Determinants of Differential Voting Rights Share Prices and Ordinary Share Prices : Evidence from Dual-Class Companies in India

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 36
Author(s):  
Muhammadriyaj Faniband ◽  
C. Karthigai Prakasam
2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (8) ◽  
pp. 103740 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Cumming ◽  
Michele Meoli ◽  
Silvio Vismara

1992 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 35 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Charles Moyer ◽  
Ramesh Rao ◽  
Phillip M. Sisneros
Keyword(s):  

1954 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 379-453
Author(s):  
H. W. Haycocks ◽  
J. Plymen

SynopsisIt is more than 25 years since the subject of Index Numbers and their application to Investment Policy was last discussed by the Faculty (See C. M. Douglas, T.F.A. 12 and A. C. Murray, T.F.A. 13). When these papers were written, ordinary shares were only just beginning to be recognised as suitable investments for Life Assurance Funds. Douglas and Murray anticipated that as ordinary shares became more popular with the offices, index numbers would be useful for the following purposes:—(1) Assessing the current position relative to the trade cycle; if this could be achieved, the timing of share purchases and sales would be greatly facilitated.(2) Comparing the prospects for the different industries.As a result of these original papers, the Actuaries Index Service commenced in 1930.In this paper, the authors review developments that have taken place in investment policy over the last 25 years, and study the contribution to these policy considerations that the Actuaries Index and other Index Numbers can provide. The paper is divided into five parts as follows:—Part I deals with the various economic and market factors which affect the level of share prices; usually share prices are closely correlated with the level of business activity. Sometimes, however, as in 1949 share prices fall, due to conditions overseas, without a corresponding decline in business activity. Practical uses of the Index are discussed in Part II. Particulars are given of the numerous applications of Share Indexes to problems arising in day-to-day investment management. In this part also, the authors describe certain techniques, developed to deal the first objective of Douglas and Murray (i.e. that of assessing the current position relative to the trade cycle). It is suggested that these techniques, which involve comparison of the Share Index with Activity Indexes, and with the Financial Times Industrial Profits Tables, merit investigation, and provide an interesting field for research. Finally, details are given of an investigation into the results of a portfolio of ordinary shares held over 25 years. This investigation shows that the appreciation of ordinary shares, both as regards capital and dividends, has to a large extent kept in step with the very considerably increased cost of living, sustained during this period.In Part III, reference is made to recent Institute Papers, where the principle has been developed of selecting investments according to the “expected yield” (See J. B. H. Pegler, J.I.A. 74 and H. G. Clarke, J.I.A.80). An attempt is now made to extend these ideas and consideration is also given to the link up between the “expected yield” of an ordinary share, the “earnings yield”, and the return provided by new money invested in the company concerned. Part III concludes with an investigation, based on Actuaries Investment Index data, showing the comparative results of purchasing shares carrying low, medium or high dividend yields. For the period 1950 to 1955, the advantage appeared to lie with that group of shares providing the lowest dividend yield (but presumably affording exceptional earnings or growth prospects).The construction and maintenance of Index Numbers are discussed in detail in Part IV. This Part deals with the initial selection of the securities, the methods of weighting, averaging and grouping, together with the procedure for keeping the Index up to date. For this purpose, the methods used by the Actuaries Index are compared with the corresponding procedures employed for the Share Index of the London and Cambridge Economic Service.The authors' conclusions regarding Investment Policy are discussed in Part V. Their main points are:—(1) For the Institutional investor, interested largely in income, a well spread and managed ordinary share portfolio should produce over the long-term a much higher return than fixed interest investments.(2) To build up and maintain such a share portfolio to the best advantage, an active policy should be pursued, keeping the “expected yield” as high as possible. For this purpose, the Actuaries Industrial Group Index Tables should be of use, to keep the maximum interest in the more progressive industries, and to reduce participation in the declining trades.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 206-222
Author(s):  
Jonathan J. Burson ◽  
Marlin R.H. Jensen

