scholarly journals The Resurgence of the Radical Right in European Policy

2020 ◽  
pp. 182-192
Author(s):  
Aleksandr Shaparov ◽  
◽  
Ekaterina Sin'kova ◽  

This article analyzed the rise of far-right political parties and movements in the most developed European countries - Germany, France, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway as well as in the Visegrád Group. The current direction of the political and social development of those major European states shows great resemblance to the 1980s. The political framework is defined by escalating disappointment in social and governmental institutions, growing political fragmentation and increasing complexity of political communications. Under such circumstances radical right parties firmly secured their presence in the national parliaments and enhanced it over the last decade. Alongside their electoral success on the supranational level, it indicates significant alterations in the European political landscape. A new reality is being built while the right radicalism strives to demarginalize itself with its high adaptivity to the essential political institutions. The article analyzed causes and consequences of the ongoing changes. It suggested a new angle to assess the present radical right’s policy effects. Proceeding from the neoinstitutional approach it provided an insight into the key assumptions of radical right, far-right contagion and institutional isomorphism, while outlining the electoral dynamics and distribution of the radical right parties and assembling the concepts of their classification.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-40
Author(s):  
Luiza-Maria Filimon

The Nordic states had an active radical right presence long before the economic and refugee crises that swept the shores of the European Union (EU) left in their wake a reinvigorated right-wing contingent. The radical right parties (RRPs) have not only registered various degrees of electoral success, but have also made inroads into the political mainstream. The three defining characteristics that set these parties apart from the more traditional far-right ones are: 1) the repudiation of hardcore extremism; 2) the search for political viability; and 3) the acquisition of mainstream recognition. The present article argues that as these parties compete for legitimacy, they are forced to alter their discriminatory rhetoric by switching tonal registers. One of the political strategies that enables them to put the outright “overt” in the “covert” is the recourse to dog whistle politics. How well can they overcome the stigma associated with their more extreme reflexes depends on a case by case basis. This article examines whether the four most prominent examples of Nordic radicalism (the Danish People’s Party, Finns Party, Sweden Democrats, and Norway’s Progress Party) have integrated dog whistles in their political messaging and tracks how these coded appeals change from one country to another. In analyzing the response to the 2015 refugee crisis, the study finds that to a certain extent, the rhetoric utilized falls into the coded register or at the very least purposefully attempts to veer away from the radical excesses which are marginalizing and self-exclusionary.


Author(s):  
Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak

During much of Ukraine’s post-Soviet history, the radical right has remained on the political periphery, wielding little influence over national politics. However, from 2009 to 2014, Ukraine saw a radical right-wing party, Svoboda, enter parliament, and from 2014 to 2016 there was an increased social role played by the right-wing radical groups Pravyi Sektor and Azov. Thus, the political impact of the far right in Ukraine extends beyond electoral performance and to the activities of extra-parliamentary groups that are beginning to penetrate political life and state institutions. The radical right in Ukraine is intertwined, but not identical, with ethnic Ukrainian nationalism. The direction and development of the Ukrainian far right have thus been a result of both the historical legacy and cultural context of a nation that was ruled over by others for centuries and is home to competing ethnic nationalisms and geopolitical orientations.


Author(s):  
A. Badaeva

In recent decades, radicalism has become an integral part of the political scene in Europe. Many countries, including Scandinavia, see an electoral success of nationalist parties. This trend is due to decrease in extent of the “party identification” and disillusionment of the electorate in the earlier dominant parties. The achievements of ultra-right forces do not accidentally coincided with an unprecedented influx of immigrants in the Scandinavian countries. Radical forces stand for preservation of national values and are ready to respond to the pressing social challenges of integrating world. According to the author, these forces are likely to reach the greatest success and to exert a significant impact on government policies.


Author(s):  
Christos Vrakopoulos

Abstract This article aims to explain the variation in the electoral support for extreme-right parties (ERPs) in Europe. The extant literature on the far-right party family does not answer this question specifically with regard to the extreme-right variants for two main reasons. Firstly, theories did not expect the electoral success of these parties in post-war Europe due to their anti-democratic profiles and association with fascism. Secondly, despite the fact that they acknowledge the differences between the parties under the far-right umbrella – namely, the extreme and the radical – they normally do not take these differences into account, and if so, they focus on the radical-right parties. This article shows that electoral support for ERPs is associated with low quality of government and highly conservative mainstream-right parties. The former creates political legitimization for anti-democratic parties and the latter ideological normalization of extreme right.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Javier Olivas Osuna ◽  
José Rama

