scholarly journals THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION VS. THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GEORGIAN LEGISLATION

Author(s):  
Tamar Avaliani

The present paper examines the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to criticism of the Court, and the compliance of the Georgian legislation and the case law with international standards (U.S. and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights). The article deals with the scope of the court’s criticism under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and its impact on the Georgian legislation. The paper analyzes the United States model of freedom of expression and compares it with the standards of the European Court of Human Rights. The study found that, similar to the U.S. model, the Georgian model of freedom of expression is based on the primacy of a neutral restriction on freedom of expression, which indicates a high standard of protection of freedom of speech. The Georgian constitutional standard for restricting freedom of expression in order to administer the process of justice smoothly, properly and effectively for a legitimate purpose is influenced by the “three-element” test developed in the Brandenburg case, and shares its essence. According to the Georgian model of freedom of expression, the restriction of freedom of expression for the legitimate aim of ensuring the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, should only be applied to the smooth and proper administration of justice, using the “Clear and Present Danger Test”, involving its high probability. In terms of the court criticism, the Georgian model offers a substantive and content-neutral regulation, and prevents the restriction of the subject of expression. According to the standard of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, expressing an opinion on the activities of a judge is considered a constitutional right and enjoys a high value status. In order to protect the authority of the court, according to the standards of both the International and the Constitutional Court of Georgia, “pushing speech into falling victim to justice” and unjustifiably exercising interference is found inadmissible.

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 527-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corinna Coors

In Germany, as in the U.S., the relationship between protection of privacy and freedom of expression has been subject of many decisions. In the U.S. a right of privacy was famously conjured out of common law precedents by Warren and Brandeis. Over the course of a century, it developed into a right of publicity, which gave celebrities the power to prevent the commercial use of their names, endorsements, images, voices, and other attributes of personality by unauthorized third parties. In defining such a right, much attention has been focused on separating what is commercially unacceptable from what is desirable free speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It has also been important to settle the duration of such rights. Publicity rights as a commercial value of a person's identity are therefore well established in the U.S., although state laws vary widely as to the extent of protection. In Germany, due to the constitutional background of the personality right, the balance between public and private interests still operates differently. After the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2004 convicted the German Federal Republic of violating the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights Fundamental Freedoms, the German Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof—BGH) took the opportunity to think over its previous position about image rights. Three judgments were examined by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht—BVerfG) and one of them was reversed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 58-83
Author(s):  
Janusz Roszkiewicz

This article concerns the right to the protection of religious feelings as a value which justifies a restriction of freedom of expression. The right to the protection of religious feelings can be protected by three methods: civil, penal and administrative. The issue is discussed from the point of view of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the European Convention on Human Rights, with particular emphasis on the case-law of the Polish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.


Author(s):  
Sabine Jacques

This chapter examines the relevance of freedom of expression to the parody exception. It first considers the debate on the interaction between intellectual property rights and fundamental rights before discussing the ways in which freedom of expression may address the excessive expansion of exclusive rights as well as the outer limits of the parody exception. The chapter explains how human rights are embodied in the parody exception and how factors established in the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence may legitimately restrict freedom of expression. It also explores how national legislators and courts in France, Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom strike a balance between freedom of expression values and copyright values. It shows that the outer limits of the parody exception in each jurisdiction are determined by the influence of freedom of expression on copyright, the margin of appreciation, and the proportionality test.


Author(s):  
Bernadette Rainey ◽  
Elizabeth Wicks ◽  
Clare Ovey

Nearly seventy years after the founding of the European Court of Human Rights it has dispensed more than 20,000 judgments and affects the lives of over 800 million people. The seventh edition of Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights provides an analysis of this area of the law. Examining each of the Convention rights in turn, this book lays out the key principles. Updated with all the significant developments of the previous three years, it offers a synthesis of commentary and carefully selected case-law, focusing on the European Convention itself rather than its implementation in any one Member State. Part 1 of the book looks at institutions and procedures, including the context, enforcement, and scope of the Convention. Part 2 examines Convention rights in terms of many aspects, including rights to remedy, rights to life, prohibition of torture, protection from slavery and forced labour, and family and private life. Part 2 also examines the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; the freedom of expression; and the freedom of assembly and association. The rights to education and elections are considered towards the end of Part 2, as are the freedoms of movement and from discrimination. Part 3 reflects on the achievements and criticisms of the Court and examines the prospects and challenges facing the Court in the present political climate and in the future.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1499-1520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen

On 14 October 2004, theBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) voided a decision by theOberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Naumburg, finding a violation of the complainant's rights guaranteed by theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The Decision directly addresses both the observation and application of case law from the European Court of Human Rights under the Basic Law's “rule of law provision” in Art. 20.III. While there is a myriad of important aspects with regard to this decision, we may limit ourselves at this point to the introductoryaperçucontained in the holdings of the case. One of them reads as follows:Zur Bindung an Gesetz und Recht (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) gehört die Berücksichtigung der Gewährleistungen der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten und der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Rahmen methodisch vertretbarer Gesetzesauslegung. Sowohl die fehlende Auseinandersetzung mit einer Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs als auch deren gegen vorrangiges Recht verstoßende schematische “Vollstreckung” können gegen Grundrechte in Verbindung mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip verstoßen


