scholarly journals A Tensão entre Constitucionalismo e Exceção: a Ordem Estatal sobreposta aos Direitos Fundamentais / The Tension between Constitutionalism and Exception: when the State Order Prevails over Fundamental Rights

Author(s):  
Henrique Smidt Simon

Resumo: Cada vez mais o poder público limita direitos e aumenta a repressão, sem corrigir as falhas que levam ao conflito. Isso indica o uso do direito como garantidor de ordem, não de liberdade. O intento deste artigo é mostrar, discutindo as noções de estado e constituição, o conflito entre liberdade e ordem e como o direito serve para proteger a primeira. Assim, relaciona-se a legalidade no estado contemporâneo com a limitação do poder. Faz-se, então, a relação com a ideia de nação e a prevalência da vontade do estado. Após, trabalha-se o estado de exceção e como a ordem e a coerção estatal são postas acima dos direitos e garantias constitucionais. A prevalência da ordem sobre a proteção constitucional pode ser vista nas manifestações de junho de 2013; nos rolezinhos e na situação do presídio de Pedrinhas, exemplos da lógica do estado de exceção incorporada à vida política brasileira, o que responde à discussão teórica que os antecede. Ademais, o estado brasileiro aumenta seu poder de repressão com estratégias jurídicas que diminuem seus limites ou seu controle. O texto defende a necessidade de retomar as lógicas da legalidade e do constitucionalismo para combater a naturalização do estado de exceção. Abstract: Nowadays is getting usual for the government to limit rights and expand its capacity of repression without correcting the flaws that cause conflicts. This indicates the use of the law as a way to grant order, not liberty. The aim of this article is to show, discussing the ideas of state and constitution, the tension between liberty and order and how the law should work to protect the former. Thus, the contemporaneous state is related to legality, understood as a mean to limit the state power. Then, the concept of state of exception is presented and is shown as the state order and coercion overlap constitutional rights. This overlapping can be seen in the “June 2013” protests; in the flash mob situations and in the case of “Pedrinhas” Prison. Those are examples of the logic of the state of exception embodied to the Brazilian political life. Furthermore, Brazilian state increases its repression power by using legal strategies that decrease its means of being restrained. The text asserts the need to rethink legality and constitutionalism as a way to fight the naturalization of the state of exception.

2002 ◽  
Vol 101 (651) ◽  
pp. 29-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diane Singerman

What has warranted the Egyptian government's use of state security courts, military courts, military law, and exceptional regulation and control of political life over the course of more than five decades? Clearly, Islamist radicals who have been willing to use violence against the state and civilians outside the parameters of the law warrant strong measures…. [Yet] these laws have remained in place even as the government has claimed that its policies have vanquished the Islamist threat.


Author(s):  
Peter Ferdinand

This chapter examines how laws, constitutions, and federalism provide structure to the context of political life. It first considers the importance of constitutions in determining the basic structure of the state and the fundamental rights of citizens that they establish before asking whether the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is Western-centric. It then explores different ways in which states may attempt to realize justice in applying the law, with particular emphasis on differences between Islamic and Western practice. It also discusses the importance of constitutional courts, the ways that the institution of federalism contains the powers of the state and manage diverse societies, and consociationalism as an alternative approach to managing such diversity. Finally, it comments on the increasing legalization of political life.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Conor McCarthy

While exclusion from law is often assumed to be an historical phenomenon, the discussion here argues that it is an enduring and important tactic of state power. Such exclusion can occur in two directions – exclusion above the law (as where the state licenses itself or its agents to act with impunity) or exclusion below the law (as where the state excludes an individual or group from the law's protection). This book concerns itself with both, and in doing so, offers readings from two bodies of literature in English not normally read in tandem – the literature of outlawry, and the literature of espionage. This Introduction briefly surveys some influential previous work in this area – in particular Eric Hobsbawm’s notion of the ‘social bandit’ and Giorgio Agamben’s idea of the homo sacer and his related study of the ‘state of exception’ – and sets out the argument to follow.


2020 ◽  
pp. 218-239
Author(s):  
Peter Ferdinand

This chapter examines how laws, constitutions, and federalism provide structure to the context of political life. It first considers the importance of constitutions in determining the basic structure of the state and the fundamental rights of citizens that they establish before asking whether the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is Western-centric. It then explores different ways in which states may attempt to realize justice in applying the law, with particular emphasis on differences between Islamic and Western practice. It also discusses the importance of constitutional courts, the ways that the institution of federalism contains the powers of the state and manage diverse societies, and consociationalism as an alternative approach to managing such diversity. Finally, it comments on the increasing legalization of political life.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-403
Author(s):  
Barbara Pierre