Spain has been one of the hardest hit countries by the COVID-19 pandemic, and this crisis presented a window of opportunity for VOX, as it has for other far right parties, to raise its visibility as opposition force. This paper investigates whether the discourse of VOX has evolved during the pandemic and affected the political dynamics in Spain. This article proposes a new multidimensional strategy to measure the degree of populism in political communications, via quantitative and qualitative content analysis. It dissects the parliamentary speeches of the leader of VOX, Santiago Abascal, in the debates for the approval and extension of the “state of alarm” to fight against COVID-19 between March and June 2020. In order to assess the changes and relative intensity of populist features in Abascal’s parliamentary speeches we compared them with his speech during Pedro Sánchez’s investiture session as the Spanish President of the Government, in January 2020, and VOX’s latest political manifestos—2019 European and Spanish General Elections—, as well as with speeches of the representatives of the five main parties and coalitions during the COVID-19 debates in the Spanish Congress.Our paper shows that populists’ discourses are context-dependent and that their performances are not only shaped by crisis but also constitutive of crisis. The density of populist references in Abascal’s speeches grew steadily during the period analysed. Morality and antagonism overshadowed sovereignty and society as key populist attributes, and the tone of the discourse became increasingly hyperbolic. Moreover, Abascal’s discursive performances had a sort of contagion effect in other parties in the parliamentary sessions studied. People’s Party (Partido Popular–PP) leader Pablo Casado chose to follow VOX and harshly criticized the government, meanwhile the discourses of the speakers of Together We Can (Unidas Podemos–UP) and Catalan Republican Left (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya–ERC), adopted a demonizing rhetoric against VOX and PP also grounded on a populist logic of articulation. This polarizing dynamic between competing Manichean discourses contributed to reinforce the sense of crisis by adding a political dimension to the already existing health and economic problems.


2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 84-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Wagner ◽  
Thomas M Meyer

The emergence of the radical right as a strong competitor to mainstream parties has fundamentally reshaped patterns of competition in many European party systems. In this article, we systematically explore changes to the ideological landscape in Western Europe by examining whether there has been programmatic mainstreaming of radical right parties due to (a) accommodation to and (b) moderation by radical right parties. We examine positions and salience on liberal-authoritarianism and the salience of economic issues using manifesto data from 68 parties in 17 countries. Our findings provide empirical support for a rightward shift in European party systems: on liberal-authoritarianism, mainstream left and right parties have increased their emphasis and moved to the right. Yet radical right parties have generally remained niche competitors; they are increasingly extreme and more focused on liberal-authoritarianism. Our analysis has important implications for understanding party systems, party competition and citizen representation in Europe.


Author(s):  
Louis Talay

Abstract It has been argued that far-right populist parties (FRPP) distinguish themselves from other parties on the right of the political spectrum through their strong association with nationalism, anti-elitism, authoritarianism and historical mythologizing. These features typically manifest in discourse that attempts to justify exclusionist immigration and asylum policies by presenting Islam as an existential threat to predominantly white societies. This paper seeks to establish whether a conservative party that has never been considered populist could possess the same features as an FRPP by comparing three selected discursive texts – one from mainstream conservative party leader John Howard and two from prominent European FRPP leaders. The analysis revealed that the key difference between the three leaders was Howard’s failure to satisfy the authoritarianism criterion, which was interpreted as a decisive factor in his party’s moderate guise. This suggests that some mainstream parties may be more ideologically extremist than they are perceived to be.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Věra Stojarová

AbstractThe paper looks at the political party scene in Visegrad countries before and after the influx of refugees and compares how much the negative reactions were instrumentalised not only by the extremist and radical right parties but by the newly emerged populist formations as well as the well-established mainstream parties across the whole political spectra. Until the “migration crisis”, the far right parties focused mainly on Roma issue, anti-Semitism, anti-communism, anti-establishment and used anti-NATO, anti-EU, anti-German, anti-Czech, anti-Slovak or anti-Hungarian card. Since 2015, the parties re-oriented against immigrants, more precisely against the Muslims presenting them as a threat and also increased their criticism on the EU. However, the mainstream parties also accepted far right topics and actively promoted them. The result is then mainstreaming of xenophobia, nationalism and marginalization of far right parties as their flexible voters move to the populist subjects.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen ◽  
Irina Ciornei ◽  
Jean-Michel Lafleur

AbstractPolicies allowing enfranchisement of non-resident citizens (emigrants and their descendants) are now implemented in the majority of states worldwide. A growing number of case studies show that the extension of voting rights to non-resident citizens is often contested among country of origin political parties. However, there is no systematic comparative study of why different political parties support or oppose external voting rights and how this position is framed by the parties. Drawing on a unique data set based on 34 debates across 13 countries, we estimate the extent to which ideology and party family are correlated with the positioning and framing of parties. Among the findings are that the more to the right is a party, the more it tends to support external voting rights, except in the case of radical right parties. The position on emigrant voting rights is largely framed along more pragmatic arguments.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882098518
Author(s):  
Kamil Marcinkiewicz ◽  
Ruth Dassonneville

The rise of populist radical right parties fuels a discussion about the roots of their success. Existing research has demonstrated the relevance of gender, education and income for explaining the far-right vote. The present study contributes to the aforementioned debate by focusing on the role of religiosity. The data collected in the eighth round of the European Social Survey (2016) allow examining in more detail the political relevance of attendance at religious services and other measures of religious devotion. This study focuses in particular on 15 countries, 11 from Western Europe and 4 from East-Central Europe. In none of the Western European countries is there evidence of a positive relationship between religiosity and vote for a populist radical right party. In fact, in many countries of this region more religious voters are substantively less inclined to support far-right movements. The situation is different in parts of East-Central Europe. In Poland, and to a weaker extent also in Hungary, the probability of a vote for right-wing populists increases with religiosity.


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