scholarly journals Current Tendencies of Judicial Review as Reflected in the New Hungarian Code of Administrative Court Procedure

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-24
Author(s):  
Krisztina F. Rozsnyai
Keyword(s):  
Public Administration ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Coherent System ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Legislation And Jurisprudence ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Present Understanding

The continuing expansion of judicial review of administrative actions, as seen throughout Europe, led to the engulfment of the administrative judiciary towards the end of the last century. Review within a reasonable timeframe is hard to grant for this reason: the tensions between lawfulness and efficiency are amplified. The answers given to alleviate this tension raise questions that lie at the heart of the principle of separation of powers. This article aims to present some of respective tendencies, which lead to new equilibriums in the system of checks and balances between public administration and the judiciary. To concretise these tendencies, the article analyses some relevant solutions given by the very new code on administrative court procedures, the Hungarian Act No. I of 2017. The most important elements of the regulation of procedures for judicial review of administrative action are provided in a dogmatic and a comparative perspective showing the changes of rules and/or their interpretation through the judiciary. Thus, also important challenges regarding the present understanding of the doctrine of separation of powers are emphasised. The most important elements of the new Hungarian regulation are presented in a coherent system, which also gives insight on the codificational considerations. Moreover, the legislation and jurisprudence must deal with the highlighted aspects in any national and EU legal systems alike.

Judicial Review of Administration in Europe

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacinto della Cananea ◽  
Mauro Bussani
Keyword(s):  
Public Administration ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Core ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Core Method ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Comparative Study

This book is about judicial review of public administration. Many have regarded this as dividing European legal orders, with judicial review of administrative action in the general courts or specialized administrative courts, or with different distance from the executive. There has been considerably less comparison of the basic procedural and substantive principles. The comparative study in this book of procedural fairness and propriety in the courts reveal not only differences but also some common and connecting elements, in a ‘common core’ perspective. The book is divided into four parts. The first explains the nature and purpose of a comparison to understand the relevance and significance of commonality and diversity between the legal systems of Europe, and which considers other legal systems which are more or less distant and distinct from Europe, such as China and Latin America. The second part contains an overview of the systems of judicial review in these legal orders. The third part, which is the heart of the ‘common core’ method, contains both a set of hypothetical cases and the solutions, according to the experts of the legal systems selected for our comparison, to the cases. The fourth part serves to examine the answers in comparative terms to ascertain not so much whether a ‘common core’ exists, but how it is shaped and evolves, also in response to the influence of supranational legal orders as the European Union and the Council of Europe.

Introduction The Birth and Growth of Judicial Review: 1607–2020

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Charismatic Leadership ◽  
The United States ◽  
Boundary Line ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
The Third

This introductory chapter discusses how judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation has usually emerged historically for a combination of four reasons. First, judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is a response to a nation’s need for an umpire to resolve federalism or separation of powers boundary line disputes. The second main cause of the origins and growth of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is what can be called the rights from wrongs hypothesis; judicial review very often emerges as a response to an abominable deprivation of human rights. The third major cause is the out-and-out borrowing of the institution of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation from either the United States’ model; the German Civil Law model; and, most recently, from the Canadian Second Look judicial review constitutional model. The fourth major cause is the existence of a system of checks and balances, which gives Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts political space to grow in. Revolutionary charismatic constitutionalism can also lead to the growth of judicial review as Professor Bruce Ackerman has explained in an important new book, REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAW (2019).

The Reasonableness of Proportionality in the Australian Administrative Law Context

2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-90
Author(s):  
Janina Boughey
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
High Court ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Principle Of Proportionality ◽  
Prevailing View

Although the High Court has never ruled on the issue, the prevailing view has been that unless parliaments enact bills of rights, the principle of proportionality does not and cannot play a role in judicial review of administrative decisions in Australia. Yet in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li, a majority of the High Court hinted that this may not be the case. This article analyses the reasons for Australia's longstanding reluctance to embrace proportionality in the administrative law context, and whether the decision in Li has altered this position. It then explores overseas developments in proportionality review which reveal that the principle may take on many forms in the administrative law context, with differing implications for the separation of powers. The article finds that it might be possible to accommodate certain methods of applying proportionality within Australia's judicial review framework, but not without significant broader changes to judicial review of administrative action in Australia.

