scholarly journals El Estado de Derecho frente al COVID: Reserva de ley y derechos fundamentales

Author(s):  
Javier TAJADURA TEJADA

LABURPENA: Azterketa honen xedea hau da: kritikoki aztertzea ea COVID-19aren kontrako borrokaren testuinguruan askatasuna (zirkulazio askerako eta biltzeko eskubidea, funtsean) murrizteko onetsitako neurri ugariak konstituzioan sartzen diren. Ez dago eztabaidagai neurri horiek, kasu gehienetan, beharrezkoak direla, baina bai neurriak nola hartu dituzten. Pandemiaren aurkako borroka egiteko moduari jarritako eragozpen juridiko nagusia da lege-erreserba urratu duela, eta, horrekin batera, segurtasun juridikoaren printzipioari ere kalte egin zaiola. Azterlanak eskema honi jarraitzen dio: lehenik eta behin, lege-erreserbaren konstituzio-esanahia eta -irismena azaltzen dira, gure Konstituzio Auzitegiaren doktrina eta jurisprudentzia finkatuaren arabera; bigarrenik, aztertzen da ea normaltasunaren zuzenbideak (Osasun Publikoaren Arloko Neurri Bereziei buruzko 3/1986 Lege Organikoa, zehazki), oinarrizko eskubideak orokorrean mugatzeko, erreserba horren eskakizunak asetzen dituen edo ez; hirugarrenik, aztertzen da ea, krisi- edo salbuespen-zuzenbidearen barruan, hartutako neurriek alarma-egoeran estaldura egokia duten edo haietakoren batek salbuespen-egoera aktibatzea behar izango zuen; azkenik, kritikoki azaltzen da eskubideak murrizteko neurriak hartzeko eskumena Gobernuko kideei edo autonomia-erkidegoen presidenteei eskuordetzeak eragin duen lege-erreserbaren urraketa. ABSTRACT: The scope of this study is to critically analyze the constitutional fit of the numerous measures restricting freedom - the right to free movement and assembly, fundamentally - that have been approved in the context of the fight against COVID 19. It is not discussed that, in most cases, they are necessary measures, but the way and the form in which they have been adopted are. The main legal objection to the way in which the fight against the pandemic has been carried out is that the reservation of law has been violated and with this the principle of legal certainty has also been damaged. The study follows the following scheme: in the first place, the constitutional meaning and scope of the reservation of law according to the doctrine and consolidated jurisprudence of our Constitutional Court are exposed; secondly, it examines whether the law of normality (specifically LO 3/1986 on Special Measures in Public Health Matters) satisfies or not the requirements of this reservation in order to establish limitations of fundamental rights in a general way; thirdly, it examines whether within the crisis or emergency law, the different measures adopted have adequate coverage in the state of alarm or some of them would have required to activate the state of exception; finally, it critically exposes the violation of the reserve of law that has meant the delegation of the competence to adopt restrictive measures of rights in members of the Government or in presidents of Autonomous Communities. RESUMEN: El objeto de este estudio es analizar críticamente el encaje constitucional de las numerosas medidas restrictivas de la libertad -el derecho a la libre circulación y de reunión, fundamentalmente- que se han aprobado en el contexto de la lucha contra el COVID 19. No se discute que, en la mayor parte de los casos, son medidas necesarias, pero sí el modo y la forma en que se han adoptado. La principal objeción jurídica al modo en que se ha llevado a cabo la lucha contra la pandemia es que se ha vulnerado la reserva de ley y con ello se ha lesionado también el principio de seguridad jurídica. El estudio sigue el siguiente esquema: en primer lugar se exponen el significado y alcance constitucionales de la reserva de ley según la doctrina y la jurisprudencia consolidada de nuestro Tribunal Constitucional; en segundo lugar, se examina si el Derecho de la normalidad (concretamente la LO 3/1986 de Medidas Especiales en Materia de Salud Pública) satisface o no las exigencias de esa reserva a los efectos de establecer limitaciones de derechos fundamentales con carácter general; en tercer lugar se examina si dentro del Derecho de crisis o de excepción, las diferentes medidas adoptadas tienen cobertura adecuada en el estado de alarma o algunas de ellas hubieran requerido activar el estado de excepción; finalmente, se expone críticamente la vulneración de la reserva de ley que ha supuesto la delegación de la competencia para adoptar medidas restrictivas de derechos en miembros del Gobierno o en presidentes de Comunidades Autónomas.