The writer advocates the view that courts interpret statutes so as to achieve their aim; that being justice in the case: as between the parties and in respect of the law. This is identified as the common thread that explains the apparent erratic behaviour of the courts in their use of the various methods or rules of interpretation. The Supreme Court decision, Attorney General of Québec v. 2747-3174 Québec Inc., is analysed against the background of this theory and is seen to give support to it. The court is shown to use various rules of interpretation, which lead the majority to a wide, and the minority to a narrow, interpretation of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms of Québec. Yet it is clear that in both cases the rules are merely a means to an end: justice as between the parties and in respect of the law. In context of the case, this means establishing a balance between the competing interests of the State and the citizen that conforms to the law relating to fundamental rights and in particular, the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms of Québec. As far as the State is concerned, it has a vested interest in confirming the constitutionality of its many administrative tribunals, which play an essential role in enabling the State to discharge its responsibility to govern. Citizens, on the other hand, need to be protected from the violation of their rights, in particular the right to an independent and impartial tribunal in matters relating to the determination of their rights and obligations, or charges brought against them. The Charter must be interpreted so that, in its scope and content, it gives real protection, but, consistent with the separation of powers doctrine, the interpretation must not amount to a usurpation by the courts of the role of the government to govern. The writer concludes that the opposing conclusions of the majority and minority are more a consequence of the difference in the opinion of the judges as to the manner in which the balance should be struck, as opposed to the rules of interpretation used by them.


Author(s):  
Javier TAJADURA TEJADA

LABURPENA: Azterketa honen xedea hau da: kritikoki aztertzea ea COVID-19aren kontrako borrokaren testuinguruan askatasuna (zirkulazio askerako eta biltzeko eskubidea, funtsean) murrizteko onetsitako neurri ugariak konstituzioan sartzen diren. Ez dago eztabaidagai neurri horiek, kasu gehienetan, beharrezkoak direla, baina bai neurriak nola hartu dituzten. Pandemiaren aurkako borroka egiteko moduari jarritako eragozpen juridiko nagusia da lege-erreserba urratu duela, eta, horrekin batera, segurtasun juridikoaren printzipioari ere kalte egin zaiola. Azterlanak eskema honi jarraitzen dio: lehenik eta behin, lege-erreserbaren konstituzio-esanahia eta -irismena azaltzen dira, gure Konstituzio Auzitegiaren doktrina eta jurisprudentzia finkatuaren arabera; bigarrenik, aztertzen da ea normaltasunaren zuzenbideak (Osasun Publikoaren Arloko Neurri Bereziei buruzko 3/1986 Lege Organikoa, zehazki), oinarrizko eskubideak orokorrean mugatzeko, erreserba horren eskakizunak asetzen dituen edo ez; hirugarrenik, aztertzen da ea, krisi- edo salbuespen-zuzenbidearen barruan, hartutako neurriek alarma-egoeran estaldura egokia duten edo haietakoren batek salbuespen-egoera aktibatzea behar izango zuen; azkenik, kritikoki azaltzen da eskubideak murrizteko neurriak hartzeko eskumena Gobernuko kideei edo autonomia-erkidegoen presidenteei eskuordetzeak eragin duen lege-erreserbaren urraketa. ABSTRACT: The scope of this study is to critically analyze the constitutional fit of the numerous measures restricting freedom - the right to free movement and assembly, fundamentally - that have been approved in the context of the fight against COVID 19. It is not discussed that, in most cases, they are necessary measures, but the way and the form in which they have been adopted are. The main legal objection to the way in which the fight against the pandemic has been carried out is that the reservation of law has been violated and with this the principle of legal certainty has also been damaged. The study follows the following scheme: in the first place, the constitutional meaning and scope of the reservation of law according to the doctrine and consolidated jurisprudence of our Constitutional Court are exposed; secondly, it examines whether the law of normality (specifically LO 3/1986 on Special Measures in Public Health Matters) satisfies or not the requirements of this reservation in order to establish limitations of fundamental rights in a general way; thirdly, it examines whether within the crisis or emergency law, the different measures adopted have adequate coverage in the state of alarm or some of them would have required to activate the state of exception; finally, it critically exposes the violation of the reserve of law that has meant the delegation of the competence to adopt restrictive measures of rights in members of the Government or in presidents of Autonomous Communities. RESUMEN: El objeto de este estudio es analizar críticamente el encaje constitucional de las numerosas medidas restrictivas de la libertad -el derecho a la libre circulación y de reunión, fundamentalmente- que se han aprobado en el contexto de la lucha contra el COVID 19. No se discute que, en la mayor parte de los casos, son medidas necesarias, pero sí el modo y la forma en que se han adoptado. La principal objeción jurídica al modo en que se ha llevado a cabo la lucha contra la pandemia es que se ha vulnerado la reserva de ley y con ello se ha lesionado también el principio de seguridad jurídica. El estudio sigue el siguiente esquema: en primer lugar se exponen el significado y alcance constitucionales de la reserva de ley según la doctrina y la jurisprudencia consolidada de nuestro Tribunal Constitucional; en segundo lugar, se examina si el Derecho de la normalidad (concretamente la LO 3/1986 de Medidas Especiales en Materia de Salud Pública) satisface o no las exigencias de esa reserva a los efectos de establecer limitaciones de derechos fundamentales con carácter general; en tercer lugar se examina si dentro del Derecho de crisis o de excepción, las diferentes medidas adoptadas tienen cobertura adecuada en el estado de alarma o algunas de ellas hubieran requerido activar el estado de excepción; finalmente, se expone críticamente la vulneración de la reserva de ley que ha supuesto la delegación de la competencia para adoptar medidas restrictivas de derechos en miembros del Gobierno o en presidentes de Comunidades Autónomas.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 427
Author(s):  
Dewi Kania Sugiharti ◽  
Muhammad Ziaurahman ◽  
Sechabudin Sechabudin