Part IV Separation of Powers, Ch.24 Review of Administrative Action

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jalan Prateek ◽  
Rai Ritin
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Indian Constitution ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Administrative Review ◽  
Consistent Basis ◽  
Indian Supreme Court ◽  
Legislative Review

This chapter examines the concept of administrative review in the context of the Indian Constitution, with particular emphasis on how administrative actions are reviewed under Article 14. It first considers whether administrative review is different from legislative review, and especially whether the grounds of judicial review under Article 14 apply to the same extent when it comes to the validity of legislation compared with administrative action. It then discusses the scope of the power of administrative review under the concept of ‘reasonableness’ and whether this concept has been applied on a consistent basis. It also comments on the inherently abstract and imprecise nature of the concept of ‘reasonableness’ and how this has contributed to the lack of a judicially manageable test or standard for analysing the various cases adjudicated by the Indian Supreme Court. Finally, the chapter discusses the nature of executive power and how it may influence an adjudication of reasonableness.

Facticity

2020 ◽  
pp. 899-916
Author(s):  
Paul Daly
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Traditional Approach ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Evolutionary Path ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
Factual Error ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter analyses, from a comparative perspective, the law of judicial review of administrative action as it relates to factual error. The analyses is conducted in four common law jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, England and Wales, and Ireland), which have a ‘filial relationship’ as part of the common law tradition of controlling administrative action through the ordinary courts. The chapter outlines the traditional approach to judicial review of factual error in the four jurisdictions, characterized by limited judicial oversight of issues of fact. Next, the chapter describes the recent evolution in the law of judicial review of factual error. Although the evolutionary path has not led to the same destination in each jurisdiction, there has been increased judicial willingness to examine alleged factual errors in judicial review proceedings. However, the factors which have influenced the evolution of the law are different in each jurisdiction.

Japan

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Political ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Rubber Stamp ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government

This chapter looks at the Japanese experience with judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan does not enforce those parts of the Japanese Constitution, like Article 9, which prohibits war making; Article 21, which protects freedom of speech; or Article 89, which forbids taxpayer money from being used to hire Shinto priests. The Supreme Court of Japan thus refuses to enforce important articles in the Constitution of Japan. It does rubber stamp and thus legitimize actions taken by the political branches of the government. Why has judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation failed to take root in Japan? Japan does not need either a federal or a separation of powers umpire, since Japan is, firstly, a unitary nation-state with no need for a federalism umpire; and, secondly, a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house of the legislature. Moreover, Japan has never atoned for the wrongs it committed during World War II nor has it truly admitted to even having done the horrible things that Japan did. A nation cannot get rights from wrongs judicial review and a Bill of Rights unless it admits it has done something wrong. Finally, the Japanese Constitution contains an inadequate system of checks and balances. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan may not have the political space within which it can assert power.

Value Pluralism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy: Waldron and Berlin in Debate

2018 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-127
Author(s):  
George Crowder
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
War On Terror ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Other ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Extended Discussion

AbstractJeremy Waldron claims that Isaiah Berlin wrongly neglects, and is hostile to, constitutional and democratic institutions. I argue that although Berlin offers no extended discussion of constitutionalism or democracy, he is not hostile to them. Moreover, the logic of Berlin's value pluralism is strongly supportive of these ideas—for example, it fits well with constitutionalist notions such as the separation of powers and checks and balances. On the other hand, Waldron's rejection of judicial review on the ground of democracy is questionable in these same pluralist terms. Here I argue that Berlinian pluralism supports democracy as long as this is inclusive in its outcomes. But contemporary democracy cannot be relied upon to be sufficiently inclusive, in part because of the effects of the war on terror and the rise of populism. Under these conditions it is unwise for pluralists to dispense with judicial review.