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 358-393
Author(s):  
Bruno Irion Coletto ◽  
Pedro Da Silva Moreira

The right to healthcare in Brazil is seriously protected by the courts. Judicialization of everyday implementation of this public policy is a fact. One explanation may be provided by the way judges understand the effectiveness of this right. People hold subjective right to individualized healthcare benefits, and so they hold standing to sue the state in order to achieve it, regardless any consideration of public policies. Through an analysis of the jurisprudence on this issue, this paper aims to provide a critical understanding not just about what is actually happening in Brazilian courts regarding healthcare, but also to criticize it. The conclusion is that a “strong” conception of constitutionalism and fundamental rights may revel itself as “weak,” from the standpoint of general equality. Judicialization ends up empting the public debate, leading the task of solving the distribution of scarce resources to a “gowned aristocracy.” 


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (101) ◽  
pp. 573
Author(s):  
José Antonio Montilla Martos

Resumen:En este trabajo se analiza la evolución de las competencias compartidas en España, cuando al Estado corresponde establecer las bases en una materia y a las Comunidades Autónomas el desarrollo normativo y la ejecución. La concepción material de las bases fue concebida como una garantía para el ejercicio de las competencias autonómicas en el supuesto de inactividad del Estado. Por ello, tenía un carácter temporal. Sin embargo, se ha convertido en la práctica en un cauce que permite al Estado agotar la regulación de la materia. Esta situación ha resultado consolidada tras la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional sobre el Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña en cuanto se han eliminado los límites que hasta ese momento había puesto al legislador estatal para determinar las bases en una materia de competencia compartida. En este contexto, se propone una reconfiguración de la forma de determinar las bases del Estado, con participación de las Comunidades Autónomas.Abstract:In this paper, the evolution of shared competence in Spain is analyzed, when the State has to establish the bases in a subject and the Autonomous Communities the normative development and execution. The material conception of the bases was conceived as a guarantee for the exercise of autonomic competence in the case of state inactivity. Therefore, it had a temporary character. However, in practice it has become a channel that allows the State to exhaust the regulation of matter. This situation has been consolidated after the judgement of the Constitutional Court on the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia as soon as the limits that until that moment had put to the state legislator to determine the bases in a matter of shared competence have been eliminated. In this context, a reconfiguration of the way to determine the bases of the State is proposed, with the participation of the Autonomous Communities. Summary:1. The shared competences bases-development in the Constitution; 2.  The material conception of the basics as a guarantee of autonomous regulatory development in the origins of the Autonomous State; 3. The formalization of the basics and its limits; 4. The deformalisation and unlimited expansion of the basics from STC 31/2010; 5. The imposition of the bases on the Statute of autonomy from STC 31/2010; 6. The application of the clause of prevalence for the non-application of autonomous rules contrary to databases which have arisen; 7. Conclusion: the need to modify the way to determine the bases.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 358-393
Author(s):  
Bruno Irion Coletto ◽  
Pedro Da Silva Moreira

The right to healthcare in Brazil is seriously protected by the courts. Judicialization of everyday implementation of this public policy is a fact. One explanation may be provided by the way judges understand the effectiveness of this right. People hold subjective right to individualized healthcare benefits, and so they hold standing to sue the state in order to achieve it, regardless any consideration of public policies. Through an analysis of the jurisprudence on this issue, this paper aims to provide a critical understanding not just about what is actually happening in Brazilian courts regarding healthcare, but also to criticize it. The conclusion is that a “strong” conception of constitutionalism and fundamental rights may revel itself as “weak,” from the standpoint of general equality. Judicialization ends up empting the public debate, leading the task of solving the distribution of scarce resources to a “gowned aristocracy.” 