Purpose This study aims to examine institutional ownership of companies that go public with dual-class share structures. Design/methodology/approach Several recent studies have discussed the potential advantages and disadvantages of the dual-class structure, which allows founders and insiders to maintain control of the firms they created through superior voting rights. Institutional investors oppose the dual-class structure, arguing that inferior voting rights make it difficult to respond to poor governance or performance. Previous research has shown the early value-added to the dual-class firm declines through time. This study examines institutional ownership of dual-class companies through time and compares institutional investments in initial public offerings with perpetual superior-class structures versus those with provisions to sunset those shares to one-share, one-vote structures. Findings Evidence suggests that institutional investors view perpetual dual-class structures as potentially riskier in terms of poor governance or performance and prefer dual-class companies with sunset provisions. Originality/value This study suggests that founders and insiders should consider either the dual-class structure with a sunset provision or if they choose the perpetual dual-class, it should include some type of event-driven safeguards.


2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kam-Ming Wan

Prior research has used the principal-agent framework to examine managerial compensation. However, in a number of corporations, managers own enough of their firms’ voting rights to be able to decide with relative impunity how they will be compensated. In a real sense, they are the principals. Using a sample of the largest U.S. corporations, I examine the compensation of such CEOs to see if they are paid more than other CEOs. My overall results provide no support that such CEOs are paid more in cash compensation as well as all forms of direct compensation. The only exception is in some smaller firms, where CEOs are paid more in total compensation when management controls enough of the company’s stock. However, such firms constitute a tiny fraction of the sample firms. For dual-class firms and firms where CEOs control enough of the company’s stock, I find no evidence that such CEOs are paid more.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-52
Author(s):  
Gabriela M. Engler Pinto

The unbundling of cash flow and voting rights has been severely criticized worldwide and yet, the dual class structure persists as an alternative widely adopted by firms. This paper aims to provide some explanations as to why this happens, particularly from a comparative perspective that analyzes the contexts of Brazil and the United States, two countries that take a rather different approach regarding corporate ownership structures. In order to do so, it reviews the panorama of dual class structures, their main characteristics and the unification process that both countries underwent. On top of these discussions, this paper presents some arguments to explain why the dual class structure still persists both in Brazil and in the U.S. (although with variable intensity), despite all the criticism aimed at the segregation of cash flow and voting rights.


1995 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Connie M. Shum ◽  
Wallace N. Davidson ◽  
John L. Glascock

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 1487-1516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean T. McGuire ◽  
Dechun Wang ◽  
Ryan J. Wilson

ABSTRACT: This study investigates whether the agency conflicts inherent in a dual class ownership structure are associated with the level of firms' tax avoidance. Dual class ownership presents a unique agency problem because insiders control a majority of the votes of a firm despite having claims to a minority of the firm's cash flows. We examine the level of tax avoidance for a sample of dual class firms and find that the extent of tax avoidance declines as the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights increases. We also compare the level of tax avoidance of dual class firms to a sample of propensity matched single class firms and find that dual class firms engage in less tax avoidance as the wedge between insiders' voting rights and cash flow rights increases. These findings are consistent with dual class ownership entrenching managers and allowing them to perform at a suboptimal level. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper.


1983 ◽  
Vol 110 (01) ◽  
pp. 17-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. S. Clarkson

1.1 The price of a particular ordinary share represents an equilibrium position between the views of those participants in the market who wish to buy and those who wish to sell. Most participants, and certainly all institutional investors, have access to a vast amount of background information, and share prices adjust continuously as these participants revise their buying or selling prices in the light of new information or in the light of a changed interpretation of existing information. If an explicit price model can be developed solely from the principle that prices are in equilibrium once all participants in the market have acted on their interpretation of the information available to them, this model will be of considerable assistance in the management of ordinary share portfolios.1.2 This paper describes the construction and application of such a price model and discusses the optimal extent to which mathematical and statistical methods can be employed in portfolio management. A recent paper by Clarkson (1980) describes the stage of development that had been reached at the end of 1978; the present paper expands on the underlying concept of market equilibrium and on the practical implications for the management of institutional portfolios of ordinary shares.


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