Universities that apply the concept of Public Service Agency (BLU - PK PTN ) in performing functions as an organ which is engaged in the service infrastructure support through goods or services . As an institution under the auspices of the government and the state budget receives PTN PK - BLU implement mechanisms to acquire goods or services in accordance with the law. However, the procurement process in obtaining goods or services sometimes poses problems that arise as a consequence of the passage of the procurement of goods or services involving the organs in it as PA / KPA , KDP , ULP , and Committee / Receiver Procurement Officer. Rector of the KPA in PK - BLU PTN has the authority to control the organs that carry out the process of procurement of goods / services in the environment . Errors in the procurement process of goods / services performed by the CO and the ULP / Procurement Officer causing state losses due to these errors, either due to negligence or unlawful acts. As the KPA in the process of procurement of goods / services Rector can control the organs in accordance with the authority given. The consequences are acceptable if the authorities ultimately the procurement of goods / services did not heed the warning Rector officials related procurement process of goods / services will receive sanctions. Keywords: Authorized Budget, Financial State.


Author(s):  
Carlos FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE ROMANÍ

LABURPENA: Lan honek Bidasoan eta Higerreko badian arrantzatzeari buruzko 1959ko uztailaren 14ko Espainiaren eta Frantziaren arteko hitzarmenaren konstituzio-kontrakotasuna aztertzen du, Espainiari dagokionez. Hitzarmen horrek, hain zuzen ere, espazio horietako ibai-arrantza, itsaski-bilketa eta akuikultura arautzen ditu, bai eta horietan egindako arau-hausteen ikuskapena eta zehapena ere, eta konstituzioa onartu eta ia berrogei urtera, ez du zuzenketarik izan araudi berrira egokitzeko. Hau da, alor horietan eta ur horietan Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoak duen eskumen esklusibora egokitu gabe dago oraindik. Arazo hori konpontzeko, bi aukera proposatzen dira: Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoaren organo eskudunek konstituzio-kontrakotasuneko errekurtsoa jartzea, edo Estatuko Gobernuari Hitzarmena eguneratzeko eskatzea, hitzarmenei eta nazioarteko beste akordio batzuei buruzko azaroaren 27ko 25/2014 Legearen 49., 50. eta 51. artikuluetan xedatutako prozedurak erabiliz. Izan ere, prozedura horietan autonomien parte-hartzea aurreikusten da. RESUMEN: El trabajo aborda la inconstitucionalidad, en lo que a España se refiere, del Convenio hispano-francés de 14 de julio de 1959, relativo a la pesca en el Bidasoa y Bahía de Higuer; tratado que regula la pesca fluvial, el marisqueo y la acuicultura en esos espacios, así como la inspección y sanción de las infracciones al mismo, pero que casi cuarenta años después del vigente bloque de constitucionalidad no ha sido enmendado para adaptarlo al mismo. Esto es, a la competencia exclusiva de la Comunidad Autónoma Vasca en esas materias y en esas aguas. Para corregir esta anomalía se propone que los órganos competentes de la Comunidad Autónoma Vasca soliciten al Gobierno del Estado la enmienda del Convenio en el marco de los procedimientos instaurados por los arts. 49, 50 y 51 de la Ley 25/2014, de 27 de noviembre, de Tratados y otros acuerdos internacionales; procedimientos que contemplan la participación autonómica. ABSTRACT: The article deals with the unconstitutionality, as far as Spain is concerned, of the Spanish-French Convention of July 14, 1959, concerning fishing in the Bidasoa and Higuer Bay; treaty ruling river fishing, shellfish and aquaculture in these waters as well as inspection and punishment of violations of it. Nevertheless, nearly forty years after the current block of constitutionality it has not been adapted to it; this is the exclusive competence of the Basque Autonomous Community in these areas and in those waters. To correct this anomaly the request by the competent bodies of the Basque Autonomous Community for the amendment of the Convention to the Government of the State in the framework of the procedures set up buy articles 49, 50 and 51 of the Law 27/2014, of 27 November, of treaties and other international agreements; procedures including regional participation, is proposed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-48
Author(s):  
Whitney K. Taylor

When do individuals choose to advance legal claims to social welfare goods? To explore this question, I turn to the case of South Africa, where, despite the adoption of a "transformative" constitution in 1996, access to social welfare goods remains sorely lacking. Drawing on an original 551-person survey, I examine patterns of legal claims-making, focusing on beliefs individuals hold about the law, rights, and the state, and how those beliefs relate to decisions about whether and how to make claims. I find striking differences between the factors that influence when people say they should file a legal claim and when they actually do so. The way that individuals interpret their own material conditions and neighborhood context are important, yet under-acknowledged, factors for explaining claims-making.


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