2021 ◽  
pp. 125-145
Author(s):  
Andrés Gascón Cuenca

Despite the general consensus about freedom of expression being a basic fundamental right on every democratic society, the debate about its boundaries has never found such a pacific agreement. Thus, the Spanish Penal Code has several articles that punish its abuse that are highly contested, like articles 490.3 and 543 that penalize the offenses directed towards national symbols or State representatives. This being so, this article examines the controversy generated by the application of this articles through the analysis of two judgements issued by the European Court of Human Rights against Spain, and a third one issued by the Spanish Constitutional Court that could follow the same path. This work will be done to describe the clash that exists between the caselaw of these two jurisdictions, in order to critically analyze the approach Spanish courts have to behaviors that criticize national symbols and state representatives.


Author(s):  
Silvia DEL SAZ

LABURPENA: Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren jurisprudentziaren ondorioz, Konstituzio Auzitegiak aurreko doktrina zuzendu behar izan du. Horretarako, errugabetasun-presuntziorako eskubidearen irismena zabaldu behar izan du, eta, administrazio-ebazpen zehatzaileetatik eta zigor-epaietatik harago, kalte-ordaina ukatzen duten erabakietara zabaldu du hori, Botere Judizialaren Lege Organikoaren 294. artikuluak eskatzen duen bezalaxe, errugabetasun-presuntzioaren printzipioa ezarri ostean akusatua absolbitu egin den baina delituzko egintzak egon ez zirela frogatu ez den kasuetarako. RESUMEN: Fruto de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, el Tribunal Constitucional se ha visto obligado a rectificar su doctrina anterior extendiendo el alcance del derecho a la presunción de inocencia, más allá de las resoluciones administrativas sancionadoras y sentencias penales, a los pronunciamientos que, tal y como exige el art. 294 LOPJ, deniegan la indemnización en atención a que el acusado fue absuelto en aplicación del principio de presunción de inocencia sin que haya quedado probado que los hechos delictivos no existieron. ABSTRACT: As a result of the case law by the European Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Court was compelled to rectify its former doctrine by broadening the scope of the right to the presumption of innocence beyond punitive administrative resolutions and criminal judgments to rulings that as art. 294 of Judiciary Act requires, deny the award of damages on the ground that the accused was acquitted due to the application of the principle of innocence without having been proved that the criminal offences did not exist.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 815-833
Author(s):  
Vesna Stefanovska ◽  
Blerton Sinani

In many occasions, the European Court of Human Rights has reiterated that the ECHR is a ‘living instrument’. The rights enshrined in the Convention have to be interpreted in the light of present day conditions so as to be practical and effective. Therefore, the Court has on several occasions modified its views on certain subjects because of scientific developments. Although in the scope of Article 6(1) of European Convention on Human Rights are civil rights and obligations and criminal charges, the application to administrative disputes has arised from the Court’s case-law. This paper will try to analyze the framework of administrative disputes in the Republic of Macedonia, mainly the Law on Administrative Disputes and its consolidation with the international standards, specifically with the ECHR. Further, subject of elaboration will be the Macedonian dossier in Strasbourg and the judgments in which the ECtHR found violation of Article 6 of ECHR in relation to administrative disputes and procedures.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-79
Author(s):  
Lucia Smolková

This paper analyses the case law of the Slovak Constitutional Court and the Slovak Supreme Court dealing with inspections conducted by selected Slovak administrative bodies – especially by the administrative bodies in the area of foodstuffs administration – where inspected companies complain that their rights guaranteed by the Slovak Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, namely the protection of their business premises, have been violated. The paper thus also deals with and analyses the related case law of the European Court of Human Rights and its (non)-application by the Slovak judicial bodies in their decision-making practice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 1023-1042
Author(s):  
Ljiljana Mijović

Internet as a means of communication, whatever the type of information it might be used for, falls within the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. As established in the European Court's case law, freedom of expression constitutes one of the essentials of a democratic society, therefore limitations on that freedom foreseen in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention are to be interpreted strictly. In order to ensure effective protection of one's freedom of expression on the Internet, States bear a positive obligation to create an appropriate regulatory framework, balancing the right to freedom of expression on one and the limitations prescribed in Article 10 § 2, on the other hand. Special attention in doing so is to be paid to the risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of other human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention, particularly the right to respect for private life. While it is the fact that the electronic network, serving billions of users worldwide, will never be subject to the same regulations and control, because of the national authorities' margin of appreciation, the European Court established commonly applicable general principles regarding the Internet as a media of exercising right to freedom of expression.


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