Author(s):  
Henrique Smidt Simon

Resumo: Cada vez mais o poder público limita direitos e aumenta a repressão, sem corrigir as falhas que levam ao conflito. Isso indica o uso do direito como garantidor de ordem, não de liberdade. O intento deste artigo é mostrar, discutindo as noções de estado e constituição, o conflito entre liberdade e ordem e como o direito serve para proteger a primeira. Assim, relaciona-se a legalidade no estado contemporâneo com a limitação do poder. Faz-se, então, a relação com a ideia de nação e a prevalência da vontade do estado. Após, trabalha-se o estado de exceção e como a ordem e a coerção estatal são postas acima dos direitos e garantias constitucionais. A prevalência da ordem sobre a proteção constitucional pode ser vista nas manifestações de junho de 2013; nos rolezinhos e na situação do presídio de Pedrinhas, exemplos da lógica do estado de exceção incorporada à vida política brasileira, o que responde à discussão teórica que os antecede. Ademais, o estado brasileiro aumenta seu poder de repressão com estratégias jurídicas que diminuem seus limites ou seu controle. O texto defende a necessidade de retomar as lógicas da legalidade e do constitucionalismo para combater a naturalização do estado de exceção. Abstract: Nowadays is getting usual for the government to limit rights and expand its capacity of repression without correcting the flaws that cause conflicts. This indicates the use of the law as a way to grant order, not liberty. The aim of this article is to show, discussing the ideas of state and constitution, the tension between liberty and order and how the law should work to protect the former. Thus, the contemporaneous state is related to legality, understood as a mean to limit the state power. Then, the concept of state of exception is presented and is shown as the state order and coercion overlap constitutional rights. This overlapping can be seen in the “June 2013” protests; in the flash mob situations and in the case of “Pedrinhas” Prison. Those are examples of the logic of the state of exception embodied to the Brazilian political life. Furthermore, Brazilian state increases its repression power by using legal strategies that decrease its means of being restrained. The text asserts the need to rethink legality and constitutionalism as a way to fight the naturalization of the state of exception.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 358-393
Author(s):  
Bruno Irion Coletto ◽  
Pedro Da Silva Moreira

The right to healthcare in Brazil is seriously protected by the courts. Judicialization of everyday implementation of this public policy is a fact. One explanation may be provided by the way judges understand the effectiveness of this right. People hold subjective right to individualized healthcare benefits, and so they hold standing to sue the state in order to achieve it, regardless any consideration of public policies. Through an analysis of the jurisprudence on this issue, this paper aims to provide a critical understanding not just about what is actually happening in Brazilian courts regarding healthcare, but also to criticize it. The conclusion is that a “strong” conception of constitutionalism and fundamental rights may revel itself as “weak,” from the standpoint of general equality. Judicialization ends up empting the public debate, leading the task of solving the distribution of scarce resources to a “gowned aristocracy.” 


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Milinković

The COVID-19 pandemic has profoundly affected all aspects of people’s daily lives. In response to the pandemic, many countries declared a state of emergency. Extraordinary measures have been implemented to reduce the spread of the new coronavirus. Some of these measures require significant restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the right to privacy, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, religious freedoms etc. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the BiH and entity authorities adopted decisions to provide a legal basis for implementation of extraordinary measures. The paper deals with the restrictive measures implemented during the COVID-19 crisis in BiH and their impact on human rights realization. The relevant decisions of the Constitutional Court of BiH are also analysed, including the decision in case AP-3683/20 according to which certain restrictive measures are contrary to the right to respect of private life and the freedom of movement.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 353
Author(s):  
Helmi Kasim

