scholarly journals Why they persist? An analysis of dual class structures and the unification process in the U.S. and Brazil

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-52
Author(s):  
Gabriela M. Engler Pinto

The unbundling of cash flow and voting rights has been severely criticized worldwide and yet, the dual class structure persists as an alternative widely adopted by firms. This paper aims to provide some explanations as to why this happens, particularly from a comparative perspective that analyzes the contexts of Brazil and the United States, two countries that take a rather different approach regarding corporate ownership structures. In order to do so, it reviews the panorama of dual class structures, their main characteristics and the unification process that both countries underwent. On top of these discussions, this paper presents some arguments to explain why the dual class structure still persists both in Brazil and in the U.S. (although with variable intensity), despite all the criticism aimed at the segregation of cash flow and voting rights.

Worldview ◽  
1972 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. 11-14
Author(s):  
Robert W. Baraett

The anomaly in present U.S.-Japanese relations is that, while both countries warmly approve each other's professed foreign policies, neither country has mastered the new styles of doing business with each other necessitated by domestic trends, imperfectly perceived, which affect how each country looks upon itself and expects the other to understand it.The United States recognizes, at last, limits on its resources, power and capabilities. At home, the U.S. Government must devote a larger part of its budget to urgent social and economic needs of its own people. Looking outward, the Government rations sparingly the wealth it shares with others and insists that others, able to do so, take a larger part of real responsibility for preservation of world order. The American people are weary of ideological overtones in power confrontations abroad and are beginning to accept, with all of the risks and confusion of new perspectives, the reality of a pluralistic world.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 736-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik P. Duhaime ◽  
Evan P. Apfelbaum

Scholars, politicians, and laypeople alike bemoan the high level of political polarization in the United States, but little is known about how to bring the views of liberals and conservatives closer together. Previous research finds that providing people with information regarding a contentious issue is ineffective for reducing polarization because people process such information in a biased manner. Here, we show that information can reduce political polarization below baseline levels and also that its capacity to do so is sensitive to contextual factors that make one’s relevant preferences salient. Specifically, in a nationally representative sample (Study 1) and a preregistered replication (Study 2), we find that providing a taxpayer receipt—an impartial, objective breakdown of how one’s taxes are spent that is published annually by the White House—reduces polarization regarding taxes, but not when participants are also asked to indicate how they would prefer their taxes be spent.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 206-222
Author(s):  
Jonathan J. Burson ◽  
Marlin R.H. Jensen

Purpose This study aims to examine institutional ownership of companies that go public with dual-class share structures. Design/methodology/approach Several recent studies have discussed the potential advantages and disadvantages of the dual-class structure, which allows founders and insiders to maintain control of the firms they created through superior voting rights. Institutional investors oppose the dual-class structure, arguing that inferior voting rights make it difficult to respond to poor governance or performance. Previous research has shown the early value-added to the dual-class firm declines through time. This study examines institutional ownership of dual-class companies through time and compares institutional investments in initial public offerings with perpetual superior-class structures versus those with provisions to sunset those shares to one-share, one-vote structures. Findings Evidence suggests that institutional investors view perpetual dual-class structures as potentially riskier in terms of poor governance or performance and prefer dual-class companies with sunset provisions. Originality/value This study suggests that founders and insiders should consider either the dual-class structure with a sunset provision or if they choose the perpetual dual-class, it should include some type of event-driven safeguards.


2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 322-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domingo Javier Santana-Martin ◽  
Inmaculada Aguiar-Diaz

In this paper we analyse the structure of ownership in non-financial Spanish listed companies in the period 1996-2002, focussing on the control chain methodology. The results obtained show that the main shareholder’s control threshold stands at about 29% of the voting rights and that in 2002 families were the ultimate owners in 52.7% of the firms. On the other hand, the use of pyramid structures continues to increase. In 2002, 29.1% of the companies were controlled in this way, which means that the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights for this year was 0.89


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 392-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
MATTHEW H. GRAHAM ◽  
MILAN W. SVOLIK

Is support for democracy in the United States robust enough to deter undemocratic behavior by elected politicians? We develop a model of the public as a democratic check and evaluate it using two empirical strategies: an original, nationally representative candidate-choice experiment in which some politicians take positions that violate key democratic principles, and a natural experiment that occurred during Montana’s 2017 special election for the U.S. House. Our research design allows us to infer Americans’ willingness to trade-off democratic principles for other valid but potentially conflicting considerations such as political ideology, partisan loyalty, and policy preferences. We find the U.S. public’s viability as a democratic check to be strikingly limited: only a small fraction of Americans prioritize democratic principles in their electoral choices, and their tendency to do so is decreasing in several measures of polarization, including the strength of partisanship, policy extremism, and candidate platform divergence. Our findings echo classic arguments about the importance of political moderation and cross-cutting cleavages for democratic stability and highlight the dangers that polarization represents for democracy.


1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 705-714 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan I. Charney

On July 28, 1994, the United States voted at the United Nations General Assembly in favor of a resolution endorsing the new Agreement that essentially amends the deep seabed regime (Part XI) of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and calls on states to ratify the Convention. Shortly thereafter, it signed the new Agreement. Plans call for the Convention to be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification in October 1994 and for hearings to be held during the next Congress in the spring of 1995. By signing the Agreement, the United States will provisionally apply the deep seabed regime, as amended, until the United States becomes a party to the Convention or decides not to do so. In this paper I examine whether such provisional application is appropriate under the U.S. system of government.


2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 1487-1516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean T. McGuire ◽  
Dechun Wang ◽  
Ryan J. Wilson

ABSTRACT: This study investigates whether the agency conflicts inherent in a dual class ownership structure are associated with the level of firms' tax avoidance. Dual class ownership presents a unique agency problem because insiders control a majority of the votes of a firm despite having claims to a minority of the firm's cash flows. We examine the level of tax avoidance for a sample of dual class firms and find that the extent of tax avoidance declines as the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights increases. We also compare the level of tax avoidance of dual class firms to a sample of propensity matched single class firms and find that dual class firms engage in less tax avoidance as the wedge between insiders' voting rights and cash flow rights increases. These findings are consistent with dual class ownership entrenching managers and allowing them to perform at a suboptimal level. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper.


10.28945/3664 ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 059-075 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan K. Gardner ◽  
Amy Blackstone

Aim/Purpose: In the United States, faculty who wish to pursue promotion to the rank of professor do so without clear guidance or structure. Even the timing of such a process is nebulous. As such, an individual engages in agentic action to pursue the rank. Background: This study examined the experiences of faculty members who chose to pursue the application process to be promoted to professor but were rejected or dissuaded. Methodology: Utilizing a case study of one institutional setting, we conducted 10 in-depth qualitative interviews. Contribution: Very little is known about the process of promotion to full professor in the U.S. and even less empirical research exists. This study advances knowledge of the process and the experiences of those undertaking it. Findings: We learned that cues from the social context greatly influenced these faculty members’ sense of agency.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document