The concept of reduction in the Edmund Husserl’s The Idea of Phenomenology

Author(s):  
Wojciech Zalewski

This article presents the concept of phenomenological reduction Edmund Husserl’s “Idea of phenomenology”. In the first part I present the specifics of the phenomenological method compared to natural sciences. In the next part I characterize the fundamental assumptions about Husserl's understanding of the concept of phenomenological reduction. Next, I emphasize and explain the issues of the main epistemological principle. In the last part I interpret the reduction as a procedure leading to the essence of the phenomenon, but also what constitutes its basis, to “givenness “, what Jean-Luc Marion calls donation.

Author(s):  
Adam Y. Wells

This introductory chapter has three aims. First, it summarizes the phenomenological method. Second, it explores the way that various assumptions about the epistemic priority of the natural sciences operate in modern biblical criticism. Third, it summarizes the essays included in the volume.


Author(s):  
Mtro. José Luis Olivo Franco

En este artículo se describen los hallazgos de la investigación titulada “Caracterización de estudiantes exitosos: Una aproximación al aprendizaje de las Ciencias Naturales”, resumidos en tres componentes imbricados entre sí: componentes motivacionales intrínsecos, motivacionales extrínsecos, y características y estrategias de aprendizaje. La investigación se desarrolló desde un paradigma interpretativo, bajo el método fenomenológico; empleando técnicas como observación, entrevista a profundidad y grupo focal. Como muestra teórico estructural no estadística se seleccionaron intencionalmente diez estudiantes con rendimientos académicos sobresalientes de la Institución Educativa Técnica Alberto Pumarejo de Malambo, Colombia. Los procesos de categorización y microanálisis permitieron que emergieran no sólo estos  tres componentes, sino también comprender la autorregulación como un fenómeno multidimensional y contextualizado, empleado por los estudiantes para tener éxito. Finalmente se prioriza sobre las actuaciones de los docentes en el uso de estrategias creativas y diversas que fomenten y desarrollen actitudes metacognitivas y autorregulatorias en los estudiantes.Characterization of successful students: An approach to the learning of the Natural SciencesAbstractThis article describes the findings of the research entitled “Characterization of successful students: An approach to the learning of the Natural Sciences”, summarized in three components interwoven with each other: intrinsic motivational components, extrinsic motivational, and learning characteristics and strategies. The research was developed from an interpretative paradigm, under the phenomenological method, using techniques such as observation, in-depth interview and focus group. As a non-statistical structural theoretical sample, ten students with outstanding academic performance of the Alberto Pumarejo Technical Educational Institution of Malambo, Colombia were intentionally selected. The processes of categorization and microanalysis allowed to emerge not only these three components, but to understand self-regulation as a multidimensional and contextualized phenomenon, used by students to be successful. Finally, it is prioritized on the actions of teachers in the use of creative and diverse strategies that promote and develop metacognitive and self-regulatory attitudes in students.Recibido: 19 de diciembre de 2016Aceptado: 05 de junio de 2017


2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 331-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saulius Geniusas

SummaryThis paper develops a phenomenological approach to the concept of pain, which highlights the main presuppositions that underlie pain research undertaken both in the natural and in the sociohistorical sciences. My argument is composed of four steps: (1) only if pain is a stratified experience can it become a legitimate theme in both natural and sociohistorical sciences; (2) the phenomenological method is supremely well suited to disclose the different strata of pain experience; (3) the phenomenological account offered here identifies three fundamental levels that make up the texture of pain experience: pain can be conceived as a prereflective experience, as an object of affective reflection, or as an object of cognitive reflection; and (4) such a stratified account clarifies how pain can be a subject matter in the natural and sociohistorical sciences. Arguably, the natural and sociohistorical sciences address pain at different levels of its manifestation. While the natural sciences address pain as an object of cognitive reflection, sociohistorical sciences first and foremost deal with pain as a prereflective experience and as an object of affective reflection.


Author(s):  
Dalius Yonkus

La estética fenomenológica debería ser capaz de revelar cómo la estructura de cualquier objeto estético dado está conectada con la experiencia de ese objeto, así como demostrar las condiciones necesarias para la propia experiencia estética. Para hacerlo, hay que argumentar en contra de los supuestos unilaterales, como por ejemplo la suposición del objetivismo estético que postula la belleza como rasgo exclusivo de la realidad independiente del sujeto; o la creencia opuesta, que la belleza es esencial y únicamente la proyección del gusto subjetivo sobre las cosas en el mundo. Sesemann analiza el objeto estético y el acto estético, enfatizando su conexión. Esta conexión se refiere a lo que se describe en la fenomenología de Husserl como la correlación entre el objeto intencional y el acto intencional. Esta conexión puede ser descubierta sólo mediante el método fenomenológico: realizando la reducción fenomenológica. En este documento se explicará en primer lugar la percepción estética en la estética de Sesemann. Más adelante, se examina la concepción de la estructura del objeto estético en el contexto de la estética de Sesemann: la composición de los elementos, las sensaciones en relación con el significado, etc. Por último, el artículo sugiere que la estética de Sesemann se basa fundamentalmente en el método de la reducción fenomenológica.Phenomenological aesthetics should also be able to show how the structure of any given aesthetic object is connected with the experience of that object, as well as to demonstrate the necessary conditions for the aesthetic experience itself. In order to do so, one must argue against one-sided assumptions, such as the aesthetic objectivism’s supposition that beauty is exclusively the trait of reality not at all dependent on the subject’s experience of it; or its opposite belief that beauty is essentially and solely the projection of the subjective taste onto the things in the world. Sesemann analizes the aesthetic object and aesthetic act by emphasizing their connection. This connection relates to what is described in Husserls phenomenology as the correlation between the intentional object and the intentional act. This connection can be discovered only by using the phenomenological method: by doing phenomenological reduction. This paper will first explain the aesthetic perception in Sesemann‘s aesthetics. Later, it examine the conception of the aesthetic object‘s structure in Sesemann‘s aesthetic: composition of elements, sensations in connection with meaning; etc. Finally, the paper will argue that Sesemann‘s aesthetics is essentially based on the method of phenomenological reduction.


