scholarly journals Current caselaw discrepancies in the protection of national symbols and state representatives between the European Court of Human Rights and Spanish courts: a vicious circle

2021 ◽  
pp. 125-145
Author(s):  
Andrés Gascón Cuenca

Despite the general consensus about freedom of expression being a basic fundamental right on every democratic society, the debate about its boundaries has never found such a pacific agreement. Thus, the Spanish Penal Code has several articles that punish its abuse that are highly contested, like articles 490.3 and 543 that penalize the offenses directed towards national symbols or State representatives. This being so, this article examines the controversy generated by the application of this articles through the analysis of two judgements issued by the European Court of Human Rights against Spain, and a third one issued by the Spanish Constitutional Court that could follow the same path. This work will be done to describe the clash that exists between the caselaw of these two jurisdictions, in order to critically analyze the approach Spanish courts have to behaviors that criticize national symbols and state representatives.

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 527-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corinna Coors

In Germany, as in the U.S., the relationship between protection of privacy and freedom of expression has been subject of many decisions. In the U.S. a right of privacy was famously conjured out of common law precedents by Warren and Brandeis. Over the course of a century, it developed into a right of publicity, which gave celebrities the power to prevent the commercial use of their names, endorsements, images, voices, and other attributes of personality by unauthorized third parties. In defining such a right, much attention has been focused on separating what is commercially unacceptable from what is desirable free speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It has also been important to settle the duration of such rights. Publicity rights as a commercial value of a person's identity are therefore well established in the U.S., although state laws vary widely as to the extent of protection. In Germany, due to the constitutional background of the personality right, the balance between public and private interests still operates differently. After the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2004 convicted the German Federal Republic of violating the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights Fundamental Freedoms, the German Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof—BGH) took the opportunity to think over its previous position about image rights. Three judgments were examined by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht—BVerfG) and one of them was reversed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 58-83
Author(s):  
Janusz Roszkiewicz

This article concerns the right to the protection of religious feelings as a value which justifies a restriction of freedom of expression. The right to the protection of religious feelings can be protected by three methods: civil, penal and administrative. The issue is discussed from the point of view of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the European Convention on Human Rights, with particular emphasis on the case-law of the Polish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.


Author(s):  
Szabolcs Stock

The aim of the article is to present how one can excercise their freedom of expression through acts. I focus ont the decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the European Court of Human Rights and the U. S. Supreme court. I analyze these decisions, and compare the fundamental rights that can collide, such as freedom of expression versus the right to property, which one should prevail when they come into collision. I also study how one can decide, whether the act should fall within the protected circle of the freedom of expression, or it should be penalized as a crime, or misdemeanor.


2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 62-86
Author(s):  
Danilo Stevandić

The right to life falls under the category of fundamental human rights, which are guaranteed to every person, under all circumstances and in all places. Nevertheless, the right to life is subject to certain restrictions required by reasons considered justified according to standards prevalent in a democratic society. After laying special stress on the relevant provisions set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the paper further tackles the basic viewpoint of the European Court of Human Rights on the Protection of the Right to Life and implementation of the "absolutely necessary force" criterion, after which it addresses the compliance of domestic law with the European legal standards in this area. The legal standard concerning absolutely necessary force means a higher degree of necessity in relation to the standard detailing on what is "necessary in a democratic society" and therefore represents the ultima ratio for achieving a legitimate goal. As a last resort intended for the protection of human life, the force has to be aimed at protecting physical integrity and thus it is proportionate to the threatening violence, i.e., clear and imminent danger to human life. The European Court of Human Rights assesses whether the force that was used is proportional to the achievement of legitimate goals and thereby absolutely necessary according to the criteria of a democratic society by applying a more stringent necessity and proportionality tests in each specific case. The legal standards of the European Court of Human Rights, especially the standards on the use of absolutely necessary force, both support and affirm the protection of the right to life and concurrently shape the practice of the Constitutional Court of Serbia. The establishment of a normative and institutional framework has created elementary prerequisites for effective protection of the right to life in the Republic of Serbia, whilst breach of its procedural obligation is the most common reason for its responsibility with respect to violations of the right to life.


