Problematization and modification of phenomenological concept of experience in Martin Heidegger`s fundamental ontology

2021 ◽  
Vol - (3) ◽  
pp. 138-148
Author(s):  
Vlada Anuchina

The aim of the paper is to justify the view of Martin Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as a recon- ceptualization and modification of Edmund Husserl’s concept of experience (Erfahrung). The subject of analysis is Heidegger's concept “Dasein”, which is one of the most problematic concepts of the entire Heidegger's legacy due to ambiguity of its meaning and the resulting variability of possible interpretations. Specific attention is paid to examining the ontological reading of Heidegger's philosophy as opposed to both existentialist and anthropological ones; the author also textually argues for its legitimacy. Author textually proves that Dasein indeed is a modification of Husserl`s concept of experience. Moreover, she claims that not only the concept of Dasein but fundamental ontology itself may be seen to some extent as an original modification of Husserl’s phenomenology. For not only one of the key phenomenological concepts gets modified, but also its method of exploration and some crucial topics (e. g. the temporality of consciousness) get modified and incorporated in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology project.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfram Hogrebe

In this book, Wolfram Hogrebe deals with the realm of the intermediate – an ancient philosophical tradition according to which philosophical thinking is concerned with a kind of intermediate space that holds the orders of concepts and ideas in a remarkable limbo. The in-between is, as it were, a medium sustaining both thoughts and languages and is thus likely to disclose uncharted areas where thinking itself changes. Hogrebe shows how frequently this in-between, which has also been known to surface in experiences of nature, is the subject theme of a host of different philosophers and poets such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Martin Heidegger, Henry David Thoreau and Peter Handke.


PhaenEx ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 121
Author(s):  
NANDITA BISWAS MELLAMPHY

In 1971, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter introduced his study of Nietzsche as an investigation into the history of modern nihilism in which “contradiction” forms the central thread of the argument. For Müller-Lauter, the interpretive task is not to demonstrate the overall coherence or incoherence of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but to examine Nietzsche’s “philosophy of contradiction.” Against those such as Karl Jaspers, Karl Löwith and Martin Heidegger, Müller-Lauter argued that contradiction is the foundation of Nietzsche’s thought, and not a problem to be corrected or cast aside for exegetical or political purposes. For Müller-Lauter, contradiction qua incompatibility (not just mere opposition) holds a key to Nietzsche’s affective vision of philosophy. Beginning with the relationship between will to power and eternal recurrence, in this paper I examine aspects of Müller-Lauter’s account of Nietzsche’s philosophy of contradiction specifically in relation to the counter-interpretations offered by two other German commentators of Nietzsche, Leo Strauss and Karl Löwith, in order to confirm Müller-Lauter’s suggestion that contradiction is indeed an operative engine of Nietzsche’s thought. Indeed contradiction is a key Nietzschean theme and an important dynamic of becoming which enables the subject to be revealed as a “multiplicity” (BGE §12) and as a “fiction” (KSA 12:9[91]). Following Müller-Lauter’s assertion that for Nietzsche the problem of nihilism is fundamentally synonymous with the struggle of contradiction experienced by will to power, this paper interprets Nietzsche’s philosophy of contradiction in terms of subjective, bodily life (rather than in terms of logical incoherences or ontological inconsistencies). Against the backdrop of nihilism, the “self” (and its related place holder the “subject”), I will argue, becomes the psycho-physiological battlespace for the struggle and articulation of “contradiction” in Nietzsche’s thought.  


Author(s):  
Françoise Dastur ◽  
Robert Vallier

This chapter examines the philosophical reflections of Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger regarding the link between phenomenology and history. The philosophies of historicity developed in the climate of relativism that marked the failure of Hegelianism announce a new confrontation with G. W. F. Hegel and a new perspective on the relation of truth and history, which must not be confused with mere anthropocentrism. It is this new perspective on history that we see unfolding in the horizon opened by Husserl's phenomenology and prepared by certain aspects of “life- philosophy.” The chapter first considers Dilthey's concept of “historicity” before discussing the similarities of the Hegelian and Husserlian manners of thinking the subject of history. It also analyzes Heidegger's claim that finitude and historicity are essentially interconnected, with mortality constituting the hidden ground of the historicity of existence.


2017 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuel Hurych

Abstract Authenticity is usually understood as something similar to truth, or as a kind of ability of one “to be oneself”. However, for the philosophical approach, authenticity presents a more complex and complicated term. This conception has been followed in existentialism and fundamental ontology, where it has been examined and analyzed in depth (especially by Martin Heidegger). This paper deals with the search for some potentiality of the authentic modus of being through the practice of some forms of sport tourism. We selected and described four model types of sport tourism activities. Then, we designed and selected some factors of authenticity. The evaluation of authenticity within the selected activities according to the factors was applied in a two-round process of evaluation. The results of the process are explained and discussed. In conclusion, authenticity is presented as a concept that is not strongly influenced by outer settings, but is rather strongly connected with personal attunement and individual (or group) perception of the outer world.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Antipenko Leonid Grigoryevich

The task of the article is return prosody to linguistics, to turn linguistics to speech, to voice content. For this, linguistics rises to the logo. It is shown that the logo as such is divided into three hypostases: the verbal logo, the musical logo (melos) and mathematical logo. The results of objectifications (Entӓusserung, Gegenstӓndlichkeit in German) of these components are expressed respectively by letters, notes and numerals. Each of the three components has two aspects that the author calls styles. The verbal logo has a prosaic and poetic style; musical logo has vocal (voice) and musical-instrumental style; mathematical logo has a logical style and a historical style.  Martin Heidegger showed that the logo is inextricable linked with time. The projection of time on the created images  ̶  verbal and poetic (letters), musical (notes), mathematical (numеrals)  ̶  allows you to fill them with life, to give them a natural look. Thus, orientation to the logos leads the linguist to a wider understanding of the subject of linguistics in comparison with the previous, narrowed version of its interpretation.   