Judicial review and codification

Legal Studies ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy H. Jones
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
Administrative Procedure ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Further Development

This article addresses the potential advantages and disadvantages of codifying the grounds of judicial review of administrative action. The four principal legal values associated with codification are described: certainty; clarity; democratic legitimacy; and rationality. The extent to which codification might further these values is considered in the light of two comparative models: the United States Administrative Procedure Act 1946 and the Australian Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). It is concluded that codification offers no solution to the practical and theoretical problems of judicial review. Codification places the content of the principles of judicial review in the hands of politicians. Australian legislation limiting the grounds of review available in migration cases shows the danger to the separation of powers inherent in codification. If it is thought desirable to foster the further development of the principles of judicial review, this can best be achieved by leaving the task to the judiciary.

Tocqueville's Constitutionalism

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1175-1195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert P. Kraynak
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
The United States ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Private Rights ◽  
Constitutional System

For the ancient philosophers, constitutionalism meant classifying regimes and constructing regimes to form virtuous citizens. In the modern world it generally means checks and balances, institutional mechanisms limiting the power of government and protecting private rights. In Democracy in America Tocqueville attempts to combine both views in his interpretation of the U.S. constitutional system. He employs the regime analysis of ancient constitutionalism to understand the new phenomenon of popular sovereignty and its potential for despotic control over the minds and characters of citizens. At the same time, he shows how the constitutional devices found in the United States—such as federalism, judicial review, and the separation of powers—can be adapted to inculcate a kind of moral virtue by teaching citizens to exercise liberty with moral responsibility and to govern themselves. The result is a constitutional theory that weaves ancient and modern principles into an original and coherent whole.

scholarly journals THE “DEFERENCE” OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO THE STATE*

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nomthandazo Ntlama
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Main Function ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
New Process ◽  
State Authority ◽  
The Republic

The adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter “the Constitution”), provided an opportune moment for the courts, especially the Constitutional Court to ensure an appropriate balance in the development of the principles and values of the doctrine of separation of powers vis-à-vis those of judicial review. The Constitution is framed in a manner that entrenches a system of checks and balances (this is deduced from the manner in which the various chapters of the Constitution are structured, dealing with the roles of the legislature, executive and the judiciary). This system gives the general public a legislative and executive authority that is accountable to them subject to judicial review by an independent judiciary. The system of checks and balances affirms the limited power of the legislative and executive authorities which is confined within the constraints of constitutional values and principles. The importance of checks and balances is similarly endorsed by Edwards as a system that has ushered in a new process of the regulation of state authority in the new dawn of democracy. This system envisages a move away from a culture of authority of the apartheid rule to one of justification of the new constitutional dispensation. He substantiates his argument by pointing out that the new process of regulating state authority has enabled the courts to educate other branches of government through principled and robust articulations of the foundational and constitutional values of the Constitution in a democratic society. Against this background, the purpose of this note is to provide a brief overview of the Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa (2008 (10) BCLR 968, hereinafter “Merafong”) judgment. The particular emphasis on this judgment is its potential to defer the judicialauthority (which the author refer to as a “political doctrine”) to the state. The objective is to analyse this doctrine and evaluate it against the development of substantive principles of judicial review. This purpose is motivated by Chaskalson CJ’s argument in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa (2000 (3) BCLR 241). Chaskalson CJ in this case held that the Constitutional Court cannot allow itself to be diverted from its main function as the final andindependent arbiter in the contest between the state and its citizens. In Merafong, the court created an impression of having misconstrued this purpose and the objectives it has to fulfil. This note is limited to the “political approach” which the court emphasisedwithout much thought, and attempt to address the question of public involvement in legislative processes raised in this case. It alsoacknowledges that the court has affirmed its independence as the guardian of the Constitution in the regulation of state authority and advancement of the principles of judicial review, but its lack of consistency in its adopted approach is a worrying factor and a causefor concern for the regulation of state authority.

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