Author(s):  
Natalya OPOLSKA

The article examines the main criteria for the legitimacy of restriction the right to freedom of creation in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular, legitimacy (legality) – the restriction of the right to freedom of creation should be provided for by international and national legislation, the purpose of which is to restrict the right to freedom of creation to be justified, coherent purpose, consistent with the principle proportionality and not to go beyond the bounds of necessity; content – restrictions on the freedom of creation can not be interpreted expanded, correspond to the basic content of freedom of creation and its social purpose. It has been determined that in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights there are various legal positions regarding the restriction of the right to freedom of creation. In order to streamline the practice of applying the Convention, since compliance with the precedent not only meets the requirements of the independence and impartiality of the Court, but also reflects the very essence of judicial policy, consider the most typical decisions of the ECtHR in complaints about limiting the right to freedom of creation. It is concluded that in each case dealt with by the ECtHR, there are grounds for making a decision both in favor of the complainants and in support of governments for limiting the freedom of creativity. The importance of the above mentioned restrictions on the right to freedom of creativity in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is that: - first, they relate to pressing issues concerning the restriction of freedom of creation, as the competence of the right to freedom of expression, which is enshrined in Art. 10 of the Convention; - second, in the cases cited above, the ECtHR ruled that convictions were not in these cases in violation of Article 10 of the Convention and supported the position of national courts in interfering with freedom of expression of the arts; - Thirdly, the decision of the ECHR points to the absence of a single international concept of "public morality", from which it can be concluded that it is expedient to determine the general tendencies in the development of modern morals of mankind; - fourthly, the decision of the ECtHR in complaints concerning the restriction of the right to freedom of creativity, which infringes religious feelings of the population, norms of social ethics and morals, provided that the state intervention was carried out with a high degree of conviction in its expediency, the court turns to the side national courts. Relevant restrictions on the freedom of creativity are considered legitimate if they are aimed at preventing neglect of the feelings of national minorities or believers in protecting the most vulnerable categories of the audience (children) if there is a danger that they may have access to this information. However, we are talking about well-considered decisions, since under the same slogans censorship and other undemocratic institutions can be introduced, and here the important point of the ECHR as a guarantor of the Convention is considered. It is determined that in the European legal tradition, the freedom of creativity is closely connected with the restrictions, the need for which must be proved with a high degree of their legitimacy (legality), proportionality and expediency (purpose). The analysis of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the violation of Article 10 of the Convention made it possible to summarize the case law of the ECHR in the area of restricting the right to freedom of creation and to divide it into three groups, depending on the grounds for interference of the states in the freedom of creativity: Restriction of the right to freedom of creativity in order to protect health; Restrictions on the right to freedom of creativity that are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public security, in order to prevent riots or crimes; Restriction of the right to freedom of creativity in order to protect the reputation or rights of others. When restricting the right to freedom of creativity in order to protect the health or morals of others, the case law of the ECtHR recognizes a broad discretion by the states. In resolving the question of the limits of state intervention in order to protect public morality, the Court proceeds from the absence of a single coherent international concept of "public morality". The limits of freedom of creativity are set by the states in accordance with the norms of social ethics and morals. Relevant restrictions on the freedom of creativity are considered legitimate if they are aimed at preventing neglect of the feelings of national minorities or believers, to protect the most vulnerable categories of the audience (children), etc. (“Müller and Others v. Switzerland”, "Handyside v. Great Britain", "Otto Preminger v. Austria"). The restrictions on creativity in the practice of the ECHR in cases involving encroachments on the democratic foundations of society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public security, in order to prevent riots or crimes are relatively narrower. The precedent of such decisions in assessing the validity of government actions, their determinants of urgent social need, proportionality and compliance with the legitimate aim. When interfering with the right to freedom of creativity, an analysis of the balance between the restrictions that are necessary in a democratic society and the right to freedom of expression are considered. Summing up the practice of the ECHR concerning restrictions on the freedom of creativity that are necessary in a democratic society.


Author(s):  
Tamar Avaliani

The present paper examines the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to criticism of the Court, and the compliance of the Georgian legislation and the case law with international standards (U.S. and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights). The article deals with the scope of the court’s criticism under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and its impact on the Georgian legislation. The paper analyzes the United States model of freedom of expression and compares it with the standards of the European Court of Human Rights. The study found that, similar to the U.S. model, the Georgian model of freedom of expression is based on the primacy of a neutral restriction on freedom of expression, which indicates a high standard of protection of freedom of speech. The Georgian constitutional standard for restricting freedom of expression in order to administer the process of justice smoothly, properly and effectively for a legitimate purpose is influenced by the “three-element” test developed in the Brandenburg case, and shares its essence. According to the Georgian model of freedom of expression, the restriction of freedom of expression for the legitimate aim of ensuring the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, should only be applied to the smooth and proper administration of justice, using the “Clear and Present Danger Test”, involving its high probability. In terms of the court criticism, the Georgian model offers a substantive and content-neutral regulation, and prevents the restriction of the subject of expression. According to the standard of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, expressing an opinion on the activities of a judge is considered a constitutional right and enjoys a high value status. In order to protect the authority of the court, according to the standards of both the International and the Constitutional Court of Georgia, “pushing speech into falling victim to justice” and unjustifiably exercising interference is found inadmissible.


Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  

The article presents the conceptual foundations of bringing judges to civil and legal liability. It was found that the civil and legal liability of judges is one of the types of legal liability of judges. It is determined that the legislation of Ukraine provides for a clearly delineated list of the main cases (grounds) for which the state is liable for damages for damage caused to a legal entity and an individual by illegal actions of a judge as a result of the administration of justice. It has been proved that bringing judges to civil and legal liability, in particular on the basis of the right of recourse, provides for the payment of just compensation in accordance with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. It was established that the bringing of judges to civil and legal liability in Ukraine is regulated by such legislative documents as the Constitution of Ukraine, the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Explanatory Note to the European Charter on the Status of Judges (Model Code), the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges», the Law of Ukraine «On the procedure for compensation for harm caused to a citizen by illegal actions of bodies carrying out operational-search activities, pre-trial investigation bodies, prosecutors and courts», Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding the compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of certain provisions of Article 2, paragraph two of clause II «Final and transitional provisions» of the Law of Ukraine «On measures to legislatively ensure the reform of the pension system», Article 138 of the Law of Ukraine «On the judicial system and the status of judges» (the case on changes in the conditions for the payment of pensions and monthly living known salaries of judges lagging behind in these), the Law of Ukraine «On the implementation of decisions and the application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights».


Author(s):  
Guido Raimondi

This article comments on four important judgments given by the European Court of Human Rights in 2016. Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland addresses the issue of how, in the context of sanctions regimes created by the UN Security Council, European states should reconcile their obligations under the UN Charter with their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to respect the fundamentals of European public order. Baka v. Hungary concerns the separation of powers and judicial independence, in particular the need for procedural safeguards to protect judges against unjustified removal from office and to protect their legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary is a judgment on the interpretation of the Convention, featuring a review of the “living instrument” approach. Avotiņš v. Latvia addresses the principle of mutual trust within the EU legal order and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.


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