This writing analyses access to water not merely as a right but as human  rights. Since the right to water constitues human rights, then constitutionally, the state, mainly the government, is obliged to respect, fulfil and protect that right. In order that the government can perform its obligation to fulfil the right of citizens   to water, the sate should put control of water under the power of the state. Thus, there are two perspectives in fulfilling the rights of citizens to water, human rights perspective and the perspective of state control. From the perspective of human rights, the 1945 Constitution has stipulated the obligation of the state in fulfilling the human rights of citizens including the right to water as stated in Article 28I paragrahp (4). From the perspective of state control over water resources, the 1945 Constitution has also determined constitutional standard as stipulated in Article 33. This concept of state control based on Article 33 has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court in its decisions. Specifically, in the decision concerning the law on water resources, the Court returned control over water to the state. The Court  set some limitations on how to utilize water resources. Private corporations are still allowed to participate in water management with strict conditions. The enhancement of this control by the state over water is intended to guarantee the fulfilment of the right of citizens to water. As an idea, monopoly of the state over water resources might be also be considered just like monopoly of state over electricity.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-403
Author(s):  
Barbara Pierre

The writer advocates the view that courts interpret statutes so as to achieve their aim; that being justice in the case: as between the parties and in respect of the law. This is identified as the common thread that explains the apparent erratic behaviour of the courts in their use of the various methods or rules of interpretation. The Supreme Court decision, Attorney General of Québec v. 2747-3174 Québec Inc., is analysed against the background of this theory and is seen to give support to it. The court is shown to use various rules of interpretation, which lead the majority to a wide, and the minority to a narrow, interpretation of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms of Québec. Yet it is clear that in both cases the rules are merely a means to an end: justice as between the parties and in respect of the law. In context of the case, this means establishing a balance between the competing interests of the State and the citizen that conforms to the law relating to fundamental rights and in particular, the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms of Québec. As far as the State is concerned, it has a vested interest in confirming the constitutionality of its many administrative tribunals, which play an essential role in enabling the State to discharge its responsibility to govern. Citizens, on the other hand, need to be protected from the violation of their rights, in particular the right to an independent and impartial tribunal in matters relating to the determination of their rights and obligations, or charges brought against them. The Charter must be interpreted so that, in its scope and content, it gives real protection, but, consistent with the separation of powers doctrine, the interpretation must not amount to a usurpation by the courts of the role of the government to govern. The writer concludes that the opposing conclusions of the majority and minority are more a consequence of the difference in the opinion of the judges as to the manner in which the balance should be struck, as opposed to the rules of interpretation used by them.


Author(s):  
Akhileshwar Pathak

Ajay Hasia and few others failed to secure admission to Regional Engineering College, Srinagar. They challenged before the Supreme Court that the admission process was arbitrary and violative of the Fundamental Right of equality in Article 14 of the Constitution. The right, however, is available only against the ‘state’ as defined in Article 12. The definition of ‘state’ includes ‘other authorities.’ The term ‘other authorities’ has been subject to judicial interpretation and come to include instrumentality or agency of the government. The Ajay Hasia Case consolidated the developing law and formulated that not only the bodies created by an Act but also bodies created under a law, like societies under the Societies Registration Act can be ‘other authorities’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 358-393
Author(s):  
Bruno Irion Coletto ◽  
Pedro Da Silva Moreira

The right to healthcare in Brazil is seriously protected by the courts. Judicialization of everyday implementation of this public policy is a fact. One explanation may be provided by the way judges understand the effectiveness of this right. People hold subjective right to individualized healthcare benefits, and so they hold standing to sue the state in order to achieve it, regardless any consideration of public policies. Through an analysis of the jurisprudence on this issue, this paper aims to provide a critical understanding not just about what is actually happening in Brazilian courts regarding healthcare, but also to criticize it. The conclusion is that a “strong” conception of constitutionalism and fundamental rights may revel itself as “weak,” from the standpoint of general equality. Judicialization ends up empting the public debate, leading the task of solving the distribution of scarce resources to a “gowned aristocracy.” 


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