wisdom ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-60
Author(s):  
Anton DIDIKIN ◽  
Daria KOZHEVNIKOVA

This paper analyzes the essence of the phenomenological method as it is used in certain theories in ethics and legal philosophy. The purpose of the paper is to provide a full study of phenomenology to determine its place in modern philosophical thought. The paper used methods of the history of philosophy, especially method of rational reconstruction, and based on interpretation of the classical phenomenological texts (E. Husserl, E. Levinas, A. Reinach). The main result of the paper is the justification that the unity of logic, ontology and ethics became the ground of application of the phenomenological method in the field of legal and ethical knowledge. Therefore the ideas of E. Levinas’s ethical phenomenology were the basis for understanding ethics as the “first philosophy” in a phenomenological context. The main conclusion of this paper is that the ethical dimension of responsibility for the actions of the subject and their consequences expands the horizons of phenomenological reduction and allows us to reveal the essence of legal reality in a new way. The paper was carried out within the framework of the HSE research project “Ethics and Law: correlation and mechanisms of mutual influence”.


2008 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Finlay

AbstractThis article explores the nature of "the phenomenological attitude," which is understood as the process of retaining a wonder and openness to the world while reflexively restraining pre-understandings, as it applies to psychological research. A brief history identifies key philosphical ideas outlining Husserl's formulation of the reductions and subsequent existential-hermeneutic elaborations, and how these have been applied in empirical psychological research. Then three concrete descriptions of engaging the phenomenological attitude are offered, highlighting the way the epoché of the natural sciences, the psychological phenomenological reduction and the eidetic reduction can be applied during research interviews. Reflections on the impact and value of the researcher's stance show that these reductions can be intertwined with reflexivity and that, in this process, something of a dance occurs—a tango in which the researcher twists and glides through a series of improvised steps. In a context of tension and contradictory motions, the researcher slides between striving for reductive focus and reflexive self-awareness; between bracketing pre-understandings and exploiting them as a source of insight. Caught up in the dance, researchers must wage a continuous, iterative struggle to become aware of, and then manage, pre-understandings and habitualities that inevitably linger. Persistance will reward the researcher with special, if fleeting, moments of disclosure in which the phenomenon reveals something of itself in a fresh way.


1997 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amedeo Giorgi

AbstractThis article points out the criteria necessary in order for a qualitative scientific method to qualify itself as phenomenological in a descriptive Husserlian sense. One would have to employ (1) description (2) within the attitude of the phenomenological reduction, and (3) seek the most invariant meanings for a context. The results of this analysis are used to critique an article by Klein and Westcott (1994), that presents a typology of the development of the phenomenological psychological method.


2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amedeo Giorgi

While it is heartening to see that more researchers in the field of the social sciences are using some version of the phenomenological method, it is also disappointing to see that very often some of the steps employed do not always follow phenomenological logic. In this article several dissertations are reviewed in order to point out some of the difficulties that are encountered in attempting to use some version of the phenomenological method. Difficulties encountered centered on the phenomenological reduction, the use of imaginative variation and the feedback to subjects.


2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rune L. Mølbak

Abstract In this paper I make the argument that being phenomenologically faithful to human experience means broadening the scope of the phenomenological method to not only include subjective experiences. Instead of reducing the psychological study of phenomena to the subject who ‘has’ an experience and who makes sense of this experience according to his or her own goal-directed plans, I will introduce the idea of starting our research from an understanding of an experience that is more original than the subject who ‘has’ it, since it both happens to this subject and transforms this subject in the process of happening to it. This understanding of experience, which is based in part on insights from the later Heidegger and the work of Jean-Luc Marion, takes the phenomenological reduction beyond what this or that experience meant to a particular subject (a psychological reduction) and looks instead at how this particular subject came into being as part of an experiential event that allowed it to become the subject that it is. I will call this new phenomenology a ‘phenomenology of the event’ and will seek to develop the implications of situating the study of psychological phenomena within such a paradigm.


Labyrinth ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-100
Author(s):  
Alain Millon ◽  
I-Ning Yang

  At the crossroads of poetry and philosophy: Francis Ponge and Maurice Merleau-Ponty     The aim of the present article is to clarify the place of the sensitive dictionary in the work of Francis Ponge and to show how it denotes human's relationship to nature. To achieve that, we will use the body question as a measure of the human–nature relationship and apply the phenomenological method that Ponge took over from Merleau-Ponty. It should be noted that Merleau-Ponty rarely makes reference to Ponge's poems, except for a few incisions in his Causeries. As for Ponge, he uses explicitly only the notion of phenomenological reduction to explain his project of sensitive dictionary. However, we will argue that there are many similarities of thought between the philosopher and the poet, which are still unexplored.


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