽  
Ming Li ◽  
Ran Tao ◽  
Dali Yang

China has adopted a transfer-based fiscal decentralisation scheme since the mid-1990s. In the 1994 tax sharing reform, the central government significantly raised its share of government revenue vis-à-vis local governments by taking most of the newly created value-added tax on manufacturing. One aim for the adoption of the transfer-based fiscal scheme was to channel more funds to less developed regions and rural areas, and to alleviate growing interregional inequality and urban–rural income disparity. In 2002 and 2003 the Chinese central government further grabbed 50% and 60%, respectively, of the income taxes previously assigned only to local governments while providing more fiscal transfers to the country’s poor regions and the countryside. Utilising the 2002–2003 change in China’s central–local tax sharing regime as an exogenous policy shock, we employ a Simulated Instrumental Variable approach to causally evaluate the effects of the policy shock on growth, interregional inequality and urban–rural disparity. We find the lower local tax share dis-incentivised local governments and led to lower growth. Although higher central transfers helped to reduce interregional inequalities in per capita GDP and per capita income, the equalising effects were only present for urban incomes. We argue that transfer-based decentralisation without bottom-up accountability was detrimental to economic growth and had limited impact on income redistribution.


Author(s):  
Paul Onyango-Delewa

Drawing on network and fiscal federalism theories, we investigated central government patronage and donor aid as antecedents of budget performance in local government (LG). A mixed methods design with data collected from 18 LGs, two ministries, and four donor agencies in Uganda was employed. Results revealed that both central government patronage and donor aid predict budget performance. Moreover, autonomy does not mediate the interactions as initially hypothesized. Implications for theory and practice are discussed and future research direction is provided.


Studia BAS ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (65) ◽  
pp. 147-169
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Wójtowicz

The aim of this paper is to explore the rationale for the reform of the shares of local government units (LGUs) in national income taxes in Poland as well as to evaluate the selected proposals for changes in this area. The paper begins by outlining the definition and the basic features of tax sharing in the context of fiscal federalism. The next section provides an overview of the tax shares operating in some OECD countries. The main part of the article focuses on the key principles of the tax sharing system in Poland. The author briefly examines the fiscal efficiency of this source of local revenue in different types of Polish LGUs and the most significant dysfunctions of Polish local tax shares. The final section investigates the most important proposals for the reform of tax sharing and discusses their advantages and disadvantages.


Author(s):  
George Galster

In 2013 Detroit became the largest municipality to declare bankruptcy. Unfortunately, bankruptcy does not treat the long-term cause of Detroit’s financial crisis: the ongoing fiscal death spiral triggered by loss of industrial, commercial and residential tax base starting in the 1950s. The first loss came from manufacturers who abandoned older factories in the city in favor of suburban locations. The second came from the federal government, whose guarantees for FHA-VA mortgages and subsidies for expressway construction spurred suburbanization of Detroit’s (overwhelmingly white) middle class. Detroit trimmed services and raised tax rates in response. But this made it an increasingly uncompetitive location, thereby further contracting its property and income tax bases, forcing still more cuts in services and increases in tax rates. What is required to break out of the fiscal death spiral in which Detroit finds itself is substantially more federal and state revenue sharing and regional growth management.


2001 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Norbert Berthold ◽  
Stefan Drews ◽  
Eric Thode

AbstractThis paper deals with the system of fiscal federalism (Finanzausgleich) in Germany and its effects on macroeconomic growth. The maze of both transfers from federal government to the states (vertikaler Finanzausgleich) and interregional transfers between the states (horizontaler Finanzausgleich) is revealed and how the growth rates of the GDP developed. Econometric analysis show the negative impact on growth. This is due to both vertical and horizontal redistribution because of the massive negative incentives of the system. States contributing to and even those obtaining from the current system could benefit from changes.


10.1068/c0444 ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Lago-Peñas

High debt autonomy and low tax autonomy often characterize evolving federations, making the bailout hypothesis very attractive in resolving subcentral government deficits. However, meeting both conditions is not enough to conclude that bailout expectations are the main reason for a potential deficit. There are many other factors affecting expectations and the real behavior of the agents involved: central government, subcentral governments, and the financial markets. Empirical research is the only means by which to determine the relevance of the bailout problem in each situation. To demonstrate this argument, the author describes an exhaustive analysis of the Spanish case. The main conclusion is that deficit seems to be better understood by a more traditional model of fiscal choices than by bailout expectations.


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