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Antipenko Leonid Grigoryevich

The task of the article is return prosody to linguistics, to turn linguistics to speech, to voice content. For this, linguistics rises to the logo. It is shown that the logo as such is divided into three hypostases: the verbal logo, the musical logo (melos) and mathematical logo. The results of objectifications (Entӓusserung, Gegenstӓndlichkeit in German) of these components are expressed respectively by letters, notes and numerals. Each of the three components has two aspects that the author calls styles. The verbal logo has a prosaic and poetic style; musical logo has vocal (voice) and musical-instrumental style; mathematical logo has a logical style and a historical style.  Martin Heidegger showed that the logo is inextricable linked with time. The projection of time on the created images  ̶  verbal and poetic (letters), musical (notes), mathematical (numеrals)  ̶  allows you to fill them with life, to give them a natural look. Thus, orientation to the logos leads the linguist to a wider understanding of the subject of linguistics in comparison with the previous, narrowed version of its interpretation.   


Author(s):  
Kirill Prozumentik

This article is dedicated to one of the key problems of social philosophy – the phenomenon of human alienation. The subject of this research is the ontological grounds of alienation. The goal consists in determination of the existential foundation of alienation as a complicated socio-ontological phenomenon, as well as differentiation of the narrow and broad sense of the concept of “alienation”. In the narrow sense, alienation implies the process, when the products of human activity and activity itself obtain the status of autonomous agents opposing to human. In a broad sense, alienation is interpreted as an ontological distinction within the structure of being. For revealing the ontological grounds of alienation, the author attracts and reconsiders the ideological arsenal of philosophical anthropology, fundamental ontology, existentialism, personalism, Marxism, and post-phenomenology. The ontological interpretation allows comprehending the anthropogenesis, historical development of human, and evolution of human mind in the context of the terms of alienation. Thus, the first is interpreted as a self-alienation of the world; the second – as alienation of human from himself; and the third – as an ideal of appeal of the world towards itself, realized through human spiritual activity. All elements of the triad form an ontological basis doe alienation in the narrow sense.


Author(s):  
◽  
VALTERS ZARIŅŠ ◽  

Book review focuses on two books by Gunther Neumann, dedicated to the thought of Heidegger and Leibniz. If one of the books deals specifically with the understanding of freedom in both of the two philosophers, then the other one deals more with Heidegger’s three approaches to Leibniz’s thought: (1) Interpretation of Leibniz in the context of the making of fundamental ontology and in Being and Time, as well as the reading of Leibniz after Being and Time; (2) Interpretation of Leibniz during the transition to Ereignis thought; (3) Interpetation of Leibniz in the framework of Ereignis thought. Author’s scrupulous close reading approach allows to show the changes in Heidegger’s approach to Leibniz’s philosophy, as well as sketch out the placement of Leibniz’s great themes on the horizon of Heidegger’s history of the truth of being. Author also shows that from metaphysics there stems a certain view in the modern philosophical discussions oriented on neurosciences—a certain view on the human being and on the freedom of will. On this background Heidegger appears as a thinker who has looked beyond the alloy of metaphysics and sciences, in which the concept of freedom has been greatly restricted. Heidegger manages (thanks to the radical questioning of Being) to turn the view on the problem of freedom, which appears in G. Neumann’s books as the main problem of philosophy—through the contact of Leibniz’s thought and Heidegger’s.


2010 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 705-710
Author(s):  
Michael A. Gillespie

Martin Heidegger observed in his inaugural lecture at the University of Freiburg in 1929 that the profundity of all fundamental questions lies in the fact that they call into question not merely the subject of the inquiry but also both the questioner and the act of questioning itself. To put this another way, any comprehensive explanation must be able in principle to account for the one who is giving the explanation and for the explanation itself, and any account that cannot do this disproves itself in the very act of its narration. Thus, if any such account does not make clear the nature of the narrator and the narration, it is suspect on these grounds and readers may reasonably ask for an explanation. Since I did not discuss or try to justify the methodology or the nature of the narrative that I employ in my book, it is not surprising that all three of my critics either explicitly or implicitly raise this as a question. Kirstie McClure perhaps poses it in the most straightforward fashion by asking about the character of my narrative, suggesting quite plausibly that it might be read as an account of the adventures of the divine predicate. Less directly, Tim Fuller seems to make a similar claim with his characterization of my position as middle Hegelian. Since I argue that in modernity the divine, as Tim Fuller eloquently puts it, is “absorbed” by the individual, it is certainly reasonable to ask what kind of account I imagine I am giving. Or to put it a bit more maliciously than my three interlocutors do, one might reasonably ask who I think I am. It seems to me that this is not only a fair question, but also a very penetrating one, and one that I must try to answer. I imagined my own goals to accord more with Tom Merrill's characterization of my thought as an attempt to bring about an encounter with the fundamental questions that underlie the basic assumptions we make about ourselves and our world. But to give no more explanation than this would hardly be satisfying. Moreover, since I complain at the beginning and the end of the book that we moderns need to pay a great deal more attention to the example of Oedipus and not forget who we are and where we come from, it is incumbent on me to explain myself and what I think I am doing more fully. I will try to do this after first attempting to clarify my argument and responding to several other questions my critics raise.


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